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ABSTRACT 
A STRATEGIC CHOICE MODEL FOR ASIA-PACIFIC SHIPPING 
Jeffrey Edward Hawkins 
The importance of strategy to an organisation's competitiveness is widely 
acknowledged in the strategic management literature. However, although strategy 
research has become substantial in other areas, the same cannot be said with the 
shipping industry. Very littie is known about how shipowners choose competitive 
strategies or what strategies they pursue under certain environmental conditions. Of 
what is available, most focus on Northern Europe and Northem America, with scant 
regard for the Asia-Pacific, which has become a major shipping power in recent decades. 
This study was, therefore, conducted to address these gaps in the literature. It analysed 
the strategic choices made by Asia-Pacific shipowners at the corporate level, compared 
actual shipowners' behaviour with strategic management theory on strategy selection, 
and developed a strategy selection model that was applicable to Asia-Pacific shipowners 
and consistent with strategic management theory. An extensive review of the literature 
was initially undertaken to develop a generic strategic choice model, which then served 
as the basis upon which information from Asia-Pacific shipowners was collected. 
A multi-method approach, called triangulation, was used to guide data collection and 
analysis. Data was obtained from two sources (shipowners' representatives and 
shipping experts) and through several methods (mail survey, interviews, simulation, 
expert and document review), and the extent to which these various sets of data were 
congruent had to be established. Because of the exploratory nature of the study, data 
was analysed using a qualitative approach. 
There was a high degree of congruence in the data collected. Out of the analysis, two 
primary findings emerged: (1) there was strong support for the strategic choice model, 
which implied greater inter-industry applicability than originally expected; (2) however, 
modifications to the model were needed to reflect a general tendency among Asia-Pacific 
shipowners to use other strategies in combination with or as a substitute to those 
offered by the model. 
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Chapter One 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Over the past several decades, the rapid globalisation of the market place has intensified 
competition within the already competitive shipping industry. This is particularly true 
in the Asia-Pacific region, which is predicted to dominate international trade in the next 
century. It is a certainty that with this dynamic growth in trade will come an increased 
demand for shipping services. 
Asia-Pacific shipov^ers intent on taking advantage of this growth and successfully 
competing in the market place will require a strategic approach to the way they manage 
their organisations. Research suggests that strategy is the single most important factor 
leading to a firm's success or failure. A shipowner's choice of strategies, therefore, will 
be critical to its long-term market success. 
The strategic management literature offers a wide range of strategy selection models but 
serious doubts have been raised over the applicability of these models to shipowners in 
general and Asia-Pacific shipovmers in particular. Much of what is know^ about 
strategy is drawn fi'om manufacturing industries; very little comes from the service 
industries, and even less from the maritime industry. Shipping-based research on 
strategy selection is limited, and very little is known about shipowners' strategic 
decision making behaviour. Practical tools to guide and inform shipowners in their 
strategy selection are also seriously wanting. 
Criticism of existing strategy selection models also highlights the general lack of 
empirical support for strategy selection models. Most models have not undergone any 
empirical testing to establish their utility and reliability in enhancing an organisation's 
strategic decision making. Further, although most models assume a generic nature, 
claiming broad applicability across businesses and industries, there is very little 
empirical evidence to support this claim. Indeed, there is growing evidence to the 
contrary. 
These limitations in our current knowledge of strategy selection require greater scrutiny 
and examination. I f we are to fully understand the application and effectiveness of 
strategy in a service industry like shipping, particularly in the context of a rapidly 
growing economic power like the Asia-Pacific, then it is critical that we learn more 
about how shipowners in the region actually make strategic choices. What factors do 
they consider when making strategic choices? What process do they follow to select and 
evaluate strategies? How does this behaviour compare with current theory on strategy 
selection? These are questions that this study aims to answer. Based on the results, the 
objective is to then develop a strategy selection model that is applicable to Asia-Pacific 
shipping. 
1.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGY 
The study of strategy lies within the domain of strategic management, which has 
emerged as an important new discipline within the general field of management In the 
last two decades, there has been a steady build-up in our knowledge o f the subject, both 
in terms of theory and empirical evidence. Literature reviews conducted in the last 10 
years (Snow and Thomas, 1994; Lyies, 1990; Morris, 1986, 1987; Thomas, 1984) show 
a steadily maturing field whose conceptual and methodological debates continue to 
enrich and advance current understanding of strategic management After more than two 
decades of research, there is now a substantial body of evidence that shows that 
organisations practising strategic management tend to outperform those that do not 
(Collis and Montgomery, 1997; David, 1997; Hussey, 1994; Miller and Cardinal, 1994). 
The groundwork was laid by a number of studies conducted in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g. 
Wood and La Forge, 1979; Karger and Malik, 1975; Herold, 1972; SchoeflHer et al., 
1974; Ansoff et al., 1971; Eastlack and McDonald, 1970; Thune and House, 1970). 
Thune and House (1970) carried out a study in 1965 to examine the performance of a 
number of companies over a 7-15 years period (i.e. since the introduction of formal 
planning in the company). They found that those who planned outperformed those that 
did not on three counts: earnings per share, earning on common equity, and earnings on 
total capital employed. They also found that planners outperformed themselves based 
on records prior to the introduction of planning. Herold (1972) extended the study by 
Thune and House and also found that companies that planned outperformed those that 
did not. 
Other studies provided further supporting evidence. Eastlack and McDonald (1970) 
studied 211 companies, 105 of whom were among the Fortune 500. They concluded that 
CEOs who used strategic management concepts headed companies with the fastest 
growth rates. The following year, AnsofF et al. (1971) examined the strategic decisions 
made by 93 companies regarding acquisitions over a 19-year period (1946-65). They 
found that on many financial and sales measures, as well as ability to predict the 
outcomes of planning activities, companies that used a strategic management approach 
performed better than those that did not. 
Further proof was provided by Schoeffler et al. (1974) whose study became popularly 
known as the Profit Impact of Marketing Strategy, or PIMS» study. This study 
involved 57 firms in 620 different lines of business and analysed the relationships of a 
wide range of strategic activity variables and profitability. Results showed that the 
appropriate use of strategic management resulted in increased profitability. Similar 
results were obtained by Karger and Malik (1975) who studied 273 companies in the 
chemical, drug, electronics and machinery industries. They found that on a number of 
financial measures, firms which used strategic management methods outperformed those 
that did not. Wood and La Forge (1979) got similar results: their study of 60 large US 
banks showed that banks using comprehensive long-range planning methods had 
significantly better financial performance than those that had no formal planning system. 
From these promising beginnings, knowledge of strategic management continued to 
advance. Studies not only focused on monetary variables but on more intangible 
organisational factors. Based on a review of the literature, Greenley (1986) identified 14 
benefits of strategic management, which David (1993) has summarised as follows: 
1. It allows for identification, prioritisation and exploitation of opportunities. 
2. It provides an objective view of management problems. 
3. It represents a framework for improved coordination and control activities. 
4. It minimizes the effects of adverse conditions and changes. 
5. It allows major decisions to better support established objectives. 
6. It allows more effective allocation of time and resources to identified opportunities. 
7. It allows fewer resources and less time to be devoted to correcting erroneous or ad hoc 
decisions. 
8. It creates a framework for internal communication among personnel. 
9. It helps to integrate the behaviour of individuals into a total effort. 
10. It provides a basis for the clarification of individual responsibilities. 
11. It gives encouragement to forward thinking. 
12. It provides a cooperative, integrated and enthusiastic approach to tackling problems and 
opportunities. 
13. It encourages a favorable attitude towards change. 
14. It gives a degree of discipline and uniformity to the management of a business (p. 19). 
Yoo and Digman (1987) further add that because the strategic management process 
results in increased employee satisfaction and provides more timely information to key 
decision makers, decision making becomes faster, more reliable and less costly to the 
organisation. 
Simply applying the strategic management concept is no guarantee for success, however. 
As a number of reviews and research studies point out, not all companies using strategic 
management have achieved significantly higher financial performance. However, they 
attribute this failure to errors in the application of the concept, rather than in the 
concept itself (Miller and Cardinal, 1994; Fredrickson, 1984; Fredrickson and Mitchell, 
1984; Schellenberg, 1983;Kudla, 1980; Grinyer and Norbum, 1975). 
Overall, there has been a significant increase in the popularity and usage of strategic 
management in recent years (Porter, 1980). Over a decade ago, it was estimated that 75 
per cent of all companies [in the United States] were using strategic management 
techniques, compared to less than 25 per cent in 1979 (Allen, 1985). Today, application 
has become more global, with strategic management concepts continuing to be applied to 
a widening range of businesses and industries in various parts of the world, and new 
models developed or old ones refined as a result of ongoing research in the area. 
1.2 LIMITATIONS OF STRATEGY SELECTION MODELS 
Leading management thinkers agree that strategic management is particularly essential to 
those industries subject to higher levels of uncertainty and risk, and that i f applied well, 
it can help such industries adapt to their environments more effectively (Ansoff, 1984; 
Simon, 1976; Drucker, 1974). As reviews of the literature show, research into the area 
largely substantiates this argument (Miller and Cardinal, 1994). 
Shipping is one industry which clearly falls under the high-risk, high-uncertainty 
category (Lorange and Norman, 1972; Hope and Boe, 1981). As Frankel (1989) points 
out, this is even more true today than in the past: 
Shipping and ports are today affected by larger uncertainties and risks than ever before. These 
risks include not only maricet risks, but uncertainties in terms of financing, ship and port 
technological and operational restrictions, terms of business, competition, control, and many 
more. On the other hand, commitments of financial or other assets and resources to ports and 
shipping remain long term and are usually veiy large in relation to cash flow turnover. As a 
result. It is more Important than ever to [select and] evaluate alternative strategies for the 
determination of tactics which maximize the chances of success (p. 123; emphasis added). 
Unfortunately, Frankel's call for more effective ways of selecting and evaluating 
strategies remains largely unanswered in the shipping literature. Although research in 
various industries show that strategy is a major, i f not the most major, determinant of a 
firm's success or failure (e.g. Rumelt, 1991; Kruger, 1989; Robinson and Pearce, 1988), 
there is very little evidence of the practical application of strategic management 
concepts to shipping, much less of conceptual models specifically designed to guide the 
industry in its choice of strategies (Hawkins, 1993). 
This is not to say, however, that there is a dearth of strategy selection models. The 
general literature on management and business offers a wide range o f models (see, for 
instance, Pearce and Robinson, 1997), but the applicability of many of these models is 
under serious question. An increasing number of researchers and practitioners have cast 
doubt on the generic nature of these models, questioning the validity of the assumption 
that these models can be uniformly applied to all industries. Criticism has tended to 
focus on four problem areas: lack of research drawn from the service industries in general 
and commercial shipping in particular, lack of empirical support for strategy selection 
models, problems with methodological rigour, and lack of a global/international research 
focus. 
Most strategy models are based on manufacturing industries, whereas research suggests 
that what applies to manufacturing does not necessarily apply to service 
industries (Schellenberg, 1983; Hambrick, 1983; Thomas, 1979). Schellenberg (1983) 
notes that 'applying some supposedly all-purpose or universal [concepts] to the whole 
range of entirely different types of companies in entirely different industries is virtually 
destined to result in a list of business strategy failures; indeed, universal concepts of 
strategic management have to be tailored to each industry and organisation type. Blanket 
application can only result in less \han optimal results' (p, 4). There is some empirical 
evidence that shipping sectors do use strategy selection models (Wong, 1991; Harvey, 
1987), but it is not known whether such models have been used 'as is' or modified to fit 
individual needs, and whether usage has led to better performance. 
Another major criticism is the lack of empirical data to validate models. Many models 
have been built from conceptual constructs which have little supporting empirical 
evidence to demonstrate whether they do work and how effectively. In their review of 
typologies of strategies in the early 1980s, Galbraith and Schendel (1983) noted that: 
[i]n general. ... classifications of strategy types have been conceptual constructs derived fhmi 
appropriate dimensions taken from theory without much empirical support beyond perhaps 
some grounding in case studies and anecdotal accounts of competitive activity. Although 
important insights regarding strategic behaviour have been gained in this manner, the validity 
of any typology is enhanced if empirical support could be provided (p. 155). 
Since then, other empirical studies have been conducted to validate typologies of 
strategies across different business settings (Herbert and Deresky, 1987) and industries 
(Schellenberg, 1983). However, empirical support from the maritime industry has yet to 
be provided. 
A third area of criticism revolves around methodological problems. Citing Hambrick 
(1980), Herbert and Deresky (1987) attribute the lack of empirical support for strategy 
selection models to 'methodological difficulties in identifying and measuring business-
level strategy, for which no generally accepted approach has been developed' (p. 136). 
The same is true with corporate-level strategies. Referring to portfolio models in 
particular, which are used to evaluate corporate-level strategies. Wind and Mahajan 
(1981) argue: 
[Although the] importance of the measurement aspect of portfolio analysis is evident from a 
cursory examination of the diverse dimensions and definitions various approaches use ... 
surprisingly, most of the literature on portfolios has focused not on the fundamental issues of 
definition and measurement but on the seUing of one approach over another and on the strategic 
implications of, for example, the *dog* or 'cash cow* status of a certain product (p. 157). 
Similar problems persist even today. Recent reviews of the literature (Snow and 
Thomas, 1994; Lyies, 1990) also point to the minimal attention paid to the development 
of valid and reliable measures of key strategy constructs. In addition, they also highlight 
a growing concern over the dominance o f quantitative approaches to the study of 
strategy and the need for a better balance in the choice of research topics, methods, and 
perspectives. While quantitative approaches may provide greater objectivity and 
reliability, they have not been able to explain many important, more complex 
organisational realities. Within the field, therefore, there are now calls for multi-method 
approaches, where quantitative and qualitative methods can be used in the same study 
to facilitate a fuller and richer examination of complex and dynamic strategic issues. 
Another problem inhibiting strategic management research has been a lack of an 
intemational/giobal research emphasis. Such issues as international competition and 
global strategies, although considei^d critical in today's world, did not become a research 
focus until recent years. Wrote Hamel and Pralahad in 1985: 
The threat of foreign competition preoccupies managers in [various] industries ... [but] 
corporate response to this threat is often misdirected and ill timed—in part because many 
executives don't fully understand what global competition is. [Unfortunately, they] haven't 
received much help from the latest analysis of this trend ... [The] current perspective on global 
competition and the globalisation of markets is incomplete and misleading. Analysts are long 
on exhortation—*go intemationaP—but short on practical guidance (p. 139). 
Five years later, after reviewing articles published from 1986-89 in leading management 
journals and interviewing established researchers in management in the US, Lyies (1990) 
concluded that although global competition was the 'top issue of the day', little research 
had been done on the area. She found that although intemational competition and 
multinational strategies were the topics identified as being the most relevant to 
practising general managers and the area having the most impact on strategic management 
research in the 1990s and beyond, none of the recent major research studies which were 
widely regarded as having the most impact on strategic management thought in the 
1990s applied to international/global strategies. Further, very few of the experts 
surveyed were actually involved in this research area. 
In the last few years, there has been a growing effort to rectify this lack of a 
global/international research perspective, as evidenced by an increasing number of 
publications on the topic (see, for instance, Chryssochoidis et al., 1997; Hibbert, 1997; 
Alkhafaji, 1995; Lasserre and Schutte, 1995; Yip, 1995; Rugman and Verbeke, 1992). 
However, because research interest and work on global/intemational strategies is 
relatively recent, much of the discussion is still at the conceptual level, studies focus on 
individual cases, and integrative reviews and syntheses of available literature are not 
much in evidence. 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND ISSUES 
In view of the identified gaps in current knowledge about strategy selection, the 
applicability of existing strategy selection models to an intemational service industry 
such as commercial shipping indeed requires careful scrutiny and examination. This 
research study, therefore, aims to: 
analyse the strategic choices that Asia-Pacific shipowners pursue at the corporate 
level, 
compare actual shipowners' behaviour with strategic management theory on 
strategy selection, and 
• develop a strategy selection model that is applicable to Asia-Pacific shipowners and 
consistent with strategic management theory. 
I f the general literature on corporate strategy selection is correct, it can be assumed that 
Asia-Pacific shipowners wi l l : 
change/modify their corporate strategies in response to changing environmental 
conditions. 
• base strategic changes and the time frames for these changes on their future 
expectations of environmental conditions. 
pursue a 'grow' strategy when internal and external environmental factors are 
favourable. 
pursue a 'stabilise' strategy when internal environmental factors are favourable but 
external environmental factors are not. 
pursue a 'develop' or 'tumaround' strategy when external environmental factors are 
favourable but internal environmental factors are not. 
pursue a 'harvest' strategy when internal and external environmental factors are 
both unfavourable. 
But how valid are these assumptions? Since not much is known about the strategic 
choices that Asia-Pacific shipowners make, it is necessary to establish i f these 
assumptions do reflect what Asia-Pacific shipowners actually do. I f theory and practice 
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do not match, where do the differences lie? And i f there are differences, what should a 
strategy selection model that is specific to Asia-Pacific shipowners look like? These are 
the questions that the study aims to answer. 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the interrelationship of these research questions, which also reflects 
the general research approach of the study. 
What does the literature say about 
strategy selection in general? 
Corporate strategic 
choice model 
To remain competitive, what 
corporate strategies do Asia-Pacific 
shipowners pursue under what 
environmental conditions? 
Do theory (strategic choice 
J model) and practice (Asia-
^ Pacific shipowners* behaviour) 
match? 
If no, what changes must be 
made to the model to make it 
applicable to Asia-Pacific 
shipowners? 
Figure 1.1 General research approach: main questions to answer 
A brief note on nomenclature is in order here. The internal and external environmental 
factors mentioned earlier represent the two dimensions on which strategy selection is 
examined. On the strategic choice model developed for this study (see section 6.3 of 
Chapter Six, Conceptual Framework), these variables are formally called 'organisational 
competitive factors' and 'market factors' to clearly defme the parameters being studied. 
The first includes an organisation's strengths and weaknesses vis-a-vis its competitors; 
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the second includes opportunities and threats in the market(s) in which the organisation 
operates. For ease in reference, these variable names are often replaced by the terms 
Mntemar or 'external' environmental conditions or factors. Any succeeding reference to 
such terms, therefore, should be made in relation to the more narrow definitions givoi 
here. These two factors and the associated corporate strategies (grow, develop, stabilise, 
turnaround, harvest) are discussed in detail in Chapter Six (Conceptual Framework) and 
generally in Chapters Four (The Content of Strategy) and Five (Strategy Selection 
Models). 
1.4 RESEARCH FOCUS 
The focus of this study is on one geographical and economic area (the Asia-Pacific 
region), one type of decision makers (commercial shipowners), and one type of strategy 
(corporate-level strategy). 
Geographical focus: Asla-Paclfic 
The last three decades have seen the remarkable growth of the Asia-Pacific region into an 
economic power (World Bank, 1993). Although the current financial crisis has 
dramatically put a halt to this rapid growth and the euphoria that has accompanied it, 
predictions continue that once past this painful crisis, which has seen many 
achievements, such as the reduction o f absolute poverty, severely eroded, the region will 
continue to build its dominance in intemational trade in the coming century (World 
Bank, 1997). Within this region, of particular interest to the study are 12 countries that 
have been responsible for much of the region's economic growth: Australia, China, Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, 
Singapore, and South Korea Although Hong Kong is now back in China's hands after 
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more than a century of British rule, for the purposes of this study it wil l continue to be 
treated as a separate entity. These 12 countries are discussed in further detail in Chapter 
Two (Asia-Pacific Shipping). 
Maritime focus: Commercial shipowners 
Within these 12 countries, the targeted group of maritime decision makers are 
commercial shipowners. With all the rapid changes that have occurred in the region, 
shipowners are now faced with the challenge of meeting increased demands amidst more 
intense competition and under highly uncertain conditions. How well they rise to this 
challenge, and how effectively they are able to maintain a competitive edge, depend a lot 
on their ability to think and act strategically. 
To develop a comprehensive picture of strategic choice patterns among Asia-Pacific 
shipowners, all major shipowners in the liner and bulk trades have been included in the 
study. A general profile of Asia-Pacific shipping is presented in Chapter Two (Asia-
Pacific Shipping), while the steps taken in selecting shipowners for inclusion in the 
study are discussed in Chapter Seven (Methodology). 
Strategy focus: Corporate-level strategies 
Strategies can be grouped into three levels: corporate, business and functional. At the 
top are corporate strategies, which govern all strategic choices within an organisation. 
Before any lower-level (i.e. business and functional) strategy can be pursued, corporate 
strategies must first be in place. In this sense, therefore, corporate strategies can be 
regarded as 'master' strategies. They set the strategic direction that an organisation 
should take: what mix of businesses (services, markets, or industries) the organisation 
should go into, and how resources should be allocated to these businesses. Once 
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established, they then set the parameters within which business and functional strategies 
should be made. They determine what specific business strategies an organisation should 
take to ensure each of its businesses is competitive; and what specific functional 
strategies each business should pursue to support its business strategy or strategies. 
Of these three strategy levels, this study has focused on corporate-level strategies. 
There are two reasons for this. First, the study is concerned with strategic choices that 
enhance the overall competitiveness of major shipowners most of whom operate a mix 
(or portfolio) of businesses. Their main concern is to ensure that these businesses all 
contribute to the organisation's overall competitive position, and this is clearly the 
domain of corporate-level strategies. Second, although both corporate and business 
strategies are primarily concerned with keeping a firm competitive, research on business 
strategies already outweighs work done on corporate strategies, particularly in relation 
to shipping and a region like the Asia-Pacific. An examination of corporate strategies in a 
relatively un-researched area like Asia-Pacific shipping should, therefore, help broaden 
our understanding of strategy selection. Strategies are discussed in detail in the next three 
chapters. 
1.5 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 
Defining strategy has always been problematic. The review of the literature conducted 
for this study reveals two main reasons. The first stems from fundamental differences in 
people's perspectives, in the way they view the world and how it operates; the second 
stems from mere semantic sloppiness. 
The strategic management field has drawn on a wide range of disciplines for its theories, 
concepts and methods. Within the field there is a good representation of disparate 
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academic disciplines (e.g. economics, management science, psychology, sociology), 
theoretical leanings (e.g. microeconomic theory v. behavioural theory, logical positivism 
v. process orientation), research foci (e.g. content v. process, formal planning variables 
v. organisational or behavioural variables), and methodological approaches (e.g. 
quantitative v. qualitative, snapshot v. longitudinal). 
Even among those who share the same theoretical perspective, major differences exist. 
Within the dominant formal analysis school, for instance, which espouses the use of 
rational and logical models, some quarters define strategy in broad terms, including in the 
definition both the goals (variously called 'objectives', 'plans' or 'missions') of a firm 
and the means to achieve these goals. Those belonging to this group include, among 
otiiers, Chandler, Andrews, Katz, Steiner and Miner, Rumelt, Porter and other writers 
associated with the Harvard Business School. Others within the same school see 
strategy in a narrower sense, preferring to limit its scope to the means by which a firm 
can achieve its goals. In this second sense, goal setting is seen as a closely related but 
separate activity. Those who belong to this group include, among others, Hofer and 
Schendel, AnsofF, and Cannon and Glueck. 
There is no easy answer to this aspect of the strategy debate; ultimately, choices are lefi 
to individual convictions and preferences. Empirical evidence cannot be the ultimate 
arbiter in this regard because research to date provides both sides o f the debate with 
enough justification to support their respective positions. 
What makes the literature unnecessarily confiising is the looseness with which certain 
key terms are used and the contradictory uses to which they are put. Some prime 
examples are 'corporate' v. 'business', 'generic', and 'goals' v. 'objectives'. 
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In the literature, four levels of strategies are universally cited: enterprise or societal, cor-
porate, business, and functional. This classification is based on the organisational 
structure of a complex fum: top management, single business units, functional 
departments. Of the four strategy levels, corporate and business strategies get far 
greater attention in the literature because they represent the competitive £U€as of the 
firm. In spite of this attention, there is no consistent differentiation applied between 
levels of strategy, particularly between 'corporate' and 'business'. 
The confusion lies in the fact that the term 'business strategy' is typically used in 
different semantic contexts. In one sense, it may refer to a specific course of action that 
aims to improve a firm's profitability and market share; in this case, a 'business' 
strategy can be contrasted with an 'organisational' strategy which focuses on structure 
and organisational processes, or a sociopolitical strategy, which focuses on the dynamics 
of human behaviour. In another sense, 'business strategy' is used to refer to the 
organisational level at which the strategy is used, that is, the single business unit level. 
When what is involved is a firm engaged in a single business, so that the term 
'corporate', as typically used in business (that is, as having the nature of a corporation, 
which is defmed as a group of people authorised to act as one individual, with legal 
rights, powers and privileges), becomes irrelevant, then the term 'business' is used in 
place of, or as a synonym for, 'corporate'. Used in this second sense, 'business' 
acquires a broader meaning, probably closer to its traditional use as an umbrella concept 
(akin to the concept 'business policy') for any commercial enterprise, regardless of size 
and type. 
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Since all these definitions are valid, the field offers no standard definitions. The task of 
defining key strategy terms is typically left with individual authors. Unfortunately, not 
all do so and readers are thus left to infer, from the flow of the discussion, the intended 
meaning attached to such fundamental concepts as 'corporate' or 'business' strategy. 
Another term that is sometimes misused is the word 'generic'. The dictionary defines 
'generic' as 'referring to a whole kind, class, or group' or 'inclusive or general'; therefore, 
a generic strategy would mean a broad grouping of strategies that share common 
characteristic or that have general applicability. In most cases, the word 'generic' is used 
in this sense, but there are occasions when it is given a totally different meaning. In a 
discussion of strategy evaluation, for instance, a leading writer in the field talks of a 
'generic' and a 'competitive' aspect of strategy, where the generic aspect is concerned 
with the 'basic mission or scope of the business' and looks 'at changing economic and 
social conditions over time' (Rumelt, 1980, as cited in Quinn et al., 1988, p. 52). While 
it is likely that a strategy can indeed manifest these characteristics, nonetheless, to use 
'generic' in this sense is misleading. It merely adds confiision to a literature that is 
ab-eady littered with conftising jargon. 
A third area where confijsion continues to surface, even when there is no longer any 
need to, involves the distinction between goals and objectives. Older disciplines in the 
social sciences make clearcut distinctions between goals and objectives. Goals are 
broadly couched statements that attempt to encapsulate an organisation's 'ideals' or 
'vision'. In this respect, goals are broad and fuzzy, and often unmeasurable. Objectives 
transform these goals into specific, measurable and attainable statements of intent. 
These objectives, in turn, can be categorised or ordered into a hierarchy, with each level 
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supporting the next higher level until the terminal or long-term objectives are achieved. 
Although these distinctions are in standard use in other research areas, such is not the 
case in strategic management, where confusion between goals and objectives still 
continues. 
To avoid the semantic confusion discussed above, the following definitions are used in 
this study: 
• Strategy. The means by which an organisation achieves its goals and objectives 
(Ansoff, 1965; Hofer and Schendel, 1978). The word is used here in its most generic 
sense, that is, regardless of scope, level, etc. 
• Generic strategy. A broad group of strategies which share common characteristics 
and are applicable across a variety of situations. 
Corporate strategy. The overall means by which an organisation can remain 
competitive in the market(s) where it operates. It is designed to help the top 
management determine the mix of businesses the organisation should be in, how 
these businesses should be run, and how resources should be allocated to them. 
Corporate strategy sets the general strategic direction that an organisation should 
pursue, as well as the parameters within which lower-level strategies (business and 
fimctional) should be made. 
Business strategy. The means by which each individual business that a 
organisation operates can be competitive. Business strategies should support 
corporate strategies. 
• Grand strategy. The overall strategy of an organisation, regardless of size or type. 
a) For a complex organisation engaged in several businesses, its grand strategy 
is synonymous to its corporate-level strategy. 
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b) For an organisation engaged in a single business, its grand strategy is a 
combination of strategies that a complex organisation may delineate as 
'corporate' and 'business'. 
* OrganisatioD. Any business company, whether unincorporated or not. In this 
study, the words 'organisation,' 'company' and ' f i r m ' are used interchangeably and 
refer to commercial enterprises only. 
Multinational/global. These words are used in this study to mean either of two 
things: 
a) When used to describe a strategy, as in multinational or global strategy, they 
mean the same thing: a strategy that is used across national borders, i.e. 
world-wide. Another term used interchangeably with global strategy is 
international strategy. 
b) When used to describe an organisation, as in multinational company and 
global company, they assume very specific meanings: a multinational 
company has one or a limited range or products made and sold in a specific 
set of countries; a global company uses resources wherever they are located 
and sells products/services wherever there is a market. 
Typology. A system of classifying similar items on the basis o f explicitly stated 
criteria; synonymous to taxonomy or to what Miller and Minztberg (1983) call 
'configuration'. 
These definitions wil l underpin all succeeding discussion and should, therefore, be used 
as frame of reference for the entire study. 
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1.6 KEY ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE STUDY OF STRATEGY 
The study's general approach to strategy is premised on two guiding principles: a 
systemic view of the firm and a pragmatic approach to research. 
A systemic view 
According to Hofer and Schendel (1978), a firm's strategic management system must be 
studied as 'an integrated total system' (p. 198), A system's view provides a powerful 
tool by which both the totality and specific aspects of the strategic management process 
can be examined. It allows us to see the broad picture, and in general terms, see how 
strategy affects and is affected by the sub-systems, organisational processes and human 
dynamics within a firm. At the same time, it enables us to focus on a fragment of the 
whole, dissect it, and then relate the discrete pieces back to the whole. Finally, it 
constantly forces us to remember that the total picture is bigger, more complex, less 
amenable to dissection, than the mere sum of these discrete pieces. 
A system's view requires a theoretical perspective and research methodology that can 
allow a holistic approach to analysis, that is, an approach that allows analysis of 
individual parts without losing sight o f the whole. Unfortunately, although it is much 
easier to talk about a holistic view, it is far more difficult to represent it graphically: i f 
we want the broad picture, details can get blurred, making in-depth analysis very 
difficult, i f not impossible. Conversely, i f we put more emphasis on the details, we run 
the risk of losing sight of the broad picture. 
For this study, the strategic management model in Figure 1.2 (Hawkins, 1993) has been 
chosen because it allows the analysis of specific aspects of the strategic management 
process within the context of the organisation and its environment. O f primary concem 
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to the study is that aspect of the strategic management process that deals with strategy 
selection. This corresponds to the * strategies' section of the model, within the broader 
area of'strategic choices'. 
Strategic Issues 
Goals or 
objectives 
Strategies 
Mssbn 
gwa\egjc_cho/ce5 
Plans, 
functions 
strategies 
budgets 
Strategic 
control 
and 
evaluation External assessment 
Structure 
internal 
assessment Culture, leadership, 
human factor 
> ^ 1^ 
Strategic issues 
Figure 1.2 A model of the strategic management process 
Source: Hawkins, 1993 
It must be emphasised that focusing on one specific area of the strategic management 
process—in this case, strategy selection—does not negate the need for a holistic and 
systemic approach to the study of strategic management To come to an in-depth 
understanding of the process, the specific parts and stages that make it up should be 
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analysed and understood. Thus studied, the specific parts can then be incorporated into 
a holistic view of the process. 
A criticism that many strategic management models often attract is their sequential 
representation of the strategic management process. This is a main weakness in model 
building. Authors and model builders unanimously acknowledge the dynamic, iterative 
and non-sequential nature of the strategic management process. In the words o f Sharplin 
(1985), 
[t]he strategic management process has two attributes which are particularly significant. First, it 
is iterative; that is, [as illustrated in Figure 1,] (he process continues over and over in a never-
ending cycle. Second, it is nonsequential in actual practice. U is easy to think of formulating, 
activating, evaluating, and controlling strategy, but more difficult to do it in separate steps. In 
fact, it does not normally occur in precise order ... Any single manager might at one moment 
be involved in one or several of the steps in strategic management... (p. 14). 
However, they often find it difficult to draw up a model that can capture these qualities 
and still remain understandable and instructive. The typical trade o f f is to construct a 
model that shows a sequential pattern and then highlight the holistic, iterative and 
nonsequential nature of the process in their description of the model. The model used 
for this study follows a similar approach, but also attempts to capture the holistic 
nature of the process by presenting the various aspects of the process as pieces of a 
jigsaw puzzle. The puzzle can be broken up and each piece can be studied separately, 
but to create the full picture, ail the pieces must be linked together into their proper 
slots. The model wil l be discussed in full in Chapter Six, when the conceptual 
framework of the study is presented. 
In closing, it should be remembered that models are no more than mere attempts to 
impose some order on what is often a 'messy' world (Ackoff, 1979); indeed, they are no 
more than mere representations of what their authors, both by inclination and as a result 
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of training, perceive reality to be. Although models are very instructive tools, it would 
be wise for the reader to bear this caveat in mind. 
A pragmatic approach to research 
Another fundamental premise upon which this study is based is the need for a prag-
matic approach to research. This means the use of, and reliance on, an eclectic, 
interdisciplinary research base. Morgan (1983) describes this approach rather well: 
[This approach assumes that] there is no one best set of assumptions or tools for conducting 
research, and that it is appropriate to vary assumptions from one situation to another according 
to the issues being studied or the problem being solved. The idea that there is an optimal way 
ofconducting research is thus qualified by the principle of contingency: the view that " i t all 
depends" (p. 379; boldface added). 
Where possible, a pragmatic approach also 
„. attempts to use the differences among competing perspectives as a means of constructing 
new modes of understanding ... [It] deliberately counterposes the insights of different 
perspectives in the hope that a completely new mode of understanding wi l l emerge from the 
debate generated by this opposition (Morgan, 1983, p. 379). 
As Chapter Seven (Methodology) will show, this study will use a combination of 
perspectives and methodologies to gain a better understanding of strategy selection, 
particularly among Asia-Pacific shipowners, who are the subjects of this research. 
1.7 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
In this initial chapter (Problem Statement), the objective has been to present the subject 
of the study, the rationale for choosing it, the objectives that the study aims to achieve, 
and the key questions it seeks to answer. The chapter also provides a definition of key 
terms used in the study, and outlines the basic principles underpinning the study's 
methodological approach. 
The remainder of the study is organised into 10 other chapters. Chapter Two documents 
the economic growth of the Asia-Pacific in the last three decades, discusses Asia-Pacific 
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shipping and the strategic challenges shipowners must face to take advantage of the 
region's dramatic growth, and highlights the lack of information on strategic decision 
making in general and strategy selection in particular that can assist Asia-Pacific 
shipowners in their pursuit of a competitive advantage. 
Chapters Three to Five then examine the literature on strategic management to analyse 
and synthesise what is currently known about strategy selection. Chapter Three 
(Overview of Strategic Management) provides a backdrop to the discussion by tracing 
the development of strategic management as a field of inquiry, highlighting major trends 
in strategic management theory and practice, and identifying current areas of research. 
Chapter Four (The Content of Strategy) focuses on various types o f strategies that 
organisations can use and synthesises the discussion with a comprehensive typology of 
strategies for use at the corporate, business and functional levels o f an organisation. 
Chapter Five (Strategy Selection Models) extends the discussion on strategy by 
reviewing a range of models used for strategy selection and analysis, and then presents a 
composite strategic choice model that reflects the common features and strengths of 
these models. 
In Chapter Six (Conceptual Framework), the strategic management process introduced in 
Chapter One, and the typology o f strategies and the strategic choice model presented in 
Chapters Three and Four, are integrated into one conceptual framework, and key 
aspects of the framework are explained and defined. In Chapter Seven (Methodology), 
the general approach to data collection and analysis is explained, and specific 
methodological techniques and procedures used during the study are identified. 
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Research findings are presented in the next three chapters. Survey and interview data are 
discussed in Chapter Eight; simulation data in Chapter Nine, and a synthesis of research 
findings, which leads to a shipping-specific strategic choice model, in Chapter Ten. This 
sequence reflects the research process outlined in Chapter Seven (Methodology), and 
discussion in each chapter is organised around the six assumptions of the strategic choice 
model. 
In the final chapter. Chapter Eleven (Conclusions and Issues for Further Research), 
major conclusions about corporate strategy selection by Asia-Pacific shipowners and 
the applicability of the strategic choice model to Asia-Pacific shipping are drawn. The 
limitations of the study are also discussed and areas for further research are identified. 
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Chapter Two 
ASIA-PACIFIC SHIPPING 
The last three decades have seen the phenomenal growth of the Asia-Pacific region into 
an economic powerhouse. Behind this growth is a small band of countries located along 
the western rim of the Pacific. They are primarily responsible for the intensification of 
trade within the region, as well between the region and the rest of the worid, particularly 
the United States and Europe. Because most of these countries are maritime countries, 
their economic growth and burgeoning trade have significant implications to shipowners 
operating in the region. I f shipowners are to compete effectively in this dynamic market, 
they must know, and be prepared to pursue, those strategies that wi l l optimise their 
chances of gaining a desired competitive position. Further, since strategy choice is 
predicated on a knowledge of the environment, it is imperative that shipowners have a 
good understanding of what is going on in the Asia-Pacific and where strategic 
opportunities, as well as threats, lie. 
In the next remaining chapters, discussion will focus on strategy selection and its 
implications to Asia-Pacific shipowners. To put this discussion in perspective, it would 
be useful to begin with a profile of the Asia-Pacific region and commercial shipping in 
the region. In this chapter, therefore, a summary of key growth trends and trading 
patterns in the region in general and commercial shipping in particular is presented. 
Against this background, the competitiveness of Asia-Pacific shipowners is then 
examined, and the extent to which the current shipping literature on strategy and 
strategic management is able to lend practical advice to shipowners is assessed. 
2.1 THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION: DEFINING ITS SCOPE 
The term *Asia-Pacific' is used widely in the academic and professional literature and in 
the mass media, but its precise geographical configurations remain in contention. In its 
broadest sense, the Asia-Pacific region is said to encompass all countries located on both 
sides of the Pacific Ocean: fix)m Asia on one side to North America and Latin America 
on the other. This grouping is reflected in the composition of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum, whose 18 members make up half the total world economy 
(for a detailed discussion of APEC, see Rimmer, 1997; Gamaut and Drysdale, 1994; 
Higgott, et al., 1991; Elek, 1991). Other writers also refer to this broad grouping of 
nations as the Pacific Rim (Rimmer, 1997). 
In its narrower sense, the term Asia-Pacific is used to refer to those countries located 
along the western rim of the Pacific Ocean, but even within this limited version, different 
interpretations exist A popular view includes China, South (and North) Korea, and 
Japan in the north all the way down to Australia, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea 
in the south. Al l these countries belong to APEC, but some writers prefer to call them 
the 'Western Pacific' to distinguish them from the broader Asia-Pacific (Kunkel, 1995). 
Other geographical configurations either broaden or reduce this grouping. Some writers 
start further north to include Russia and Mongolia; others go further east to include the 
smaller Pacific island nations; still others restrict their coverage to East Asian countries 
only, from China and Japan in the north to Burma in the west and down to Indonesia in 
the south (Lasserre and Schutte, 1995; Shibusawa, et al., 1992; Park, 1991). The 
uncertainty of the region's geographical boundaries is reflected in the various names 
given to the region. Some retain the name 'Asia Pacific' even i f they mean the East Asian 
countries only (Lasserre and Schutte, 1995); others use alternatives like 'Pacific Asia' 
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(Shibusawa, et al., 1992; Park, 1991) or more traditional nomenclature like Tar East' 
(Fitzgerald, 1994). 
This study has adopted the narrower definition of the Asia-Pacific region, that is, only 
those countries located along the western rim of the Pacific Ocean. However, the term 
* Asia-Pacific' wil l be used, rather than 'Western Pacific', because it is the more widely 
used terminology. Within this region, of particular interest to the study are those 
countries that are inter-linked by strong trade and investment ties (Garnaut and 
Drysdale, 1994). As shown in Figure 2.1, these include 10 countries in East Asia (China, 
Hong Kong, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore, the Philippines, 
Taiwan, and Thailand) and two in Australasia (Australia and New Zealand). 
S(JL i ) i 
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D HONG KONG 
P I N H S 
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SINOAPORE 
INDONESIA 
AUSTRALIA 
> 
N ( W Z E A L A N D 
Figure 2.1 The Asia-Pacific region: Focus on 12 countries 
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In terms of geographical distribution, these 10 East Asian countries can be grouped into 
Northeast Asia (China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) and Southeast 
Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand). Because the 
Southeast Asian countries are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), they are also referred to as ASEAN countries. 
Questions have been raised about the inclusion of Australia and New 2^aland in any 
Asia-Pacific grouping, largely on the argument that these countries have always viewed 
themselves more as part of the western world, rather than of Asia. While this sentiment 
may still be predominant (not only in the countries involved but throughout Asia as 
well), geographical proximity offers a persuasive argument for inclusion; so do current 
trading patterns. Already, a big majority of the trade conducted by Australia and New 
Zealand takes place within the region. As the cause of intra-regional cooperation, 
through such mechanisms as APEC, is furthered, the fact that both countries are stable 
high-income economies can only be a boon to the entire region. For these reasons, 
Australia and New Zealand are included, with East Asia, in the category 'Asia-Pacific 
region'. 
Throughout the study, any reference to the Asia-Pacific region will be limited to 
countries on the western side of the Pacific Ocean, and more specifically, to the 12 
countries covered by the study. Because the purpose of this chapter is to present an 
overall picture of the Asia-Pacific environment, particularly as it relates to shipping, no 
attempt is made to discuss individual country performance. Instead, the region is treated 
in aggregate terms, much akin to broad brushes on a canvas. However, this should not be 
taken to mean that the study views the region as a homogenous mass. Far fi-om it. 
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Within the region, significant differences in economic performance exist (Gamaut and 
Drysdale, 1994; World Bank, 1993; Shibusawa, et al., 1992; Ar i f f , 1991), as do equally 
significant social, cultural and political differences (Fitzgerald, 1997; Chow et al., 1997; 
Chu, 1995; Adler et al. 1995). Providing some telling comparisons, Lasserre and Schutte 
(1995) note: 
Asia Pacific [excluding Australia and New Zealand] by no means represents a group of 
homogeneous economic or political systems. National and business cultures vaiy significantly 
and macro-economic data show extreme differences. In 1993 Indonesia had 187 million people 
with an income per capital of US$370; neighbouring Singapore had a population of less than 
three million with an average income of US$19310. Japan represents 16 per cent of the global 
economy, but has only 2.3 per cent of the world's population; China's population, on the 
other hand, makes up more than a flfUi of the world's population but contributes only 2.2 per 
cent to the world's economy. OfHcially, at least, government socialist principles still determine 
the fate of the Chinese economy, while Hong Kong's laissez /aire policies have turned its 
economy into a capitalist's paradise. In no other part of the world does one fmd such 
variations, whether in Europe, Latin America or Africa ... (p. 3). 
Country-specific information such as this, while critical to effective strategy selection at 
the individual shipowner level, lies outside the scope of this chapter. Instead, attention 
is directed toward a general picture of the Asia-Pacific environment, particularly on 
general growth trends and regional trading patterns that have direct relevance to Asia-
Pacific shipowners. To this end, more specific information on growth trends and trade 
patterns have been put together in Appendix 1 rather than being incorporated into this 
chapter. 
2.2 THE ASIA-PACIFIC AS AN ECONOMIC POWER 
Although the region has sustained remarkably high growth rates since the 1960s, and 
often at a time when all other regions were either stagnating or in recession (World Bank, 
1993), worldwide interest in the region's growth, particularly at the academic and 
policy-making levels, is of relatively recent origin. Indeed it was not until the late 1980s 
that the region's economic record was subjected to more widespread scrutiny. Since 
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then, there has been an explosion of writings, both academic and popular, all intent on 
analysing the reasons behind the region's economic success and whether this success 
will continue well into the new century. 
The substantial literature on the subject bears strong proof of the region's growth as an 
economic power over the last 30 years, but there is less agreement, indeed there is 
intense debate, over the nature, causes, and sustainability of this growth. The specific 
details o f this debate wi l l not be covered in this chapter, as their full treatment requires 
far more depth and breadth than can be adequately provided in this section and chapter. 
However, as part of the backdrop to the study, it will be useful to identify its main 
streams. 
On the one hand are those who firmly believe in the region's ability to maintain a 
healthy pace and lead the world in economic development (Gamaut, 1997; Rimmer, 
1997; Tan and Wee, 1995; Gamaut and Drysdale, 1994; Worid Bank, 1993). Many 
writers refer to the region's success as a 'miracle', and the primary contributors to this 
growth (i.e. Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and more recently, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand) as 'miracle' economies that are predicted to lead the 
region into what is being dubbed as the 'Asian' or 'Pacific' century. There are those, 
however, who contend that this miracle is but a myth (e.g. Kmgman, 1994), arguing that 
because the region's growth has been due more to substantial foreign capital and 
investment inflows rather than to improvement in overall technical efficiency and 
domestic productivity, which are essential for long-term competitiveness, the 
sustainability of this growth is doubtftil (Lingle, 1997; Ignatius, 1996; Krugman, 1994). 
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These two opposing views serve as the main themes around which current discussions 
of Asia-Pacific growth now revolve. 
The debate has intensified in the last few years, fuelled by the region's slowing growth 
rates, fiercer global competition, and more recently, a financial upheaval that has had 
devastating eftect on the region's nationzd economies. This market upheaval, which 
started in mid 1997, saw a steep and sudden drop in currency values and a subsequent 
massive flight of capital out of the currency and share markets in Thailand initially, and 
then in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and South Korea. Subsequent government 
action—or inaction—merely exarcebated the problems, and the crisis deepened as 
national governments failed to implement hard-nosed economic structural reforms that 
would have helped restore market confidence. The continuing crisis has raised grave 
doubts about the financial and political stability of the region, especially Southeast Asia. 
Prospects, at least in the short term, are bleak. For 1997 and 1998, the anticipated 
annual growth rates of 5-8 per cent for Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have 
been pushed back to 4-6 per cent; more pessimistic estimates go even lower, to about l -
2 percent. For Thailand, which averaged a 9 per cent growth rate from 1986-1995, the 
most optimistic forecast is 3-4 per cent; conservative analyses talk of negative growth or 
even a probable recession. Market recovery in these countries is expected to take some 
time, as foreign investors take their money elsewhere, notably China and Latin America, 
while warily awaiting further developments in Southeast Asia. It is argued that unless 
confidence in the markets and Southeast Asia's political leadership is restored, foreign 
investors are likely to stay away, which in turn wi l l further dampen economic growth. 
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markets and Southeast Asia's political leadership is restored, foreign investors are likely 
to stay away, which in turn will further dampen economic growth. 
Does this mean then the end of the Asian 'miracle'? While some analysts and 
commentators are quick to agree, noting dismissively the 'rise and fall of the Asian 
century', the more broadly accepted view is that in spite of current market and political 
uncertainties, as well as a regionwide slowdown in growth rates, the long-term 
prognosis for the region remains optimistic. The latest World Bank assessment (World 
Bank, 1997) shows that the countries in the region are economically strong enough— 
[they have] 'comparatively high savings ratios, low debt burdens, historically strong 
fiscal positions, and a history of market-friendly policies' (p. 2)—to recover from the 
currency crisis and regain healthy growth rates, especially i f needed economic, fiscal and 
policy changes are quickly put into effect. To be certain, tough economic decisions have 
to be made by East Asian countries to strengthen their economies, but overall the region 
is still expected to maintain healthy growth rates, albeit at a more subdued pace, but that 
will keep them well ahead of other regions in the worid. Trade will continue to intensify, 
particularly within the region, to meet the consumption needs of the region's growing 
middle class which, given current demographics, is poised to become the world's biggest 
(Rohwer, 1996). Given all these driving forces, the region is predicted to emerge 'as an 
independent engine of growth [that]... [i]n the longer run ... may even evolve into a 
powerful trading region that can propel itself with less and less reliance on the US and 
Europe' (Tan and Wee, 1995, p. 51). 
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2.3 MAJOR TRADING PATTERNS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC 
What major trade patterns characterise this growing economic power? There are several 
that are particularly noteworthy. Since the 1960s, when the countries in the region began 
to advance economically, there has been a significant flow-on of benefits from the 
wealthier countries to their poorer neighbours. With economic growth has come a 
significant increase in people*s incomes and educational levels, and a subsequent rise in 
purchasing power and consumer spending. Today, the region's exports account for 
about a quarter of total worid exports. It is also becoming its own biggest market. 
Initially, trade between countries was underwritten for the procurement and supply of 
cheap labour and land; today, it is to satisfy the growing needs and demands of the 
region's growing middle class. Whereas before manufactured goods made in the region 
were mostly exported to countries outside the region, notably the United States and 
Europe, today these goods are increasingly kept within the region. While the United 
States remains a major player in the region, the region's leading economies are taking on 
a more significant role; today they provide a big majority of the investments flowing 
into the region's newly industrialising economies. These major trends are expected to 
continue into the next century, particularly as China, with its more than a billion people, 
gradually transforms itself into the worid's biggest economy. 
The flying geese of East Asia 
East Asia's economic grov^ is often likened to the flight formation of geese: Japan at 
the head, followed by the Four Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and 
Taiwan), and then by the region's newly industrialising economies (NIEs) notably, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and more recently, China and the Philippines. The 'flying 
geese' analogy is drawn fi\)m the way the East Asian economies have developed their 
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economies within a relatively short period of time. Japan started the growth momentum, 
first by industrialising and, when it prospered as an exporter nation, by moving its high 
capital and labour intensive industries to the less-developed countries in the region, 
whose low labour and production costs allowed Japan to maintain its competitive edge. 
Since then, the momentum has been maintained, with the countries in the region growing 
in tandem. The advancement of a country has typically led to the advancement of 
others, as all have closely followed Japan's overall strategy for growth. This pattern of 
development has allowed the region to grow rapidly, as the follov^ng market trends 
reflect. 
World market share 
Largely because of the economic success of the East Asian countries, the trade 
controlled by the Asia-Pacific region has grown at an unprecedented rate over the last 
three decades. It is now 26 per cent of total world trade, compared to the European 
Union's 37 per cent and NAFTA's 19 per cent. When the region's share is added to the 
other members of APEC (i.e. Canada, Chile, Mexico, and the United States), the total 
APEC share jumps up to almost half of the entire world trade (Bergsten, 1997). A 
significant proportion of the region's exports include higher-value manufactured goods, 
while most imports are relatively low-value raw materials or energy (Drewry, 1993). 
Intra-regional trade 
One striking aspect of Asia-Pacific trade has been the increase in intra-regional trade 
(Menon, 1996; Kunkel, 1995). The region is now its own biggest market, with intra-
regional trade estimated in 1991 to account for 40 per cent of total trade, up fi-om 30 per 
cent in 1986 (Drewry, 1993). The value of trade among these countries is now greater 
than their trade with the US. A decade ago, for instance, Japan's trade with the US was 
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about 40 per cent of its total trade; now it is less than a third. During the same period, 
Japan's trade with its neighbours rose to around 40 per cent, from less than 25 per cent 
(Leger, 1995). This trend is reflected throughout the region, particularly between the 
Four Tigers and the five NIEs (FCunkel 1995). 
Intra-reglonal Investments 
The rapid market integration within the Asia-Pacific region has been fuelled by the 
massive inflows of investment from the wealthier nations of the region to their newly 
industrialising neighbours. Major foreign investors in the NIEs have been Japan and the 
Four Tigers, displacing the US and Europe. As a group, the Tigers have been the largest 
investors in the NIEs: 44.7 per cent in Thailand, 40 per cent in the Philippines, 47.8 per 
cent in Malaysia, and 29.3 per cent in Indonesia. They also hold the biggest share of the 
NIEs' exports, and are the biggest market for China's exports. (Tan and Wee, 1995; 
Leger, 1995). While for a number of countries these huge inflows have dramatically come 
to a stop in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis, the investment pattern outlined here is 
nonetheless expected to continue. 
Growth triangles 
Another significant aspect in the growing intra-regional trade has been the development 
of'growth triangles' within the region. Growth triangles are economic zones that involve 
two or more countries but not necessarily these countries' entire national economies. 
Two very successful growth triangles now attracting world interest and attention are the 
Singapore-Johor-Riau (SIJORI) triangle, which comprises Singapore, the state of Johor 
in Malaysia, and the Riau province in Indonesia; and the Great South China Economic 
Zone, which includes Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and the southern coastal provinces 
of Guangdong and Fujian in China (Yue and Yuan, 1994). Massive investments by the 
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Tigers (and to a lesser extent by Japan) into Guangdong and Fujian in China, Johor in 
Malaysia and Riau in Indonesia have led to a dramatic economic transformation in these 
areas. From being areas of poverty, they have become major industrial and investment 
centres, whose high incomes contrast sharply against national averages (Yue and Yuan, 
1994). Major industrial restructuring is also being undertaken, as investments allow the 
construction of superhighways, power generators, communications systems, and similar 
infrastructure programs critical to the sustenance of an industrialising economy. 
The concept behind the growth triangles is similar to the flying geese pattern of national 
development. Wealthier nations invest in their poorer neighbours, whose cheap labour 
and land allow the former to keep manufacturing costs down and thus remain 
competitive. With growth triangles, however, the areas involved are physically close to 
each other to allow (with government approval) a relatively easy movement of goods, 
people and capital across national borders. As with the flying geese pattern, there is 
growing evidence that the economic benefits from the growth triangles are spreading 
beyond the original boundaries; as wages rise and labour becomes in short supply, and 
as real estate prices soar, investors go further in search of fresh supply of cheap labour 
and land (Yue and Yuan, 1994). 
Mindful of these successes, various countries in the region are now in different stages of 
negotiation to establish more growth triangles. At the most advanced stage of 
negotiations is the Northern Growth Triangle, proposed by Malaysia, and designed to 
comprise 15 southern provinces of Thailand, 4 states in Malaysia and 2 provinces of 
Sumatra in Indonesia (Yue and Yuan, 1994). The Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) has also agreed to establish a free trade area (to be called ASEAN 
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Free Trade Area, or AFTA) within 10-15 years, commencing 1 January 1993. Since its 
meeting in 1992, when the AFTA concept was approved, ASEAN member nations 
have been negotiating on timetables for tariff reductions of ASEAN products, covering 
all manufactured and capital goods, processed agricultural products and other items that 
do not meet their definition of agricultural products (Menon, 1996). Three others in the 
offmg are the Tumen River Delta Area project (eastern Russia, China, Mongolia, South 
and North Korea), the Yellow Sea Economic Zone (Japan, South Korea, northern 
China), and the Japan Sea Economic Zone (Japan, eastern Russia, northeastern China, 
South and North Korea). 
Growth of consumer power 
Companies initially began investing in East Asia to take advantage of low-cost labour 
and then export their products outside the region. While this trend continues today, a 
growing proportion of manufactured products now remains within the region to serve a 
fast-growing middle class. Sustained economic growth has led to a substantial rise in 
incomes, educational levels and purchasing power, making possible the rapid emergence 
of this middle class, whose sheer numbers make their purchasing potential formidable. 
The 10 East Asian economies covered by the study account for about 30 per cent of the 
world's population, more than 60 per cent of whom are between 25 to 65 years old and 
with some consumer spending power. If growth trends are sustained, the region is 
expected to have about 1 billion consumers by the early 2000s, whose consumption 
needs and demands would have to be met (Rohwer, 1996; Tan and Wee, 1995). 
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The Chinese network 
Another critical aspect of intra-regional trade in the Asia-Pacific is the presence of the 
Chinese network. There is actually no single network; rather, there are numerous 
networks that span national boundaries, crisscrossing the Asia-Pacific region and over to 
North America and Europe. These networks are made up of Chinese who have resettled 
throughout the Asia-Pacific and the rest of the world; they are estimated to be about 50 
million strong in East Asia alone (6 million in Hong Kong, 21 million in Taiwan, 30 more 
million spread out from Korea to Indonesia). Not much research has been conducted into 
these Chinese networks, but the accepted wisdom is that their ties are strong and 
extensive, and that they work largely on the basis of personal, family, school, and/or 
business connections. They control much of the banking, finance and trade in East Asia 
and are involved in major investments throughout the region, including Australia and 
New Zealand (Fitzgerald, 1997). They are principally responsible for massive 
investment inflows into China, accounting for about 70 per cent of the country's total 
investments (Tan and Wee, 1995); these investments are expected to continue, giving 
China the strength and resiliency it needs to transform itself into a major economic force. 
Future prospects 
Trade in the Asia-Pacific region is expected to follow the region's overall pattern of 
economic development. Although short-term prospects are gloomy due to the 
continuing financial crisis, the long-term prognosis for the region remains positive. From 
all indications, countries will continue to industrialise and liberalise their economies, 
which will enable intra-regional trade to grow in importance (Menon, 1996). Intra-
regional cooperation and competition will also be maintained as countries work together 
to establish free trade areas and more growth triangles, and as they maintain regional 
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consultations through various mechanisms, notably APEC and ASEAN. While the idea 
of a 'Pacific or Asian century' may not be widely shared—indeed, is hotly contested— 
the prevailing view is that the Asia-Pacific region vWll grow into a strong economic 
region in the next century, particularly if individual countries implement much-needed 
economic and structural reforms. 
2.4 ASIA-PACIFIC SHIPPING 
The performance of the Asia-Pacific region over the last several decades finds close 
parallel in the performance of commercial shipping in the region, which should come as 
no surprise since shipping is a derived demand and the region's geography virtually 
demands heavy reliance on maritime transport. 
The role of maritime transport 
Geography has been a significant factor in the region's reliance on maritime transport. 
The region is highly archipelagic, which means trade within the region, as well as within 
individual countries, almost always implies the use of water transport (Peters, 1986). 
Contiguous land links to mainland Asia and beyond do not necessarily provide an 
advantage either; in their discussion of the influence of geography on the use of maritime 
transport in Asia, Leinbach and Sien (1989) point that 'the high mountains to the north 
and east create formidable barriers which effectively render the region highly dependent 
on water transport' (p. 98). A fijrther complication, reports Lloyd's Maritime Asia 
(May 1997), is the lack of reliable and extensive land-based infrastructure links to 
facilitate transport of goods; forcing fast-growing Asia-Pacific countries with 
manufacturing bases to significantly increase their use of maritime transport. 
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Trade has not been the only reason for the region's dependence on maritime transport; 
the improvement of communication and the need for greater administrative and political 
control, to name a few, have also been major factors behind the growing demand for 
shipping (Rimmer, 1997; Leinbach and Sien, 1989; JAMRI 1987). Neither is the 
region's reliance on maritime transport merely a late 20th century phenomenon; it goes 
back in time, long before western countries made their presence felt in the region. As 
Leinbach and Sien (1989) put it, 
[Asia has] a rich maritime tradition which dates from well before the era of Western influence 
in the region. The early Indonesian empires of Srivijaya based on Sumatra and Majapahit based 
on Java relied on sea power to hold sway over their maritime territories. The extension of 
Chinese power over the Nanyang ('Southern Seas') was made possible by its powerful navy. 
Commerce between the region and West Asia, East Africa, and South Asia, as well as within 
the region, was carried by sea-borne transport which also provided the means of cultural 
exchange. It is well known that among the peoples of the Malay archipelago, there has been a 
very long and established tradition of seafaring ... With the anrival of the Europeans in the 
eighteenth centuiy and the eventual domination of colonial powers in the nineteenth and the 
first half of the twentieth centuiy, trade and polical control of the region continued to rely 
heavily on maritime transport (p. 97). 
In the last two decades, this reliance on maritime transport has grown significantly to 
keep pace with the rapid economic growth of the region. Recent studies on Asia-Pacific 
shipping highlight a remarkable record of growth in shipping activity from the 1970s to 
1990s, with the 1980-90 period recording the most significant growth (OECD, 1997; 
UNCTAD, 1996b; Lee, 1996; Drewry, 1993; Xingyuan, 1991; Thanopoulou, 1995; 
JAMRI, 1987; Peters, 1986). In 1980, the region controlled 18 per cent of the total 
world volume in bulk imports and 29 per cent in container throughput; by 1991, this 
share had grown to 33 per cent and 40 per cent, respectively (Drewry, 1993). In terms 
of annual growth rate, the Asia-Pacific has been leading the way, as a recent report 
(OECD, 1997) confirms: 
The most dynamic exporting countries are generally found outside of the O E C D area. This is 
particularly tnie of exports from the Dynamic Asian Economies (+14 per cent), Latin America 
(+11.5 per cem) and Central and Eastern Europe (+9.5 per cent). With regard to import 
growth, only Asia performed above the average (+13 per cent, with +11.5 per cent for Japan 
and +15 per cent for the DAEs). These figures show the relative decline in the share of 
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international trade of the non Asian Members of the O E C D , and confirm the growing 
importance of the Asia-Pacific area in international shipping maiicets (p. 67). 
Asla-Paclfic seaborne trade 
Shipping is not one homogeneous market; rather, it is made up of several important 
sectors. There are three main sectors (also called markets or trades): liner (also called 
general cargo), tanker (also called wet bulk), and dry bulk (Stopford, 1993). The tanker 
and dry bulk markets are normally grouped together as bulk trades. Because the industry 
norm is to organise the shipping market into these three sectors, this typology will be 
used for the remainder of the chapter. Further, because the characteristics of each 
shipping market is well documented in the shipping literature (e.g. Spruyt, 1994; 
Farthing, 1993; Stopford, 1988; ESCAP, 1986; Branch, 1982), no attempt will be made 
here to replicate previous efforts. The reader is asked instead to refer to these sources 
for an extensive discussion of shipping markets. 
Forecasts for world seaborne trade from 1996-2005 show that world seabome trade 
growth is expected to grow by an average of 4.1 per cent per annum over the next 
decade, that is, from 3,865 million tons in 1995 to an estimated 5,454 million tons in 
2005 (Feamleys Review, 1996a; UNCTAD, 1996b). As shown in Table 2.1, the 
highest growth rate is expected from the liner sector (6.4 per cent), mainly fi-om 
containerised and general cargo, followed by the dry bulk sector (4.5 per cent), and the 
tanker sector (2.6 per cent). 
Table 2.1 Growth forecasts for world seaborne trade (1996-2005) 
Industry Growth Rate Estimated Volume 
Sector (base year=l995) (2005) 
Dry bulk 4.5 1.685 
Tanker 2.6 2J68 
Liner* 6.4 1,601 
Source: DRI/McGraw-Hiil, 1995, as cited in UNCTAD, 1996b 
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Most analysts agree that growth rates in seaborne trade for the Asia-Pacific region will 
not be as great in the 1990s as those achieved in the last two decades. The main growth 
drivers (China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand) have 
started slowing down after years of rapid unprecedented growth (OECD, 1997), and the 
current financial crisis gripping the region is expected to further dampen this growth. In 
terms of differential trade requirements, JAMRI (1987) predicts that as countries 
continue industrialising, trade in raw materials will decrease while trade in semi-finished 
products will increase. Drewry (1993) also predicts higher growth rates for liner 
shipping, especially containerised cargoes, but a much slower growth for the bulk trades; 
in spite of this slowdown, however, the bulk trades are still predicted to grow not only 
in volume but also in world importance. More specific trends in each sector are 
discussed below. 
Bulk trades. The three largest commodities in world seaborne bulk trades are crude oil, 
iron ore, and coal, all of which have had a dominant impact on demand patterns G^L, 
1997). Comparative figures for these and other bulk commodities are presented in Table 
2.2. 
Table 2.2 World seaborne trade of main bulk commodities (billion of ton-miles) 
1985 1990 1995 
Crude oil 4 007 6 261 7 375 
Iron ore 1 702 1 978 2 287 
Coal 1 473 I 849 2 176 
Grain I 004 I 073 1 160 
Bauxite & alumina 166 20S 199 
Phosphate 156 154 136 
Source: Feamleys, 1996b 
The Asia-Pacific region already commands a significant share of this trade, and any 
increase during the 1990s is expected to be marginal. Drev^ry (1993) predicts a 25 per 
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cent growth by 2000, which will put the region's share to about 34 per cent of total 
world trade. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 provide some comparative figures. 
Table 23 World and regional share in bulk trades* (million tons) 
World Asia-Pacific % 
1992 3 014 1 025 34.0 
2000 3 422 1 170 34.2 
* excluding LNG 
Source: Drewiy, 1993 
Table 2.4 Asia-Pacinc trade as a percentage of world trade 
1991 1995 2000 
Crude oil 24.6 26.9 28.3 
Oil products 25.9 22.7 17.3 
L N G ( l ) 73.3 76.4 65.8 
Iron ore 53.5 51.3 53.0 
Coking coal 57.3 60.3 58.1 
Steaming coal 40.5 41.5 42.3 
Grain 35.9 38.7 39.8 
Forest products 39.0 41.0 43.9 
Cement 55.6 54.5 53.5 
Total (2) 33.6 34.0 34.2 
(1) billion cu.av of low/high forecasts 
(2) excluding LNG 
Source: Drewiy, 1993 
Container trades. The region's container trades have followed similar growth patterns as 
the bulk trades, with the last two decades showing increased container traffic in and out 
of the region. From a negligible 1 per cent of world container traffic in the early 1970s, 
it jumped to 28 per cent in 1982 (Peters, 1986). Since then the region has continued on 
its exponential growth pattern, growing at a much faster pace than any other region, 
more than twice that of Western Europe and four times more than North America. As of 
1990, the region controlled nearly 40 per cent of world container traffic; by 1995, this 
rose to 46 per cent; by 2000, it is predicted to rise to 50 per cent. Regional growth 
trends are summarised in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. 
44 
Table 2.5 Global container activity (million T E U ) 
(Total throughput at regional ports) 
1980 1990 1995 2000 
Asia-Pacific 11.2 34.9 63.4 99.1 
W. Europe 11.7 22.4 30.5 39.9 
N. America 9.5 16.7 20.8 24.1 
L.America 2.3 4.8 8.0 11.7 
Mid East 1.9 3.5 6.8 10.5 
Africa 1.5 2.7 4.2 6.2 
S. Asia 0.2 1.8 3.4 5.8 
E.Europe 0.4 0.6 0.6 1.0 
World Total 1 38.7 87.4 137.7 198.2 
Source: Drewry, 1996c 
Table 2.6 World and Asia-Pacific container activity 
Worid Total Asia-Pacific 
(million T E U ) Percentage Share 
1980 38.7 28.9 
1990 87.4 39.9 
1995 17.7 46.0 
2000 198.2 50.0 
Source: Derived fix)m Table 2.5 (Drewiy, 1996c) 
Individual country performance within the region is predicted to vary. ASEAN 
countries are expected to lead the way, with an annual growth rate of 9.5 per cent, 
closely followed by Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and China, which are expected to 
grow at an average of 6.1 per cent per annum. Both groups will exceed the world average 
of 4.6 per cent, while Japan, Australia, and New Zealand are expected to fall below it. 
These figures are sunmiarised in Table 2.7. 
Table 2.7 Container activity in the Asia-Pactnc region (million T E U ) 
Average Growth % Countries Included 
Far East 6.1 Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, China 
Japan 3.9 -
SE Asia 9.5 Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan, Thailand 
Oceania 2.1 Australia, New Zealand 
World 4.6 
Source: Drewry, 1993 
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Intra-reglonal seaborne trade 
One striking aspect in the growth of seabome trade in the Asia-Pacific has been an 
extraordinary increase in intra-regional trade. In the last several decades, intra-regional 
seabome trade has expanded much faster than trade with countries outside the region 
(Drewry, 1993; Xingyuan, 1991). In 1991, it accounted for 40 per cent of its total trade; 
in 1995, for the first time it exceeded the region's trade with the rest of the world. Like 
regional economic growth in general, the growth in seabome trade has been spurred by 
regional cooperation networks (e.g. APEC, ASEAN) and the establishment of economic 
zones, or more colloquially known as 'growth triangles', in the region (Rimmer, 1997; 
Lee, 1996). As noted earlier in the chapter (see section 2.3), such regional cooperative 
schemes have significantly boosted trade within the region either through increased 
dialogue and consultation among the countries in the region or through joint ventures 
between nationals or governments of two or more countries. Most analysts agree that 
this growth in intra-regional trade will continue well into the future, which augurs well 
for the region's maritime industry (Containerisation International, 1997b; Lloyd's 
Maritime Asia, 1997; Lloyd's Shipping Economist, 1997; OECD, 1996; Lee, 1996; 
UNCTAD, 1995; Drewry, 1993; Xingyuan, 1991; JAMRI, 1987). 
For Asia-Pacific shipowners, the implications of this trend are immense. Greater intra-
regional trade will require a major shift in the way shipping is conducted; from being 
mainly feeder service providers, shipowners will increasingly serve as longer haul 
operators and providers of direct service routes to Asia. Changes will also be inevitable 
as the promise of greater profits will attract more competitors into the area. Lloyd's 
Maritime Asia (1997) offers a hint of the lurking potential: 
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Intra-regional trades, are, in comparison to transpaciflc routes, lucrative. One account has it that 
the cost of running a T E U from Shanghai to Ronerdam has flattened from $1,800 two years 
ago to less than $800 today. By way of contrast, a T E U from Shanghai to Manila earns 
$1,200, the same as it did two years ago. The trades offer other comparative cost savings as 
well. For example, on short-haul, port-to-port services, containers do not generally need to be 
relayed from one ship to another en-route to final destinations, so transhipment costs arc 
limited. These port-to-port services also translate into relatively low inland transportation costs 
compared to long-haul carriers, for which rail and trucking costs represent almost 20% of 
operating costs (p. 44). 
Of the region's shipping markets, container trades are predicted to show the most 
significant increases (Rimmer, 1997; Containerisation International, 1996c; Drewry 
1993), and their growth is expected to be a major determinant in the development of 
world shipping (ISL, 1996). By 2000, the region is expected to account for about a 
quarter of total world box movements (Containerisation International, 1997c). This 
growth in the region's intra-regional containerised cargo flows is summarised in Table 
2.8. 
Table 2.8 Intra-reglonal Asia-Pacinc containerised trading volumes* (TEUs, 1991-2001) 
1991 1996 % change 2001 % change 
Japan 1 703 098 2 407 654 41.4 3 288 194 36.6 
South Korea 705 497 1 103 844 56.5 1 755 552 59.0 
Taiwan 967 849 1 339 826 38.4 1 970 373 47.1 
Hong Kong 832 740 1 402 177 68.4 2 308 549 64.6 
Philippines 184 748 400 901 117.0 664 042 65.6 
Indonesia 492 084 962 353 95.6 1 647 277 71.2 
Singapore 762 509 I 337 456 75.4 2 245 544 67.9 
Thailand 533 033 922 372 73.0 1 487 487 61.3 
Malaysia 573 811 1 131 603 97.2 1 941 940 71.6 
Total 6 755 369 11 008 186 63.0 17 308 958 57.2 
* Data based on import customs reports; revenue terms converted to tonnes and then into T E U . 
Source: DRI/Mercer, 1997, as cited in Containerisation International, 1997c 
As can be seen from the table, the region's containerised cargo leapt by 63 per cent 
from 1991 to 1996, with the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia showing the most 
significant increases, closely followed by Singapore, Thailand, and Hong Kong. By the 
year 2000, the region's share is expected to rise by another 52 per cent, with Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and Singapore expected to show the highest increases. 
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The most significant growth corridors have been linking Japan and South Korea with East and 
South East Asia (Taiwan. Hong Kong, Malaysia and Thailand), where the one-way cargo flows 
exceed 200,000 per year. In addition, significant trade is taking place between Taiwan and 
Hong Kong and South East Asia, as manufacturers in these countries follow their Japanese and 
Korean counterparts and take advantage of lower labour costs and cheaper land to establish 
assembly and production plants offshore. This, in turn, is leading to the development of certain 
interesting secondaiy trades, such as those between Malaysia/Indonesia, Philippines/Thailand 
and TaiwanA^ietnam (Containerisation International, 1997c, pp. 49-50). 
Asla-Paclfic fleet development 
As of December 1995, a total of 35 maritime nations controlled the majority (93.8 per 
cent) of world tonnage, as measured by number of vessels and deadweight tonnage. As 
Table 2.9 shows, all Asia-Pacific shipowners except New Zealand made it to this elite 
group of maritime nations, controlling over a third (32.85 per cent) of the worid fleet 
Japan, with its 12.93 per cent share, dominated; but even with considerably smaller 
shares, China, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore all made it to the first 
top 15. The Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, Thailand, and Malaysia were positioned 
closer to the bottom of the list. 
Table 2.9 Distribution of the Asia-Pacific fleet 
World Fleet Rank Country % of World Fleet 
2 Japan 12,93 
5 China 5.25 
6 Hong Kong 4.67 
8 South Korea 3.12 
11 Taiwan 2.14 
13 Singapore 1.94 
25 Philippines 0.70 
27 Indonesia 0.61 
32 Australia 0.51 
33 Thailand 0.49 
34 Malaysia 0.49 
Source: Adapted from UNCTAD, 1996a 
In terms of ship types, those that dominate world shipping today are oil tankers (tanker 
trades), bulk carriers (dry bulk trades), and general cargo ships and containerships (liner 
trades). The collective strength of these ship types can be described in a number of 
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ways, one of which is by gross tonnage (gt). I f all ship types above 100 gt are 
considered, then the four ship types can be said to make up 86.3 per cent of the 1997 
world fleet. I f the cut-off point is above 1,000 gt, then the percentage jumps up to 99.2 
per cent for the same period. The distribution of the worid fleet according to ship types 
using these two measures is shown in Table 2.10. 
Table 2A0 Two ways of determining world fleet distribution by ship type (1997) 
Major Ship Types over lOOGT over 1.000 gt 
Oil tankers 36.5 42.0 
Dry bulk carriers 32.3 37.2 
General cargo ships tl.O 13.3 
Container ships 6.5 6.7 
Total % of world total 86.3 99.2 
Source: Lloyd*s Maritime Information Service, 1997 
For commercial shipowners operating in major trades (which exclude those providing 
feeder services), the l,000gt basis is more appropriate because it provides a better 
representation of major commercial ship types and the tonnage size used on major 
shipping routes (Lloyd's Maritime Information Service, 1997; ISL, 1997). This higher gt 
level is used as the basis in Table 2.11 which shows the Asia-Pacific's share of the 
world fleet by ship type, gross tonnage, and deadweight tonnage. As the table shows, 
the four ship types account for 99.2 per cent of the world fleet, with oil tankers and dry 
bulk carriers representing almost 80 per cent of the total. Of this fleet, 37.6 per cent is 
controlled by the Asia-Pacific region. In terms of gross tonnage (gt), container ships 
(43.8 per cent) and dry bulk carriers (43.6 per cent) represent a slight majority, with oil 
tankers (33.3 per cent) and general cargo ships (31.7 per cent) not far behind. In terms of 
deadweight tonnage (dwt), bulk ships, which account for neariy 80 per cent of the total 
world fleet, dominate Asia-Pacific shipping, with dry bulk carriers comprising the 
largest group (47.1 per cent), followed by oil tankers (32.8 per cent). The liner sector is 
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smaller due to the prevalence o f small semi-container ships (8.8 per cent) and even 
smaller general cargo ships (11.2 per cent) in the region (Drewry, 1993). 
Table 2.11 Regional fleet distribution by gross (gt) and deadweight (dwt) tonnage (1997) 
Major Ship Types % of World Fleet % of Asia-Pacific share 
(over 1.000 gt) (over 1.000 gt) (over 1,000 dwt) 
Oil tankers 42.0 33.3 32.8 
Diy bulk carriers 37.2 43.6 47.1 
General cargo ships 13.3 31.7 11.2 
Container ships 6.7 43.8 8.8 
Total % of world total 99.2 37.6 37.6 
Source: Lloyd's Maritime Information Service, 1997 
In terms of geographical distribution, Europe and the Asia-Pacific account for almost 82 
per cent of the world fleet, with the first holding 44.1 per cent and the latter, 37.6 per 
cent. North America holds the next largest share (7 per cent), followed by Latin and 
South America (2.4 per cent), and Africa (1 per cent). Between 1994-1997, the Asia-
Pacific region registered the highest growth rate (4.2 per cent), followed by Africa (2.9 
per cent). The rest—Europe, North America, and Latin and South America—all 
declined. Regional fleet distribution and growth rates are summarised in Table 2.12. The 
geographical location of 8 per cent of the world fleet cannot be ascertained and hence are 
grouped under the category 'unknown'. 
Table 2.12 Regional fleet distribution and growth rates, 1997 
(% share of world fleet by dwt for ships of lOOOgt and over) 
Regions Oil Bulk Container General Total Growth 
Tankers Caniers Ships Cargo Ships % Rate* 
Europe 46.0 41.3 40.2 46.8 44.1 -0.1 
Asia-Pacific 33.3 43.6 43.8 31.7 37.6 4.2 
North America lt.9 2.8 8.1 2.6 7.0 -3.7 
Latin & South America 2.5 2.3 1.5 2.5 2.4 -3.5 
Africa 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.9 1.0 2.9 
Unknown 5.3 9.1 5.5 14.4 8.0 — 
* Average yearly growth rates from 1994-1997 
Source: Lloyd*s Maritime Information Services, 1997 
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The national fleets of the Asia-Pacific have grown considerably over the last three 
decades (Lloyds Maritime Information Service, 1997). Their most significant growth 
period was between 1960-1970, when they grew by 250.5 per cent; however, as world 
fleet size increased and shipping demand slumped, the growth rate slowed dov^, to 
104.4 per cent between 1970-1980 and then to a low 30.9 per cent between 1980-1990. 
Between 1990-1996, however, the growth rate picked up again, reaching 61.3 per cent 
At these growth rates, the national fleets o f the region have been able to substantially 
increase their share of the world fleet, from only 6.9 per cent in 1960 to 23.4 per cent in 
1996. I f foreign flag vessels are included, which means a fiirther 16.2 per cent added to 
the world total, the region's share will rise to over one third. Behind this remarkable 
growth are six countries: Japan, China, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore 
(Lloyds Maritime Information Service, 1997). 
Since container shipping has had and will have the most dramatic impact on world 
shipping (Rimmer, 1997; JAMRI, 1987), it is worth exploring the growth of this fleet at 
this point. Container carriers were introduced to the maritime industry in the 1970s, and 
in the short span of 10 years, many had made their presence felt on world shipping 
markets. Evergreen (Taiwan), NOL (Singapore), and MISC (Malaysia) were all formed 
in 1968, followed by Yang Ming (Taiwan) in 1973, Hyundai (Korea) in 1976. and 
Hanjin (Korea) in 1978. Table 2.13 traces the development of the leading Asia-Pacific 
container operators over a 15-year period (1975-1990). By 1990, Evergreen o f Taiwan 
had the largest number o f TEUs carried, followed by four Japanese companies (NYK, 
MOL, K Line), Cosco from China, and OOCL from Hong Kong. 
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Table 2.13 Number of T E U s carried by leading Asia-Pacific container operators 
1975 1980 1985 1990 
Cho Yang 564 3 033 10 742 
Cosco - 474 28 752 71 046 
Evergreen - 18 100 74 132 130 498 
Hanjin- - 5 948 7 028 46 943 
Hyundai - - 6 841 16 048 
Japan Line 4 684 5 992 7 209 -
K-Line 7 967 8 906 22 851 58 290 
K S C - 7 776 9 650 -
MISC - 4 900 10 734 10 442 
MOL 13 373 18 952 35 967 66 838 
NLS - - - 17 809 
NOL 1 100 8 323 13 874 35 943 
NYK 15 330 21 664 33 963 73 062 
OOCL 18 267 21 701 33 825 56 629 
Showa 2 795 5 190 5 780 228 
Y-S Line 5413 6 584 9 950 -
Yang Ming - 7 344 23 409 46 817 
Source: Containerisation International Yearbooks, various dates 
As a result of this growth, many of the region*s leading container operators improved 
their world ranking within a relatively short period of time (Rimmer, 1997; Tanaka, 
1993). Table 2.14 compares their performance vis-a-vis other leading world container 
operators over a 10-year period (1980 and 1991). 
Table 2.14 Top 15 container operators (1980-1991) 
1980 Rank 1991 Rank 
Rank Operator Capacity Rank Operator Capacity 
(000s T E U ) (000s TEU) 
1 Sea-Und (USA) 58 1 Evergreen (TWN) 115 
2 Hapag(GER) 43 2 Maersk (DEN) 104 
3 Maersk (DEN) 34 3 Sea-Land (USA) 95 
4 O C L (GBR) 29 4 NVK (JPN) 83 
5 O O C L ( H K ) 27 5 C O S C O (CHN) 69 
6 N Y K ( J P N ) 26 6 APL (USA) 61 
7 COM (FRA) 24 7 M O L (JPN) 60 
8 APL (USA) 21 8 O O C L (HK) 55 
9 Evergreen (TWN) 19 9 Hapag(GER) 54 
10 Wilhelmsen (NOR) 18 10 Hanjin ( K O R ) 53 
11 Nedlloyd (NTH) 18 11 K-Line (JPN) 53 
12 M O L (JPN) 17 12 Yang Ming (TWN) 49 
13 US Line (USA) 16 13 P&O (GBR) 44 
14 Farrell Lines (USA) 12 14 N O L (SNG) 40 
15 N O L (SNG) 8 15 ZIM (ISR) 40 
Source: Tanaka (1993) 
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Between 1980 and 1991, Evergreen moved from 9th to the top position; NYK, from 6th 
to 4th; and MOL from 12th to 7th. While OOCL of Hong Kong and NOL dropped 
from 5th to 8th and 8th to 14th respectively, they still remained in the top 15; in 
contrast, seven leading operators, mainly from Europe and the US (OCL, CGM, APL, 
Wilhelmsen, US Line, and Farrell Lines), did not make it to the 1991 list. A more recent 
analysis provided similar results (Containerisation International, 1996c). In 1983, six 
container operators from the Asia-Pacific made it to Containerisation Intemationars 
Top 20 league; collectively they accounted for 27 per cent of the total. By 1995, half the 
list was made up of Asia-Pacific shipowners, representing close to 50 per cent of total 
world container capacity. These changes clearly reflect the shift of the center of power 
within container shipping to the Asia-Pacific region (Rimmer, 1997). 
2.5 COMPETITIVENESS OF ASIA-PACIFIC OPERATORS 
The shipping literature cites four main reasons why Asia-Pacific shipowners have 
succeeded in gaining significant headway into world shipping within a relatively short 
period of time: cost advantage, government support, access to a vibrant maritime 
infi^structure, and aggressive growth strategies. 
Cost advantage 
In their early stages of development, the main competitive advantage o f Asia-Pacific 
shipowners was easy access to a relatively inexpensive and committed workforce, which 
meant lower vessel operating costs (Holste. 1993; Drewry, 1993; Leinbach and Sien, 
1989; Peters, 1986). This cost advantage over the traditional maritime nations of 
Europe has been maintained over the years as the fleets of the Asia-Pacific have 
continued to expand. A typical example of the lower operating cost differentials 
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between Europe and the Asia-Pacific is provided in Table 2.15. A 30 per cent lower 
operating cost structure is a significant competitive advantage in freight markets, 
especially during times of depressed freight rates and long periods o f over-tonnaging. 
This difference would be even more pronounced i f compared to the even cheaper South 
East Asian shipowner (Leinbach and Sien, 1989). 
Table 2.15 Operating cost difTerentlals for an 800 T E U contalnership (1992, US$ per day) 
N. European Operator Asia-Pacific Operator % DifTerence 
Operating costs* 10,315 7,915 30.3 
•manning, insurance, stores, ship management 
Source: Drewiy, 1992 
Cheaper labour costs, both at sea and ashore in shipping management, have not been the 
only cost advantages of Asia-Pacific shipowners. As their share of the world fleet 
increased, the use of more modem and efficient ships and equipment, particularly in 
container trades, gave them another competitive advantage (Holste, 1993). Drewry 
(1993) sums up the situation very well: 
During the last 20 years, there has been a tremendous expansion in the merchant fleet owned 
and operated by interests located within the Asian Pacific Rim. In recent years attention has 
focused on the growdi of its container carrying services but throughout the whole period there 
has also been substantial growth in the number of other vessel types operated by regional 
interests (by both domestic and foreign flag holdings), most notably the dry bulk carrier and 
tanker fleets. Undoubtedly a major factor encouarging the penetration of Pacific Rim fleets into 
the worid scene was cost advantage. The region is the centre of the world shipbuilding industry 
and close relationships have been built up between local ship operators, cargo interests and 
shipbuilders. But more than this has been the large differentials in operating costs - particularly 
crew costs, which (with the exception of Japan) have given local ship operators a significant 
cost advantage - more so in periods of depressed freight levels (p. 6). 
In the tradition of the * flying geese' model of development, discussed earlier in the 
chapter, as operating costs increased, many Asia-Pacific shipowners initially flagged out 
their national fleets to other cheaper Asian national flags (e.g. fi*om Japanese to Hong 
Kong registry) in an effort to maintain their cost advantage over Europe and North 
America (predominantly the US). These regions in turn tried to narrow the cost 
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advantage of the Asia-Pacific by flagging out their national fleets to open registries, 
offshore flags, and the creation of second registries. Many also formed joint ventures 
and tended to specialise in the more advanced areas of shipping like containensation in 
an attempt to be competitive. The Asia-Pacific retaliated through imitation, flagging out 
their national fleets mainly to open registries, thus still maintaining their cost advantage 
(Thanopoulou, 1995; Sletmo and Holste, 1993; JAMRI, 1987). 
This trend is reflected in Table 2.16 which shows what percentage o f the Asia-Pacific 
fleet are under foreign flags. It is interesting to note that, with the exception o f China, 
the countries which have the highest world ranking are those with the highest percentage 
of fleets under foreign flags, namely, Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
These countries have mainly used the open registries of Liberia and Panama (and 
Vanuatu for Japan and Hong Kong) and to a lesser extent Cyprus and the Bahamas 
(Lloyd's Maritime Directory, 1997). In the case of China, where the fleet is owned and 
operated by the state, it is reasonable to expect the majority of its fleet to be under its 
national register. The main reason why 34 per cent of its fleet are under.foreign flags is 
to gain access to shipping markets and commercial finance (Drewry, 1993). 
Table 2.16 Asia-Pacific fleets under foreign flags (December 1995) 
World Rank Country Foreign flag as a % 
of total controlled fleet 
2 Japan 73.00 
5 China 34.28 
6 Hong Kong 77.70 
8 South Korea 53.55 
11 Taiwan 47.02 
13 Singapore 39.48 
25 Philippines 3.34 
27 Indonesia 31.39 
32 Australia 8.84 
33 Thailand 41.18 
34 Malaysia 5.20 
Source: UNCTAD, 1996b 
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In summary, as a result o f cheaper crewing costs, the use of more modem ships and 
technology, and the move by many of the leading Asia-Pacific shipowners to open 
registries, a ftmdamental shift occurred in the comparative advantage of the industry 
players, with the Asia-Pacific shipowners maintaining a lower cost advantage over their 
competitors. 
Government support 
The Asia-Pacific's rise to power in world shipping has been greatly assisted by 
individual national governments whose maritime and industry policies have been 
instrumental in developing and promoting the industry. In the bulk sector, the expansion 
into tankers and dry bulk carriers has been encouraged to meet the increasing demand for 
bulk imports so that the domestic economy could achieve the maximum benefit from 
such trade. In the liner sector, the development into containerisation has likewise been 
encouraged to meet the export and intra-regional trade growth in semi-finished products 
(Lee, 1996; Thanopoulou, 1995; JAMRl, 1987; Brooks, 1985). Peters (1986) explains 
the rationale behind government support: 
One reason the developing countries [of the Asia-Pacific] moved so aggressively into the 
shipping markets was their concern about invisible trade. The contention was—and largely 
still is—that substantial and avoidable payments of scarce foreign exchange were going to 
foreign carrieis and their insurers. Officiate decided the solution was to acquire their own 
tonnage. In some cases, the decision was also influenced by strategic considerations. Often, 
easy export credit financing was available from foreign shipyards, further encouraging such 
decisions (p. 11). 
Using the classic economic 'infant industry' argument, which contended that shipping 
should be protected until it was strong enough to compete on its own, many Asia-
Pacific governments used a range of measures to restrict foreign competition and assist 
national shipowners. Assistance was both direct (operating, construction, credit and 
loan subsidies) and indirect (taxation allowances, cargo/flag preference and reservation, 
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cabotage, moratoria and loan guarantees). Other measures that guaranteed preference for 
national flags over foreign flags were carrier licensing, discriminatory pricing (giving 
national flags a subsidised rate), support given to ancillary industries (e.g. funding 
maritime training institutions, shipbuilding, research and development), operation of 
govemment-owned national carriers, tight government control on foreign investment, 
joint ventures and business restrictions, and additional bureaucratic requirements 
imposed on foreign operators. Such measures have significantly helped expand the fleets 
of the Asia-Pacific into their current carrying power (Lee, 1996; Thanopoulou, 1995; 
Goss and Marlow, 1993; Holste, 1993; Leinbach and Sien, 1989; Hawkins, 1989; 
Brooks, 1985). 
Shipping market analysts have argued and debated the merits of this assistance given to 
Asia-Pacific shipowners. Many claim that such government intervention is unfair and 
discriminatory, arguing that the benefits of this assistance to Asia-Pacific shipowners 
have been at the expense of international shipping, contributing to overtonnaging and 
over-investment and creating market inefficiencies and economic distortions by 
undercutting more efficient international competitors. Others also argue that over-
investment in shipping hurts national productivity because it shifts scarce resources 
away from other well-deserving economic areas. Underiying these criticisms is the view 
that Asia-Pacific shipowners have been given an unfair advantage, which in turn is 
fuelling the growing calls for a more 'level playing field' in international shipping 
(Thanopoulou, 1995; Goss and Marlow, 1993; Sletmo and Holste, 1993; Kim, 1992; 
Hawkins, 1989; Peters, 1986; Jon, 1986; Yui and Nakagawa, 1985). 
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On this issue, however, the traditional maritime countries o f Europe and North America 
can hardly stand on high moral ground. As Hawkins (1989) found in his study of 
shipping subsidies, similar measures were followed by many of these traditional 
maritime countries in their effort to consolidate the position of their national fleets 
during the early stages of their maritime development Hawkins (1989) also adds that 
rightly or wrongly, subsidisation has always been viewed as the primary method of 
assisting national fleets: 
Shipping subsidies have always been the classical method of assistance to national shipowners. 
Their origins go as far back as the seventeenth century when England started providing 
subsidies to its shipping industiy to maintain its supremacy in the world markets. By the 
nineteenth centuiy, maritme subsidies had become commonplace not only in the United 
Kingdom but also in other countries such as Japan and the United States. Today, we have a 
situation where there is not a maritime nation which does not oflfer some fomi of assistance to 
its national fleet (p. 1). 
Since the start of the 1990s, with mounting pressure fi^m their major trading partners, 
many Asia-Pacific governments have begun changing direction, moving more closely, 
albeit very slowly, towards the liberalization of their shipping industries and the 
removal of barriers to their markets (OECD, 1994). Pressure has been applied in 
different ways; for instance, in recent years, the US Federal Maritime Administration 
has conducted investigations into unfair trade practices of Asia-Pacific shipping, while 
the Korean shipping line, Hyundai, has been brought before the Commission of the 
European Directorate-Competition for unfair trade practices. OECD has ongoing 
discussions on harmonising shipping policies to bring the Asia-Pacific more in line with 
tiieir trading partners (OECD, 1994; Holste, 1993). There is growing impatience at the 
slowness with which the region is carrying out its reforms, and with tiie region currently 
in serious financial trouble, witii a number of countries requiring huge financial assistance 
from international sources (i.e. the International Monetary Fund), there is strong 
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likelihood that Europe and North America will use this as a leverage for greater trade 
liberalization in the region. 
Maritime Infrastructure 
A third contributory factor to the sucess of Asia-Pacific shipping has been its maritime 
infrastructure. There is a growing body of opinion and research that highlights the 
importance of what Lewam and Hawkins (1994) call a strong ^maritime infrastructure' 
in maintaining the competitiveness of a national shipping industry. This maritime 
infrastructure includes a network of people, operations, and activities designed to 
support the seaborne transport of goods and people. 
The work of Lewam and Hawkins (1994), Sletmo and Holste (1993), and Pelecanos 
(1992) all follow Svendsen's (1989) original argument that the long-term 
competitiveness of a national shipping industry requires a vigorous 'shipping milieu', 
which is defined as 'the network o f qualified men and women working in the cluster o f 
shipping activities, private and government' (p.254). This network represents a 
dynamic pool of information, knowledge, and expertise. It includes a range of different 
users (importer, exporters), providers (port authorities, terminals, stevedores, agency, 
customs, training, brokers) and government services (safety, transport, customs, 
quarantine, research, search 8c rescue). Interaction and commimication within and among 
these groups are needed to establish and maintain an environment within which national 
shipping can effectively compete. 
Svendsen's view of a vigorous shipping milieu finds parallel outside the shipping 
industry in Porter's (1990) research on what he calls the 'home base' or the 'diamond of 
national advantage'. Porter argues that the home base is critical to long-term 
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competitiveness because it provides the thrust for innovation, improvement, and change. 
It promotes the creation of domestic rivalry among suppliers which in turn fuels 
expansion into related industries. The home base also creates greater strategic flexibility. 
Porter's research was conducted over a four year period and involved ten o f the world's 
most important trading nations. Of these, three were from the Asia-Pacific: Japan, South 
Korea, and Singapore. Focusing on the most successful industries o f each nation, he 
found that the competitive advantage o f a national industry depended on the strength of 
its national environment, i.e. the 'home base'. 
In many Asia-Pacific countries, the development of the maritime infrastructure has been 
given prominent consideration in national maritime policies and discussions. Largely as a 
result of this, the region is now a dominant player in world shipbuilding, ship repair, 
shipbreaking, sale and purchase markets, and maritime training, research and 
development. It is also provides the largest pool of low-cost seafarers. The forging of 
close working relationships between and among the various sectors of a country's 
maritime infrastructure has also led to many cost advantages. In South Korea, for 
example, the entire national fleet, which underwent massive expansion in recent years, 
was virtually built on Korean shipyards; when one large Korean operator got into 
trouble (KSC), it was simply absorbed by another (Hanjin). In Taiwan, a state-owned 
carrier (Yang Ming) acquired its new fleet from a state-owned shipbuilder (China 
Shipbuilders) on very favourable terms. These examples are repeated elsewhere across 
the region, both within shipping and outside it. Given this level of support, it is easy to 
see why the Asia-Pacific fleet has grown significantly both in size and commercial 
power within a relatively short period of time (Drewry, 1993; Holste, 1993; Pelecanos, 
1992). 
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Aggressive growth strategies 
The final element behind the success of Asia-Pacific's shipping are aggressive growth 
strategies. The Asia-Pacific fleet, particularly in liner shipping, grew faster than its own 
seaborne trade requirements, which led to more tonnage being offered in the already 
crowded markets of Europe and North America. Indeed, many analysts place the blame 
for the chronic overtonnaging situation in liner trades to the excessive expansion 
strategies of Asia-Pacific shipowners, pursued with the tacit or express blessing of their 
national governments (Thanopoulou, 1995; Kim, 1992; Jon, 1986). 
The new Asian carriers, particularly from Taiwan and South Korea, gained a foothold in 
Europe and North America through their aggressive push for growth and their 
unconventional approach of competing against the conference system, which caught 
the market by surprise. Commented Drewry (1993): 
[T]he carrier establishment was used to running the world container trades in a completely 
different way to the strategy adopted by the new Asian lines, and the emergence of a new breed 
of competitor was an enormous culture shock. The spirit of compromise and concilliation 
which these lines had previously taken for granted in their iiner operations was anathema to the 
new Far East carriers, who simply seemed to formulate a strategy and then put it into 
operation, with apparently unlimited financial resources (p. 104). 
What also caught many by surprise was the global ambition of the Asia-Pacific carriers. 
Many came fix)m large industrial conglomerates and had the support o f their national 
governments, thus they had the resources to support global corporate strategies (Holste, 
1993; Drewry, 1993; Kim, 1992). Drewry (1993) again encapsulates this view very 
well: 
[W]ith the Asia-Pacific region developing into a major generator of liner cargo, a simultaneous 
advance in liner shipping to service this rapid expansion could have been anticipated. What 
was less easy to anticipate—and certainly what the established carrier? in Europe and elsewhere 
failed to appreciate fully— was the fact that the ambitions of the new Asian lines extended fir 
beyond any national, or even regional, limitations. Almost without exception, these earners 
had global horizons (p. 7). 
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A more recent trend that is just becoming apparent is the move away by Asia-Pacific 
shipowners fi-om independent operations to consortiums and partnerships. With leading 
Asia-Pacific shipowners having successfully penetrated world shipping markets and 
with Uieir governments coming under increasing international pressure to liberalise trade 
policies and practices, many Asia-Pacific shipowners are moving towards the conference 
system of contortia/partnership arrangements to maintain market share and profitability. 
This is not just happening at the regional level, but in the global markets as well. In the 
name of profitability and survival in the global market, shipowners from the Asia-
Pacific, European and North American regions are all forming mega global alliances on a 
scale never seen before in container shipping (Containerisation International, 1997c; 
Lloyd's Shipping Economist, 1996a; Drewry 1995, 1996). 
A final word on Asla-Paclflc competitiveness 
The influence of Asia-Pacific shipowners in world shipping cannot be ignored. It can 
only be expected to intensify, as the following quotes show: 
[WJhen this degree of control [of the world fleet] is combined with the competitively priced 
operations which so many of these owners/operators are able to offer, either because of their low 
cost native crews and/or the cost advantages of their open register status (low cost crews, low 
taxation, advanced depreciation of hull values etc), then the full extent of their challenge to 
world shipping becomes evident (Drewiy, 1993, p. 112). 
With the help of such an expanded tonnage capacity and their competitive freight rates, the 
fleets of these nations will increasingly And themselves in an advantageous position over the 
advanced maritime nations* fleet Hence, the international competition on the maritime 
transport market is expected to become more and more intensified (JAMRI, 1986, pp. 63-64). 
Such pronouncements on the Asia-Pacific's influence are not without critics, however. 
With a growing evidence that many Asia-Pacific shipowners are losing their competitive 
edge, nagging doubts have been raised about the region's staying power (Lee, 1996; 
Holste, 1993; Kim, 1992; Peters, 1986). The implications of the current financial tunnoil 
gripping the region are also adding to this general feeling of unease and uncertainty. 
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Would Asia-Pacific shipowners be able to maintain their success in world shipping? The 
answer it seems is that i f Asia-Pacific shipowners are to maintain their new dominant 
position in shipping, they have to leam better ways of competing. Holste (1993) best 
sums up the current mood: 
No market segment exists in which competitive advantages are permanent If companies from 
the TMCs [tradional maritime countries] are to compete successfully, they will have to adapt 
frequently to changing market conditions and will have to fonn strategic alliances on a global 
level to best respond to the needs of an integrated world economy. Similar conditions for 
success apply to carriers fiom the NMCs [new maritime countries of the Asia-Paclftc], which 
have to move beyond their cost advantage and use this temporary strength to build a lasting 
market advantage based on Innovative corporate strategies and strategic alliances (p. 51). 
Such calls for innovative corporate strategies are growing, but how ready are the Asia-
Pacific shipowners to rise to this new challenge? 
2.6 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN ASIA-PACIFIC SHIPPING 
Like Holste (1993), Peters (1986) makes a similar plea for more strategy research into 
Asia-Pacific ports and shipping. He argues that there is much potential for growth in the 
area, but a lot depends on shipowners' ability to pursue the right strategic approach and 
on their knowledge of the general shipping environment. Unfortunately, as he has found 
in his study, although a lot has been written about Asia-Pacific shipping, much of this is 
fragmented and dispersed, with no coherent base, which severely limits widespread use. 
Credibility is also suspect, with many studies ofien skewed to reflect vested interests or 
political viewpoints. Even conceptual contributions are based mostly on personal views, 
without any empirical backing. The rapidity and magnitude of change in shipping adds 
fiirther complications because rapid change means findings have a very short 'shelf-life'. 
Peters thus argues for a continuing need to carry out new investigations and update 
current knowledge. He cites, for instance, the need for a better understanding of how 
transport system planning, the efficient management of the transport system, and the 
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financing of transport investments in ports and shipping are interrelated. According to 
him, these three areas are pivotal because they determine and are heavily influenced by 
the type of strategies selected by shipowners. Unfortunately, not much is known about 
how these three areas can be effectively integrated, and even less about the nature of 
strategies and strategic behaviour of shipowners. 
Lack of shipping strategy research 
Recent work by Wong (1991), Hawkins (1993), and Reker (1997) shows that the 
literature on shipping strategy is sparse and of very uneven quality, and specific 
reference to the new maritime nations of the Asia-Pacific is almost non-existent 
(Hawkins, 1993). Of the few available sources, attention has mainly focused on Europe 
and North America, with greater emphasis on the former (e.g. McKinsey, 1985; Hope 
and Boe, 1981; Lorange and Norman, 1972). This European orientation is perhaps to be 
expected given Europe's long tradition in world shipping; and even despite its gradual 
decline in fleet size since the 1970s, it still controls the largest share o f the worid's fleet 
(Lloyd's Martime Information Services, 1997; Thanopoulou, 1995; Aspinwall, 1995; 
Ledger and Roe, 1992). However, there is some evidence that this geographical 
imbalance is slowly being addressed. Harvey's (1987) study on ship financing included 
both European and US shipowners, while Cullinane (1991) covered a broader 
geographical mix, including one prominent Asia-Pacific nation. Hong Kong, in his study 
of risk preferences in shipping. More recent studies (Wong, 1991; Hawkins, 1993; 
Barton, 1995; Reker, 1997) are shedding more light on strategic management issues in 
the Asia-Pacific. Management texts on the area are also on the increase (e.g. Bartol, et 
al., 1998; Chow, et al., 1997). With the growing world interest in the region, the 
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increasing globalisation of shipping markets, and the recent trends in liner shipping 
toward global alliances, it is likely that more studies wi l l increasingly follow this pattern. 
Geographical orientation aside, the lack of research into shipping strategy appears to be 
pervasive throughout the industry. In academic and trade journals, management books, 
scholarly publications, and graduate courses and training programs, there appears to be a 
singular lack of attention to the theory and practice of shipping strategy. 
Shipping management journals and publications. Shipping strategy has not received any 
prominent attention in leading journals in shipping and port management. The Maritime 
Policy and Management, for instance, which is arguably the leading international 
academic journal on shipping and port research, has devoted very little space to the 
subject: a few articles on strategic plarming, and none on strategic management in general 
or corporate strategy in particular. While a number of articles have referred to corporate 
strategy, the treatment has been superficial, made only to support or clarify the main 
thrust of the authors' thesis (e.g. Aries, 1989, on business strategies; Hawkins, 1991b, 
on port strategy). Of the papers on strategic planning (Frankel, 1989; Arit, 1987; Rich, 
1978), all are concept papers in which the authors expound on their personal 
interpretations of the application of strategic planning to ports and shipping. Although 
no doubt these interpretations are drawn from the authors' extensive experience in the 
field) a major limitation is their lack of shipping-based research to provide empirical 
support. Even Frankel's (1989) highly influential work, which is the most frequently 
cited in shipping literature, shows no reference to shipping strategy research. Instead, 
support is drawn primarily from the general strategic management literature. 
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Other shipping publications and trade journals cover a wide range of subjects, but they 
too document very little research work. Some provide overviews of strategic 
management in shipping and ports, either in the form o f historical reconstructions or 
general introductory descriptions (e.g. Fairplay, 1997; Hawkins 1993; Yui and 
Nakagawa, 1985; ESCAP 1985a). Others give a brief analysis of the strategies of 
individual companies such as MISC (Lloyd's Shipping Economist, 1996b), OOCL 
(Containerisation Intemational, 1996b), K Line (Containerisation International, 1996d), 
COSCO (Containerisation Intemational, 1996e), Korean Carriers (Containerisation 
Intemational, 1997a), and Evergreen (Lloyd's Shipping Economist, 1997). Many others 
come in the form of conference papers, which, like the articles in shipping academic 
joumals, are primarily concept papers with little or no supporting evidence from 
shipping research. Some examples of such papers include Soper (1980) who v^rote on 
corporate planning in shipping, Carlson (1989) who focused on developing a business 
strategy for a port, and Hawkins who wrote about managing port investments (1991) 
and strategic management for Asia-Pacific shipowners (1996). Shipping management 
textbooks offer no better alternatives. Four widely used textbooks on the practices of 
shipping managers (Spruyt, 1994; Marcus, 1987; Yui and Nakagawa, 1985; Frankel, 
1982) do not even have any meaningful discussions on strategic planning and shipping 
strategies. 
Graduate degree programs. Further evidence of this lack of research literature on 
shipping strategy can be found in the curricula of graduate degree programs on shipping. 
In western countries, many leading institutions offering graduate programs on shipping 
management normally include at least one subject on strategic management in shipping in 
their curricula. This subject usually comes under various titles, for instance, shipping 
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policy (Master of Science in International Shipping, University of Plymouth), strategic 
management tools (Master of Transport and Maritime Management, University of 
Antwerp) strategic management (Master o f Business in Maritime Management, 
Australian Maritime College), corporate strategy in marine industries (Master o f Science 
in Maritime Management, Maine Maritime Academy), or shipping management strategy 
(Master of Science in Shipping Management, World Maritime University). While all 
these programs cite some general shipping literature on strategic planning for shipping 
and ports (notably Frankel, 1989) in their course material, they make no similar 
referencing for corporate strategies. Instead, they rely on the general strategic 
management literature, particularly on the work of Porter (1980, 1985) on competitive 
strategies at the business level. 
In East Asia, the trend is the same. Course material in many maritime management and 
shipping programs contains hardly any reference to shipping strategy research, while a 
significant part of the reading list is drawn from general strategic management literature 
(e.g. Kobe University of Merchantile Marine (Japan), Singapore Polytechnic, Korea 
Maritime University, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Dalian Maritime University 
(China), Indonesian Merchant Marine Academy, Malaysian Maritime Academy, 
Vietnam Maritime University, Thailand Maritime College). 
Theses and dissertations coming out of these graduate programs also reveal this lack in 
strategy research. Harvey's (1987) extensive review of the literature on corporate 
planning and strategy, for instance, draws almost exclusively on the general strategic 
management literature; in his review of the shipping literature on strategy, only two 
sources were cited, one by Rich (1982) and the other by the US Maritime 
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Administration (1982), which had been prepared for them by Delta Steamship Lines and 
Temple, Barker and Sloane Inc. Similar reviews by Wong (1991), Barton (1995), and 
Reker (1997) essentially take the same approach. 
The Importance of strategy research In shipping 
The lack of research work on strategic management in shipping is surprising for two 
reasons. One, there have been persistent calls for more strategic research in shipping 
since Lorange and Norman (1972) sounded the first call 25 years ago. And yet, although 
succeeding writers have echoed the same message in recent years (Peters, 1986; Wong, 
1991; Holste, 1993; Barton, 1995; Reker, 1997), the call has evidently not reached the 
wider shipping population. This continuing inattention to shipping strategy is even 
more surprising given significant advances in our understanding of the role of strategy in 
competitive performance. Research evidence over more than two decades points to a 
conclusive link between strategic management and performance: firms who practise 
strategic management have been found to be more profitable than those who do not 
(Miller and Cardinal, 1994). In spite of this substantial body of research, however, there 
is very little evidence of wide application in shipping. 
The critical role that strategy is expected to play in the 1990s and the new century is 
increasingly being stressed in the literature today, particularly in reference to the Asia-
Pacific. Lasserre and Schutte (1995) strongly argue that to successfully compete with 
Asian companies, Western companies must gain a better understanding of the 'Asian' 
way of doing things. They assert that this involves not just learning how to do things 
differently, but also how to do different things. According to them, this process of 
adaptation and transformation is necessary to facilitate entry into the Asian markets and 
ensure long-term competitive success in the region: 
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The [Asia-Pacific] region is changing and modernising rapidly, but it is a Western self-
delusion to equate modernisation with Westernisation. As Japan*s development over the last 
100 years or so has shown, it is possible to modernise without losing one's own identity and 
culture. Managing this change in Asia Is an enormous task and will bring setbacks and 
disasters ... 
Implementing global strategies in the region will not always be easy and will create problems 
for those who believe in a simple, uniform world. Not many global consumers are at home in 
Asia Pacific. Only on a superficial level do we witness a convei^ence in beliefs and practices. 
Bearing in mind the successful development of Asia Pacific over the last few decades, it cannot 
be expected that the region will move towards Western societal, economic and management 
models soon, if ever. As Rudyard Kilping said at the turn of the last century, *Asia is not 
going to be civilised after the methods of the West. There is too much Asia, and she is too 
old.' (p. 292). 
These have important implications to shipping, especially given recent trends in liner 
shipping of global alliances and partnerships between Euopean, North Amercian and 
Asian shipping companies. The western concepts and models of strategic management 
will need greater testing and adaptation before they can be assumed to work. Some may 
indeed not need any adaptation, while others may need a lot, but without adequate 
analysis and testing, we may be making bold and unsubstantiated assumptions. 
Toward a greater understanding of corporate strategies In shipping 
I f work on shipping strategy at a general level is sparse, work detailing the nature of 
strategy is even rarer. A number of articles and books discuss the evolution of strategies 
in different shipping companies (Slack et al., 1996; Lim, 1996; Yui and Nakagawa 1985) 
and some maritime consultancy reports recommend specific strategies for container 
shipping (Drewry, 1991) and dry bulk shipping (Drewry, 1996b). However, none of 
these provide any detailed and comprehensive analysis of shipping strategies; neither do 
they offer insights into the strategic behaviour of Asia-Pacific shipowners. 
Strategies can be classified in several ways, but of particular relevance to an 
organisation's long-term success are two types of strategies: business and corporate. 
Their names refer directly to the organisational level at which they are determined and 
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pursued: business strategies focus on the individual businesses or divisions of an 
organisation; corporate strategies, on the entire organisation. In general strategic 
management literature, work on business strategies has predominated while that on 
corporate strategies, although not entirely neglected, is relatively lighter. In shipping 
strategy literature, however, both types have received minimal attention, with perhaps 
business strategies getting a little bit more exposure than corporate strategies. 
Business strategies. A notable example of work on business strategies is Hansen's 
(1989) emalysis of shipping strategies, which is based on his previous research into 
Norwegian shipping (McKinsey, 1985). He described this analysis as 
... an effort to develop a better understanding of what it takes strategically to be successful in 
the highly dynamic shipping markets, how shipping companies can take advantage of 
opportunities that follow market changes, and how to understand and avoid being exposed to 
deadly risks (p. 13). 
Drawing heavily on Porter's (1980, 1985) work on business strategies and Peters and 
Watermzm's (1982) report on their 'search for excellence' among US companies, Hansen 
(1989) came up with four strategic types of shipping: contract (e.g. chemicals, 
container), industry (e.g. cruise), commodity (e.g. large bulk or oil), and special (e.g. 
LPG). Using these four types, he then proposed a number of business strategies for 
shipping, which essentially followed Porter's business strategy principles. In his 
analysis, Hansen concluded that superior analytical skills were one of the success 
factors common to all successful shipping companies; such skills enabled shipowners to 
assess market opportunities and threats and take advantage of company strengths. He 
also recommended the use of analytical frameworks to assist any such environmental 
analysis. 
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Following Hansens's lead, the Institute of Shipping Analysis recently conducted a 
similar analysis of shipping business strategies (Fairplay, 1997). The close resemblance 
in the approach used by the two studies could probably be attributed to the fact that the 
author of the Institute paper. Professor Tor Wergeland, was also part o f the McKinsey 
study team who studied Norwegian shipping in 1985. Like Hansen, this latter study 
also drew heavily on Porter's work (1980, 1985), leading Fairplay (1997) to claim, 
rather mistakenly, a universal application of Porter's strategies to shipping. 
Corporate strategies. Unlike business strategies, corporate strategies have not received 
similar attention in shipping. Recent studies on Asia-Pacific shipping (Barton, 1995; 
Reker, 1997) highlight this gap in the literature and urge for more research into the area, 
particularly in relation to Asia-Pacific shipping. In their surveys of East Asian 
shipowners, mainly in the liner trades, Barton (1995) and Reker (1997) found that the 
need for analytical tools and techniques to evaluate strategies was a major concern. 
Many shipowners complained of the lack of shipping-based analytical tools and 
criticised general tools which many believed were inappropriate or untested in shipping, 
and hence were not used. Wong's (1991) analysis of the strategic planning tools used by 
North East Asian shipowners in the liner industry highlighted a similar problem of 
credibility and low level o f use. Both users and non-users of analytical strategy selection 
techniques, such as the ones found in the general strategic management literature, voiced 
concerns over the relevance of such techniques to shipping. Although users were familiar 
with, and used to a limited degree, a number of mainstream analytical techniques and 
models, the general perception was that such techniques and models were not really that 
applicable to shipping. Non-users explained that because the language and layout used in 
the models was unfamiliar to them (presumably because they were drawn from 
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manufacturing concepts and principles), they dismissed them as not relevant or 
applicable to their industry. Similar conclusions were reached by a study on information 
technology use by Hong Kong shipowners (Saxena and Joshi, 1992). According to them, 
although the conservatism of shipowners may be a factor, an even bigger factor is the 
poor design of such systems, which has created a 'credibility gap' in shipovmers' minds 
and has made them more reluctant to use such systems (p. 61). 
The studies by Wong (1991), Barton (1995) and Reker (1997) have shed some much 
needed light on the strategic behaviour of shipowners, particularly Asia-Pacific 
shipowners. Although the generalisability of their survey data is limited because of low 
response rates (less than 20 per cent), nonetheless their studies represent one of the 
initial steps toward developing a better understanding o f strategy use by Asia-Pacific 
shipowners. They also highlight the need for more research into strategies and strategy 
selection techniques that can assist Asia-Pacific shipowners in competiting more 
effectively among themselves and with other regions. I f strategy is the answer to long-
term competitiveness, what must Asia-Pacific shipovmers do to achieve this objective? 
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Chapter Three 
OVERVIEW OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
This chapter and the next two examine the strategic management literature. Three areas 
are covered: the historical development of strategic management as a field of inquiry 
(Chapter Two), the types of strategies pursued by organisations to maintain their com-
petitive edge in the market(s) in which they operate (Chapter Three), and available tools 
for strategy selection and evaluation (Chapter Four). 
In this chapter, the development of strategic management as a field of study is examined. 
The major theoretical perspectives that have shaped strategic management are discussed, 
and the development of the field over the last 30 years is analysed. Based on this re-
view, areas for further research are then identified. 
3.1 MAJOR INFLUENCES ON MANAGEMENT THOUGHT 
Anderson (1984) lists eight schools of thought that have been major contributors to the 
growth and development of our understanding of management Classified into three main 
groups, they include: 
Theories of management skills 
The human relations school 
The organisation behaviour school 
The information and decision school 
Theories ofmanagement functions 
Scientific management 
The quantitative school (management science) 
The strategic management school 
Theories of organisational systems 
Administrative management 
The organisational theory school 
These schools of thought are compared in Table 3.1, and an overview o f the disciplines 
that have given rise to them is depicted in Figure 3.1. A l l these major schools o f man-
agement thought have built on the contributions of other disciplines in the development 
of their theories. However, although these disciplines have laid the foundation for and 
enriched management thought, their application, with their disparate theoretical orienta-
tions and methodological approaches, within the same research area has also produced 
confusion and disagreement As the following sections would indicate, this confusion 
and disagreement would be echoed within the strategic management field, particularly 
during its fledgling years. 
Political 
Science 
Indus tnal 
Engineering 
Sociology 
Cooperative 
Social 
Systems 
Socio 
Technical 
Systems 
Social 
Psychology 
General 
Systems 
Theory Group 
Behaviour 
Applied 
Systems 
Theory 
Cultural 
Anthropology Basle 
Management 
Theory 
Decision 
Theory 
Interpersonal 
Behaviour 
Rational 
Choice 
Distilled 
Managing 
Experience 
and Analysis of 
Managerial 
Roles 
Psychology 
Management 
Science 
Economic 
Theory 
Clinical Expenence 
of Practitioners Mathematics 
Figure 3.1 Academic disciplines that have contributed to management thought 
Source: Anderson, 1984, p. 55 
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Table 3.1 A comparison of major schools of management thought 
(Compiled from Anderson, 1984) 
School Problem 
Addressed 
Original 
Authors 
Specific Areas Main Contribution 
Human relations Motivation Mayo 
Roethlisberger 
Human factoid on the job Provided a broader definition of motivation: shift 
from an econonuc orientation to a multi-faceted 
approach emphasising psychological, social and 
economic Actors 
Oiganisation behaviour Integration of 
people into the 
oiganisation 
Argyris 
Maslow 
MacGregor 
Likert 
Relationship of individuals with the or-
ganisation, satisfying individual needs 
while simultaneously reaching high levels 
ofpeifomiance 
Fostered employee p productivity through devel-
opment of interpenonal skills, basic skills in 
decision making and goal setting, and instilling 
in managers the value of trust and participation 
Infonnadon and decision Management 
decision skills 
Simon 
March 
Cyert 
(Caraegie-
Mellon Univ) 
How managers actually make decisions on 
the job, process of decision making, effec-
tive human and organisational decision 
making skills 
Differentiated between progranomed and non pro-
grammed decisions; propounded the rational the-
ory of satisficing and the rational approach to de-
cision making 
Scientific management Human produc-
tivity 
Taylor 
Gilbreth and 
Gilbredi 
Scientific decision making; manage-
ment/labour cooperation, time and motion 
studies, standardisation, bonus, individu-
alised work, shorter hours, management 
training, rest pauses 
The beginnings of modem management theoiy: 
first systematic use of goal setting in organisa-
tions, procedures for selection and hiring, system-
atic study of woric and the role of management 
Undertook first attempts at systematic oiganisa-
tional design. 
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Table 3.1 (cont'd) A comparison of major schools of management thought 
(Compiled from Anderson, 1984) 
School Problem 
Addressed 
Original 
Authors 
Specific Focus Areas Main Contribution 
Quantitative school 
(management science) 
Application of 
objective func-
tions to man-
agement 
Koontz Mathematical/quantitative approach to 
management 
Introduced analytical and statistical tools for func-
tional areas, particularly planning and control: 
linear programming, inventory models, queuing 
theory, planning tools (eg PERT) 
Strategic management Lx)ng range 
planning and 
management 
Harvard Business 
School 
Dnicker 
Ansoff 
Defining and implementing long term 
goals and plans of the organisation, the 
strategy process, content of strategy, link 
between strategy and oi^ ganisation 
Defined role and functions of chief executives v. 
lower level managers; stressed importance of 
strategy to company survival 
Administrative manage-
ment 
Organisational 
structure 
Weber 
Fayol 
Bureaucratic structure; hierarchy, division 
of labour, ranking of individuals accord-
ing to power and expertise; professional 
management 
First to develop management principles for man-
agers in large organisations, emphasise that train-
ing in these basic principles is the key to suc-
cessful management, and lay the ground rules for 
the organisation of large enterprises 
Organisational theoiy Oiganisation 
design 
Woodward 
Thompson 
Lawrence 
Lorsch 
Galbraith 
Components of organisations, interrela-
tionships with one another with the envi-
roimient, process of matching an organisa-
tion's design with its environment 
Laid down tiie theoretical foundations of the in-
terdependencies between parts of an organisation; 
introduced the concept of an organisation as an 
open system 
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3.2 THE BEGINNINGS OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
As an area of study within the field of management, strategy is of relatively recent ori-
gin, but the concept itself is not new. The word strategy comes from the Latin word 
strategos, which 
[ijnitially ... referred to a role (a general in command of an army). Later, it came to mean 'the 
art of the general,' which is to say the psychological and behavioral skills with which he occu-
pied the role. By the time of Pericles (450 BC), it came to mean managerial skills 
(administration, leadership, oration, power). And by Alexander's time (330 BC) , it referred to 
the skill of employing forces to overcome opposition and to create a unified system of global 
governance (Evered, 1983, p. 3). 
Up until about four decades ago, the term strategy had been associated mainly with mili-
tary operations: 
One of the functions of the earliest historians and poets was to collect the accumulated lore of... 
successful and unsuccessful life-and-death strategies and convert them into wisdom and guid-
ance for the future. As societies grew laiger and conflicts more complex, generals, statesmen, 
and captains studied, codified, and tested essential strategic concepts until a coherent body of 
principles seemed to emerge. In various forms, these were ultimately distilled in the maxims of 
Sun Tzu (1963), Machiavelli (1950), Napoleon (1940), Von Clausewitz (1976), Foch (1970), 
Unin (1927), Hart (1954). Montgomery (1958), or Mao Tse-Tung (1967) (Quinn et al., 1988, 
p. 4). 
According to Ansofif (1965), von Neumann and Morgenstem (1948), who developed the 
theory of games, provided the bridge from military to business usage: 
Although game theory has not resulted in many practical applications, it has revolutionized 
ways of thinking about social problems in general and business in particular. One of the conse-
quences was the increasing use of the concept of strategy in business literature. As one would 
expect, some business writers borrowed from game theory to define strategy as a set of specific 
product-marlcet entries ... while others have defmed it in the military sense as the broad overall 
concept of the firm's business ... (Ansoff, 1965, pp. 118-119). 
Once introduced, the concept of strategy found ready acceptance in the management 
field. As AnsofT, one of the most influential voices in the field, noted in 1965: 
[d]uring the past ten years the idea of strategy has received increasing recognition in manage-
ment literature ... This interest grew out of the realization that a firm needs a well-defined scope 
and growth direction, that objectives alone do not meet this need, and that additional decision 
rules are required if the firm is to have orderly and profitable growth. Such decision roles and 
guidelines have been broadly defined as strategy or, sometimes, as the concept of the finn's 
business (Ansoff, 1965, p. 103; boldface added). 
Since then, the practice and study of strategic management in general and of strategy in 
particular has developed steadily. It continues to be a dynamic, rapidly growing area. 
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with research branching out into a widening array of organisations and industries cover-
ing different countries and geographical locations. 
3.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AS A FIELD OF 
INQUIRY 
The development of the strategic management field following the second w^orld war can 
be roughly organised into three stages, commencing in the 1960s and extending into the 
present. This section provides a brief overview of the three stages, and then discusses 
each stage in detail, highlighting the key issues, developments and thinkers in each. 
Overview 
The 1960s mark the formal emergence of strategic management as a separate field of in-
quiry. At this initial stage, the first attempts at theory building were published. 
The succeeding decade, the 1970s, which marked stage 2, was characterised by a rapid 
growth in, and robust debate over, theoretical (and quasi-theoretical) perspectives and 
conceptual models. At this stage, much of the debate remained at the conceptual level; 
empirical evidence, although steadily growing, was not substantive enough to redefine 
the debate. 
Stage 3 began in the 1980s and extends into the present. This stage is characterised by a 
continuing refinement of concepts and models as more empirical evidence is gathered and 
the field matures. The debate now is not so much on the superiority of one paradigm or 
research method over another as on the suitability and appropriateness o f combining dif-
ferent paradigms and methods to explain different situations. Empirical evidence to date 
points to the need for more eclectic, more integrated and inter-disciplinary approaches. 
There are also calls for more reviews of the literature so that the growing body of strate-
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gic management theory and research can be systematically analysed and incorporated 
into the field's body o f knowledge. Theory building and testing are continuing, as re-
search broadens to areas far beyond the original manufacturing/product industries which 
provided the foundation for initial research studies. 
The first two stages in strategic management research, the 1960s and 1970s, were domi-
nated by two competing schools of thought. One was the 'formal analysis' school, with 
its roots mainly in economics, scientific management, management science and adminis-
trative management It was also known as the * rational-analytical' or Mogical-
positivistic' school. The second was the 'process' school (Morris, 1987a), with its roots 
on organisational behaviour, design of organisations, and human and organisational deci-
sion-making processes. These two schools have also come to be known as 'rationalist' 
and 'incremental' or 'emergent', respectively. The level of disagreement between these 
two schools was—and is—remarkably high. Proponents of the formal analysis school 
discredit models based on the process school as non-rational, unstructured, and reactive; 
proponents of the process school, on the other hand, argue that models based on the 
formal analysis school were too mechanistic and formalistic. 
In recent years, a third school of thought has emerged. Although there is no widely ac-
cepted name for it, it can be aptly called the 'holistic' or 'synthesis' school, because it 
advocates a more holistic and interdisciplinary approach to the study of management 
The word 'synthesis' is borrowed fi"om Miller and Mintzberg (1983) who argue that 
management research can be best served by an approach that seeks to integrate various 
attributes of managements into composite frameworks or configurations. 
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stage 1: Theory building (19609) 
The study of strategy and strategic management became an identifiable field o f inquiry m 
the business literature in the 1960s with the simultaneous publication o f three semimd 
pieces of work: Alfred Chandler's Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of 
American Industrial Enterprise, published in 1962; Igor AnsofPs Corporate Strategy: 
An Analytic Approach to Business Policy for Growth and Expansion, published in 1965; 
and the Harvard Business School's (Edmund Learned, C Roland Christensen, Kenneth 
Andrews and William Gutl\^ Business Policy: Texts and Cases, published in 1965. 
This initial stage was dominated by the formal analysis school. Among its leading pro-
ponents were Kenneth Andrews and Igor Ansoff. Both men are typically credited for 
first articulating the concept of corporate strategy. They were the first to focus specifi-
cally on the concept of strategy and to develop analytical frameworks within which the 
concept can be defined. However, although both built on Chandler's (1962) dictum, 
'structure follows strategy', their interpretation of the scope of strategy differed. To 
Andrews (1965, 1971), strategy included both an organisation's goals and the means to 
achieve these goals; to Ansoff (1965), it was limited to the means of achieving organisa-
tional goals. As we shall see in the succeeding discussion, this basic difference would be 
carried on by later writers. 
It should also be mentioned here that another work actually predated these three publi-
cations: Peter Drucker's The Practice of Management, published in 1954. According to 
Hofer and Schendel (1978), Drucker was actually the first to address the issue of strat-
egy in business management, but he did so only implicitly, framing it instead in terms of 
two questions: 'What is our business? And what should it be?'. As a result, it was not 
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until the latter half of thel960s, when interest in strategy had become more widespread, 
that Drucker's seminal work was 'rediscovered'. 
Stage 2: The debate between competing schools (1970s) 
The energetic inquiry into the concept of corporate strategy that followed the work of 
Andrews and AnsofF, and the emergence of a contrary viewpoint in reaction to the 
dominant formal analysis theme, characterised stage 2 in the development of the field. 
Revisions within the formal analysis schooL Much of the work produced during this pe-
riod built upon the work of Andrews and Ansoff and reflected the same formal analyti-
cal perspective. Major contributors included, according to year of publication, Katz 
(1970) Argenti (1974), Drucker, (1974), Rumelt (1974), Vancil and Lorange (1975), 
Hofer (1975), Hedley (1976,1977), and Steiner and Miner (1977). 
Within the formal analysis school, there was a distinct pattern of growth: fi-om an early 
emphasis on long-range planning to strategic planning and finally to strategic manage-
ment. The move away from fomfial long-range planning was easy to understand: plans 
became too elaborate and too unwieldy; often they did not match the realities existing 
within the organisation; and they were limited to financial forecasts based on the organi-
sation's previous performance (Ansoff, 1987). 
The shift to strategic or corporate planning partially silenced some of the major criti-
cisms levelled against long-range planning, but not for long. Although there was over-
whelming evidence suggesting that firms that planned performed better than those that 
did not (Rumelt, 1974), research also showed that almost every organisation studied 
followed different 'planning' models, some of wiiich were not always formally con-
ceived, a pr/or/, as the word 'plan' would normally suggest, or limited to financial con-
st 
siderations. Indeed, research showed that the strategy process was much more complex, 
more encompassing, than that suggested by the concept 'strategic planning'. Thus was 
bom the concept of strategic management (Ansoff, 1965; AnsofF et al., 1976). 
The emergence of the process school. I t was also during the 1970s that the fomial analy-
sis approach to the study of management came under criticism for ignoring the behav-
ioural aspects of management Criticism centred on the approach's exclusive reliance on 
measurable quantitative factors and its lack of attention to vita! qualitative, organisa-
tional and power-behavioural factors which so often determined strategic success in any 
one situation. Critics contended that in practice, planning was 'just one building block in 
a continuous stream of events that really determine corporate strategy' (Quinn, 1978, 
p.7). The process school also extended its criticisms to previous behavioural studies: 
Unfortunately, many power-behavioral studies have been conducted in settings far removed from 
the realities of strategy formulation. Others have concentrated solely on human dynamics, 
power relationships and ot^anizational processes, ignoring the ways in which systematic data 
analysis shapes and often dominates crucial aspects of strategic decisions (Quinn, 1978, p. 8). 
The most prominent members of the process school were Bower (1970), Child (1972, 
1974, 1975), Mintzberg (1972, 1973, 1976, 1978), Miller and Friesen (1977), Quinn 
(1978), and Miles and Snow (1978). Drawing on studies on the dynamics of human be-
haviour in business settings and on earlier studies done in other fields, notably public 
administration, sociology and politics (e.g. Cyert and March, 1954, 1964; March and 
Simon, 1958; Lindblom, 1959), proponents of the process school argued that strategies 
were not always formally made or formulated and that strategic decision making was not 
the exclusive domain of top management. The main thesis of the process school was that 
strategies were formed as part of the decision-making processes occurring at various lev-
els of an organisation, emerging as recognisable patterns only afterwards. 
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Stage 3: Redefining the debate (1980s to the present) 
This last stage is characterised by two trends: the move toward a holistic approach to 
the study and practice of management, and further refmements within the formal analy-
sis and process schools. 
The move toward holistic management. The need for a more holistic approach to man-
agement was first articulated by Bowman (1974) who recommended the use of difTerent 
approaches to better understand corporate strategy. However, his call was largely ig-
nored until the more prominent writers in the field took up the same cause. 
By the end of the 1970s, the mood of the debate had started to change. Summing up the 
research fmdings o f the period, Hofer and Schendel (1978) noted: 
Recent policy research has shown ... that while strategies do diflfer among different types of 
businesses, there are also patterns of strategies that are appropriate to broad sets of environ-
mental conditions ... [R]esearch in the areas of organizational theory, organizational behavior, 
and accounting have indicated that different methods of organizing, staffing, directing, and con-
trolling are appropriate for different situations... (p. 196). 
Hofer and Schendel (1978) also cited tiie work of Mintzberg (1973) and otiiers which 
clearly showed that all levels of management performed similar management functions, 
but that the nature of the work performed at each management level differed. They also 
noted that 'these ideas [had] not yet been extensively integrated in management practice' 
(p. 196) nor were they 'yet reflected in most writings in the policy, organizational the-
ory, and organizational behavior fields' (p. 197). However, they closed with a clear 
statement about what needed to be done: 
What is clear ... is that a firm's strategic management process must be treated as an integrated 
total system. Thus, it would be counter productive to try to implement some of the strategy 
fomiulation tools and techniques described in this text without concurrently altering all the im-
plementation processes and systems of the firm, including its staffmg and promotion practices, 
measurement and evaluation systems, compensation systems, and management control systems 
(p. 198). 
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Since then, research in the area has increasingly focused on a more holistic, interdiscipli-
nary, eclectic approach to strategic management. Today, the focus of the debate is not so 
much on which school provides the better theory and research methodology but, rather, 
on deciphering the appropriate strategic configurations for different situations and on 
choosing the appropriate research methodology for examining or validating different 
theoretical, conceptual or practical issues (see, for instance, Snow and Thomas, 1994; 
Lyles, 1990). While debate continues between the rationalistic and process schools, 
which one writer describes as at heart a conflict between proactive purposefulness ver-
sus reactive powerlessness (Gaddis, 1997), the general trend is toward more integrated, 
systemic and interdisciplinary approaches to the study of management (Taylor, 1997). 
Greater emphasis is placed on the need to acknowledge, in both theory and practice, the 
equal importance of intuition and analysis in strategic management, and of tiie existence 
of various configurations in which strategies are managed. This new way of thinking is 
increasingly reflected in recent editions of many management textbooks (e.g. Collis and 
Montgomery, 1997; Johnson and Scholes, 1997, Pearce and Robinson, 1997; Thompson 
and Strickland, 1996). 
Advances wUhin the formal analysis and process schools. The advent of the holistic or 
synthesis school has not necessarily meant the demise o f either the process or formal 
analysis school. Although criticisms of both schools are expected to continue, nonethe-
less, some significant advances have been made by each school that has helped clarify 
our understanding of strategy. 
Within the formal analysis school, work by Glueck (1980), Porter (1980, 1985, 1990), 
Hamermesh (1983, 1986), Rumeh (1991), Hamel and Pralahad (1989, 1990, 1993), 
84 
Goold and Campbell (1987, 1994), and Collis and Montgomery (1995, 1997) has sub-
stantially advanced our knowledge of strategy. 
Model testing and validation has continued, with a stronger emphasis shown on the ap-
plicability of models across industries and geographical regions. In his review of the lit-
erature, Morris (1987a) cited several such recent attempts: Galbraith and Schendel 
(1983) and Dess and Davis (1982) tested Porter's models; Hammermesh (1983, 1984) 
tested portfolio planning; and Herbert and Deresky (1987) tested typologies of business 
strategies. 
There has also been a clear trend toward greater research on the content of strategy, fo-
cusing specifically on specific strategies and their impact on economic performance 
(Morris, 1988). This is borne by more recent syntheses (David, 1997; Hussey, 1994) 
which show the latest research on strategy and performance (e.g. Rumelt, 1991; 
Ramanujam and Venkatraman, 1987; Cook and Ferris, 1986; Rhyne, 1986; Allen, 1985) 
further strengthening the evidence that high-performing organisations tend to be more 
strategic in both orientation and practice. With the reality of global trading and the rapid 
multiplication of multinational companies, greater attention is also being placed on the 
role of corporate bodies in managing their portfolio of businesses for greater profitabil-
ity. Leading the way in this area are Goold and Campbell (1987, 1994). 
A new revolutionary idea on viewing strategy has also taken hold. From merely at-
tempting to find a fit between what an organisation has and what the market offers, there 
is a new view that defines the organisation in terms of its core competences (Hamel and 
Pralahad, 1990) and examines the various ways the organisation can take advantage of 
these competences to make itself competitively strong. This view has come to be known 
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as the resource-based view of the f i rm (Wemerfelt, 1984; Collis and Montgomery, 1995) 
and as Collis and Montgomery (1997) assert, it 'more broadly and accurately defines the 
assets that can function as core competences and lays out the conditions under which 
they can be sources of value in multiple businesses' (p.22). 
Within the process school, a similar process of model building and verification is occur-
ring, with research focusing on such key areas as the politics of strategic decision mak-
ing, the Unk between structure and the strategy process, the role of informal decision 
making and managing in strategy implementation and the fit between managerial skills, 
styles, and responsibilities. Some o f the more noteworthy work on these areas includes 
Fredrickson (1984), Fredrickson and Mitchell (1984), Warner and Arnold (1986), 
MacMillan (1986), and Miles and Snow (1986). Speaking of these new developments in 
process research, Morris (1987a) notes: 
...[A recent and] interesting trend in thinking about strategy ... suggests the need for a shift 
away fix>ni mechanistic and highly rational planning to recapture flexibility, creativity and 
judgement Such arguments have implications for the role of planners, the processes of planning 
and the shape of organizations. They suggest a reawakening of interest in instinct rather than 
programmed analytical decision-making; a refocusing on the importance of line-management 
experience for really understanding product maikets; a challenging of all assumptions (p. 93). 
Further work on the nature of strategy as a process has also been undertaken, notably 
by Mintzberg and Waters (1985) and Mintzberg (1987). Mintzberg's main thesis is that 
strategy formation has less to do with formal planning than with the intuitive knowledge 
and experience of decision makers whom he likens to highly skilled crafismen who 
'craft' rather than deliberately plan strategies (Mintzberg, 1987). Strategy itself is not 
always deliberate; it can emerge from the various political processes and decisions made 
within the organisation (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). 
86 
Since the 1990s, both schools have also moved towards a stronger international orienta-
tion, which was largely a reflection of recent developments in world trade. As the 
world's markets continue to be reorganised into regional trading blocs, and as companies 
increasingly seek entry into national markets around the world, the need for appropriate 
strategies to deal with competition at this global scale has become a primary focus in the 
field, as evident in the work of Porter (1990) on the competitive advantage of nations 
and Yip (1995) on global strategy, and as reflected in recent reviews o f strategic man-
agement research agenda (Gopinath and Hoffman, 1995; Lyies, 1990). There has also 
been a geographical broadening of the research base, with attention increasingly dravm to 
the Asia-Pacific region (e.g. Bartol, et al., 1998; Lasserre and Schutte, 1995). The re-
gion's dynamic growth in the last three decades has attracted large-scale commercial and 
academic interest, and as more western organisations venture into relatively 'unknown 
world of the Asian', this interest is likely to continue into the next century. 
In summary, it can be seen Grom the literature over the last three decades that there has 
been a steady maturation of the field, which has considerably expanded our knowledge 
of the subject, both in breadth and depth, across different businesses, industries, and 
geographical regions. A sign of this maturity has been the move away from espousing 
the superiority of one particular school of thought, paradigm or research method over 
another, the need for greater integration between intuition and analysis or between for-
mal and informal strategy processes, and the growing adoption and advocacy of more 
eclectic, interdisciplinary approaches. However, there still remain some conceptual and 
methodological problems that prevent a broader application of strategy. The meaning 
and use of key terminology still remain unresolved; more importantly, empirical evi-
dence to demonstrate the practical application and validity of conceptual models across 
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business, industrial and geographical settings is still wanting (Lasserre and Schutte, 1995; 
Miller and Cardinal, 1994; Snow and Thomas, 1994; Lyles, 1990). 
3.4 AREAS FOR FURTHER R E S E A R C H 
What then does the fiiture hold? Clearly, the debate wil l continue as empirical evidence 
builds up and theory building and refmement is pursued. From the major trends emerging 
in the literature, which have been summarised in the preceding sections, greater emphasis 
on the following areas can be expected: 
the content of strategy, specifically, on generic strategies and their applicability to 
a variety of business, industry, and geographical settings, 
• the link between content and process, specifically, in relation to behavioural vari-
ables (values, motivations, power, etc.) and organisational processes, and 
a more eclectic, interdisciplinary approach to theory building and research. 
Of these issues, the study of corporate strategic choices by Asia-Pacific shipowners 
falls within the first domain, the content of strategy. In the next two chapters, therefore, 
discussion will focus on the types of strategies needed for competitive survival 
(Chapter Four) and the analytical tools that can facilitate strategy selection and evalua-
tion (Chapter Five). 
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Chapter Four 
THE CX)NTENT OF STRATEGY 
The literature on strategy can usually be organised into two areas, one focusing on the 
content of strategy and the other focusing on the process. Of these two areas, work on 
content is far more extensive (Bailey and Johnson, 1995). While much o f what is written 
about the content of strategy, both in terms of conceptual frameworks and empirical 
evidence, has been drawn from the manufacturing industries, and while there continues 
to be disagreement in the definition of concepts like 'strategy' (see Chapter One), there 
is a remarkable high degree of agreement on everything else, particularly on such key 
areas as the purpose of strategy, the major strategy types an organisation can pursue to 
maintain a competitive edge, and the organisational levels at v ^ c h these strategies 
should be pursued. This chapter examines these aspects of strategy, and by way of 
conclusion, pulls together what is currenUy known about strategy types into a 
comprehensive typology of strategies. This typology is then used as part of the study's 
conceptual framework (see Chapter Five). 
4.1 THE NATURE OF STRATEGY 
It has been said earlier that the literature on strategic management suffers from semantic 
problems, the most serious of which is the lack of consistency in the use of fundamental 
concepts like strategy and business strategy. In some instances, strategy is defined as 
the means to achieve a goal; in others, the defmition is broadened to include botii the goal 
and the means to achieve this goal. When stripped of tiie surrounding polemics, 
however, it is easy to see Uiat any differences in defmitions lie mainly in scope: some 
authors bring goals into the definition; others do not. What is never in question is the 
key attribute o f strategy: the means of achieving a strategic goal. In this regard, there is 
clear unanimity in the field. Basic tenets about strategy—for instance, its importance to 
a firm's competitive survival, the components o f effective strategy, levels o f strategy— 
receive almost universal acceptance. 
The power of strategy 
Strategy has long been held to be one of the most important areas of management 
(Howe, 1986). Harvey (1988, p. 9) attributes this to strategic management's ability to 
give a firm and its top management a distinct advantage in 'providing long-term 
direction, adapting to an increasing rate of change, gaining a competitive advantage in a 
high-risk environment, and achieving a more effective organisation*. David's (1997) 
synthesis of the research over the last several decades amply shows a strong link 
between strategy and performance: those who use strategic management concepts are 
more profitable and successful, are more likely to engage in systematic planning, are 
better at understanding their environment and anticipating future changes, take a more 
long-term perspective, and empower both managers and employees by involving them in 
the strategy decision-making processes. Research also shows that *the process, rather 
than the decision or document, is the more important contribution of strategic 
management' (p. 15). 
Elements of an effective strategy 
In their review of strategy research, Hofer and Schendel (1978) identified four key 
elements o f an effective strategy: scope, resource deployments, competitive advantage 
and synergy. Briefly, these can be defined as follows: 
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Scope (or domain) is the range of a firm's present and planned interactions with 
the environment. It include such factors as product and market segments, 
geography, technology, distribution channels, etc. 
• Resource deployments (distinctive competencies) refer to the availability of 
certain skills and resources that a firm requires to achieve its goals and objectives 
(Porter, 1980, 1985). 
Competitive advantage is the relative position of a firm vis-a-vis its competitors, 
which results from the firm's product positioning, market positioning and/or re-
source deployments. 
• Synergy. This is similar to Ansoffs 2+2=5 concept, which is premised on a 
holistic view of the firm. Hofer and Schendel (1978, p. 26) define it as 'the degree 
to which the various resource deployments and interactions of the organisation 
with its environment reinforce or negate one another'. 
These four components are widely regarded as equal contributors to a firm's overall 
success, although in some cases, one component may assume a greater role than another. 
Taken togedier, an organisation's scope, resource deployments, and competitive advan-
tages determine its effectiveness. The prime determinants of its efficiency, however, are 
the synergies it develops among its various distinctive competencies and product/market 
entries. 
The levels of strategy 
Another area where there is strong agreement is in strategy levels. There are three 
acknowledged levels—corporate, business and functional—which correspond to the 
organisational levels of a complex firm: top management, single-business units and 
functional departments, respectively. 
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Corporate strategy is the domain of top management. I t encompasses both the business 
and functional levels and provides the general parameters within which strategic choices 
at each level should be made. Corporate strategy is used to defme the mix and match of 
businesses in which a firm should compete, and to ensure a proper alignment between 
these choices and the requisite resources and organisational structures (Hofer and 
Schendel, 1978). Corporate strategy typically implies usage within a national market 
However, with the rapidly increasing globalisation of markets, its meaning has now been 
extended to include multinational strategy, or strategy aimed at dealing effectively with 
competitors on a worldwide basis. 
Where corporate strategy involves the whole firm and is primarily concerned with 
where the firm must compete, business strategy focuses on the individual business units 
that make up the firm and how the firm must compete in each of these businesses. Also 
known as competitive strategy, business strategy is designed to improve the competitive 
position of a specific business or product in the market(s) in which the fimi competes. 
Porter (1985), the leading expert in business strategy, explains: 
Competition is at the core of the success or failure of firms. Competition determines the 
appropriateness of an organisation's activities that can contribute to its performance, such as 
innovations, a cohesive culture, for good implementation. Competitive strategy is the search 
for a favorable competitive position in an industry, the fundamental arena in which competition 
occurs. Competitive strategy aims to establish a profitable and sustainable position against the 
forces that detennine industry competition (p. I) . 
At the third and lowest level is the Junctional, or operational, strategy. Its main area of 
responsibility is determining how the different functions of a firm can contribute to the 
business and corporate levels. 
The functional level is concemed with managing product, geographic, or functional areas and 
the actual production and marketing of goods and services. The principal focus of functional 
strategy is on maximizing target objectives as an element of a business strategy, such as 
becoming the lowest-cost producer of a product. There is a functional strategy for each major 
segment of the business, including marketing, manufacturing, finance, human resources, 
research and development, and indeed for each functional unit that makes up a total business 
strategy (Harvey, 1988, pp. 14-15). 
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In recent years, a fourth level has been identified in the literature. Called enterprise 
strategy or societal strategy^ its scope is broader than corporate strategy. In brief, the 
main difference between the two lies in their interaction with their external environment. 
Corporate strategy focuses on giving the firm a winning edge in market competition; 
enterprise or societal strategy deals with an organisation's interactions with various 
sectors of the public with which it conducts its business. A sub-group of enterprise or 
societal strategy also recentiy identified is collective strategy (Quinn et al., 1988; Astley 
and Fombrun, 1983; Pfeffer, 1976), where the aim is to band with other firms to 
promote a common cause. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the hierarchical relationship of the four strategy levels. Business 
strategy and corporate strategy have received by far the most attention in the literature, 
as these are the ones primarily required to sustain an organisation's competitive edge in 
the market. By comparison, the conceptual work that has gone into delineating the other 
strategy levels, functional and societal, is relatively light, as is the empirical evidence 
available on them. 
Enterprise (or societal) level 
Corporate level 
Business level 
Functional level 
Figure 4.1 Hierarchy of strategy levels 
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4.2 T Y P E S O F S T R A T E G I E S 
Over the last 30 years, a considerable body of work has accumulated on specific 
strategies that fums use to remain competitive in the markets in which they operate. 
Particularly during the initial years, much of the work involved individual research 
attempts on a specific level, a specific organisation or spread of organisations, and a 
specific industry. However, no attempt was made to pull this growing body of 
knowledge together, examine it, and draw a more comprehensive picture o f what was 
known about strategy. Without this synthesis, it was probably inevitable that confusion 
over terminology arose as a seemingly wide array of strategies entered the strategic 
management literature. 
Efforts to put more order into the research on strategies commenced in the early 1970s, 
when typologies of strategies began to appear. Since then, numerous attempts at 
classifying strategies have continued to appear, leading one critic to call 'the 
construction of lists' as *the dominant methodology of strategy', which although widely 
used is erroneous because most of these lists are not subjected to empirical testing to 
establish their practical application (Kay, 1995, p. 360). 
Today the typologies on offer are just as numerous, and at first glance just as confusing. 
However, careful examination will show that in spite of differences in terminology and 
scope, all currently available typologies are based on one or a combination of the 
following classification criteria: 
product/market/corporate life cycle (e.g. Herbert and Deresky, 1987; Glueck, 
1980; Hofer and Schendel, 1978; BCG, 1976; Buzzell, etal., 1975; James, 1974) 
• market positioning (e.g. Porter, 1985; Hofer and Schendel, 1978) 
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geographical scope (e.g. Leontiades, 1985; Shanks, 1985; Doz, 1980) 
• organisational structure (e.g. Galbraith and Schendel, 1983; Miles and Snow, 1978; 
Rumelt, 1974; Wrigley, 1970) 
• the organisational level at which the strategy is used (e.g. Melcher and Kezner, 
1988; Hofer and Schendel, 1978; Pfeffer, 1976) 
the strategic management process (e.g. Mintzberg, 1988, 1996) 
management styles (e.g. Mintzberg, 1980) 
Of these eight classification criteria, the fif\h, organisational level, is used as the main 
basis for classifying strategies in this study. This criterion has been chosen to provide a 
clearer link between strategies and organisational structure and because i t allows an easy 
incorporation of the first four classification criteria. The last two classification criteria, 
strategic management process and management styles, are excluded from consideration 
because they deal more with tiie process rather than tiie content of strategy. 
The discussion that follows covers the three main strategy levels: corporate, business 
and functional. Of these three levels, the study's primary concern is with corporate 
strategy; to better understand its role and place in an organisation, however, it is 
necessary to also bring into focus business and functional strategies. The fourth level, 
enterprise or societal, is not included in the discussion largely because o f the paucity of 
information about it, both conceptually and empirically. 
Corporate-level strategies 
Corporate strategies, as defmed earlier in this chapter, are the domain of top 
management. They define the general parameters within which an organisation makes its 
strategic choices. Originally used to imply usage within national markets, today 
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corporate strategies also encompass multinational or global strategies. Both types of 
corporate strategy wi l l be discussed in this section. 
What is currently known about corporate strategies? To answer this question, a 
comprehensive comparison of corporate strategies identified in the literature was made 
(Hawkms, 1989), and the results are sunmiarised in Tables 4.1 to 4.4. 
A generic typology of corporate strategies 
Since the early 1970s, a number of typologies have been developed to aid strategy 
identification and selection. Table 4.1 identifies 13 of these typologies. Considered to be 
the major ones, they include James (1974), Hofer and Schendel (1978), Wissema et al. 
(1980), Glueck (1980), Galbraith and Schendel (for consumer products, 1983), Galbraith 
and Schendel (for industrial products, 1983), Buzzell, Gale and Sultan (1983), Day 
(1984), Allaire and Firsirotu (1985), Smith, Arnold and Buzzell (1985), Howe (1986), 
Herbert and Deresky (1987), and Harvey (1988). 
At first glance, the typologies offer a seemingly wide variety of corporate strategies. 
However, when the strategies were compared in terms of objectives and general 'plan of 
attack', a high degree of similarity across typologies surfaced. Although the terminology 
used in the various typologies varied, there was enough commonality among them to 
warrant grouping them into five generic types: develop, grow, stabilise, turnaround, and 
harvest (Herbert and Deresky, 1987). 
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Table 4.1 A comparison of typologies of corporate strategics 
V Author 
Type 
of N 
strategy 
James 
1974 
Hofer & 
Schendel 
1978 
Wissema 
el al. 
1980 
Glueck 
1980 
Galbraith a 
Consumers 
Products 
1983 
id Schendel 
Industrial 
Products 
1983 
Buzzell, 
Gale and 
Sultan 
1983 
Day 
1984 
Allaire & 
Firsirotu 
1985 
Smith, 
Arnold and 
Buzzell 
1985 
Hovve 
1986 
Herbert & 
Deresky 
1987 
Harvey 
19S8 
Develop Emergence Share 
increasing 
Explosion 
Groi Aih Buil 
> 
der Grov Buil( ling Grow 
> 
tfa 
• 
Explc >sion Devel DP Growl h 
Grow Growth Growth 
increasing 
Expansion Pofonnanoe 
improve-
ment (sales 
volume) 
Revitalis-
ation 
Stabilise Maturity Profit and 
market 
oonoentro-
tion, asset 
reduction 
Continuous 
growth, 
consolida-
tion 
Stabilise Cash-out, 
continuity 
niche 
Maintenance 
Nidie 
Hold Pcrfomianoe 
improve-
ment (prod-
uctivity 
gains) 
Refomia-
tion 
Status quo Stabilise Neutral 
Turnaround Regenera-
tion 
Turnaround 
^ » 
Climber Turnaround Turnaround Turnaround Turnaround Turnaround 
Defen5 
> 
ove 
Harvest Decline Divest and 
liquidate 
Slip and 
controction 
Retrench Harvest Low 
commitmeni 
Harvest Harvest Reorient-
ation 
Decline Contraction Harvest 
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Develop/grow strategies 
Strategies designed for development and growth are often bracketed together for two 
reasons: both are characterised by an aggressive push to dominate, and both are 
preferred by young firms. They differ only in that 'develop' strategies are more 
applicable to businesses at the very embryonic stage of their life, while 'grow' strategies 
are more applicable to those that have achieved a foothold in the market and now have 
the ability to go ahead. Both strategy types are aggressive by nature. The objective is to 
intimidate the competition and dominate the market. The level of aggressiveness 
depends on the nature of the industry in which a firm competes: the more competitive 
and technology- driven an industry is, the more aggressive a firm needs to be. There is 
strong evidence that companies that pursue develop/grow strategies are strong market 
leaders, both within and across national boundaries. They are most likely to operate in, 
or seek entry into, high growth markets and segments within these markets (Gutman, 
1964; Chevalier and Catry, 1974). Research indicates that companies that do not 
compete aggressively in this type of industry wil l have serious problems staying 
healthy (Howe, 1986; Glueck, 1980; Henderson, 1979). 
Stabilise strategies 
Strategies designed for stabilisation aim to maintain the status quo either by keeping to a 
tried and tested course of action, changing incrementally in response to environmental 
changes (Quinn, 1978), or both. Those who pursue this strategy type are typically 
mature companies whose main objective is to maintain their dominance in the market(s) 
in which they are competing by penetrating new products and markets in an incremental 
fashion. Even companies with low market shares use this strategy with a high degree of 
success. Research shows that those who concentrate on maintaining their niche in a par-
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ticular market, operate efficiently, and aim for profitability are likely to achieve excellent 
returns on investments (Hamermesh et al., 1983). However, stabilisation strategies are 
not meant to be long-term alternatives. Citing the work of Thomas (1977), Howe (1986, 
p. 61) argues that they are appropriate for limited periods of time only (for instance, 
when the level of change in the industry is low), and point to the 'crop of business 
failures in recent years [as the result of a] complacent adherence to untenable positions'. 
Turnaround strategies 
'Turnaround' strategies are short-term survival measures aimed at reducing or 
eliminating those activities that inhibit a firm's growth and hurt its performance (Herbert 
and Deresky, 1987). The objective is to simultaneously cut down costs, increase 
revenue and reshape the organisational structure into a more suitable form. Companies 
that pursue this strategy type are usually more mature and in fmancial trouble, due, for 
instance, to such external conditions as economic recessions, market decline and 
innovative breakthroughs by competitors, and/or to internal haemorrhages caused by 
mismanagement, production inefficiencies and shortage of resources. 
Harvest strategies 
Like turnaround strategies, harvest strategies are short-term measures designed to reduce 
or eliminate poorly performing businesses. These strategies may either be deliberate or 
emergent (Herbert and Deresky, 1987). They are deliberate i f they form part of a long 
term disinvestment plan; emergent, i f they result from either unsuccessful turnaround 
attempts, unanticipated forces from the environment or new and better opportunities in 
other businesses. The basic strategy in both cases is the same: once a firm holds a stable 
and dominant position in a given market (or fails in its attempt to turn around a 
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business), the next phase is to scale down operations by selectively tapering of f 
unprofitable segments, milk the remaining investment for cashflow and divest at the 
most opportune time. Kotler (1978) suggests that harvest strategies are likely to succeed 
i f a particular business is in a stable or declining market, doesn't provide sales stability 
or prestige to the firm, has a small market share which would be too costly to increase, 
and does not contribute a large percentage to total sales. 
The major features of the five strategy types are summarised in Table 4.2. As the table 
shows, develop and grow strategies, as well as turnaround and harvest, are so closely 
related that they are often treated together. 
Table 4.2 Major features of generic types of corporate strategies 
(Adapted from Harvey. 1988. p. 112) 
Strategy Type Purpose Type of Business 
Environment 
Frequency 
of Usage 
Develop/grow To increase 
sales/earnings 
High market growth, 
economic prosperity 
54.4% 
Stabilise To increase profitability In a mature industry, stable 
environment 
9.2% 
Turnaround/ 
harvest 
Survival, to cut costs, to 
eliminate losses 
In crisis, when facing severe 
losses 
7.5% 
Combination of 
the above 
To increase earnings, to 
cut costs 
In economic transition, multi-
division companies 
28.7% 
Specific strategies In support of the four generic types 
Defsending on its internal and external environmental conditions, a firm can choose from 
11 specific strategies in support o f the four generic types (develop, grow, stabilise, 
harvest). The first nine can be regarded as internal strategies because they rely solely on 
a firm's own resources and capabilities, while the last three are external because they use 
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resources and capabilities of other firms as well. The strategies are briefly defined below, 
but ful l treatment is not provided here because they lie outside the scope of the study. 
Internal strategies 
Concentration: to do one thing only but to do it well 
• Integration: to control a number of similar economic processes previously carried 
out independendy 
• Diversification: to increase the variety of products/services that a f i rm offers 
• Divestiture: to sell ofT a business or a major part of it as a going concern 
• Liquidation: to sell o f f a business or a major part of it as a tangible asset due 
primarily to bankruptcy 
Timing: to introduce a real-time rapid-response system into a business 
• Samegame: to imitate industry success factors and use them to create a market 
niche 
• Newgame: to redefme industry success factors and use them to create a market 
niche 
External 
• Merger: to combine two or more firms into one 
• Acquisition: to purchase the assets of another firm and absorb these assets into 
the firm's own operations 
• Joint venture: to join forces with another firm to achieve a common purpose 
Table 4.3 classifies tiiese eleven strategies according to the generic types for which they 
arc most suited. 
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Table 4.3 Matching specific strategies with generic strategy types 
Specific Strategy 
Generic Strategy type 
Develop/Grow Stabilise Turnaround Harvest 
Internal 
Concentration • 
Diversification • • • • 
Divestiture • • • 
Integration • • 
Liquidation • • • 
Newgame • • 
Samegame • • 
Timing • • • 
Externa! 
Meiger • • 
Acquisition • 
Joint venture • • 
A generic typology of multinational corporate strategies 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, multinational strategy is part of corporate strategy; 
it differs from other corporate strategies in its geographical scope. It requires separate 
treatment because of the complexities associated with operating across national 
boundaries and markets. 
Very little has been written about specific types of multinational strategies. Major 
contributors include Porter (1986), Leontiades (1985), Shanks (1985), and Doz (1980), 
all of whom have developed typologies to classify multinational strategies. In spite of 
their differences in terminology, a comparative analysis of the four typologies conducted 
as part of this study has revealed enough commonalities to warrant their classification 
into five basic types: global cost leader, global niche, protected national market, national 
niche, and follower. Table 4.4 compares the four typologies according to these five 
types. 
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Table 4.4 Comparison of global strategies 
Generic 
Multinational 
Strategy 
Porter 
1986 
Leontiades 
1985 
Shanks 
1985 
Doz 
1980 
Global cost 
leader 
Global cost Global high 
share 
Global leader Worldwide 
. integration Global niche Global segment Global niche 
Protected 
national maricet 
Protected 
market 
National high 
share 
Domestic 
National 
responsiveness 
National niche National 
responsiveness 
National niche 
Intelligent 
follower 
Follower Administrative 
coordination 
Global cost leader 
Firms that pursue a global cost leader strategy sell a standard product/ service to many 
different mass markets. The product/service may not be at the cutting edge of tech-
nology, but it is at least at the forefront With high market shares and economies of 
scale, firms of this type are able to keep their costs down, effectively undercutting 
competitors. This also enables them to maintain a high level o f research and 
development at relatively low costs. Operations are coordinated across a range of 
national boundaries in order to secure a major share of the global market Companies 
pursuing this strategy require a huge amount of resources to support their activities. 
This is why most companies that use this strategy are the giants of the industry, e.g. 
Toyota, I B M , Shell and General Motors. In addition, they prefer to act alone. 
... Such films are often waiy about alliances with other finns (such as joint ventures or 
licensing) in what they consider to be in their core products and markets, though exceptions 
increasingly are being made in those countries that are difficult to enter and with promising 
new suppliers that have developed new products and/or techniques (Leontiades, 1985, p. 52). 
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Global niche 
Firms pursuing this strategy seek to avoid direct competition with global cost leaders by 
focusing on a particular market segment. Their area of specialty may be technology, 
unique products, special geographical characteristics, or some stage of the production-
cycle (finished or semi-processed products). The scale of operations, as the strategy 
name implies, is world-wide, which gives a firm the opportunity to increase in size 
within its area of speciality. There are also opportunities to achieve a certain amount of 
cost advantages through joint ventures with other firms. Fewer resources required for 
this type of strategy, which is why it is often the first strategy used by national 
competitors seeking entry into the global market. 
Protected national market 
Firms using this strategy seek out countries in which market positions are protected by 
host governments. Many firms that do not have the resources and/or the skills required 
to go global or that seek a tax shelter to offset the profits of other businesses units often 
find this strategy attractive. Typically, firms seek a competitive advantage in the 
national market by taking full advantage of government measures designed to protect 
this market, for instance, national entry barriers (high tariffs, stringent import quotas, 
high entry costs), national government support/preference (subsidies, local purchasing 
requirements, excessive regulations), and local economic advantages (greater knowledge 
of national conditions and customer needs, closer and shorter communication with the 
customer, national preference of dealing with local partners, flexibility to tailor 
operations more to customer needs and only one set of national conditions). However, 
this is a high risk strategy: stronger global competitors may enter the market and edge 
them out, or government protection may be discontinued. 
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National niche 
Firms using this strategy specialise on a particular product/service within any number of 
national markets. These firms capitalise on local/national differences. Provided there is 
sufficient size involved and a cost advantage to be attained, they will seek out national 
customers with special/unusual needs (e.g. a chemical production business which 
requires special products at short notice in various amounts and where the product to be 
supplied carmot be stored). As with the protected national market strategy, this strategy 
is appropriate for firms who do not have the resources/skills to compete globally. It is 
sustainable only to the extent that local/national differences remain strong and the firm is 
able to offer lower prices than its competitors, both national and global. National niche 
and protected national market strategies can be pursued simultaneously whenever 
governments provide protection to a market segment that is highly specialised and has 
unusual market needs. 
Intelligent follower 
Firms that pursue this type of strategy have one common characteristic: they follow 
tried and tested formulas, preferring the security of established products/services to 
high-risk entrepreneurial ventures. They are classic 'middle-of-the-road', taking 
advantage of opportunities as they come, and always making sure a high level of 
profitability is maintained. 
Table 4.5 summarises the main features of these five generic types of multinational 
corporate strategies. 
105 
Table 4.5 Five generic types of multinational corporate strategies 
Generic Multinational 
Strategy 
Key Features 
Global cost leader • Sell a well-known product or service to different mass markets 
• Pursued by firms with high market shares and economies of 
scale (i.e. industry giants) 
• Requires substantial resources 
Global niche • Focus on a particular specialty and market segment, and avoid 
competing with global cost leaders 
• Pursued by national competitors seeking entry into the global 
market 
• Requires fewer resources than global cost leader, and cost 
advantages are possible through joint ventures 
Protected national 
market 
• Seek entry into countries which ofTer protection to national 
markets, and take advantage of protective measures to gain a 
competitive edge 
• Pursued by firms with neither the resources nor the expertise to 
establish global operations, or seek tax shelters to offset profits 
• High risks involved 
National niche • Similar to protected national market except here the strategy is 
to specialise on a particular and unusual product/service within 
a number of national markets 
• Pursued by firms with neither the resources nor the expertise to 
establish global operations 
Intelligent follower * Stick to established products/services which provide a high 
level of profitability 
Business-level strategies 
Of ail strategy levels, business strategies have been the most discussed and examined in 
the literature. It has been noted earlier in the chapter that business strategy focuses on 
how to compete in one particular business. In a diversified company, business strategies 
are based on higher-level corporate strategies. In a firm involved in a single business, 
however, business strategies assume the role of corporate strategies. To a great extent, 
this dual interpretation of 'business strategy' has contributed significantly to the 
enduring confiision over terminology within the strategic management field. Any 
analysis of empirical data on business strategies, therefore, must careftilly establish 
whether 'business' is used in the first sense, or whether it is used at the same level as 
'corporate'. 
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The acknowledged leader in the field of business strategy is Porter (1985). Much of 
what is written on the subject draws upon Porter's extensive work and builds on his 
conceptual frameworks. Porter (1985) argues that a firm can gain a competitive 
advantage either through low cost or differentiation. When these are combined with a 
firm's scope of activities, three types of business strategies can be pursued: cost 
leadership, differentiation and focus. These strategy types are presented in Table 4.6. 
They wil l be discussed in detail in Chapter Four, when analytical models for strategy 
selection and analysis are examined. 
Table 4.6 Porter's typology of business strategies 
Business Strategy Objective 
Cost leadership To gain a cost advantage by providing a highly standardised 
product/service and under-pricing the competition 
DifTerentiation To seek a position that enhances the special qualities of a 
product/service that is widely valued by customers and that 
will allow the firm to charge higher than average prices 
Focus To concentrate on achieving a cost advantage (cost focus) or 
providing a specialised product/service (difTerentiation focus) 
within a narrow segment of the market 
There are other typologies of business strategies, but though names may vary, the 
underlying concepts differ little from Porter's. A comparison of Porter's typology 
(1980, 1985) with another well known typology, for instance, which has been 
developed by the Strategic Planning Associates (1981), shows that both typologies are 
based on the fundamental premise of competitive advantage, and each pair of strategy 
types (i.e. cost leadership v. commodity, differentiation v. specialty, cost focus v. 
hybrid, cost differentiation v. transitional) are highly similar in approach and orientation. 
They differ only in the wording of their variables, which could be attributed to the 
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authors' individual orientations. Porter's is more oriented toward economics; the SPA*s, 
toward marketing. 
Functional-level strategies 
Strategies at the functional level are the domain of the specific operational units within a 
business. They specify the means by which the different functional areas of the 
business must contribute to the business and corporate levels of strategy. According to 
Pearce and Robmson (1988), three characteristics differentiate functional strategies from 
business and corporate strategies: time horizons, specificity and participants. 
• Time horizons. Fimctional strategies are designed to identify and coordinate short-
term action programs, usually for no longer than one year. These short time 
horizons force functional managers to be more proactive and vigilant; they are 
expected to act on what currently needs to be done to implement higher level 
strategies, constantly scan the environment for opportunities and threats, and be 
ready to make the appropriate adjustments when necessary. 
• Specificity, Functional strategies must be specific, ready to be put into operation 
by lower-level managers. They should therefore come in the form of detailed 
project plans/outlines, specifying all key aspects of strategy implementation 
(resources, control, time, etc.). 
Participants. The responsibility for the development of functional strategies is 
typically delegated by the business-level manager to the principle subordinates 
responsible for the operating areas of the business (e.g. marketing, production, 
finance). Furthermore, it is up to the business-level manager to ensure such 
fimctional strategies meet the requirements of the business-level strategy. The 
active involvement by operating managers helps in the implementation of the 
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functional strategy because they end up gaining a thorough knowledge of exactly 
what needs to be achieved. I t also tends to increase their commitment to the 
business. 
Efforts to classify functional strategies into typologies are far less substantial that those 
devoted to corporate and business strategies. Of the few attempts made over the last 
three decades, the most well known include Melcher and Kerzner (1988), Pearce and 
Robinson (1988) and Argenti (1974). Table 4.8 compares the work of three authors on 
functional strategies. 
The number of functional strategies depends largely on the organisational design of the 
business. The basic rule is that each operating department (production, finance, 
personnel, etc) in a single business unit must have its own set of functional strategies, 
and that these strategies should be based on, and support, the business strategies of the 
organisation. 
Table 4.7 Three views of functional strategies 
Argenti 
1974 
Pearce and Robinson 
1988 
Melcher and Kerzner 
1988 
Market Marketing Marketing 
Financial Finance/accounting Finance 
Product 
Supplies 
Facilities 
Production/operations Manufacturing 
Research Research and development Research and development 
Organisational Personnel 
Overall, the literature on strategy does not devote as much attention to functional 
strategies as it does to strategies at the higher levels. This is understandable, as the 
literature on strategy focuses primarily on those areas within the domain of top 
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management, and functional strategies do not fit this category. In essence, corporate and 
business strategies are considered the domain of the generals and strategists; functional 
strategies, that of the soldiers on the battlefield. 
4.3 SYNTHESIS: A COMPREHENSIVE TYPOLOGY OF STRATEGIES 
The relationships between the various types and levels of strategies examined in this 
chapter can be more clearly understood i f synthesised into a comprehensive typology of 
strategies. This typology is presented in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.8 A comprehensive typology of strategies 
Specific Strategy 
Strategy Level Generic Strategy Type Primary Secondary 
Internal External Internal External 
Corporate 
(General) 
Grow 
Develop 
Stabilise 
Turnaround 
Harvest 
A common pool of specific strategies can be 
used to support generic strategy types at the 
corporate or business levels. This pool is also 
the source of functional strategies. Among the 
more well known specific strategies are: 
Corporate 
(Multinational) 
Global cost leader 
Global niche 
Protected national market 
National niche 
Intelligent follower 
Internal: 
Concentration 
Diversification 
Divestiture 
Integration 
Liquidation 
Newgame 
External: 
Merger 
Acquisition 
Joint venture 
Business Cost leadership 
Differentiation 
Cost focus 
Differentiation focus 
Samegame 
Timing 
Strategies are internal when they require a 
company*s own resources; external when they 
require external resources. 
Functional 
If they are first choice, they are called primary, 
if they are alternative choices, they are called 
secoTukay (or ancillary or contingency). 
This typology of strategies will be used as part o f the study's conceptual framework, 
which wil l be discussed in Chapter Six (Conceptual Framework). 
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Chapter Five 
STRATEGY SELECTION MODELS 
Corporate strategy, as discussed in the previous chapter, is primarily concerned with 
deciding which businesses a firm should be in and what the firm must do to ensure these 
businesses contribute to its overall profitability. Bowman and Asch (1996) elucidate: 
[Corporate strategy] is primarily about: 
• Deciding which businesses and industries are attractive. 
• Making decisions about the opportunity costs and benefits of allocating resources across and 
between [single business units] SBUs. 
• Making decisions as to how excess cash flows from trading will be appropriated as 
dividends or for reinvestment funds. 
• How the corporation is to be structured and controlled. 
• How the overall activities are to be financed. 
• How growth is to be achieved, and what kind of growth is sought (p. 119) 
Decision making on such strategic issues as identified above by Bovmian and Asch—mix 
of businesses and industries, deployment of resources, organisational structure, long-
term goals and strategies for growth—obviously has to be done within an integrating 
framework, otherwise the relationships between and among businesses, and their 
implications to the firm's overall profitability and competitiveness, cannot be 
adequately assessed. Fortunately, a wide range of alternative fi^meworks that can 
facilitate strategy selection and analysis is available. While they may vary in focus and 
scope, as well as in conceptual and methodological rigour, these fireworks or models 
provide firms with the tools to evaluate strategic decisions at the corporate level. They 
are what Porter calls 'consistency checks' (1980, p.388) that firms can use to assess 
their market positions and on this basis select appropriate strategies to maintain a strong 
competitive presence in the marketplace. 
The literature offers a wide range of models for strategy selection and analysis but for 
the purposes of this study, only the most widely used models have been included in the 
analysis. 
5.1 APPROACHES TO STRATEGY SELECTION AND ANALYSIS 
Out of an array of possible choices, how can the manager know which strategy, or set of 
strategies, wi l l promote the firm's continuing competitiveness and profitability? 
Traditionally, the answer has been to use a technique that is popularly known as 
portfolio analysis. Portfolio analysis refers to the evaluation of the various businesses 
that a firm has in its portfolio to determine how well they contribute to the firm's 
overall goals and objectives and what the firm must do to maintain a competitive edge in 
the market(s) where it operates. Portfolio analysis typically involves the use of a 
portfolio model, usually presented in matrix form, where the relative positions of 
businesses in a firm's portfolio are plotted in terms of profitability and market share. 
While it is widely acknowledged that the various models used for portfolio analysis are 
equally applicable to corporate and business strategies, portfolio analysis is 
predominantly associated with firms with multiple businesses (ie diversified companies) 
because this is how it was introduced in the 1960s by the Boston Consulting Group 
(BCG), the authors of the portfolio concept, and how it has been subsequently 
embraced by the management field. However, there is now a growing trend away from 
the use of the term 'portfolio models' in favour of more encompassing terminology such 
as 'strategy selection models' or some similar derivation, as this does away with the 
arbitrary demarcation line drawn between corporate and business strategy selection. 
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Behind this shift in thinking is the argument that i f portfolio models are equally 
applicable to multiple-business firms and single-business or less diversified firms, then 
the terminology should be changed to reflect this broader use of the models. The shift 
also moves the field away from the continuing debate surrounding the usefulness of 
portfolio analysis and its different models, and pushes the field on to the next level of 
theory building and testing. 
Of the many models available for corporate and business strategy selection, there are 
about 11 which are the most widely used in the field. These models can be broadly 
categorised into three groups: 
Group 1: Early models 
BCG business portfolio model 
GE's business screen 
Group 2: Derivations of Group 1 models 
Royal Dutch Shell's directional policy matrix 
Thompson-Strickland matrix 
Arthur D. Little life cycle model 
Porter's product/market life cycle model 
Hofer and Schendel's product/market life cycle 
Porter's model of generic competitive strategies 
Group 3: More holistic approaches 
SWOT analysis matrix 
Grand strategy selection matrix 
International competitiveness matrix 
The groupings are based mainly on chronology to signify the changing shifts in strategic 
management thought. The earliest and most well known model is the BCG matrix, 
developed by the Boston Consulting Group to help their clients manage their business 
portfolios. After this initial attempt came other models, each designed to address some 
identified weakness in the BCG model and each following essentially the same matrix 
format. As the three groupings suggest, over the years there has been steady progression 
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in model building, from the more simple models of BCG and GE to broader, more 
holistic approaches like the SWOT, grand strategy selection, and international 
competitiveness matrices. A l l models are still current, with the BCG model still leading 
the way. 
5.2 BCG BUSINESS PORTFOLIO MODEL 
The BCG model, considered the progenitor of strategic planning matrices, uses two 
variables, market share and market growth, as bases for classifying single business units. 
For this reason, it is also widely known as the growth market/share matrix. The BCG 
model measures market share and market g r o v ^ in terms of what might be called the 
experience curve principle, which states that 'each time the accumulated production of a 
product is doubled, unit costs in real terms shall decline by a percentage, 
characteristically in the vicinity of 20 to 30 percent' (Smith, 1985, p. 89; see also Day, 
1986; Hax and Majluf, 1983a; Hedley, 1977). 
Based on this principle, we can say that i f a firm doubles its market share as it becomes 
more experienced with its product or market, it is likely to enjoy a 20 to 30 per cent 
cost advantage over its competitor. Simply, this means more cash for the firm, and the 
more experienced it becomes, the more cash it can generate. However, since the firm's 
market share is dependent on how fast the market grows, then the faster the market 
grows, the more cash the firm will need in order to compete. The relationship between 
market share and market growth is illustrated in Figure 5.1. On the horizontal axis is the 
market share of each business relative to the industry leader; on the vertical axis is the 
annual market growth rate for each business' particular industry. Within the cells are 
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four types of businesses: Stars, Cash Cows, Question Marks (also known as Problem 
Child and Wild Cats) and Dogs. 
32 
28 
24 S T A R S QUESTION MARKS 
20 
Market Growth 16 
Rate (%) 
12 
8 
CASH COWS DOGS 
4 
n 
I Ox 1.5x l.Ox 0.5x 
Relative Market Share (Log Scale) 
O.lx 
Figure 5.1 The B C G market growth/share matrix 
Source: Naylor, 1982, p. 7 
• Stars are business units which are characterised by high market growth and high 
market share. They usually generate considerable cashflow but also absorb it in the 
form of investment to maintain market share. Stars usually show positive profits 
whether the cashflow is positive or not. A star eventually evolves into a cash cow 
when growth and reinvestment requirements slow down. 
Cash cows are business units which are characterised by a high market share and 
low market growth. They frequently generate a large amount of cash, but not all of 
this is ploughed back to them. They get back only what they need to maintain 
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their position, and any excess cash goes to other businesses, e.g. the Question 
Marks. 
• Question marks are business units which are characterised by high market growth 
and low market share. They are typically at the very earliest stage of their life 
cycles. Question marks generate very little cash but they require considerable 
investment in order to survive. As their name suggests, their future is questionable: 
i f all works well, they turn into Stars; i f not, they become Dogs. 
• Dogs are business units which are characterised by low market share and low 
growth. They are often cash traps: although they may be able to show positive 
profits, the profit must consistently be reinvested to maintain market share. 
Viewing business units fi-om this perspective certainly helps a firm maintain a balanced 
business portfolio. The basic strategy is simple: The first goal is to maintain the Cash 
Cows without investing too much in them. The cash generated by the Cows should be 
used to consolidate the position of the Stars, and any surplus could be devoted to 
developing some of the Question Marks. The Dogs must be recognised as the weak link 
for the company and handled ruthlessly; they should be managed for cash, with minimal 
or no investment (Smith, 1985). Figure 5.2 presents the corporate strategy types 
appropriate for each business category. 
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Figure 5,2 Generic strategies for the B C G model 
Since its introduction, the BCG model has come under criticism. It has been described as 
too simplistic, with no allowance made for businesses that fall right in the middle o f the 
matrix; i t reflects no temporal qualities so that although it is based on long-term 
relationships, it is mistakenly used as a short-term adjustment technique; market share, 
which is used in the model to measure the competitiveness of a business, is not 
necessarily directly correlated to profitability or business strength; and finally, it does 
not address the issue of new business development, especially in detemfiining growth 
rates (Harvey, 1988; Smith, 1985; Smith et al., 1985; Porter, 1980; Hofer and Schendel, 
1978;Rumelt, 1974). 
In spite of these criticisms, the BCG model continues to be widely used today. 
Although empirical support for the model is sparse (Hambrick et al., 1982, cited in 
Harvey, 1988), to many in the management field, the enduring power and popularity of 
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the BCG model is proof enough of the robustness of its precepts. Unlike other models 
that have come and gone after it, without leaving too much of a dent on the field, the 
BCG model continues to serve as a popular tool in strategy selection and analysis. 
There have been a number of elaborations made on the BCG matrix since it was first 
articulated by the Boston Consulting Group in the mid-1960s. Michael Gould of the 
BCG has offered a revised matrix in which market share is replaced by competitive 
position as a measure of market leadership and products are regrouped in terms of the 
manufacturing process so as to reflect economies of scale in manufacturing (Smith, 
1985). Others have substituted market share for an investment threshold cut-off rate, 
which should indicate to management when to withhold investment because present 
cash generation is more valuable than the future equivalent (MacMillan, 1986). 
Companies like Arthur D. Little and Mckinsey and Company also offer planning 
models that are highly similar to BCG models (Naylor, 1982). 
The rest of the models discussed in this chapter are all derivations of the BCG model. 
The main difference between these latter models and the BCG matrix is the move away 
from single measures of business strength (market share) and market conditions (market 
growth). Market share is broadened in these latter models to include a wide array of 
factors aflecting a firm's business strength (or competitive position, as it is more 
commonly called in the literature), and market growth is replaced by the product/market 
life cycle as a measure of industry maturity or attractiveness. 
5.3 GENERAL ELECTRIC S BUSINESS S C R E E N 
One popular elaboration of the BCG matrix is the General Electric Business Screen. 
Also called the GE Planning Grid or the Industry Attractiveness-Business Strength 
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Matrix, the GE model is broader in approach and more qualitative in nature. Instead of 
relying on market share alone, it uses a wide range of factors (size, growth, share, 
position, profitability, margins, technological position, strengths and weaknesses, image, 
pollution, people) as criteria for assessing a firm's position in the market Its criteria for 
assessing industry attractiveness are similarly wide-ranging, including size, market 
growth, pricing, market diversity, competitive structure, industry profitability, and an 
array of technical, social, environmental, legal, and human issues (Porter, 1980). 
The genereil approach to assessment is relatively straightforweird. First, relevant factors 
are selected, then a weight is assigned to each factor to signify its relative importance. 
Using a rating scale, fiiture conditions for each factor are forecast. The weight and rating 
assigned to each factor are then multiplied to produce a total score for that factor. While 
the combination of factors on both scales do have a weighted multivariate approach, 
there are no defmitive weights per se. Ultimately, choices are made on the basis of 
judgment calls and consensus. Methodological fi-ameworks for the use o f the GE grid are 
provided by Hax and Majluf (1983b), Rothschild (1976, 1979) and Businessweek 
(1975). 
On the GE grid, the outcome of the assessment is portrayed in the form of circles. Each 
circle represents the size of the industry in which a firm competes; thus, the bigger the 
circle, the bigger the industry. The pie slices within each circle reflects the firm's market 
share within the industry; thus, the bigger the slice, the bigger the share. The complete 
grid is presented in Figure 5.3, together with the generic strategies appropriate for each 
cell in the matrix. The other names by which each generic strategy is known are also 
presented (Porter, 1980; Hofer and Davoust, 1977). 
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Strong 
Business Strength 
Average Weak 
Industry 
Attractiveness 
High 
Medium 
Low 
Grow Grow Stabilise 
(invest, build) (invest, build) (improve, 
defend, hold) 
Grow 
(invest, build) 
Stabilise 
(improve, 
defend, hold) 
Harvest 
(divest) 
Stabilise Harvest Harvest 
(improve, 
defend, hold) 
(divest) (divest) 
Figure 5.3 The G E business screen 
Source: Adapted from Pearce and Robinson. 1988, p. 287 
As the figure shows, when both industry attractiveness and business strength are high, a 
firm should pursue a grow strategy, but when attractiveness and business sU-ength are 
both low, the fimi should harvest or divest. In intermediate positions, the fimi would 
need to be selective in the way it allocates resources, giving priority to most attractive 
segments or in segments where the firm has a unique competence. The strategy is to 
stabilise, either by improving the business, or defending its market position and 
maintaining the status quo 
Like the BCG matrix, the GE Planning Grid has received its fair share of criticism. 
Mainly, it is criticised for its failure to adequately represent new businesses in 
industries that are at an embryonic stage of evolution, a weakness it shares with the 
BCG model (Hofer, 1977). Hax and Majluf (1983b) also criticise the pseudo-scientific 
nature of the model's weighted-score approach which assigns quantitative values to 
highly judgmental assessments; they offer no alternative approach, however, as they 
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also admit that 'when dealing with multiattributes, a weighting process is unavoidable, 
whether done explicitly or implicitly' (Hax and Majluf, in Dyson, 1993, p. 91). 
5.4 DIRECTIONAL POLICY MATRIX 
Like the GE grid, the Directional Policy Matrix, which was developed by Royal Dutch 
Shell specifically for the petroleum-based sector of the chemical industry, uses a 
weighted multivariate approach to determine a business' position in the market It is 
designed to assist in the selection of appropriate criteria for defining and assessing the 
two dimensions of the matrix, business sector prospects and a company's competitive 
capabilities. The same analytical procedures as that applied to the GE grid are used; in 
addition, competitors' ratings can be represented alongside those o f the firm. The 
directional policy matrix is illustrated in Figure 5.4, along with appropriate strategy 
options for each cell in the matrix. The corresponding generic corporate strategies are 
also identified. 
Business Sector Prospects 
Unattractive Average Attractive 
Weak 
Company 
Competitive 
Capabilities 
Average 
Strong 
Disinvest 
(harvest) 
Phased 
withdrawal 
(turnaround, 
harvest) 
Double or quit 
(develop/grow) 
Phased 
withdrawal 
(turnaround, 
harvest^  
Custodial 
(stabilise) 
Growth 
Try harder 
(develop/grow) 
Cash 
generation 
(stabilise) 
Growth 
(develop/grow) 
Leader 
(stabilise) 
Leader 
(stabilise) 
Figure 5.4 Directional policy matrix 
Source: Adapted from Harvey. 1988, p. 158 
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There are eight likely strategies a firm can choose from depending on the position of a 
business on the matrix: disinvest, phased withdrawal, custodial, cash generation, double 
or quit, try harder, growth, and leader. 
In low-growth areas, where the fimi is not likely to make substantial earnings, the 
strategy is to disinvest right away or withdraw gradually. The diflference between these 
two strategies is mainly one of time; like the generic harvest strategy (see Chapter 
Three), the ultimate objective is to cut losses and redeploy resources into more 
profitable areas. However, i f the firm has strong competitive capabilities in such areas, 
so that the business is able to generate respectable profits for the firm, then the business 
should be nurtured with commensurate resources to enable it to continue being a cash 
generator. A similar approach should also be pursued in fairly stable areas where the 
firm has average to weak competitive capabilities; here the firm should take on a 
custodial role to ensure the business remains in stable condition and to shift to other 
strategies should conditions change. 
Where business prospects are average to attractive, the firm has several choices 
depending on its competitive strength. In highly profitable areas where the firm is a 
weak competitor, there are two choices available: i f it wants to stay it should 
significantly improve its competitive capabilities; otherwise, it should quit the sector 
altogether. In fairly stable areas where the fimi's competitiveness is average to strong, 
the strategy is to grow through commensurate allocation of resources. The same is true 
in highly profitable areas where the firm is not as strong as its competitors; it can try 
harder by allocating the necessary resources to gain competitive equality. Finally in 
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highly profitable areas where the fimi is the undisputed leader, the strategy is to give 
businesses in these areas top priority to ensure they maintain market leadership. 
5.5 THE THOMPSON-STRICKLAND MATRIX 
Another derivation of the BCG matrix is provided by Thompson and Strickland (1983). 
Their matrix retains market growth as a dimension of analysis, but like other post-BCG 
models, it uses the broader concept of competitive position in place o f market share. 
The Thompson and Strickland matrix is presented in Figure 5.5. Using this matrix, busi-
nesses can be positioned in any one of four quadrants, and strategies appropriate for 
each quadrant identified. These strategies are described briefly in Chapter Four. 
• Quadrant I. Businesses with a dominzmt market position. They should pursue 
strategies for growth or maintenance as the ones listed above to ensure they remain 
in this position. 
Quadrant II. Businesses with an uncertain outlook. There is scope for growth, as 
in the case o f new businesses, but there is also a lot of risk involved. The 
appropriate strategy should be to focus on gaining a stronger competitive position 
while continuing to achieve rapid market growth. However, for businesses which 
are unable to achieve this, divestiture and liquidation are the appropriate strategies. 
Quadrant III. The worst position in the quadrant. Typically, businesses within a 
stagnant industry are found here. The strategy is to tightly manage the business 
for profitability and when appropriate, to divest and liquidate. 
• Quadrant IV. Businesses with a promising future. They have slow market growth 
but strong cash flow. The most appropriate strategy is for a firm to pursue a 
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hold/maintain strategy for existing businesses and free up some of its cashflow for 
new ventures. 
Rapid Market Growth 
1 Concentration 
2 Vertical integration 
3 Concentric 
diversification 
Strong 
Competitive 
Position IV 
1 Concentric 
diversification 
2 Conglomerate 
diversification 
3 Joint venture 
Reformulation of 
concentration 
Horizontal 
integration 
Divestiture 
Liquidation 
in 
1 Turnaround or 
retrenchment 
2 Concentric 
diversification 
3 Conglomerate 
diversification 
4 Divestiture 
5 Liquidation 
Weak 
Competitive 
Position 
Slow Market Growth 
Figure 5.5 Thompson-Strickland matrix 
Source: Adapted from Thompson and Suickland, 1983, p. 154 
5.6 LIFE C Y C L E MODELS 
Other authors attempting to overcome the shortcomings of the BCG and GE matrices 
have not only replaced market share with competitive position, they have also replaced 
market growth with the product/market life cycle concept. The most well known include 
the consulting firm Arthur D. Little (Harvey, 1988), Porter (1985), and Hofer and 
Schendel(1978). 
Arthur D. Little developed a nine-cell matrix to analyse the relationships between a 
business' competitive position and the stage o f the industry life cycle at which it is 
found. According to this model, a business' competitive position is assessed in terms of 
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a five-point rating scale (dominant, strong, favourable, tenable and weak) while its 
attractiveness to the industry is assessed in terms of its position in the product/market 
life cycle (embryonic, growing, mature, aging). The circles follow the same principle as 
the GE grid; that is, the bigger the circles, the bigger the size of the industries they 
represent. Using this matrix, the typical strategy is to maintain a balanced mix of 
businesses, avoiding such pitfalls as having too many embryonic or aging businesses. 
Although businesses in their embryonic stages may have a bright future outiook, they 
can give the firm cash flow problems in the short term; those in the aging sector may 
offer short term profits but they may in fact have a very poor ftiture outlook. The 
Arthur D. LitUe model is presented in Figure 5.6, together with some specific strategies 
that are appropriate for each cell in the matrix. 
Industiy Maturity (Attractiveness) 
Embiyonic Growing Mature Aging 
Competitive 
Position 
Dominant 
Strong 
Favourable 
Tenable 
Weak 
Invest 
Consc »lidate 
Hold 
Improve ^ Mai ntain 
Selective Harvest 
Niche 
Liqu idate 
Sele :tive t 
Divest 
Figure 5.6 Arthur D. Little*s life cycle model 
Source: Harvey, 1988. p. 160 
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Porter (1985) provides an alternative perspective. In contrast to the Arthur D. Little 
model. Porter limits the product/market life cycle to three stages (growth, maturity, 
decline) and classifies a business either as leader or follower. His model also focuses 
more on a single business rather than on a complex firm. It is illustrated in Figure 5.7 and 
shows the range of strategies that are applicable for each cell in the matrix. 
Product/Market Life Cycle 
_Growth Maturity Decline 
Strategic 
Position 
Leader 
Keeping ahead of 
the field 
Cost leadership 
Raise barriers 
Deter competitors 
Redefine scope 
Divest 
peripherals 
EncouTBge 
departures 
of the 
Organisation Imitation at 
lower cost 
Differentiation Differentiation 
Follower Joint ventures Focus New 
opportunities 
Figure 5.7 Porter's life cycle model 
Source: Johnson and Scholes, 1988, p. 182 
A third life cycle model is provided by Hofer and Schendel (1978). Like Arthur D. Little 
and Porter, Hofer and Schendel also use product/market life cycle and competitive 
position in their matrix, but the life cycle is assumed to have five stages (development, 
shake-out, growth, maturity, decline) and competitive poisition is assessed on a four-
point rating scale (strong, average, weak, drop-out). Like Porter's life cycle model, the 
focus is on a single business. In both cases, however, the models can be applied equally 
well to multiple-business firms. Conceptually, all three life cycle models vary little; 
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hence, there should be no problem in using any of them as alternative models for 
corporate strategy selection and analysis. 
The Hofer and Schendel model is presented in Figure 5.8, together with suitable 
strategies for each cell in the matrix. Of the five stages of market evolution, changes in 
competitive position can occur most easily during the development, shakeout and 
decline stages. 
Relative Competitive Position 
Evolution Strong Average Weak Drop-out 
Development Share increase Turnaround 
Shakeout Share increase 
Growth Growth Liquidation 
Maturation Profit 
Market 
Concentration 
Divestiture 
Decline Asset reduction 
Figure 5.8 Hofer and Schendel's life cycle model 
Source: Adapted from Hofer and Schendel, 1978, p. 104 
5.7 PORTER S MODEL OF GENERIC COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES 
Other models for strategic analysis offer slightly different variations. Porter, for 
instance, uses a two-dimensional grid to determine a firm's competitive advantage and its 
competitive scope. The grid is shown in Figure 5.9, together with the appropriate 
strategies for each quadrant. According to Porter, a firm must decide whether to aim for 
a broad or narrow target (competitive scope) and what it wants to be (competitive 
advantage); trying to be everything is simply a recipe for failure (what he calls 'being 
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stuck in the middle'). He identifies three appropriate generic strategies: cost leadership, 
differentiation, and focus. These strategies were introduced in Chapter Four. 
Competitive Advantage. 
Lower Cost Differentiation 
Broad target 
Competitive Scope 
Narrow target 
Cost leadership Differentiation 
Cost focus DifTerentiation focus 
Figure S.9 Porter's generic competitive strategies model 
Source: Porter, 1980, 1985, p, 12 
According to this matrix, a firm has four options: 
• To produce a highly standardised product/service and under-price the competition, 
that is, to be a cost leader 
• To specialise on a particular product/service that is considered unique throughout 
the market and, thus, be able to charge higher than average prices {differentiation) 
To concentrate on a particular product/service or a particular segment of the 
market, and be known for: 
- providing a better product/service than others, and, like in the second option, be 
able to charge higher than average prices {differentiation focus), and/or 
- servicing this target at lower costs than most {cost focus). 
Porter's model is one of the most popular in the field today. It has undergone a series of 
testing (Miller and Dess, 1993; Wright, 1987; Miller and Friesen, 1986; Galbraith and 
Schendel, 1983; Dess and Davis, 1982), and as would be expected in a healthy research 
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environment, this has revealed a number of weaknesses. The model's reliance on 
qualitative analysis has attracted the inevitable complaint that it lacks quantitative rigour 
(see, for instance, Asseldonk, 1988), but the more serious criticism comes from Quinn 
(1988) and Grimm et al. (1988) whose research dispute Porter's assertion that 
companies that are 'stuck in the middle' have inferior strategies. Grimm and his 
associates argue in particular that firm size plays an important role in determining the 
appropriate strategy: for example, they found out that lai^er companies did quite well 
when stuck in the middle while smaller firms did not. 
5.8 SWOT ANALYSIS MATRIX 
This section marks the first of the third and last group of strategy selection models 
covered in this chapter. In contrast to the preceding models, the models in this last 
group are more holistic in their approach to strategy selection and analysis. 
SWOT is an acronym for Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats. Strengths 
and weaknesses refer to a business' intemal environment, and opportunities and threats, 
to its external environment In this regard, therefore, the SWOT matrix can be used as a 
comprehensive tool for strategic environmental analysis. The main value of the SWOT 
framework is its emphasis on a holistic approach to environmental analysis. Its four 
cornerstone concepts—intemal strengths and weaknesses, external opportunities and 
threats—are broad enough to encompass a full range of environmental factors 
(orgzinisational, economic, psychological, social, technological, political, etc). Yet, they 
are also flexible enough to be tailored according to company specifications. A company 
interested only in economic variables, for instance, can tailor its SWOT analysis along 
this particular line. 
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Because a SWOT analysis is aimed at maximising a business* internal strengths and 
opportunities and at the same time minimising its weaknesses and threats, it is a 
particularly useful tool in strategy selection. Figure 5.10 is an example of a SWOT 
analysis matrix v^ere appropriate strategies are selected for each cell in the matrix. 
Internal (Organisational) 
Strengths Weaknesses 
External 
Opportunities 
I 
Aggressive strategy 
n 
Turnaround strategy 
(Environmental) 
ni IV 
Threats Diversification strategy Defensive strategy 
Figure 5.10 Sample SWOT analysis matrix 
Source: Pearce and Robinson, 1988. p. 294 
As this figure indicates, it is possible for a business to find itself in any of four 
quadrants. 
Quadrant I. This is clearly the most favourable position for a business to be in, 
and strategies should be directed at increasing and maintaining this dominant 
position. 
Quadrant II. Businesses in this quadrant have an uncertain future. While there are 
many opportunities for g rov^ , internal weaknesses prevent them from taking 
advantage of these opportunities. Their main goal should be to select those strate-
gies that can turn them around, that is, that can increase their internal strengths and 
help them compete more effectively in the market. 
Quadrant III Businesses in this quadrant are typically good performers but they 
also face serious external threats. They should seek strategies capable of building 
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long-term opportunities in other environments where they can use their internal 
strengths to the fullest. 
• Quadrant IV, This is the worst position for a business to be in. The appropriate 
strategy is to manage the business for cashflow or profitability and when 
appropriate to divest. 
5.9 GRAND STRATEGY SELECTION MATRIX 
The Grand Strategy Selection Matrix is an alternative to the SWOT matrix. Unlike the 
latter, which focuses on intemal and external environmental factors, the Grand Strategy 
Selection Matrix is more specific: it targets two key variables in the strategy selection 
process: the purpose o f the strategy (overcome weaknesses, maximise strengths) and the 
area of emphasis (intemal, external). When the emphasis is intemal, resources are 
redirected within the firm; i f it is external, the firm may choose to acquire new assets or 
enter into a merger to improve resource capability. The Grand Strategy Selection Matrix 
is shown in Figure 5.11. 
Areas of Emphasis 
Intemal External 
Overcome 
weakness I n 
Purpose of the 
Vertical integration 
Conglomerate diversification 
Turnaround or retrenchment 
Divestiture 
Liquidation 
Grand Strategy 
III IV 
Maximise 
strength 
Concentration 
Market development 
Innovation 
Horizontal integration 
Concentric diversification 
Joint venture 
Figure 5.11 Grand strategy selection m a t r i i 
Source: Adapted from Pearce and Robinson* 1988, p. 296 
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The term 'grand strategy' in this case refers to both corporate strategies of multi-
business firms and business-cum-corporate strategies of single-business firms. Like the 
other models discussed earlier, the Grand Strategy Selection Matrix leaves the selection 
of relevant factors to the company itself The matrix allows four strategic choices: 
Quadrant I. A firm in this quadrant has limited growth opportunities in its existing 
business(es); therefore, the approach is to expand its external scope of operations. 
However, there are inherent risks with this approach, e.g. costs of expansion, 
learning to cope with significantly new and/or larger businesses, and gaining a posi-
tion of strength. Care must be taken not to trade one weakness for another, 
otherwise, the firm may find itself in a worse position. 
• Quadrant II. Businesses in this quadrant elect a more conservative approach; the 
basic strategy is to slim down the business and become more efficient as a result. 
Resources will tend to be redirected only towards more efficient or pressing 
activities. Many activities may also need to be consolidated, thus resulting in a 
much more leaner business. 
• Quadrant III. This quadrant includes businesses who pursue an aggressive 
build/maintain strategy to support internal development. 
• Quadrant IV, Businesses in this quadrant have similar options as in quadrant I I I , 
except the focus is on strategies that will support external development. The aim 
is to take advantage of maricet opportunities and strengthen one's position in the 
industry. 
5.10 INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS MATRIX 
The International Competitiveness Matrix, the final one in this series, was developed by 
Leontiades (1985). The focus is international, and strategy selection is based on two 
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factors, market share objectives and geographical scope. The matrix is presented in 
Figure 5.12. 
Market Share Objective 
Low 
Scope 
Global 
National 
Global high share Global niche 
National high share National niche 
Figure 5.12 International competitiveness matrix 
Source: Leontiades. 1985, p. 53 
From Figure 5.12, it is readily evident that: 
Companies that desire high market share on a global level should pursue a high 
share strategy. However, this option is only really available to companies with 
substantial resources. Those with fewer resources are better o f f building a 
particular strength or niche in the market and then competing on this basis in the 
global market 
* Companies seeking to establish or maintain a high market share within a national 
market should limit the entry of global competitors into this market through such 
protective measures as entry barriers, providing costs advantages in local produc-
tion/services, creating strong customer loyalty, etc. Companies that have carved 
special niches for themselves within a national market should do the same to limit 
the entry of both national and global competitors into their particular segments of 
the market. 
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5.11 A CRITIQUE OF STRATEGY SELECTION MODELS 
The strategy selection models presented in this chapter are among the most widely used 
in the management field today (Abell and Hammond, 1979). Although there are obvious 
differences, the similarities among the models far outweigh the differences. Indeed, what 
differences there are lie mostly in four areas: the terminology used to describe a 
company's position in the industry (e.g. competitive position v. business strength v. 
internal strength), the terminology used to describe generic strategies (e.g. stars v. cost 
leadership v. growth strategy v. aggressive strategy v. invest strategy), the number of 
stages in the product-market life cycle (e.g. Porter has three; Arthur D. Little, four; 
Hofer and Schendel, five), and scope (except for one, all the models focus on 
competition within domestic markets; while some limit their analysis of the industry to 
include economic variables only, others look at a wider range of environmental factors). 
There is one key difference that should be highlighted, however: the models do differ in 
temis of the organisational level at which strategies are examined. Some models 
specifically focus on strategy selection at the corporate level; others, at the business 
level; and a few on a worldwide basis. However, it has been noted earlier in this chapter 
that this need not be a major concem; it is widely acknowledged that strategy selection 
models, particularly those examined in this chapter, are equally applicable to single-
business or multi-business organisations. In Chapter Four, it has also been stressed that 
the division between corporate and business levels is more likely to be found in complex 
multi-business firms, whereas single-business firms are more likely to collapse these two 
levels into one. Thus, where a multi-business firm would use the models to decide on 
which businesses and industries it should be in, the single-business firm would use the 
same models to decide which products, services or markets it should be in. 
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In terms of the more important underlying concepts, all models exhibit highly similar 
characteristics. The one exception is the original BCG model whose basis of analysis 
remains firmly anchored on two simple measures, market growth and market share. 
Unlike the BCG model, the other models share two main assumptions. First, a 
company's position in the marketplace is not a function of market share alone, but is 
dependent on a host of interrelated factors (economic, social, technological, 
organisational, etc.). In addition, situations and conditions change, much faster in some 
industries than in others, and a firm must be able to act accordingly in the face of these 
changes. Consequently, strategy choices are seen as contingent on the set of 
circumstances and conditions under which a firm is operating at any one time. 
The strategy selection models, again with the exception of the BCG model, also follow 
similar analytical procedures. They use a multivariate approach to assess the position of 
a company vis-a-vis its competitors; leave the selection, definition, weighting, and 
ranking of specific variables to individual companies; and rely heavily on qualitative 
analysis and judgment calls, while at the same time acknowledging the usefulness of 
reasoned and statistical arguments. 
The critical examination to which the strategy selection models has been subjected over 
the years has allowed the field to further its knowledge of the use of strategy selection 
models, and the vastly different ways that individual businesses and industries are likely 
to behave under different organisational and market conditions. As the literature 
suggests, these models are not stale, static, pseudo-scientific approaches to strategic 
decision making. Rather, they are tools for 'asking questions' (Lewis et al., 1993, 
p. 224) and they provide decision makers with a disciplined method of evaluating 
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strategic decisions at the corporate, business and functional levels of the organisation. 
Most likely because of this, strategy selection models (or portfolio models, as they are 
still widely known in the field) continue to be very popular, even when empirical 
evidence on whether their use does lead to better performance hangs on the balance 
(Mintzberg, 1994). Haspeslagh (1982) provides a clue to the models' enduring success. 
In his research, he found a fairly high level of use o f portfolio analysis among leading 
companies (36% of Fortune 1000 companies and 45% of Fortune 500 companies). 
Most importantly, he also found the use of portfolio analysis had profoundly affected 
the way executives thought about the way they managed their businesses. Today, over a 
decade later, executives apparently still think so. 
5.12 A COMPOSITE STRATEGIC CHOICE MODEL 
In addition to the similarities highlighted in the preceding section, a closer examination of 
all 11 models also reveals that regardless o f the seemingly varied approaches advocated, 
they all recommend the same basic strategies. These strategic choices are listed in Figure 
5.13, which shows a composite model for strategy selection and analysis. 
Organisational Competitive Factors 
High (Strengths) Low (Weaknesses) 
High 
(Opportunities) 
Grow Develop or Turnaround 
Market 
Factors 
(Threats) 
Low 
Stabilise Harvest 
Figure 5.13 A composite model for strategy selection and analysis 
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The composite model assesses a firm's profitability and competitiveness on two 
dimensions: organisational competitive factors (high/strengths, low/weaknesses) and 
market factors (high/opportunities, low/threats). These two factors are designed to serve 
as umbrella concepts under which the various terms used by the models covered in this 
chapter can be categorised. The first would include competitive position, business 
strength, etc; the second would include market growth, product-market life cycle, etc. 
As the figure also indicates, the composite model is very similar to the SWOT 
framework. 
At a general level, the matrix provides five basic corporate strategies: grow, develop, 
turnaround, stabilise, and harvest. 
Grow strategies are for firms with high quality business factors and high quality 
industry factors. These are the high fliers, the leaders. 
• Develop and turnaround strategies are for firms with low quality business factors 
and high quality industry factors. Typically, the develop strategy applies more to 
new or emerging businesses while the turnaround strategy is more applicable to 
mature industries. 
Stabilise strategies are for firms with high quality business factors and low quality 
industry factors. 
• Harvest strategies are for firms with low quality business factors and low quality 
industry factors. 
In the next chapter, this composite matrix will be expanded to include the typology of 
strategies presented earlier (see Table 4.8). The integrated fi'amework wil l then be used 
to guide the study's methodological approach. 
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Chapter Six 
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter discusses the conceptual framework underpinning the study. The 
conceptual fi'amework brings together the strategic management model introduced in 
Chapter One, the typology of strategies developed in Chapter Four, and the strategic 
choice model developed in Chapter Five. To put the discussion in its proper context, an 
overview of the strategic management process is first presented. 
6.1 THE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
In the previous chapters, focus has been placed on the examination o f strategy and 
strategy selection models. As a management activity, however, strategy selection does 
not take place in a vacuum; neither is it undertaken as an independent activity. Rather, it 
is an integral part of a dynamic and iterative process whose main aim is to keep an 
organisation profitable and competitive. This process is called strategic management, and 
its underlying assumptions and principles must be clearly understood because they set 
the foundation upon which the conceptual framework rests. 
Strategic management can be defined as the process of formulating and implementing the 
most effective and efficient means of ensuring the long term survival and success o f an 
organisation and of continuously evaluating its performance. Embodied in this definition 
are several critical attributes of strategic management: 
• It is a process that is ongoing and dynamic, with any one step able to lead directly 
to another or with several steps taking place simultaneously. It is not a static 
system that moves along a closed linear loop. 
• Its end goal is to enable an organisation to maintain a competitive advantage in the 
marketplace. The focus is on the long tenm, and the need for the organisation to 
embrace any change necessary to ensure the goal is attained. 
It involves three strategic activities: the formulation, implementation, and 
evaluation of the most effective and efficient means of achieving the end goal. To 
effectively undertake these activities, an organisation must have a broad and 
comprehensive understanding of its business and the environment in which it 
operates, and then use this knowledge to identify feasible outcomes that it should 
seek to achieve and implement, determine which options are most appropriate to 
pursue to achieve desired outcomes, integrate these options into a coherent plan of 
action, implement this plan, and at every point in the process know how well the 
organisation is doing and what corrective measures must be taken to ensure long-
term success and continuously improve performance. Knowledge in this sense is 
the combined result of deliberate analysis, intuition, experience and judgment calls. 
Effective strategic management requires the long-term involvement and commitment of 
the entire organisation, and because it involves major changes over a period of time, an 
effective system of managing the change process is also needed to help members at all 
levels of the organisation cope with and support such changes. While key strategic 
decisions may be made by senior managers, responsibility for strategic decision making 
and implementation goes all the way down to the operational levels. Figure 6.1, which is 
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an expanded version of Figure 4.1, illustrates the various organisational levels at which 
strategies are made and implemented (Hofer and Schendel, 1979; Mintzberg, 1973; 
Ansoff, 1965). It is essential that appropriate organisational mechanisms are in place to 
support strategic decision making and implementation at these various levels. 
Enterprise (or societal) level Focuses on how an organisation should Interact 
wRh the wider soclocuttural environment In 
which it operates. 
Corporate level Focuses on how an organisation should 
orchestrate the businesses It Is Involved In. 
Business level Focuses on (he overall competitive 
performance of each business. 
Functional level Focuses on the specific operations of each 
business (eg marketing, finance, production). 
Figure 6.1 Hierarchy of strategic decision making 
At the core of strategic management is the development and implementation of a plan of 
action that is aimed at ensuring the organisation's long-term success. This plan of action 
is referred to as the strategic plan. A lot of debate has surrounded the nature of strategic 
plans and the strategic planning process (Mintzberg, 1994). As noted earlier in Chapter 
Three, to a great extent this debate reflects the differences in perspective between the 
various schools of strategic management thought. The dominant view is that strategic 
plans are the products of deliberate thought, analysis and formulation, often presented 
as written blueprints describing how an organisation should act to maintain or improve 
its competitive edge. However, there is also ample evidence that shows that not all plans 
are written and formalised; and even i f a written plan does exist, it may not necessarily 
be the complete version, with access to the more sensitive information limited to a few 
senior people and within the narrow confines of the boardroom. In other cases, no 
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'formal' planning may be conducted; instead, decision making is based on judgment calls 
('gut sense') and the plan 'emerges' largely as a confluence of certain forces that happen 
to be at play during a particular period of time. Others argue that strategic decision 
making 'walks on two feet' (Mintzberg, 1987, p. 69), that is, it is both formal 
(deliberate) and informal (emergent) in nature. Some aspects may be planned, others 
may emerge based on current conditions and intuitive judgment. This last view of 
strategic planning has gained solid ground in recent years, in large part reflecting the 
steady maturation in strategic management research (AnsofF, 1987; Morris, 1988; Quinn 
etal., 1988; Mintzberg, 1994). 
Regardless of the form it may take, a strategic plan is designed to help an organisation 
answer five key questions: 
1 Where are we now? 
2 Where can we go? 
3 Where do we want to go? 
4 Where should we go? 
5 How do we get there? 
Questions 1 and 2 focus on an organisation's present competitive position—where it is 
at present and where it is possible to go. Answers to these questions are arrived at 
through an analysis of the internal capabilities (ie strengths and weaknesses) of the 
organisation and the opportunities and threats in its external environment. 
Once both the present and the future are examined, the organisation's future competitive 
position—where it wants to go and where it is capable of going—is determined. This is 
what questions 3 and 4 address, the answers to which normally lead to a mission 
statement and strategic goals and/or objectives. 
141 
Question 5 focuses on how the organisation can achieve its mission, goals, and/or 
objectives. The result is a set of strategies that will enable the organisation to move from 
its current position to a more desirable position in the future. 
An organisation's movement from a present to a future competitive position can be 
described as strategic leaping (Hawkins, 1993). Through careful strategic decision 
making, an organisation can make strategic leaps from its current position to a more 
desirable market position. Figure 6.2 illustrates the concept of strategic leaping and the 
key questions that must be addressed i f the organisation is to achieve long-term success 
and survival. 
CHOICE: 
Where do we want to go? 
Where should we go? 
Mission, goals, 
objectives 
Future 
competitive position 
CHOICE: 
How do we get there? 
Present 
competitive position I 
Extemal and Internal 
assessment 
ANALYSIS: 
Where are we now? 
Where can we go? 
Figure 6.2 Strategic leaping 
Source: Hawkins, 1993 
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6.2 THE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT MODEL 
How can an organisation make successful strategic leaps? Figure 6.3 provides a model of 
the process that an organisation must follow. This model was introduced earlier as 
Figure 1.2 in Chapter One (Problem Statement) and is reproduced here for easy 
reference. As noted in that chapter, this model has been chosen because it captures the 
dynamic, iterative and holistic nature of the strategic management process without 
necessarily presenting various strategic activities in a linear and sequential fashion. 
strategic Issues 
FOCUS OF 
THE STUDY 
Goats or 
oblectives 
Strategies 
Msson gjaieglc^o/ce; 
t 
T 
Plans 
tunctions 
strategies 
budgets 
Strategic 
control 
and 
evaluation External 
Structure 
Intemal Culture 
leadership, 
human factor 
V / 
strategic issues 
Figure 6.3 A model of the strategic management process 
Source: Hawkins, 1993 
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The model is represented as a circular flow to show the iterative and dynamic nature of 
the strategic management process. Al l the various activities in the process are closely 
interrelated, with any one activity able to lead direcUy to another and with some 
activities occurring simultaneously. Al l the components of the model also lock together, 
much like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, to form an integrated system. While the 
individual parts may each be taken as a discrete element, with its own particular 
function and focus, their respective roles and functions can only be properly understood 
when examined within the context of the whole. The close interrelationships between 
parts mean that consideration of any one aspect requires equal consideration of the 
others. As a strategy is formulated, for instance, issues affecting its implementation, 
control and evaluation must be simultaneously addressed. No matter how brilliant a plan 
may be, it is of littie use unless it is implemented and controlled properly; further, 
although closely intertwined, formulation and implementation have significant 
differences that require significanUy different skills. 
The model also assumes that the process operates as an open system, with the potential 
to affect and be affected by a wide range of strategic issues in the external environment. 
This is why it is critical for the organisation to continually scan its internal and extemal 
environment and identify those aspects, both current and future, that can have a 
dramatic impact on long-term competitiveness. This is also why strategic evaluation and 
control is central to the process, because it allows the organisation to collect information 
about how it is going as a means of exercising better control over its performance. 
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The model organises the strategic management process into four broad areas of activity: 
strategic analysis, strategic choices, strategic implementation, and strategic control and 
evaluation. 
• Strategic analysis and strategic choices form part of a broader activity, strategic 
formulation, where the aim is to set an organisation's future direction (mission, 
goals, objectives) and its means of getting there (strategies), based on an analysis 
of the organisation's strengths and weaknesses (internal assessment) and the 
opportunities and threats in the external environment (external assessment). While 
the analysis may be deliberate and systematised through the use o f analytical and 
evaluation techniques, judgment calls based on intuition and experience play an 
equally important role in decision making. As noted earlier, the end result is a 
strategic plan, which sets out the specific ways by which the organisation is to 
reach its desired destination. 
• Strategic implementation involves any action taken to carry out strategic decisions. 
At this stage, the focus is on ensuring that operational areas (finance, operations, 
personnel, etc) are able to support the organisation's strategic goals and objectives 
through the development and implementation of operational plans, that the 
organisational structure (ie reporting, communication, coordination, monitoring 
systems) is appropriate for implementing the strategic and operational plans, and 
that critical people issues—a supportive organisational culture, strong leadership, 
a sound human resource management policy—are effectively addressed. 
• Strategic evaluation and control serves as the monitoring function whose primary 
objective is to ensure that all strategic activities goes according to plan and that 
any corrective action is taken to keep the organisation on track. As noted earlier, 
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this function is central to the strategic management process, which is why it lies at 
the centre of the strategic management model. This central position means 
evaluation must be carried out at every main stage of the process to find out how 
good the strategic plan is and how well it is implemented, so that based on this 
information, better control over various aspects of the process can be exercised. 
The end goal of strategic evaluation and control is the continuous improvement of 
the organisation. 
Of these key aspects of the strategic management process, of central concern to the 
study is that aspect of the process that deals with strategy selection, that is, the 
selection of the best means by which an organisation can realise its mission and achieve 
its strategic goals and objectives in a most effective and efficient way. As shown earlier 
in Figure 6.3, strategy selection corresponds to the 'strategies' aspect of the 'strategic 
choices' section of the model. 
6.3 THE STRATEGIC CHOICE MODEL 
Strategy selection involves three activities: strategic positioning, evaluation of strategic 
alternatives, and selection of the appropriate strategy or strategies. First, the overall 
position of the organisation vis-a-vis its mission and strategic goals/objectives has to be 
analysed. In this analysis, the organisation's business or businesses are examined, 
individually and in relation to one another, to gauge the overall competitiveness of the 
organisation. Based on this analysis, strategic alternatives are identified and evaluated, 
resulting in a strategy or set of strategies that will enable the organisation to strengthen 
its position and maintain a competitive edge. 
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The positioning, evaluation and selection of strategies can be achieved using the strategic 
choice model illustrated in Figure 6.4. As noted in Chapter Five, where the model was 
first presented, this model draws on the common features of many strategy selection 
models but uses broader terminology that can be applicable to commercial shipping. It 
also integrates a SWOT approach to analysis to encourage an organisation to look at 
relevant strengths and weaknesses in its internal environment and opportunities and 
/hreats in its extemal environment when making strategic choices. As also noted in that 
chapter, the model should be used, not as a step-by-step how-to guide, but as a tool for 
•asking questions' (Lewis et al, 1993, p. 224) whose objective is to provide strategic 
decision makers with a disciplined approach to evaluating strategies. 
Market 
Factors 
Organisational Competitive Factors 
High (Strengths) Low (Weaknesses) 
High 
(Opportunities) 
(Threats) 
Low 
Figure 6.4 The basic framework of the strategic choice model 
Dimensions of analysis 
The strategic choice model allows an organisation to evaluate its strategic position (or 
the strategic position of a business) along two dimensions: organisational competitive 
factors and market factors. 
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Organisational competitive factors refer to an organisation's strengths and 
weaknesses vis-vis its competitors: a strength means the organisation does an 
activity better than any of its main competitors; a weakness means it does an 
activity more poorly than any of its competitors. Organisational competitive 
factors are internal to the organisation and over which the organisation has a high 
degree of control. Some examples include return on investment, profitability, 
quality of services and managerial skills, and efficiency of technology used (e.g. 
ships). 
Market factors on the other hand are factors that are external to the organisation 
and therefore are normally not within the organisation's direct control. These 
factors can either be opportunities or threats in die market place that can have a 
significant effect on an organisation's competitiveness. Some examples include 
freight rate trends, competition in the market, economic conditions in world trade, 
environmental and safety regulations, trade barriers, and protectionist measures. 
The high-low continuum for both organisational and market factors allows an 
organisation to plot its relative strategic position (or the relative position of a 
business) on the matrix. In terms of organisational factors, the more strengths an 
organisation has, the higher is its strategic position; the more weaknesses it has, 
the lower is its strategic position. In terms of market factors, the more 
opportunities there are in the market, the higher is an organisation's strategic 
position; the more threats there are, the lower the position. Based on this analysis, 
an organisation can identify the strategy or strategies most appropriate for it to 
pursue. 
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There are no set organisational or market factors to consider when analysing an 
organisation's strategic position. Shipping research suggests that the number and nature 
of organisational and market factors differ according to shipowner and market segment 
They also change over time as markets and the competition change (Anderson et al., 
1993; Brooks, 1995). The same is true in general management where, as Wind and 
Mahajan (1981, p. 160) found out, 'the factors defining the composite dimensions 
naturally vary among companies and even (though not often) among different businesses 
of the same company\ Therefore, an important assumption in the use of the strategic 
choice model is that the user must be able to define, or be cognisant of, the key success 
factors that are applicable to the time period under analysis. 
To ensure that the analysis of organisational and market factors is thorough, the 
literature on shipping and ports (Rich, 1978; Arlt, 1987; Frankel, 1989; Hawkins, 
1991a, 1991b, 1993) and on general strategic management (Johnson and Scholes, 1988, 
1997; Montanari, 1990; David, 1995, 1997) recommend that the analysis should be 
broad-based, that is, it should take into consideration a broad range of factors against 
which the strengths and weaknesses of an organisation, and the opportunities and 
threats in its external environment, can be assessed. Frankel (1989), for instance, offers 
eight internal and external factors (competitive, adversity, technological, human 
relations, political/governmental, market, international relations, resources), all of which 
can be broken down into more specific subgroups. Hawkins (1991a, 1991b, 1993) takes 
a similarly broad approach, using a method called 'THE Full SCOPE' to assess an 
organisation's internal and external performance. 'THE Full SCOPE', which is an 
acronym for /fechnological, /lealth and safety, environmental, financial, social, 
commercial, organisational, political, and economic factors, is an organising framework 
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that allows an organisation initially to take a broad view of all success factors that are 
likely to affect its internal and extemal performance, and then focus on those factors that 
are most relevant to its current situation. Based on this analysis of current success 
factors, the organisation's strategic position can then be plotted on the matrix and 
strategic choices identified. 
Strategic choices 
What strategic choices can an organisation pursue, given its strategic position? In 
Chapter Four (see Table 4.8), a comprehensive typology of strategies was developed to 
pull together the most well-known strategies identified in the strategic management 
literature. As noted in that chapter, the typology is meant to serve as a companion to 
the strategic choice model to show the range of strategies, from corporate to ftinctional, 
that an organisation can pursue. The typology is reproduced in Table 6.1 for easy 
reference. 
Of particular concern to the study are the five generic corporate strategies: grow, 
develop, stabilise, turnaround, and harvest. The justification, presented earlier in 
Chapter One (Problem Statement), is sU^ightforward. Choosing the 'right' corporate 
strategy or strategies is essential i f an organisation is serious about gaining long-term 
competitiveness; such strategies set the general direction of organisational strategic 
activities and define the specific strategies that must be pursued at the lower levels of 
the organisation. They help the organisation integrate its various strategic activities so 
that, instead of being pursued separately, strategic efforts are able to support one 
another. Under the integrating framework of a corporate strategy (or set of strategies), 
resource allocation also becomes more effective and efficient, since the organisation has a 
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broad understanding of the relative importance of various businesses, industries and 
markets in which it operates. 
Table 6.1 Typology of strategies 
FOCUS OF 
THE STUDY 
Strategy Level Generic 
Specific Strategy 
Primary 
Internal External 
Secondaiy 
Internal External 
Corporate 
(General) 
Grow 
Develop 
Stabilise 
Turnaround 
Harvest 
Corporate 
(Multinational) 
Global cost leader 
Global niche 
Protected national market 
National niche 
Intelligent follower 
Business Cost leadership 
Differentiation 
Cost focus 
Differentiation focus 
Functional 
A common pool of specific strategies can be 
used to support corporate or business level 
strategies. This pool is also the source 
of functional strategies. Among the more 
well known specific strategies are: 
InSerncd: External: 
Concentration Merger 
Diversification Acquisition 
Divestiture Joint venture 
Integration 
Liquidation 
Newgame 
Samegame 
Timing 
Strategies are internal when they require a 
company's own resources; external when 
they require external resources. 
If they are first choice, they are called 
primary, i f they are alternative choices, 
they are called secondary 
(or ancillary or contingency). 
The five corporate strategies were discussed in detail in Chapter Four, hence, only a 
brief description of each strategy is provided here. An organisation may choose to grow 
or develop i f it wants to compete in new high-growth areas; the two strategies differ 
only in that the first (grow) is used in relation to organisations that have achieved a 
foothold in the market while the second (develop) is used for those still in their 
embryonic stages. I f an organisation chooses to stabilise, its aim is to maintain the status 
quo either by keeping to a tried and tested course, changing incrementally in response to 
environmental changes, or both. I f it is in financial trouble, it is likely to choose a 
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turnaround strategy to enable it to reduce or eliminate those activities that are hurting 
its performance and restore financial viability; i f this does not work, it may move on to a 
harvest strategy where the objective is to divest of a poorly performing business or 
parts of it that are. 
On the strategic choice model, the five corporate strategies can be plotted into four 
quadrants, as shown in Figure 6.5. This model was first introduced in Chapter Five as 
Figure 5.13 but is reproduced here for easy reference. 
Organisational Competitive Factors 
Market 
Factors 
High (Strengths) Low (Weaknesses) 
High 
(Opportunities) 
Quadrant 1 Quadrant 2 
Grow Develop 
Turnaround 
Quadrant 3 Quadrant 4 
Stabilise Turnaround 
(Threats) 
Low 
Harvest 
Figure 6.5 Corporate strategies on the strategic choice model 
• Quadrant 1: This is where the organisation or business unit is high on both 
organisational competitive factors and market factors. It has many strengths and few 
weaknesses vis-vis competitors, and market trends show many opportunities and 
few threats. Under these circumstances, the most appropriate strategy is to grow. 
• Quadrant 2: This is where the organisation/business is low on organisational 
competitive factors and high on market factors. It has many weaknesses and few 
strengths vis-vis competitors, while market trends show many opportunities and few 
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threats. Under these circumstances, the most appropriate strategies are turnaround (if 
the organisation^usiness is mature) and develop (if the organisation/business is new 
and emerging), pursued either separately or together. 
• Quadrant 3: This is where the organisation/business is high on organisational 
competitive factors and low in market factors. It has many strengths and few 
weaknesses vis-vis competitors, but market trends show many threats and few 
opportunities. Under these circumstances the most appropriate strategy is to 
stabilise, that is, to maintain the status quo. 
• Quadrant 4: This is where the organisation is low on both organisational competitive 
and market factors. It has many weaknesses and few strengths vis-a-vis competitors, 
and market trends show many threats and few opportunities. Under these 
circumstances, turnaround and harvest strategies are the most appropriate. 
As the model shows, of all the four quadrants, quadrant 1 represents the most 
favourable position (competitively strong, many market opportunities), closely 
followed by quadrant 3 (competitively strong, many threats); quadrants 2 
(competitively weak, many threats); and 4 (competitively weak, many threats) are 
undesirable. Which strategy or strategies should be pursued if an organisation falls in a 
given quadrant? What happens when the organisation sits very close to or on the 
borderline? There are no straightforward answers to these questions, just as the model 
does not provide 'how-to' steps to resolve them. 
Earlier, it has been noted that a major assumption in the use of the model is that the user 
must be able to identify those success factors that apply to current conditions. There is 
no magic formula for determining these factors; their correct identification requires an 
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intelligent combination of deliberate analysis and intuitive judgment When it comes to 
making strategic choices, this same caveat applies. The user must be able to use good 
intuitive judgement in positioning the organisation, particularly when several choices 
may be available and the organisation (or a business) falls close to or on the borderline. 
This is where strategic thinking comes in: the user is expected to ask critical questions 
about the different strategy alternatives relative to the position of the organisation and 
then make decisions based on this appraisal. 
Hawkins (1993, pp. 19-29) argues that the evaluation of corporate strategies should 
address 10 key questions. Basically, these questions seek answers on the strategy's 
organisational compatibility (questions 1-3), commercial value (questions 4-6), and 
intrinsic power (questions 7-10). 
Is the strategy consistent with the findings of the environmental assessment 
(internal and extemal) and with what the organisation intends to achieve (goals and 
objectives)? 
• Are the right people available to support the strategy? Are the organisational 
culture and managerial skills adequate for the strategy to work? 
Are there sufficient resources (capital, facilities, managerial expertise, people) to 
make the strategy work? 
Does the strategy offer a genuine competitive advantage? Is it based upon 
something which is important to customers, and something which the organisation 
can do better than its competitors? 
• Does the strategy offer an acceptable level of risk (relative to return) that the 
organisation is happy to live with? 
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• Is the strategy socially acceptable? Would society find the strategy to be within 
the norms of ethical behaviour? 
Is there sufficient fiexibility in the strategy? Is there enough 'slack' in the strategy 
so that i f environmental conditions give the organisation a surprise, the strategy 
may be adapted or modified? 
Is the strategy clear enough for all to understand? 
Can the strategy be measured so that it can be compared against other alternatives 
and its ability to meet its target be monitored? 
Is the strategy achievable and challenging enough so that people will be motivated 
to make it work, yet not so easy or conservative that they lose interest in it? 
Once corporate strategies are selected, supporting specific strategies, such as those 
outlined in Figure 6.5, can then be identified. Specific strategies will not be discussed 
here as they lie outside the focus of the study. 
6.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter has discussed in detail the conceptual framework for the study, focusing 
specifically on strategy selection and the strategic choice model. The key attributes of 
die model can be summarised as follows: 
• The model is a tool for evaluating an organisation's strategic position and 
determining what strategy or strategies are most appropriate for it to pursue. 
• An organisation's strategic position and choice of strategy are determined on two 
dimensions: organisational competitive factors and market factors. 
• Organisational factors refer to an organisation's strengths and weaknesses vis-a-vis 
competitors; market factors, to the opportunities and threats in the marketplace. 
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Organisational factors are internal to the organisation and therefore are under the 
organisation's direct control; market factors are extemal and are not within the 
organisation's direct power to control. 
The particular organisational (intemal) and market (extemal) factors likely to have 
a significant effect on an organisation are called key success factors. These factors 
are expected to change over time as markets and the competition change. 
There are five corporate strategic alternatives to choose from depending on an 
organisation's strategic position: grow, develop, stabilise, turnaround, and harvest. 
(a) Grow strategies are for organisations with many strengths and are in areas 
where there are many opportunities. 
(b) Turnaround develop strategies are for firms with many weaknesses but are 
in areas where there are many opportunities. 
(c) Stabilise strategies are for firms with many strengths but are in areas where 
there are many threats. 
(d) Harvest strategies are for firms with many weaknesses and are in areas 
where there are many threats. 
The model requires the use of both quantitative (statistical data, etc) and 
qualitative (intuitive judgment, experience) approaches. It is best used as a tool for 
asking questions; indeed, as a frameworic for making the evaluation and selection of 
corporate strategies more integrated and disciplined. 
6.5 TESTING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE MODEL TO ASIA-PACIFIC 
SHIPPING 
The assumptions underiying the strategic choice model are based largely on work done 
in areas outside commercial shipping, hence the extent to which they apply to Asia-
156 
Pacific shipowners still has to be tested. I f the model is correct, that it can be assumed 
that Asia-Pacific shipowners will : 
1 change/modify their strategies in response to changing environmental conditions. 
2 base strategic changes and the time frames for these changes on their future 
expectations of organisational and market conditions. 
3 pursue a 'grow' strategy when internal organisational competitive (internal) and 
market (external) factors are high. 
4 pursue a 'stabilise' strategy when organisational competitive factors are high and 
market factors are low. 
5 pursue a 'turnaround' or 'develop' strategy when organisational competitive 
factors are low and market factors are high. 
6 pursue a 'harvest' strategy when organisational competitive and market factors are 
both low. 
It will be recalled that these assumptions were first introduced in Chapter One (Problem 
Statement), and their applicability to Asia-Pacific commercial shipping was brought into 
question. As was stated in that chapter, since not much is known about the strategic 
choices that Asia-Pacific shipowners make, it is necessary to establish i f these 
assumptions do reflect what Asia-Pacific shipowners actually do. I f theory and practice 
do not match, where do the differences lie? And if there are differences, what should a 
strategy selection model that is specific to Asia-Pacific shipowners look like? These are 
the questions that the study aims to answer. In the next chapter, the methodology for 
answering them will be discussed. 
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Chapter Seven 
METHODOLOGY 
In the preceding chapter, a generic strategic choice model that synthesises what is 
currently known about strategy selection was developed. The model depicts in matrix 
form the type of corporate strategies that are appropriate for an organisation to pursue 
under certain internal (or organisational) and extemal (or market) environmental 
conditions. Although the model focuses on corporate strategies, an underlying 
assumption is that once a corporate strategy is selected, supporting specific strategies 
then have to be identified. Thus, the strategic choice model has an accompanying 
typology of strategies to aid strategy selection. Like the model, the strategy typology is 
a synthesis of the most widely known and used strategies in the strategic management 
literature. 
Because empirical evidence supporting the strategic choice model is drawn largely from 
manufacturing industries, the applicability of the model to service industries like 
shipping, and in particular to commercial shipping within a specific geographical area, 
the Asia-Pacific, has yet to be determined. As noted in earlier chapters, very little is 
known about how Asia-Pacific shipowners make strategic choices (Reker, 1997; Barton, 
1995; Wong, 1991; Hawkins, 1989). In addition, a substantial body of research 
highlighting significant differences between service and manufacturing industries 
(Armistead, 1994; Herbert and Deresky, 1987; Schellenberg, 1983; Hambrick, 1983) has 
cast serious doubts on what has often been assumed as the universal and uniform 
applicability of strategy selection models. Thus, before the model can be used both as a 
conceptual and practical tool to understand and aid strategic decision making by Asia-
Pacific shipowners, its applicability to this particular group of users requires testing. 
This chapter explains the methodology used to determine how applicable the strategic 
choice model is to Asia-Pacific commercial shipowners. It provides a detailed 
description of the research methods used for the study, the major sources of data, and 
the procedures for data collection and analysis. To provide a backdrop to the discussion, 
a brief overview of the research methods and data sources is presented first. 
7.1 OVERVIEW 
How applicable is the strategic choice model to Asia-Pacific commercial shipowners? To 
answer this question, several data sources and research methods were used to guide data 
collection and analysis. The decision to combine several sources and methods was made 
to allow the researcher to cross-check information obtained from one source or through 
one method with information obtained from another source or through another method. 
It also made possible the combined used of qualitative and quantitative approaches to 
data collection and analysis. As Miles and Huberman (1984) strongly advise, 
.... although words may be more unwieldy than numbers, they also enable *thick description* 
... That is, they render more meaning than numbers alone, and should be hung onto 
throughout data analysis. Converting words into numbers, then tossing away the words, gets a 
researcher into all kinds of mischief... Focusing solely on number shifts our attention from 
substance to arithmetic, and thereby throws out the whole notion of qualitativeness; one would 
have done better to have started with numbers in the first place and saved a lot of time. Also, 
when word-derived numbers don't make sense, diere is usually no veiy satisfactory way cf 
making them more intelligible with more numbers, which is all one has at hand. The solurion 
to this problem ... is to keep words and any associated numbers together throughout the 
analysis. Essentially words and numbers keep one another analytically honest (pp. 55-56). 
This process of systematic verification, using both qualitative and quantitative data, is 
called triangulation, Triangulation is discussed more fully in section 7.2 of this chapter. 
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Data sources 
Data for the study was collected from three sources: shipowners, maritime experts, and 
maritime statistical and related documents. Shipowners were the primary source of 
information, with maritime experts and relevant documents used to verify, evaluate, or 
expand on information collected from or about shipowners. At this point, discussion of 
data sources will be limited to a brief overview; they will be treated more fully later in 
this chapter and in Chapters 8 through 10. 
The shipowners included in the study were ship operators in the bulk and liner markets 
who were based in 12 Asia-Pacific countries: Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Thailand. Maritime experts included leading researchers and practitioners in the Asia-
Pacific maritime field whose primary role was to verify whether and to what extent the 
information obtained from and about shipowners was congruent with what was known 
about the Asia-Pacific in general and Asia-Pacific commercial shipowners in particular. 
Maritime documents included aveulable relevant material (trade journals, statistical 
series, annual reports, company reports, etc.) that provided information about the Asia-
Pacific region in general and its commercial shipowners in particular. 
A total of 748 respondents provided data for the study. Of these, 733 represented 
shipowners and 15 were maritime experts. Of the 733 shipping respondents, 109 
participated in the survey, 54 in the interviews, and 570 in the simulation. A total of 
130 shipowners were represented, or about 38 per cent of the original survey 
population (n=340). 
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To ensure comparability, background information was collected from all these shipping 
respondents. This included personal data about the respondent (position in the 
organisation, years in this position, experience and training in strategic planning, age, 
gender, nationality, ethnic background), company information (market sector and 
percentage of total operations, trade routes, compemy size), and general strategic 
planning practices (presence of a strategic plan, strategic planning process). Where 
possible, self-reports were cross-checked against information available in shipping 
statistical reports, trade journals, and armual company reports. 
Research methods 
To collect information from shipowners, three research methods were used: a mail 
survey, interviews, and simulation. To verify information collected from shipowners or 
shed further light on specific issues under study, two other methods, expert review and 
document review, were also used. Only a general description is provided here; further 
details can be found later in this chapter. 
A mail survey was initially administered to commercial shipowners in the Asia-Pacific 
to collect baseline information about their strategic practices. This was followed up by 
interviews with a sample of shipowners to allow for more in-depth examination and 
analysis of issues. At the same time, simulation sessions were conducted, during which 
shipowners made strategic decisions under computer-simulated shipping conditions. 
The information collected from shipowners was sent to a number of maritime experts 
who were asked to provide feedback on the findings based on their knowledge of the 
maritime industry in the Asia Pacific. Depending on the location of the person, feedback 
was provided either in writing, by phone, or in person. Relevant documentation that 
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pertained to the issues investigated by the study was also reviewed to obtain ftirther 
information. 
Following the advice of Miles and Huberman (1984), data analysis commenced during 
data collection. This interweaving approach enabled the researcher to 'cycle back and 
forth between thinking about the existing data and generating strategies for collecting 
new—often better quality—data; [it also served as] a healthy corrective for built-in 
blind spots ... [and made the] analysis an ongoing, lively enterprise (p. 49). 
Data collected was both quantitative and qualitative in nature; hence, appropriate 
quantitative and qualitative methods were used to analyse the data and interpret the 
results. Overall, a qualitative approach to analysis, which allowed for emergent patterns 
and trends to be identified, categorised, and described, was used to integrate and 
interpret results obtained through the various methods and sources into a final set of 
findings and conclusions. The approach to qualitative data analysis is explained in 
Appendix 2. 
7,2 TRIANGULATION A S A R E S E A R C H A P P R O A C H 
Because of its highly applied nature, strategic management research has always been 
dominated by field studies. Field studies are undertaken in practical settings, involve real 
managers and organisations, and draw from a variety of research methods to examine 
strategic and organisational behaviour and processes (Snow and Thomas, 1994). Many 
of these field studies have taken a quantitative approach; in recent years however there 
has been a growing call for an expanded research perspective, one that reflects a better 
balance between theory building and testing, and between quantitative and qualitative 
methods. 'Multimethod approaches' to the study of strategy are particularly 
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recommended as an alternative to the dominant quantitative paradigm because they 
allow the collection and analysis of quantitative and qualitative data in a variety of 
ways and thus provide a far richer data base (Snow and Thomas, 1994; Lyies, 1990). 
According to Snow and Thomas (1994), 
... calls are being heard for research that explores the considerable unexplained variance that 
remains from the quantitative studies ... Invariably, these calls recommend that greater use be 
made of field methods, particularly multiple methods. In addition, we urge researchers to 
expand their research designs beyond the confines of field methods to include other types cf 
methods [i.e. quasi-experiments, laboratory experiments, computer simulations]. While such 
between-method triangulation may be labour-intensive, the reward is likely to be increased 
validity. As an applied field, strategic management owes its constituents, particularly 
practitioners, the most robust results that it can provide (p. 474). 
A temi typically associated with multimethod approaches is T R I A N Q U L A T I O N , which is 
defined as a systematic process of using several methods, perspectives, and/or sources 
to evaluate or validate the same idea (Baker and Ahem, 1990; Miles and Huberman, 
1984; McGrath et al., 1982; Patton, 1980; Cook and Reichardt, 1979; Denzin, 1978; 
Webb et al. 1965). According to Denzin (1978), there are four basic types of 
triangulation: data triangulation (use of several data sources in a study), investigator 
triangulation (use of several different researchers), theory triangulation (use of multiple 
perspectives to interpret a single set of data), and methodological triangulation (use of 
multiple methods to study a single problem). Al l these types can be used singly or in 
combination with one another. 
The use of triangulation as a means of establishing the validity of data is not new. The 
process had been variously referred to as 'multi-trait', 'cross-validation' or 'multiple 
validation' procedures in earlier research literature (e.g. Campbell and Fiske, 1959; 
Becker, 1958) until Webb at al. (1965) coined the term 'triangulation' to depict a 
process of'validating a finding by subjecting it to the onslaught of a series of imperfect 
measures' (Miles and Huberman, 1984, p. 234). 
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Miles (1982) elucidates: 
The rhetoric of triangulation, a term drawn from the field of surveying, imples that three 
elements of a triangle are known ... Where there are two data points, all we have is a measure 
of agreement or disagreement.. Real triangulation requires additional information, which may 
be data from an actual third source (one whose position relative to the two other sources is 
known), a more general theoretical explanation that subsumes the apparent disagreement, or 
information about the trustworthiness of the two sources drawn from other data ... (p.224). 
Triangulation uses both qualitative and quantitative methods to arrive at one conclusion 
(Northurp and Kraemer, 1982). Its effectiveness is based on the premise that the 
weaknesses of one method can be counterbalanced by the strengths o f another (Jick, 
1979; Cook and Reichardt, 1979). Through this process, the methods are used to check 
and build on one another. Convergence is said to be reached when evidence gathered in 
different ways from different sources support the same conclusion (Baker and Ahem, 
1990; Kerlinger, 1973). Add Cook and Reichardt (1979), disparate methods which 
still converge on the same operations are better than similar ones because the former are 
likely to share fewer biases than the latter. Often qualitative and quantitative methods 
work well together because they are relatively disparate' (p. 23). 
The research methods used in the study—mail survey, interviews, computer simulation, 
expert review and document review—have been selected on the basis of their ability to 
build on one another* s strengths while minimising their respective weaknesses. As the 
following discussion shows, by triangulating findings collected through these various 
methods and sources, convergence, or the extent to which it is achieved, can thus be 
established. 
The mall survey and interviews 
It is widely acknowledged in the literature (e.g. Zikmund, 1994; Gay and Diehl, 1992, 
Leedy, 1992; Hoaglin et al.. 1982; Williamson et al., 1977; Kerlinger, 1973) that a survey 
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is particularly appropriate when the goal is to describe certain characteristics of a group 
of people. Information is systematically collected from members of this group, and 
based on this information, inferences about the characteristics of the whole group are 
then made. A survey is typically administered through the use of questionnaires mailed 
to respondents, interviews conducted in person or by phone, or both. 
Of the various survey approaches in use today, a M A I L S U R V E Y is considered as 
particuleu'ly appropriate when a large sample is involved, the respondents are 
geographically dispersed (e.g. in different countries across the Asia-Pacific), and when 
response to questionnaire items require careftil thought (e.g. describing strategy selection 
practices or identifying what strategies they choose under given circumstances). 
However, it suffers from two weaknesses: the risk of non-response is usually high, and 
it is not possible to check responses as they are given. To compensate for these 
limitations, the collection of data through other means (e.g. in-depth interviews), as well 
as steps to encourage a better response rate, are normally recommended (Snow and 
Thomas, 1994), 
Unlike the mail survey, which takes a broad but superficial view of a subject under 
study, the I N T E R V I E W takes a narrower focus and examines it in-depth. Particularly when 
rapport and trust is established between interviewee and interviewer, an interview can 
result in data that respondents would not normally give on a questionnaire, as well as in 
more accurate and honest responses since the interviewer can explain and clarify the 
purposes of the research and individual questions, follow up on incomplete or unclear 
responses, and ask probing questions to determine the reasons behind a particular 
response. Because the interview gives interviewees the opportunity to express their 
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ideas in their own words, the interviewer develops a better understanding of the 
interviewee's perspective. 
By its very nature however the interview is far more costly and time-consuming than 
the mail survey; where respondents are geographically dispersed, administration costs 
can be too prohibitive to justify its use as a primary research method. However, 
because the interview can produce rich qualitative data not possible with a 
questionnaire, a compromise research strategy often adopted is to use it in tandem with 
the mail survey. Under this strategy, a mail survey is initially administered for a broad 
look at the issues under study, and then follow-up interviews with selected respondents 
are held for a more in-depth examination of issues. This approach takes advantage of the 
interview's sU*ength (in-depth examination of issues) and minimises its weakness (high 
administration costs) and those of the mail survey (low response rate, inability to verify 
responses). 
The survey and interviews, although eminently suitable for collecting information about 
certain features of a population, have their drawbacks. Because both rely heavily on the 
memory and honesty of respondents, there is always the risk of inaccurate recall 
(people giving factually incorrect answers) or deliberate deception (people giving 
answers that put them in a good light or they consider socially acceptable). To 
compensate for these limitations, it is advisable to collect the same type of data through 
another method and check the extent to which data obtained from two different methods 
are congruent 
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Simulation 
In relation to the current study, one method that lends itself well for the purposes of 
triangulation is simulation (Snow and Thomas, 1994). The same type of data is obtained 
(i.e. strategic choices made under given environmental conditions) but instead of relying 
on self-reports, as the survey and interviews do, the S I M U L A T I O N requires participants to 
make strategic decisions within a context set by the researcher. It recreates a particular 
environment, either through the use of a computer program or written case scenarios, 
and allows the user to manipulate this environment, make decisions based on their 
analysis of changing environmental conditions, and see the effect(s) of their decisions. 
Simulation is a problem-solving technique that allows a user to see the effect of a 
decision without actually implementing that decision (Proctor, 1996; Render and Heizer, 
1996; Kinnear et al., 1993; Fredrickson, 1986). A well-designed simulation is able to 
mimic actual conditions, and allows users access to the same type of infonnation that 
they need for decision making as what they would normally find in the workplace. The 
main strength of the simulation lies in its ability to control variables, compress months 
or years of work into a matter of minutes or hours of computer time, and provide 
participants with the opportunity to make decisions they would normally make in real 
life without the associated real-life risks. These strengths are maximised when the 
simulation has gone through enough testing, and confidence in its ability to mimic actual 
conditions is firmly established. 
In spite of its obvious advantages, the simulation has its drawbacks. Because the 
simulation takes participants out of their normal working context, the novelty of the 
experience may create more interest and motivation in the required task (i.e. strategic 
decision making) than would nonnally occur in real life (Lawler and Mohrman, 1987). In 
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addition, participants may treat the simulation merely as a game and thus may take 
more risks than usual. These limitations can be controlled to some extent by running the 
simulation under tight time pressure, and where applicable, under competitive 
conditions whereby participants compete with one another in pursuit of a given 
objective. Under the combined effect of peer and time pressure, participants are more 
likely to adopt the same decision-making style they normally use in real life. As research 
indicates, when making decisions dealing with complex problems or under conditions of 
uncertainty, individuals tend to simplify the decision-making process by opting for 
what is known and familiar (Robbins, 1991; Stoner, et al., 1994). The novelty effect can 
also be minimised through time and peer pressure; as a further measure, the simulation 
can be run long enough to allow the novelty of the experience to wear o f f (Lawler and 
Mohrman, 1987). 
Two other research issues also require careful attention. I f more than one simulation 
session is held, the researcher must ensure uniformity in information and administration 
across all sessions (i.e. inter-session reliability). Further, although the researcher must 
take care not to let participants know beforehand that the simulation is part of a 
research study, as knowledge of which might affect their behaviour during the simulation 
(i.e. the Hawthorne effect), for ethical reasons, their consent on the use o f the simulation 
data for research purposes must be obtained after the simulation. 
Expert and document review 
Although the simulation provides another means of collecting information about 
strategic choices, it still relies on the same source (i.e. shipowners) as do the mail survey 
and interviews. As a further aid to triangulation therefore the same type of data should 
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be obtained from other sources. This wil l allow the researcher to compare the responses 
of one source with those of another; the greater the congruence, the greater the 
confidence in the data's validity. For the study, two likely sources of information are 
EXPEm-s in the Asia-Pacific maritime field whose knowledge of the research topic is 
widely acknowledged and therefore can verify or shed further light on information 
provided by shipowners, and maritime D O C U M E N T S that provide general trade information 
(general shipping, Asia-Pacific shipping, shipowner-specific information, etc.) or 
specific company information (company records, strategic plans, etc.). Documents are a 
particularly rich source of information i f access to them can be arranged. They provide 
valuable information because of what can be learned directly from them, and they can 
serve as springboards for generating questions and issues to pursue during the 
interviews. 
A summary of data sources, the information sought from them, and the means of 
obtaining the infomiation is provided in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 Types of information from data sources and means of collecting it: Summary table 
Data Source Type of Information Means of Data Collection 
Sought Mail Interview/ Simulation Document 
Survey Discussion Review 
Shipowners General strategic planning • • 
approach 
Selection of corporate • • 
strategies 
Background information on • • 
the shipowner 
Maritime experts General economic and 
maritime trends in the Asia-
Pacific region 
Strategic practices of 
Asia-Paciflc shipowners 
Maritime Trade information on Asia-
documents Pacific commercial shipping 
Strategic planning, strategy 
selection 
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7.3 DATA C O L L E C T I O N AND A N A L Y S I S 
Figure 7.1 summarises the five stages in data collection and analysis. 
Stage la. Collect and analyse survey 
data, focusing specifically on: 
• strategy selection at the corporate 
level 
• strategic planning practices of 
organisations 
• profile of respondents 
• profile of oi^anisations 
Stage lb. Conduct follow-up 
interviews with a randomly selected 
group of survey respondents and 
non-respondents, and compare 
survey data with interview data 
Stage Ic. Prepare stage 1 findings on 
corporate strategic choices based on 
self-reports by shipowners 
Stage 2. Conduct simulation 
sessions, and compare simulation 
data with stage 1 findings (self-
reports) 
Stage 3a. Develop an 
aggregate picture of the 
corporate strategic choices 
shipowners make under given 
conditions 
Stage 3b. If needed, revise or 
expand on the strategic choice 
model based on stage 3a findings 
f 
Stage 4. Subject the shipping 
model to the scrutiny of 
maritime experts, and 
incorporate expert review into 
final findings 
Stage 5: Based on 
aggregate findings, 
prepare a final version 
of the strategic choice 
model for shipping 
Figure 7.1 Stages in data collection and analysis 
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As the figure shows, at stage 1, initial data fh)m shipowners was collected through a 
mail survey, followed by in-depth interviews with a randomly selected group of survey 
respondents and non-respondents. Both types of data were analysed, and initial findings 
on the strategic choices made by Asia-Pacific shipowners were arrived at. At stage 2, 
simulation data was collected and evaluated against stage 1 findings. At stage 3, findings 
from the survey, interviews and simulation were integrated to produce an aggregate 
picture of corporate strategic choices made by shipowners. A first iteration of the 
strategic choice model for shipping, based on information provided by Asia-Pacific 
shipowners, was prepared. At stage 4, experts were asked to review the strategic choice 
model for shipping. Their feedback was evaluated against shipowner-generated 
information, and results were incorporated into the final findings. Finally, at stage 5, the 
final version of the strategic choice model was prepared. At each stage, data obtained 
from relevant documents was also included in the analysis. These stages are discussed in 
fiirther detail below. 
Stage 1. Survey and interviews 
In preparation for the mail survey, the population of shipowners for inclusion in the 
study was identified. A survey questionnaire was also developed and pre-tested, and 
survey questionnaires were mailed to every shipowner in the list. Based on the survey 
responses, a group of shipowners was randomly selected for follow-up interviews. 
1 Identifying the shipowner population 
Using the Lloyd's Maritime Information Services, a list of all commercial shipowners 
for inclusion in the study was compiled. The list included all shipowners who: 
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were based in Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand (the 
major contributors to the economic growth of the Asia-Pacific region) 
managed and operated ships, i.e. ship operators, shipmanagers, managing agents, 
and disponent owners (this criterion excluded owners and leasing companies who 
did not directly operate them) 
traded in liner and bulk trades (the two major shipping markets in the Asia-Pacific 
region) 
operated any of the four major types of commercial cargo-carrying ships, i.e. 
tankers, bulk carriers, container ships and general cargo ships, as these made up 
more than 86 per cent of the Asia-Pacific fleet and 84 per cent o f the world's fleet 
(this criterion excluded (a) passenger, RO-RO, gas, chemical and refiigerated cargo 
ships which made up a small percentage of the fleet and dealt with specialised 
trades, and (b) non-commercial cargo carrying ships like fish-catching, offshore 
supply, research, towing, dredging, ice breaking, cable and naval ships and yachts) 
engaged in regional trade within the Asia-Pacific region (this criterion excluded 
shipowners engaged solely in coastal trades or trades outside the region, e.g. 
European or American trades) 
• operated more than five ships greater than 1000 grt (this criterion is widely used 
to identify major shipowners (e.g. Lloyd's Register), who are targetted here 
because they are more likely to use corporate strategies than those who only 
operate one to three ships) 
The initial list of shipowners who met all these criteria was cross-checked against the 
listings in Lloyd's Electronic Maritime Directory (1996, 1995) and Fairplay's Worid 
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Shipping Directory (1996, 1995). A total of 340 shipowners was finally arrived at. Of 
these, five were selected to pre-test the survey questionnaire; the rest were included in 
the mail survey. 
2 Administering the mail survey 
A 10-page questionnaire was developed to obtain information about the strategic 
decision-making practices of the identified shipowner population. The questionnaire 
sought information on four areas: the general strategic planning practices of the 
shipowner, the process normally followed by the shipowner to select and evaluate 
corporate strategies, the type of corporate strategies the shipowner was likely to make 
under certain environmental conditions, and background infomiation about the 
respondent and the shipowner. Questions on corporate strategy choices were based on 
the strategic choice model presented in Chapter Six (Conceptual Framework). 
To ensure that the questionnaire items were clear and the overall questionnaire design 
was appropriate for the intended respondents, the questionnaire was pilot-tested on a 
randomly selected group of five shipowners. As noted earlier, these shipowners were 
part of the identified shipowner population and were subsequently excluded from the 
survey list because of their participation in the pretest. Based on their comments, the 
questionnaire was modified and a final version prepeued. 
Two copies of the survey questionnaire were mailed to each shipowner in the sample, 
addressed to the senior people (e.g. CEO, president, executive director, managing 
director, etc.). To improve the response rate, a reminder letter, which included a copy of 
the questionnaire, was sent a month later. A third reminder was sent the following 
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month. The overall response rate was 32 per cent, with all completed questionnaires 
useable. A copy of the survey questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix 3. 
3 Selecting the interview sample and conducting the interviews 
To cross-check survey information, follow-up interviews were conducted either face to 
face or by phone with a randomly selected group o f survey respondents and non-
respondents. Face-to-face interviews were conducted in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Australia and New Zealand, where simulation sessions were also held. The first three, all 
in East Asia, were considered the 'emerging tigers' in Asia; the last two represented 
western-style economies and thus served as a contrast to the Asian economies. 
Interviews for alt other countries were conducted over the phone. 
A total of 54 shipowners were interviewed; half represented 25 per cent of survey 
respondents and the other half were non-respondents. Non-respondents were included 
to determine comparability with respondents and thereby improve the generalisability 
of survey findings. The greater the similarity between respondents and non-
respondents, the more generalisable the data (Zikmund, 1994). Inter-group 
comparability was initially established by comparing survey respondents and non-
respondents in terms of general company information (geographical location, major 
market sectors, company size) collected from the shipping literature and company 
reports. During the interviews, inter-group comparability was further established by 
collecting the same background data about the interviewees and their organisations as 
that asked for in the survey questionnaire. 
Al l face-to-face interviews were conducted by the researcher at shipowners' premises. 
An interview guide, which was based on the survey questionnaire, was used to ensure all 
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important issues were covered during each interview. The guide focused on open-ended 
questions to allow individual ideas and experiences to emerge. Efforts were also taken by 
the researcher to adapt the wording and sequence of the questions to suit the specific 
interview context. 
4 Analysis of survey and interview data 
The survey and interviews elicited both quantitative and qualitative data. Using the 
quantitative data from the survey questionnaire, a descriptive statistical analysis was 
conducted to develop a general profile of respondents (current position, years in this 
position, experience and training in strategic planning, age, sex, nationality, ethnic 
background), the organisations they belonged to (shipping sectors in which they 
operated, major Asia-Pacific trade routes, location of the head office, company size in 
terms of number of ships owned, revenue, and businesses or divisions operated), the 
general strategic planning practices of these organisations (whether they have a strategic 
plan, format and time frame of the strategic plan, importance given to strategic planning, 
estimated percentage of the annual budget spent on strategic planning, frequency of 
change, success rate), and their corporate strategies (whether they have specific 
corporate strategies, frequency of review, key factors that lead to changes in strategies, 
key people responsible for corporate strategy decisions, time spent on strategy 
selection and evaluation). 
The open-ended questions in the questionnaire and the interviews focused on two 
aspects: the general processes followed by organisations for strategic planning and 
strategy selection and evaluation, and what specific corporate strategic choices they 
would make given certain environmental conditions. Data thus gathered was content-
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analysed to uncover recurrent trends and patterns. Content analysis is a method used to 
analyse qualitative data. Like statistical analyses, content analysis also aims to identify 
'consistent patterns in the data so that results may be studied and interpreted in a ... 
meaningfiil way' (Zikmund, 1994, p. 462). It follows the same process of 
systematically reducing data into understandable patterns and organising it into a 
compact form (using narrative text, matrices, graphs, charts, etc.) to permit conclusions 
to be drawn and verified. However, unlike statistical analyses, which deal with 
numbers, content analysis deals primarily with words. It is a process that involves 
chunking together the 'raw' data in the form of field notes, teasing out general themes 
and patterns fi-om this data, establishing a coding index for easy access to all the data 
that relates to a particular topic or theme, elaborating on each major theme or pattern, 
and then drawing conclusions based on these major themes or patterns. Implicit in 
content analysis is an inductive process of analysis, which begins by identifying specific 
events or observations and building these into major themes or patterns (Miles and 
Huberman, 1984; Patton, 1980). Further discussion of qualitative data analysis is in 
Appendix 2, where the coding index used for the study is presented. 
As a final step, findings from both the survey and the interviews were integrated into an 
initial set of findings. Relevant data obtained from documents was also incorporated at 
this stage. 
Stage 2. Shipowner participation In the computer simulation 
Simulation sessions were conducted during the same period that the follow-up 
interviews were held. Thirty (30) sessions were held in five countries (Australia, New 
Zealand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore), and a total of 570 senior managers 
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representing 86 shipowners participated. A qualitative approach was used to analyse 
simulation data, which came in the form of strategic decisions made by participants over 
20 quarters (future outlook, strategic objectives, corporate strategy, fleet structure 
decisions, and operational decisions, all of which were based on their analysis of 
company and market conditions), the researcher's observations of participant/team 
behavioiu* during the simulation, and post-simulation feedback from a randomly selected 
group of 90 participants. 
1 Preparing for the simulation 
Participation in the simulation sessions was voluntary; however, every effort was taken 
to ensure that those included in the study were members of the study population and 
that they held senior management positions with authority to make strategic decisions 
for their respective organisations. Data provided by participants who did not meet these 
two criteria was excluded from consideration. 
To attract shipowner interest, the simulation was conducted as an intensive one-day 
shipping competition. A one-page flier, which invited shipowners to test their strategic 
decision-making skills against those of other commercial shipowners, was circulated to 
shipowners through national shipowner organisations, which organised the competitions 
in their respective countries. No deliberate effort was taken to invite specific 
shipowners to the competition; instead, competitions were announced through national 
shipowner bodies in the various countries and shipowners were asked to respond within 
a given period of time. There was no direct contact between the researcher and 
shipowners until the commencement of the competition. 
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2 Conducting the simulation 
The objective of the competition was to turn a financially-troubled shipping company 
around and earn as much profit as possible. Whoever posted the highest company value 
at the end of the competition was judged the winner. A computer-based strategic 
planning simulation program called 'Stratship' was used for this purpose. Produced by 
the Esmee Fairbaim Research Centre, Stratship is designed to simulate strategic decision 
making in a shipping company. A detailed description of the Stratship program, 
including the rationale for its use in the study, is provided in Appendix 4. 
At the commencement of the competition, participants were grouped into teams of three 
or four each. Each team worked under strict time limits, with a maximum of eight (8) 
hours to complete the program. To ensure uniformity in the information provided to 
participants and in the administration o f the competition, standard documentation was 
prepared and used during each simulation. This included a one-hour presentation by the 
researcher using overhead transparencies, a guidebook on the requirements and 
procedures of the shipping competition, a copy of the Stratship manual, and a booklet 
of decision sheets that participants must complete for each of the 20 quarters covered 
by the competition. The sequence of activities was also standardised, with a program of 
activities circulated to participants during the opening presentation. A description of the 
materials and administration procedures used for the simulation is found in Appendix 4. 
During each simulation, the researcher closely observed participant/team behaviour to 
gain a better insight into their group dynamics and team decision-making styles. 
Observations gained through this manner served as another basis for intra-group 
comparisons. 
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The day after the conclusion of each simulation session, three participants, chosen at 
random (i.e. the first, middle and last participant on the list, or the next person i f the 
selected participant was unavailable), were asked to comment on the realism and utility 
of the Stratship program as well as on overall administrative arrangements (timing and 
length of session, use of a competition format, and general conduct of the simulation). 
Discussions were held at the participants' work premises to create a comfortable 
atmosphere where participants would be at ease and thus would be more inclined to 
provide candid feedback. 
3 Analysis of simulation data 
The simulation data collected were of three types: strategic decisions jotted down on 
quarterly decision sheets, researcher observations of participant/team behaviour during 
the simulation, and post-simulation participant feedback. Of the 190 sets of decision 
sheets submitted by the study teams, 174 were useable (i.e. provided all essential 
information); for the post-simulation evaluation, feedback from all 90 participants was 
used. 
Every quarter, based on information provided by the simulation program, participants 
analysed the current financial situation of the company and market trends. From this 
analysis, they made strategic predictions, set strategic objectives and corporate 
strategies, and made specific strategic decisions affecting fleet structure and operations. 
The program 'implemented' these decisions, and then informed the participants of the 
financial outcome and the market response to their decisions. This process was repeated 
over 20 quarters, thus making it possible to conduct a qualitative analysis of decision 
patterns over a period of time. Using the coding tools in Appendix 2, responses of 
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participants on these areas were content-analysed to uncover general patterns of 
strategic choices. Choices taken under simulated conditions were then compared against 
shipowners' self-reports to determine the extent of congruence. 
At the first stage of analysis, a set of data-classification criteria was developed so that 
specific quarterly information on company (vessel operating costs, route value, etc.) and 
market (route market share, market trade indices, etc) conditions could be systematically 
categorised into being either favourable or unfavourable. Once categorisation on all 
quarters was completed, strategic decisions were then summarised into a quarterly-
decisions summary sheet. The summary included the type of company and market 
conditions that prevailed in each quarter, the type of strategy selected based on these 
conditions, and the time frame set for the strategy. This information was assessed in 
terms of the team's future outlook and the strategic objectives selected on the basis of 
this prediction. Initial analysis allowed the researcher to identify emergent decision-
making patterns at the team level. At the second stage, all summary sheets were 
analysed to identify more general decision-making patterns and make intra-group 
comparisons. To complete the picture, researcher observations and post-simulation 
participant feedback were also incorporated into the analysis. Once this second stage 
was completed, it was then possible to determine whether the simulation data 
supported the six assumptions of the strategic choice model and i f there were deviations 
where they occurred. 
Stage 3. First iteration of the strategic choice model for shipping 
With the data from shipowners integrated into a single set of findings, prelimineiry 
conclusions were made about the strategic choice model, particularly in terms of the 
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research objectives and questions. These initial conclusions were used to make any 
necessary modifications or changes to the generic strategic choice model and prepare a 
shipping-specific version of the model. 
Stage 4. Expert review of the strategic choice model for shipping 
To test the robustness of the shipping model, 15 leading researchers and practitioners in 
the maritime field within the Asia-Pacific region were asked to review the model. For 
this purpose, each expert was given a briefmg paper that provided a fiill description of 
the strategic choice model, and was asked to critique the model based on a set of open-
ended questions. Communication between the experts and the researcher was mainly 
written, but discussions by phone or fax were also conducted to discuss any issue or 
provide further information. The reviews from the experts were content-analysed, 
evaluated against shipowner-generated information, and then incorporated into the final 
set of findings. 
Stage 5. Final version of the strategic choice model for shipping 
At this last stage, the integrated set of findings from shipowners, experts, and 
documents was used to make fmal conclusions about the research assumptions. A 
qualitative approach, against using content analysis, was used for this fmal synthesis of 
fmdings into major conclusions. Based on these conclusions, a fmal version of the 
strategic choice model for shipping was prepared. At this stage, implications for further 
research were also discussed. 
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7.4 SUMMARY 
To determine the applicability of the strategic choice model to Asia-Pacific shipovmers, 
the study used a multi-method research approach called triangulation. Triangulation 
involves the use of several methods, perspectives, and/or sources to evaluate or validate 
the same idea. For the study, five methods (mail survey, interviews, computer 
simulation, expert review, document review) and three sources (shipowners, maritime 
experts, documents) were used to examine what corporate strategic choices Asia-Pacific 
commercial shipowners pursued under given environmental conditions. Data gathered 
was both quantitative and qualitative. Quzmtitative data was subjected to a descriptive 
statistical analysis, qualitative data to content analysis. In both types o f analysis, the 
aim was to uncover consistent patterns of behaviour so that meaningful conclusions can 
be drawn about strategy selection by Asia-Pacific shipowners. Results are discussed in 
the next three chapters. 
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Chapter Eight 
RESEARCH FINDINGS: SURVEY AND INTERVIEWS 
This chapter and the next two present the results of the study. The sequence corresponds 
to the stages in data collection and analysis discussed in the preceding chapter (see Figure 
7.1). In this chapter, survey data is presented first, followed by interview data, and then 
both sets of data are synthesised into an initial set of findings. 
In Chapter Nine, simulation data is analysed and evaluated against survey and interview 
data. In Chapter Ten, initial conclusions are drawn about corporate strategy selection by 
Asia-Pacific shipowners; from these conclusions, revisions are made to the generic 
strategic choice model to reflect more accurately the behaviour of Asia-Pacific 
shipowners. Finally, comments from experts who reviewed the shipping-based model are 
presented and evaluated against information provided by shipowners; from this aggregate 
set of findings, a final version of an Asia-Pacific shipping strategic choice model is then 
offered. 
To set the context for the ensuing discussion, the chapter commences with an overview of 
the research findings and a profile of the shipping respondents and the organisations they 
represent. 
8.1 OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
To what extent were the results, as obtained through several research methods (survey, 
interviews, simulation, expert review, document review) and from different data sources 
(shipowners, shipping experts), congruent with one another? The general picture that 
emerged was that they were highly congruent, with interview data confirming survey data, 
and simulation data confirming shipowners' self-reports. Expert opinion also supported 
shipowner-generated data; however, the quality of the feedback provided was uneven and 
therefore less useful than anticipated. 
Primary findings 
In both the survey and interviews, and as evident in the decisions they made under 
simulated conditions, shipowners provided clear support for the strategic choice model, 
either following it precisely as intended or modifying its parameters to suit their own 
strategic ends. Modifications typically involved disregarding environmental conditions 
when selecting a strategy, pursuing a strategy under conditions not called for by the 
model, or combining several strategies instead of limiting themselves to the one or two 
choices prescribed by the model. This trend consistently came up in the survey, 
interviews, and simulation, highlighting the point that strategic choices were not as 
clearcut as the model assumed. The shipping-specific strategic choice model, which 
incorporates these variations, is presented in Chapter Ten. 
Secondary findings 
In addition to the primary findings on corporate strategy selection, other key secondary 
trends also became evident. Mostly, these trends involved intergroup comparisons (e.g. 
liner v. bulk, Asian v. European, large v. small, high performers v. low performers, etc) 
based on a wide range of factors, for instance, strategic management training and 
experience, approaches to strategic planning and corporate strategy selection, 
management/decision-making styles, cultural differences, and methodological 
considerations. Secondary findings are discussed separately under their respective section 
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or chapter headings, and their implications to the primary findings and to further research 
are discussed fully in the final chapter, 'Conclusions and Issues for Further Research'. 
8.2 SHIPPING RESPONDENTS 
A total of 748 respondents participated in the study: 109 in the survey (32 per cent of 
the survey population), 54 in the interviews (divided equally into survey respondents and 
non-respondents), 570 in the simulation sessions, and 15 in the expert review. The first 
three groups provided data on shipowners' strategy selection practices, which was then 
used to draw up a shipping-specific strategic choice model; the last group reviewed the 
strategic choice model as a further check of the model's robustness. Table 8.1 shows the 
distribution of respondents by country and type of research method. 
Table 8.1 Distribution of respondents by country and research method 
Survey Interviews Simulations Expert Review Total 
Australia 6 4 52 2 64 
China 7 4 - - 11 
Hong Kong 13 6 165 3 187 
Indonesia 10 7 91 1 109 
Japan 25 10 - 3 38 
Malaysia 7 4 88 1 100 
New Zealand 5 4 41 1 51 
Philippines 4 2 - 1 7 
Singapore 13 6 133 2 154 
South Korea 9 2 - - 11 
Taiwan 6 3 - 1 10 
Thailand 4 2 - - 6 
Total 109 54 570 15 748 
In a number of instances, the same people participated in both the survey and interviews 
(n=27), in both interviews and simulations (n=13), or in both the survey and simulations 
(n=8). Taking these overiaps into consideration, the total number of individuals 
participating was 685. With the 15 shipping experts, the total tally goes to 700. 
85 
What were the general characteristics of the shipping respondents? As required by the 
study, all shipping respondents held senior management positions in their organisations. 
These positions included senior executive positions (21 per cent) with responsibility for 
the entire organisation (e.g. chairman of the board, chief executive officer, president, 
managing director, executive director), senior divisional level positions (66 per cent) with 
responsibility for major areas/divisions within the organisation (e.g. director, senior 
manager, general manager), and corporate level positions (13 per cent) with responsibility 
for the organisation's corporate and/or strategic management activities (e.g. 
corporate/strategic manager, development & plarming manager, corporate 
planner/strategist). 
More than half of the respondents (62 per cent) had been in their current positions for 1-
5 years; the remaining 38 per cent for 6-10 years. Many (72 per cent) had been involved 
in strategic planning for about 6 to 10 years but much of what they knew about it had 
been learned on the job, with the majority (76 per cent) having had no formal training 
(university degree or short courses) in strategic planning or management. Most were 40-
49 year old males (81 per cent) who held the nationality of the country in which they 
worked. In terms of ethnic background, the majority were Chinese (42 per cent), 
European or North American (19 per cent), Indian (12 per cent), and other South Asian 
( I I per cent); the rest were scattered among the various nationalities represented in the 
study. The main characteristics of shipping respondents are summarised in Figure 8.1. 
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senior level position (100%) 
1-5 years (62%) 
Level of management position 
Years in current position 
Years in strategic planning 6-10 yeais (72%) 
Formal training in strategic management None (76%) 
Age 40-49 years old (81%) 
I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Figures.! General profile of shipping respondents 
Background data on the 54 survey respondents and non-respondents who participated in 
the interviews showed a high level of similarity between the two groups; they differed 
only in that on average survey respondents were younger and had more formal training 
and experience in strategic planning than non-respondents. Data on the simulation 
participants followed the same set of general characteristics as described above. 
8.3 PROFILE OF SHIPOWNERS 
The 733 shipping respondents represented 130 shipowners, or about 38 per cent of the 
shipowner population (n=340) drawn initially for the survey. These shipowners operated 
in two major market sectors, bulk (53 per cent) and liner (47 per cent). Of these, 19 per 
cent could be classified as large operators, 46 percent as medium-sized, and 35 per cent as 
small. Company size was based on the number of ships and businesses/divisions in the 
company. A shipowner was classified large i f it had more than 35 ships and more than 5 
businesses/divisions; medium-sized i f it had between 10-35 ships and between 3-5 
businesses/divisions; and small i f it had 5-10 ships and 0-3 businesses/divisions. 
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Strategic planning practices 
As part of the background data on shipowners, shipping respondents were asked whether 
their organisations had strategic plans. The general picture that emerged was that the 
majority of shipowners (68 per cent) had no formalised strategic plans; however, most 
(84 percent) did report following a systematic process of decision making. A key feature 
of this process involved intensive discussions among senior management during which 
long-term goals and objectives were set and specific means or strategies to achieve them 
were selected. A small minority (23 percent) reported using specific analytical techniques 
(SWOT being the most frequently cited) during these discussions. 
The 32 per cent who had strategic plans described their plans as formalised documents 
that normally covered a 5 year period and were subject to review and change every year 
or every one and a half years. Strategic planning was a top priority in their companies, 
with about an average 28 per cent of the company's annual budget spent on strategic 
activities. Majority of these respondents (82 per cent) were satisfied with their plans, 
giving them an average of 70 per cent success rate. 
Corporate strategy selection 
Regardless of whether they had strategic plans or not, majority of shipowners (69 
percent) reported having corporate strategies. Corporate strategies were defined as those 
strategies that focused on a company's mix or portfolio of businesses and determined 
which businesses the company should be in and how these businesses should be managed. 
According to the respondents, senior management was primarily responsible for selecting 
corporate strategies (87 per cent), which were reviewed every year (74 per cent) and 
changed when necessary (65 per cent). In most instances, the selection of corporate 
strategies did not progress into formal plans (75 percent), mirroring the trend discerned 
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earlier with regard to the development of strategic plans. These two trends indicated that 
while the majority might have followed a systematic process of setting goals and 
objectives and then selecting strategies in support of these goals and objectives, the 
overall process of strategic planning and strategy selection remained informal. This issue 
will be raised more fully in the section on interview data. The main characteristics of the 
shipowners represented in the study are summarised in Figure 8.2. 
Company size 
Market sector 
Formalised strategic plan 
Corporate strategies 
Management responsibility 
Overall approach to strategy selection 
Large 
(19%) 
Medium 
(46%) 
Small 
(35%) 
Bulk (53%) Liner (47%) 
No formalised plan (68%) 
Corporate strategies pursued (69%) 
Senior management level (87%) 
Informal (75%) 
I I I I I I I I L 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Figure 8.2 General profile of shipowners represented in the study 
8.4 CORPORATE STRATEGY SELECTION: KEY ISSUES 
Having established that the majority of the respondents had corporate strategies, the next 
task was to explore the key questions that lay at the heart of the study: What types of 
corporate strategies would shipowners select under what environmental conditions? How 
often would these strategies be changed and for what reasons? At a more specific level, 
would Asia-Pacific shipowners: 
change/modify their corporate strategies in response to changing environmental 
conditions? 
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• base strategic changes and the time frames of these changes on their future 
expectations of environmental conditions? 
pursue a 'grow' strategy when internal (or organisational competitive) and external 
(or market) environmental factors were both favourable (i.e. the organisation was 
competitively strong and there were many market opportunities)? 
pursue a 'stabilise' strategy when intemal environmental factors were favourable but 
external factors were not (i.e. the organisation was competitively strong but there 
were few opportunities and many threats in the market)? 
• pursue a 'develop' or 'turnaround' strategy when external environmental factors 
were favourable but intemal factors were not (i.e. there were many market 
opportunities but the organisation was competitively weak)? 
pursue a 'turnaround' or 'harvest' strategy when intemal and external environmental 
factors were both unfavourable (i.e. the organisation was competitively weak and 
there were many tfu-eats in the market)? 
It wil l be recfdled that these strategic-choice questions are the main assumptions of the 
strategic choice model. For a review of the model and its assumptions, please refer to 
section 1.3 of Chapter One (Problem Statement) and section 6.3 of Chapter Six (The 
Conceptual Framework). 
A reminder about nomenclature is also needed at this point. When the model was 
discussed in Chapter Six, the environmental factors were formally called 'organisational 
competitive factors' and 'market factors'. The first covered an organisation's competitive 
strengths and weaknesses; they were intemal to the organisation and thus within its direct 
control. The latter referred to opportunities and threats in the shipping sector(s) in which 
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the organisation operated; they were external to the organisation and thus outside its 
direct power to control. Both organisational competitive and market factors were depicted 
in the form of a continuum, with one end marked 'high' and the other marked Mow'. The 
more strengths an organisation had and the more opportunities the market offered, the 
higher was the organisation's strategic position on the matrix; conversely, the more 
weaknesses an organisation had and the more threats there were in the market, the lower 
was the organisation's strategic position. 
To simplify the terminology and keep it in line with what shipowners typically used, 
these two formal variable names were also called 'environmental conditions', with 
'organisational competitive factors' referred to also as 'internal' or 'organisational' 
conditions and 'market factors' as 'external' or 'market' conditions. Further, 
environmental conditions or factors were described as either 'favourable' or 
'unfavourable'. They were 'favourable' when an organisation had many strengths and few 
weaknesses and the market held many opportunities and few threats; they were 
'unfavourable' when the converse was true. In the following discussion of results, this 
latter set of nomenclature is used; however, when it is time to summarise or synthesise 
results and strategies are plotted in matrix form and compared against the original version 
of the strategic choice model (see Figures 8.3), the formal variable names (organisational 
competitive factors and market factors), differentiated in terms of strengths/weaknesses 
and opportunities/threats along a high-low continuum, are used instead. 
8.5 SURVEY DATA 
Survey data (32 percent of the survey population, or 109 respondents) indicated strong 
support for the strategic choice model. Results are summarised in Table 8.2. 
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Table 8.2 Survey responses to the six assumptions of the strategic choice model (n=109) 
Assumptions of the Model 
Asia-Pacific shipowners will: 
1 change/modify their corporate strategies 
in response to changing environmental 
conditions 
Categories of Responses (%) 
Yes Yes. but Unsure No No Reply* 
85 7 5 - 3 
2 base strategic changes and the time 
frames of these changes on their future 
expectations of environmental 
conditions 
80 - 9 9 2 
3 pursue a *grow* strategy when internal 
and external environmental factors are 
both favourable 
76 8 4 9 3 
4 pursue a 'stabilise' when internal 
environmental factors are favourable but 
external factors are not 
72 9 9 5 5 
5 pursue a 'develop' or 'turnaround' 
strategy when external factors are 
favourable but internal factors are not 
68 - 16 12 4 
6 pursue a 'harvest' strategy when 
internal and external environmental 
factors are both unfavourable 
52 17 21 9 1 
*Please note that 'no replies' are not referred to in the discussion. 
Discussion of survey results is organised around the six assumptions of the strategic 
choice model, which are presented in the form of questions. Responses to the first two 
assumptions were drawn from survey questionnaire items 14-15 (how often corporate 
strategies were reviewed/changed, and why), 17 and 19 (process for selecting and/or 
evaluating strategies), and 22-25 (conditions under which any of the five corporate 
strategies would be pursued). Responses to the next four assumptions were drawn from 
questionnaire items 22-33, which asked respondents to identify either the conditions 
under which any of the five corporate strategies would be pursued or which corporate 
strategy to pursue given certain internal and external environmental conditions. For those 
with strategic plans, their responses to questionnaire items 8-9 (how oflen strategic plans 
were reviewed/changed and why) were also used. Responses per questionnaire item were 
categorised using the coding index in Appendix 2. A copy of the survey questionnaire is 
in Appendix 3. The list of internal (organisational) and external (market) environmental 
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conditions or factors is found in Appendix 5; this list incorporates the major conditions 
identified by respondents in the survey, interviews and simulation. The code numbers in 
parentheses preceding each question (SQ-Ql, etc) stand for 'Survey Questionnaire-
Question r etc. 
(SQ-Ql) Will Asia-Pacific shipowners change/modify their corporate strategies 
In response to changing environmental conditions? 
There was strong agreement among respondents (85 per cent) that they would change 
their corporate strategies in response to changing environmental conditions, whether these 
were internal or external to the organisation. The need to remain flexible and be able to 
respond to changing times was high in respondents' lists, and was seen as the key to 
survival. A further 7 per cent gave a qualified yes, saying that although they would tend 
to do so, they would not i f the change would compromise the objectives they wanted to 
achieve. In such instances, some suggested that they might ignore environmental trends 
altogether. *If for instance external conditions suggested lowering a freight rate objective 
that we'd set,' said a respondent, *we'd be more inclined to ignore the market signals and 
stick to our objective,' The remaining 5 per cent were not prepared to commit to a 
definite position, saying it would depend a lot on the circumstances; in the words of a 
corporate strategist, 'some changes you can leave alone, others you have to act upon; so it 
all depends'. 
(SQ-Q2) Will Asia-Pacific shipowners base strategic changes and the time 
frames of these changes on their future expectations of environmental 
conditions? 
Majority (80 per cent) agreed that they would, and did, base change to corporate 
strategies and the time frames of these changes on what they perceived the future of their 
organisations and the market would be. Respondents indicated that such future 
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expectations were based not only on their own perceptions but also on the preferences 
and priorities of primary stakeholders (shareholders, boards of directors, etc.) Some 9 per 
cent were unsure whether they would take this course of action, saying it would depend 
on the magnitude of the change contemplated. A final 9 per cent disagreed, saying that 
there were many more factors than mere future expectations to influence strategic 
changes. The most frequently cited factors were strategic vision (i.e. a company's long 
term goals and objectives), financial credit availability (i.e. ability to expand), global and 
regional political and economic conditions, and strength of the competition (as one 
managing director put it, ' i f our competitors are weaker than us, why change?'). 
(SQ-Q3) Will Asia-Pacific shipowners pursue a 'grow' strategy when internal and 
external environmental conditions are both favourable? 
There was clear agreement on this question, with 76 per cent saying they would pursue a 
'grow' strategy under favourable environmental conditions, that is, they would seek to 
expand i f the organisation was competitively strong and the market offered many 
opportunities. Another 8 per cent also said yes, but qualified their response by adding 
that as a matter of strategic policy, they would seek to grow regardless of extemal 
conditions, provided their organisation was capable of carrying out the strategy. Some 4 
percent were unsure whether they would, saying their decision depended on other factors 
such as the strength of their competitors and the objectives and targets set by their 
organisation. The remaining 9 per cent disagreed, saying that environmental factors were 
not their primary basis for choosing a strategy; in many instances, owner/major 
stakeholder preferences and priorities dictated strategic choices, regardless of 
enviroiunental conditions. 
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(SQ-Q4) Will Asla-Paclfic shipowners pursue a 'stabilise' strategy when Internal 
environmental factors are favourable but external environmental factors are 
not? 
There was also clear consensus on this question. The majority (72 per cent) would choose 
to stabilise i f the organisation was strong but the market posed many threats, that is, they 
would aim to maintain the status quo, making minor changes only to better deal with 
these threats. Another 9 percent also said yes but qualified their response by stating that 
they would do so only 'under normal circumstances'; it was not clear, however, what 
'non-normal' circumstances were, as most did not elaborate on this response. However, 
the comment of one executive director could be an indication of likely scenarios when 
organisations chose not to take the safe course. According to this respondent, i f their 
competitors were not strong, they would 'take a gamble and milk the market for as much 
as we could; we would decide to expand [i.e. grow], for instance, even when market 
conditions were supposed to be bad for business'. Around 9 per cent were unsure 
whether they would choose this strategy, saying it would depend on current 
circumstances; a number opted for the 'grow' strategy as a likely alternative. A further 7 
f^r cent said that they would not choose 'stabilise' at all. 
(SQ-Q5) Will Asla-Paclfic shipowners pursue a 'develop' or 'turnaround' 
strategy when external environmental factors are favourable but Internal 
environmental factors are not? 
Majority of respondents (68 per cent) agreed that they would choose a 'develop' or 
'turnaround' strategy to take advantage of favourable market conditions particularly i f 
their organisation was competitively weak and facing financial problems. Responses 
accompanying this choice indicated that a 'turnaround' strategy, which involved reducing 
or cutting out unprofitable activities or operations to contain the financial haemorrhage, 
was seen as an emergency 'do it now' measure to avoid financial failure, while the 
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'develop' strategy, which involved entering into profitable trades where the organisation 
was weak but where it could build its competitive strength, was a more deliberately 
planned rescue attempt. Another 16 percent were unsure as to what strategy to pursue, 
opting for the typical 'depends on circumstances' reply but providing no further 
elaboration. The remaining 12 disagreed, saying that to escape from a bad situation one 
required a more innovative approach such as a 'grow' strategy, as this allowed the 
organisation to optimise its strengths. 
(SQ-Q6) Will Asia-Pacific shipowners pursue a 'harvest' strategy when Internal 
and external environmental factors are both unfavourable? 
Responses to this item were more dispersed. Although 69 per cent said yes to this item, 
their answers fell into three categories: (a) 52 per cent firmly agreed that a 'harvest' 
strategy, which involved selling off an unprofitable business (or parts of it), would be the 
preferred choice when the market held few opportunities and the organisation was weak 
or in financial trouble; (b) 7 per cent were more tentative, saying they would do so most 
of the time, but would make an exception if they had strategic reasons for staying in the 
area (e.g. i f they believed the market would improve); (c) 10 per cent said that they would 
pursue a 'harvest' strategy regardless of environmental conditions if they found better 
alternatives elsewhere or i f there had been a change in strategic direction. 
Of the remaining respondents, 21 per cent were not certain whether to take this course of 
action, while 9 per cent firmly disagreed, saying they would not choose a 'harvest' 
strategy regardless of environmental conditions, preferring a 'turnaround' strategy or 
occasionally a 'grow' strategy. A likely reason for the last group's reluctance could be 
discerned fi'om the responses of some respondents: shipping was their business, and they 
would find it difficult to get out of the area unless there were better alternatives in sight. 
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Thus it was more acceptable to try turning around the fortunes of the company [i.e. 
turnaround] or, to a lesser extent, seek to grow. 
Summary of primary survey findings 
From the six main findings about strategy selection among Asia-Pacific shipowners, 
several primary trends could be identified: 
• Survey data provided strong support for the strategic choice model. Agreement was 
particularly strong with regard to the model's first four assumptions: a big majority 
said they would change or modify their corporate strategies in response to changing 
environmental conditions (85 per cent), base strategic changes and their time frames 
on future expectations of environmental conditions (80 percent), pursue a 'grow' 
strategy when intemal (or organisational) and external (or market) conditions were 
favourable (76 per cent), and pursue a 'stabilise' strategy when intemal conditions 
were favourable but external conditions were not (72 per cent). However, agreement 
slightly weakened when it came to the use of 'develop' and 'turnaround' strategies 
(68 per cent) and even more with 'harvest' strategies (52 per cent). 
A likely explanation for the lesser degree of agreement in the use of the 'develop', 
turnaround', and 'harvest' strategies lies in the nature of these strategies. Ail three are 
prescribed when the organisation is weak and/or in financial trouble; they are meant 
to bail the organisation out to allow it to regain financial health. One involves taking a 
gamble by venturing into areas which are profitable but where the organisation is not 
competitively strong; the other two involve excising unprofitable operations to stop 
ftuther financial loss. Under these circumstances, survey data revealed two sets of 
responses: one was aggressive, the other conservative. Those who took an aggressive 
stand preferred to gamble, opting for more risky strategies like 'grow' and 'develop' 
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to get themselves out of trouble because while the risks were high so were the 
rewards; they would also try 'turnaround' before 'harvest'. Those who took a more 
conservative approach preferred strategies which carried less risk, such as 'stabilise', 
or if they were in trouble, they would opt for a 'turnaround' or 'harvest' strategy 
rather than pursue a 'grow' or 'develop' strategy. 
Another trend that emerged from the survey data was the link between experience in 
strategic management/planning and level of uncertainty when making strategic 
choices. Those who said they were not sure which strategy to pursue under which 
environmental condition tended to be younger and less experienced; underlying their 
uncertainty (typified by such answers as 'not sure' or 'depends on circumstances') 
could have been a simple lack of knowledge of the field (i.e. of shipping and strategic 
decision making) to enable them to make educated guesses, and as a result, a lack of 
confidence in providing definitive answers. 
While there was overall consensus on the choice of strategies, survey data also 
showed that choices were not as clearcut as the strategic choice model assumed. 
Rather than restrict themselves to the choices offered by the model, respondents 
tended to widen the field by combining or substituting strategies. Among those who 
supported the model, the 'grow* strategy emerged to be a popular choice, pursued 
regardless of environmental factors and often in combination with other strategies to 
give an organisation a better strategic balance. The most fi-equently used 
combinations of strategies are plotted in the four quadrants of the matrix in Figure 
8.3, with those in parentheses representing shipowners' additions. 
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Organisational Competitive Factors 
High Low 
(Strengths) (Weaknesses) 
High 
(Opportunities) 
Maricet 
Factois 
(Threats) 
Low 
Qaadront 1 Quadrant 2 
Grow 
Develop 
Turnaround 
(+ Grow) 
Qoadrant 3 Quadrant 4 
Stabilise Harvest 
(+ Grow) (+ Turnaround) 
Figure S3 Matr ix of strategic choices based on survey findings 
As noted earlier, environmental conditions or factors were described as 'favourable' 
when an organisation had many strengths and few weaknesses and the market held 
many opportunities and few threats; they were 'unfavourable' when the converse 
was true. Thus the more favourable the conditions were, that is, the more strengths 
the organisation had and the more opportunities the market offered, the higher was an 
organisation's strategic 'position'; conversely, the less favourable the conditions, the 
lower its position. 
It should also be noted that the answers given by respondents did not always fit 
easily into the four quadrants of the model. In a few cases, respondents chose to 
pursue more of the functional-type strategies, with marketing strategies cited 
frequently. In other instances, the strategy could not be firmly ascertained because of 
poor wording. However, because such cases were very few, they had been excluded 
from the discussion. 
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Other survey findings: Secondary trends 
The following secondary trends also emerged from the analysis: 
Company size. The larger the company, the greater the likelihood that a formal 
strategic planning system was in place. Data showed that lai^er liner operators (58 
per cent) were more likely to have strategic plans than small liner operators (23 per 
cent) and bulk operators (19 per cent). 
• Training and experience in strategic management. Younger respondents (up to 50 
years old) were more highly trained/educated in management but lacked experience; 
older respondents (older than 50 years old) were more experienced but lacked formal 
training. About 74 per cent of the first group had received some formal management 
training (short course or degree) in contrast to 17 per cent of the second group. Only 
a small percentage (9 per cent) reported having both attributes. In terms of 
nationality, respondents from Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Singapore (68 per 
cent) had more training and experience in strategic planning/management and applied 
more resources to strategic activities than those from the other countries. They also 
provided more details on their survey forms. 
• Language difficulties. Some indication of language difficulties surfaced in the survey 
responses. Responses that showed greater fluency in English were more detailed (71 
per cent), while those that did not were not were more sparse and/or difficult to 
understand. 
8.6 INTERVIEW DATA 
Interview data came from 54 respondents, half of whom (or 25 per cent) were randomly 
selected from the group of survey respondents and half from the group of non-
respondents. Background data collected on both groups showed a high level of 
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comparability, both in terms of respondent and company characteristics. 
During the interviews, survey non-respondents were asked why they had not responded 
to the questionnaire. A small majority (41 per cent) cited lack of time and 'too many 
conrmiitments' at the time the questionnaire arrived. Others (22 per cent) cited difficulty 
in answering the questions because they were not very fluent in the use of the English 
language or were unfamiliar with strategic planning concepts and therefore had great 
difficulty putting their ideas into words. 'We do talk of strategies', one respondent said, 
'but not in the terms you had them in the questionnaire, so I was not sure how to 
proceed.' Others (27 per cent) cited confidentiality of information; as one respondent 
frankly said, 'putting down in writing our ideas on how we keep our company 
competitive and then giving this information to some outside organisation which we don't 
know much about is not very prudent; it is being very foolish. For all we know you might 
be working for the competition'. To these interviewees, concern was strong that 
commercially sensitive information could be used for purposes not favourable to the 
company, hence, their decision not to respond to the questionnaire. The rest (10 per cent) 
preferred not to give any explanation. 
In contrast to the survey, requests for personal interviews were met with interest mainly 
for two reasons: one, because the interview was seen as a good chance to learn more about 
strategic planning and corporate strategy selection (44 per cent) and two, because the 
interviews were arranged through personal contacts, who vouched for the researcher's 
credibility and intent (34 per cent). As one CEO smilingly put it, ' I f it weren't for my 
good friend ... putting in a good word for you, I would be somewhere else right now.' 
The remaining 22 per cent agreed to the interviews either because they had the time so 
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they gave it, especially since the researcher had travelled a long way to see them, or 
because they were curious about what the researcher had to say. 
On the main question of corporate strategy selection, interview data followed similar 
trends as survey data; however, some key differences also surfaced. In particular, 
interviews revealed a greater tendency to combine strategies and that an informal 
approach to strategic planning and strategy selection was more widely practised than 
suggested by survey data. Findings are discussed below and summarised in Table 8.3. The 
conditions upon which responses in the table are based are listed in Appendix 5. To 
maintain uniformity in data presentation and facilitate comparison, interview findings are 
also organised according to the six assumptions underlying the strategic choice model. The 
code numbers in parentheses preceding each question (I-Ql, etc) stand for 'Interview-
Question 1' etc. 
Table 8.3 Interview responses to the six assumptions of the strategic choice model (n=54) 
Assumptions of the Strategic Choice Model Categories of R^ponses (%) 
Yes Yes, but... Unsure No 
Asia-Pacific shipowners wi l l : 
1 change/modify their corporate strategies in 
response to changing environmental 
conditions 
75 12 6 7 
2 base strategic changes and the time frames of 
these changes on their future expectations of 
environmental conditions 
44 16 35 5 
3 pursue a 'grow* strategy when intemal and 
external environmental factors are both 
favourable 
63 22 8 7 
4 pursue a 'stabilise* when intemal 
environmental factors are favourable but 
external factors are not 
61 19 15 5 
S pursue a 'develop* or 'tumaround* strategy 
when exterrial factors are favourable but 
intemal factors are not 
52 25 16 7 
6 pursue a 'harvest* strategy when intemal and 
external environmental factors are both 
unfavourable 
65 - 31 4 
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(I-Q1) Will Asia-Pacific shipowners change/modify their corporate strategies In 
response to changing environmental conditions? 
Majority (75 per cent) agreed on this item, saying flexibility was critical to long-term 
survival. They followed this approach as a matter of policy, but the magnitude of the 
change depended on the specific issues involved. Citing the current financial crisis 
gripping East Asia, one company president said, 'So far this monetary curse has spared 
[our country], but our trading partners [elsewhere in the region] are in real trouble. Here 
[in our company] we have ongoing top-level meetings to keep a close eye on things so can 
plan ahead. We have two or three contingency plans on the drawing board, so we'll see 
what happens next.' 
The other 12 per cent also said yes, but they did so on a more selective basis. 'Most of 
the time' they would change or modify their corporate strategies due to environmental 
changes but they would not do so i f they wanted to take a gamble, alternative strategies 
were not acceptable to management, and/or organisational politics dictated otherwise. On 
this last point, i f a proposed change led to disagreement among the senior people, for 
instance, the group might decide to keep the status quo rather than change to avoid further 
arguments and dispute (the groupthink problem). 
About 6 per cent would not commit themselves either way, saying that any action taken 
would depend on the type and magnitude of the environmental change(s) involved. The 
remaining 7 per cent said environmental changes, particularly extemal ones, would not 
influence their choice of corporate strategies. 'We would follow our vision and long-term 
objectives,' confided a general manager, 'rather than be swayed by changes in 
environmental conditions, which we see as mostly short term. Of course we need to take 
precautions when major problems hit, like this currency crisis we're having now, but it 
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does not mean we need to change our long-term goals and strategies.' Another 
commented: 'We are here for the long run; we need to project what we want to be 10-15 
years from now, so we must be able to take current changes in the environment within 
this long-term perspective.' 
(i-Q2)Will Asia-Pacific shipowners base strategic changes and the time frames 
of these changes on their future expectations of environmental conditions? 
Unlike the other five assumptions, consensus on this point was weaker, with responses 
dispersed more widely. A slight majority (44 percent) firmly agreed, saying that future 
expectations played a major role in their strategic choices. ' I f we do not believe the market 
is going to be good,' said one, *then we would have to decide whether we stay or we go.' 
That's why we need to keep on top of things,' explained another, 'and know what the 
market trends are. The problem though is getting the right information when you need it; 
if it's not there, and often it isn't, then you rely on yourself, on your own intuition, to 
help you make the decision.' 
A smaller group (16 per cent) also agreed, but they qualified their response by saying that 
if there were attractive opportunities around, they would disregard future expectations 
and take advantage of current opportunities. Thus even if market conditions were 
predicted to be bad, i f they could obtain credit or purchase new tonnage under highly 
favourable terms, they would do so. ' I t will be taking a big risk,' said one respondent, 
'but i f we pull it off, then we gain a lot.' Others indicated favouring a similar approach, 
which could be aptly described as the 'gambler's choice'. 
A large number of respondents (35 per cent) were not sure if they would consistently 
take this approach. While they agreed that future expectations of environmental 
conditions, particularly market conditions, were an important factor to consider, they 
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were less certain as to whether they would actually institute strategic changes based on 
market expectations alone. This group preferred a broader base for their decision making 
so that along with market expectations, other key factors areas as organisational goals and 
objectives, ship prices, financial credit availability, and current freight rate levels were also 
taken into consideration. How opportunities in these vanous areas balanced up 
determined the type and time frame of strategic changes. 
The remaining 5 per cent said they would not change: for some, it was a case of 'once we 
make a decision, then we follow it through'; for others, it was a case of organisational 
politics. With senior management performance increasingly assessed against strategic 
plans (or, in the absence of plans, against long-term goals and objectives), many senior 
managers in this group voiced a reluctance to advocate changes, especially major ones, for 
fear this would lead to a loss of current privileges, incentives, and/or bonuses or to the 
adoption of performance criteria that would be less favourable to them. A number of 
respondents also said the attitudes and perceptions of the board of directors could be a 
deterrent to change; in some cases, changes were vetoed because influential members of 
the board did not like or were suspicious of major or too many changes. At other times if 
senior management did not express any strong views toward the need to change, the 
status quo prevailed. 
(I-Q3) Will Asia-Pacific shipowners pursue a 'grow' strategy when internal and 
external environmental conditions are both favourable? 
About 63 per cent agreed they would pursue a 'grow' strategy when market 
opportunities were excellent and their organisation had the capability to push through the 
strategy. As one manager put it, 'In this game you can only get ahead i f you are willing to 
take chances. When things are good and there are lots of opportunities about, you need to 
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take swift action. I f you're too cautious or indecisive, you get left behind.' A ftuther 22 
per cent also agreed but said that they would not necessarily restrict themselves to a 
'grow' strategy alone but would use it in combination with other strategies such as 
'develop' and 'stabilise'. This seemed to be a preferred option of larger operators which 
owned or operated several businesses/divisions. In areas where they were more 
vulnerable, they said they would choose a 'develop' strategy to improve their 
competitive strength; in areas that were more stable, they would choose a 'stabilise' 
strategy to maximise profits. 
Some 8 percent were unsure, saying Mt would depend on the circumstances'. Even after 
reviewing previous decisions, they remained unsure as to whether environmental factors 
had been the single most influential factor leading to the use of a *grow' strategy. 
However, a number did say that their choice of strategy often depended on the level of 
risk the board was prepared to accept: i f pursuing a 'grow' strategy would expose their 
organisation to too many risks, either they would lower the target or objective they had 
set or they would choose an alternative strategy to reduce the risks. 
The remaining 7 per cent firmly disagreed, offering arguments similar to those given by 
the 'unsure' group. To them a 'grow' strategy was always a risky proposition and even 
under favourable conditions, they would look for a less risky strategy, such as 'stabilise', 
that would give them consistent returns. These respondents pointed out that a lot of 
shipowners pursued 'grow' strategies regardless of environmental conditions; there had 
been too much expansion due to this indiscriminate pursuit, which was why profitability 
in shipping was low (i.e. 7-12 per cent return in investment was frequently cited). Rather 
than grow, therefore, this minority group opted to stabilise, which carried less risk. 
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(I-Q4) Will Asla-Paclfic shipowners pursue a 'stabilise' strategy when Internal 
environmental factors are favourable but external environmental factors are 
not? 
Majority (61 per cent) said yes to this item, particularly when they were in a position to 
maximise profits. This strategy was widely accepted as a short-term measure. As one 
strategist put it, ' I f we're on top, or at least close to it, we'd milk the market for as much 
and for as long as we could. Then we'd change tactics.' 
Another 19 per cent also said yes but qualified their response by saying that they would 
not limit themselves to a 'stabilise' strategy alone but would use other strategies such as 
'grow', 'develop', and 'harvest' either in combination or as substitutes. According to this 
group, they would take this approach to balance ofT strengths and weaknesses, spread out 
the risks, and thus give themselves better protection from market uncertainties. Some 
respondents in this group (12 percent) attested to the virtue of combining strategies, 
bringing out internal documents that showed how the use of alternative strategies had 
helped improve the company's financial performance. 
Around 15 per cent were unsure, saying their choice of strategy would depend on 
circumstances, particularly on the longevity and severity of market threats. They 
wouldn't categorically say a 'stabilise' strategy would be appropriate unless they knew 
what the specific circumstances were. The remaining 5 per cent said that they would not 
use a 'stabilise' strategy at all; they would opt for a 'grow' or 'develop' strategy instead 
because these strategies would enable them to increase their market lead and allow them to 
achieve greater returns than was possible with the more conservative 'stabilise' strategy. 
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(I-Q5) Will Asia-Pacific shipowners pursue a 'develop' strategy or 'turnaround' 
strategy when external environmental factors are favourable but Internal 
environmental factors are not? 
A slight majority (52 per cent) firmly agreed, with a further 25 per cent saying that they 
would do so in combination with a 'grow' strategy. Both groups gave the same line of 
reasoning as proffered by the strategic choice model: they would pursue a 'turnaround' 
strategy to get out of financial trouble; and in areas where the organisation was 
competitively weak but had the capacity to surge ahead, they would pursue a 'develop' 
strategy to improve the organisation's competitive strength. The second group, however, 
went a step further; in addition to these two strategies, which they called short-term, they 
also said they would pursue a more long-term 'grow' strategy to build on their strengths. 
'You really need a package of strategies,' said one respondent, 'so that you can dodge 
bullets here, beat the enemies there, and have a rest in between.' 
Another 16 per cent were unsure, stating no preference for either strategy or saying that 
they were not sure what answer to give. Even when asked further what they would do if 
they were weak but there were many opportunities in the market, this group showed a 
reluctance to commit themselves to either strategy which they saw, in the words of one 
respondent, as 'risky steps for an already shaky orgeuiisation'. There were several likely 
reasons for this reluctance: lack of confidence, particularly among the younger and less 
experienced managers; fear of failure, particularly where the organisational climate was not 
very forgiving of managerial/strategic mistakes or miscalculations; or simple managerial 
laziness. However, none of these underlying reasons were brought into the open with this 
group of respondents; because of the potential for conflict and antagonism, the researcher 
decided not to probe further. 
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The remaining 7 per cent said that they would not use either strategy, opting for the 
'grow' strategy instead because in an environment where there were lots of opportunities, 
it was better to take an aggressive approach to give them the capacity and economies of 
scale to improve their competitive position. To a great extent, this last group served as 
the counterpoint of the 'unsure' group: where the 'unsure' group dithered, the 'grow' 
group gambled. 
(I-Q6) Will Asla-Paclfic shipowners pursue a 'harvest' strategy when Internal 
and external environmental factors are both unfavourable? 
Majority (65 per cent) said that they would pursue a 'harvest' strategy when internal and 
external environmental conditions were both unfavourable. 'Better cut your losses while 
you can' easily summarised the sentiments of this group. However, a large 31 per cent 
were unsure. The question generated a lot of emotive statements from interviewees 
because a 'harvest' strategy meant getting out of a business which they knew and 
possibly into a new one which they did not, or even getting out of shipping permanently 
unless they had a way of tuming the company's fortunes around. Most said they would 
try as hard as they could to save the business before they would even contemplate a 
'harvest' strategy. Explaining this 'do or die' approach, a chairman of the board said: 
'Shipping is our business, so we will fight to the bitter end for our survival. The only 
acceptable strategy is one that will enable us to save the business, especially one which is 
focused on establishing a sound fmancial base within a niche area. This could mean a 
significant downsizing of the company, so we'll have to be prepared to get out in some 
areas [i.e. harvest] and improve those with greater potential for success [i.e. turnaround].' 
The remaining 4 per cent disapproved of this strategy altogether, saying they would 
choose other strategies instead. Again, the 'turnaround' strategy emerged a popular 
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choice, with the group echoing the same views and sentiments as those expressed by the 
*unsure' group. However, while the 'unsure' group was willing to move to a 'harvest' 
strategy when all things failed, this last group was not. It was unclear, however, whether 
this Mast stand' approach was mere bravado or a true test of strategic grit ('defeat is not 
part of our vocabulary'); in the end, i f efforts to save an ailing business failed, the result 
would still be 'harvest', except this time it would be forced upon a company that would 
have used up all its options. 
Summary of primary interview findings 
The analysis of interview data revealed the following primary trends: 
• Like the survey, interviews revealed a close adherence to the strategic choice model; 
however, as the percentages in Table 8.3 show, agreement was less strong and 
responses more widely dispersed. The majority of interviewees would change or 
modify their corporate strategies in response to changing environmental conditions 
(75 per cent), and they would pursue a 'grow' strategy when internal (or 
organisational) and external (or market) conditions were favourable (63 per cent), a 
'stabilise' strategy when internal conditions were favourable but external conditions 
were not (61 per cent), and a 'harvest' strategy when both intemal and external 
conditions were unfavourable (65 per cent). However, agreement slightly weakened 
when it came to 'develop' and 'turnaround' strategies, with a little over a half (52 per 
cent) giving a firm yes, and even more to the use of future expectations of 
environmental conditions as basis for strategic changes, where less than half (44 per 
cent) agreed without offering any qualifications. 
• To a great extent, this wider dispersal of responses, particularly between those that 
gave an unqualified 'yes' response and those that also said 'yes' but attached 
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qualifications to it, could be attributed to the fact that the interviews gave both the 
researcher and interviewees the opportunity to explore the questions in greater depth 
and to tease out various possible ways organisations would act under changing 
environmental conditions. Interviewees were able to spell out the various factors that 
influenced their strategic choices, and these factors did not always coincide v^th what 
the model assumed. For instance, future expectations, while important, were often 
weighed against other considerations and they did not always end up as the primary 
arbiter of change; in fact there were occasions when they were disregarded in favour 
of higher-value factors. Interviews also provided further support for two trends that 
surfaced from survey data: one, that the uncertainty shovm in choosing strategies 
was due to a relative lack of experience in shipping and management and a resultant 
lack of confidence; and two, that in terms of strategy selection, shipowners fell into 
two streams: those who were prepared to gamble and thus chose aggr^ive 
proactive strategies (grow, develop), and those who took a more cautious ('tried and 
tested') route, opting for strategies that allowed them to reduce or spread the risks 
(stabilise, turnaround, harvest). Finally, interviews also led to a fuller explanation of 
shipowners' reluctance to pursue a 'harvest' strategy. While they would not admit it 
in writing, a number of respondents saw the 'harvest' strategy not in simple hard-
nosed, strategic terms but at a more emotional level: it was a sign of failure, it brought 
on fear of the unknown (i.e. how to compete in areas where the organisation had no 
requisite resources and expertise), and it posed a major threat to the respondents' 
own lives and careers. 
As in the survey, interviews also showed a strong tendency to 'mix and match' 
strategies, with the 'grow' strategy emerging as the most popular choice, its selection 
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based more on the strategic objectives set by the organisation and its future 
expectations rather than on environmental conditions. Many respondents said they 
would pursue a *grow' strategy even when market conditions were not favourable or 
the organisation was competitively weak. To optimise opportunities and spread 
risks, they would combine *grow' with (a) stabilise and/or develop, (b) stabilise, 
develop, and/or harvest, and (c) develop and/or turnaround. These choices are plotted 
in matrix form in Figure 8.4. 
Organisational Competitive Factors 
High Low 
(Strcngihs) (Weaknesses) 
High 
(Opportunities) 
Market 
Factors 
(Threats) 
Low 
Quadrant 1 Quadrant 2 
Grow Develop 
(+Stabilise) Turnaround 
(+Develop) (+Grow) 
Qoadrant 3 Quadrant 4 
Stabilise Harvest 
(+ Grow) (+ Turnaround) 
(+ Develop) 
(+ Harvest) 
Figure 8.4 Matrix of strategic choice based on interview Findings 
It is worthwhile noting that while most choices fell within the quadrants of the model, 
there were instances when categorisation became initially problematic because the 
respondent could not explain the strategy in a manner the researcher could comprehend or 
would choose a business-type strategy such as lowest freight rate strategy (cost focus) or 
tailored service strategy (differentiation). Further discussion, however, clarified much of 
this initial confusion. 
Other Interview findings: Secondary trends 
In addition to the major findings on corporate strategic choices, other secondary trends 
emerged from the interviews. Foremost among these were the role of the top executive in 
212 
strategic decision making, the lack of external infonnation to guide strategy selection, the 
lack of formal training in strategic management, and the prevalence o f an incremental 
approach to corporate strategy selection. Differences in strategic planning practices also 
emerged between various sub-groups in the interview sample. 
• The role of the fop executive. One finding that surfaced in the interviews but not in 
the survey was the role of the top executive in strategic decision making. In the 
survey, respondents simply listed the key people involved in strategic decision 
making without delineating their relative importance in the decision-making process. 
During the interviews, however, one major difference emerged: among some 
shipowners, the decision-making structure was more participative; among others, it 
was more autocratic. Among managers of European descent, decision making was 
seen as a participative process involving several layers of management: senior 
management had primary responsibility but lower to middle level managers were also 
expected to contribute to the process; even within the senior ranks, responsibility for 
decision making was shared. Among East Asian managers, however, the top executive 
(e.g. CEO, President, Chairman) emerged as the decision maker, who decided who 
among those below him or her would contribute to the decision-making process and 
to what extent they were expected to do so. Al l other managers were expected to 
play a supportive role, as follower and adviser. 
Lack of external information and evaluation tools to guide strategy selection. 
Interviews showed that the majority of respondents did not have access to a wide 
range of information sources to help guide their choice of the most appropriate 
corporate strategy. While most used intemal financial information, very few used a 
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lot of external information sources, especially statistical information sources and 
databases on market trends like Feamley's or Lloyd's. Shipbroker reports and trade 
journals like Fairplay, Lloyd's Shipping Economist, Lloyd's Maritime Asia, and 
Asian Shipping were the most frequently cited sources of external information. 
Lack of training in strategic management. Another major issue that surfaced during 
the interviews was the difficulty faced by many interviewees in conceptualising and 
describing their strategies. To a great extent, this could be attributed to their lack of 
familiarity with the strategic management field. In response to a side question asked 
of interviewees, many said they read trade joumals and popular business magazines 
almost exclusively; of the many joumals on strategic management today, they could 
only cite a few (the Harvard Business Review was the most frequently cited) and 
admitted to having read them only once or twice (or 'occasionally') or not at all. 
This lack of familiarity with strategic management ideas and practices could in turn 
be attributed to a lack of training in the area, as evidenced by the number of 
respondents in senior level positions with no formal strategic management training 
(see section 8.1). This is also borne out by a recent survey, conducted by the Far 
Eastern Economic Review, on management needs in Asia (Granitsas and Saywell, 
1997). According to the Review's estimates, various Asian countries 'do not have 
enough skilled business managers to cope with demand over the next 10 years' (p. 2). 
The Review also cites another survey, conducted by the executive search firm 
Kom/Ferry International, which shows that all across Asia, demand for senior and 
middle executives is particularly acute. These people are expected to have a good 
grasp of fmance and marketing, understand how multinational companies do 
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business, and demonstrate a good working knowledge o f their chosen industry, 
management thought and practice, and commercial realities. Although steps are being 
taken by government and private industry alike to solve this enormous need for 
skilled managers, at present, demand is far outstripping supply. 
An incremental approach to corporate strategy selection. Another major pattern that 
emerged from the interviews was that the most prevalent strategic approach used by 
respondents, regardless of trade (i.e. liner, tanker, dry bulk), was far more informal 
than that reported in the survey or prescribed by the formal planning model (with its 
emphasis on rational and analytical planning procedures and techniques) and more 
closely resembled the incremental model (which saw planning as an informal, 
fragmented, intuitive, evolutionary, and political process). Indeed, interviewees 
voiced a strong reliance on what one senior manager described as 'an intuitive, trial-
and-error approach' to strategy development. This approach was particularly 
popular among Asian senior managers who said it came naturally to them and had 
served them well in the past. Further discussions showed that apart from natural 
inclination, another reason for the popularity of the incremental approach could be 
that it reduced the level of risk that managers had to take, particularly as the shipping 
environment became more globalised, more competitive, and therefore more uncertain 
and risky, and as managers were increasingly held accountable for strategic decisions 
and organisational performance. 
The use of an incremental approach, however, did not necessarily mean a deliberate 
adherence to the incrementalism school of thought; many respondents were as 
imfamiliar of this area of management thought as they were of the rational-analytical 
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or formal planning approach. Neither had many used theoretical and/or analytical 
models offered by the strategic management field to assist in strategy selection. The 
few who showed familiarity with some models voiced a suspicion toward them; as 
one managing director put it, 'what we have seen so far are way up in the air, they 
are not practical and they don't tell you how you can actually apply them to your 
work.' Most senior managers, however, did reveal a need for practical evaluation 
tools that could help them choose and evaluate strategies more rigorously. 'Our 
evaluation approach,' said a company president, 'is a bit rudimentary, not 
sophisticated at all. We ourselves know we need a better method of finding out 
whether we are doing the right thing, but so far we are still working on it, ' 
Differences between liner and bulk operators. On the question of corporate strategy 
selection, liner and bulk operators displayed a high level of similarity in their 
responses. Differences surfaced in three areas only: (a) liner operators, especially 
container operators, used more external information sources than tanker or dry bulk 
operators, with dry bulk using the least eunount of information; (b) the liner sector 
put more time and effort into strategic planning than bulk shipping, and within bulk 
shipping, the tanker sector did more planning than dry bulk; and (c) although the liner 
sector did more planning than bulk shipping, this gap was closing as more and more 
bulk operators were being forced to take a more strategic approach and to do more 
planning to remain competitive in an increasingly uncertain and risky environment 
Effect of company size. Company size emerged to be an influencing factor on the 
extent to which corporate strategies were formalised. Discussions with senior 
managers revealed that in general the larger the company, the greater the effort put 
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into strategy selection and the more formal the approach used. Conversely, the 
smaller the company, the more informal the strategy selection process was and the 
less likely was the strategy articulated into a formal plan; the strategy or plan was 
also less transparent to the organisation because more likely than not it was 
'articulated' only in the minds of the senior managers who released key aspects on a 
need-to-know basis. 
Differences in management approaches. Another trend that emerged from the 
interviews was that senior managers of European descent differed from their Asian 
counterparts in several ways. They conducted more formal discussions as a means of 
selecting a preferred strategy, expected the middle management level to participate in 
the decision-making process, shared information more widely within the organisation, 
and encouraged the lower management levels to offer strategic ideas and suggestions. 
In contrast, Asian senior managers (mainly of Chinese, Indian, Malay and Indonesian 
backgrounds) tended not to include middle managers in their strategic decision making 
and did not share information as widely as their European counterparts did. Asian 
senior managers saw the key role of middle management as providing information 
only and therefore saw no need to involve them, much less the lower management 
level, in strategy selection. 
Methodological considerations, A final issue that emerged out o f the interviews 
concerned the relative merits of surveys versus interviews. While a mail survey might 
allow the collection of information fix>m a broad group of people, the information 
was often superficial; it was not until interviews were conducted that *richer' data 
was accessed and better insights into the respondents' thoughts and perceptions 
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were gained. Overall the interviews yielded far more reliable information on the type 
of strategies organisations were likely to pursue; they also gave the researcher greater 
confidence that the right type of person (i.e. a key decision maker responsible for 
selecting and evaluating corporate strategies) provided the information sought. 
As noted in the beginning of this section, during the interviews, survey non-
respondents cited two main reasons why they did not respond to the survey 
questionnaire: lack of time, difficulty in answering the questionnaire (lack of 
familiarity with strategic concepts, language barriers), and confidentiality of 
information. An initial consideration of the questionnaire told them it would require 
far more time and attention than they were willing or able to give; since English was 
to many of them a second or even a third language, conveying their thoughts on a 
relatively difficult topic like corporate strategy, one they had not done before, was 
seen as a major chore. Further, the nature of the information sought involved 
commercially sensitive information that they were not sure should be shared with an 
organisation that they did not personally know. Interviews, however, allowed the 
establishment of this personal relationship, which in tum encouraged a more honest 
sharing of ideas and insights into actual corporate strategy selection practices. The 
use of personal contacts to arrange interviews, particularly with survey non-
respondents, had been very beneficial in this regard because by vouching for the 
researcher's credentials and personal integrity these contacts helped facilitate the 
exchange of ideas and information during the interviews. 
Even among the survey respondents, interviews revealed that the information 
provided on the questionnaire was kept, in the words of one respondent, 'general 
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enough so that it would be safe to share outside the organisation". Only during the 
interviews were the answers fleshed out, with qualifications made on which strategy 
or combination of strategies to use under which conditions. The actual process of 
selecting corporate strategies was also explained more clearly, so that what emerged 
was a process that was less systematic, and more informal, intuitive and incremental, 
than was indicated in their survey responses. 
8.7 SYNTHESIS: SHIPOWNERS' VIEWS ON CORPORATE STRATEGY 
SELECTION 
What then can be learned fi-om shipowners' self-reports? Table 8.4 summarises the 
majority views that emerged from the survey and interviews with regard to the six major 
assumptions of the strategic choice model. The 'qualified yes' column is the same as the 
'yes, but...' columns in previous tables and represent all 'yes' responses that deviated 
slightly from the model. 
Table 8.4 Comparing survey and interview Findings with the strategic choice model 
Survey 
The model assumes that Asia-Pacific 
shipowners will: 
Yes Qualified 
Yes 
1 change/modify their corporate strategies 
in response to changing environmental 
conditions 
85 7 
2 base strategic changes and the time 
frames of these changes on their future 
expectations of environmental conditions 
80 -
3 pursue a *grow' strategy when internal 
and external environmental factois are 
both favourable 
76 8 
4 pursue a 'stabilise' when interna! 
environmental factors are favourable but 
external factois are not 
72 9 
5 pursue a 'develop' or 'turnaround' 
strategy when external factors are 
favourable but internal factors are not 
68 -
6 pursue a 'harvest' strategy when internal 
and external environmental factors are 
both unfavourable 
52 17 
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Interviews 
Yes Qualified 
Yes 
75 12 
44 16 
63 22 
61 19 
52 25 
65 -
As the table shows, both survey and interview data supported the assumptions of the 
strategic choice model: however, as the 'qualified yes' columns suggest, the choice of 
strategies was more dispersed and less clearcut than what the model assumed. A strategy 
would be pursued regardless of environmental conditions to enable an organisation to 
grow fast, or it would be combined with any of the other four strategies to give the 
organisation greater flexibility and protection from risk. A popular choice was the 'grow' 
strategy which was selected even when conditions were unfavourable. The various 
choices are plotted in Figure 8.5, with items preceded by a plus (+) sign added by 
shipowners either during the survey (SQ) or interviews (I) and are therefore new to the 
model. 
High 
(Strengths) 
Organisational Competitive Factors 
High 
(Opportunities) 
Market 
Factors 
(Threats) 
Low 
Low 
(Weaknesses) 
Quadrant 1 
Grow 
+ Stabilise (1) 
+ Develop (1) 
Qaadrant 2 
Develop 
Turnaround 
+ Grow (SQ, 1) 
Qoadrant J 
Stabilise 
+ Grow (SQ, I ) 
+ Develop (1) 
+ Harvest (1) 
Quadrant 4 
Harvest 
+ Turnaround (SQ, 1) 
Figure 8.5 Matrix of corporate strategic choices based on survey and interview data 
As the matrix shows, while the tendency to combine strategies was evident in both the 
survey and interviews, this tendency became more marked and noticeable during the 
interviews. To a great extent, this difference could probably be attributed to the relative 
merits of mail surveys and personal interviews; as discussed earlier, the latter allowed a 
more in-depth discussion of key issues, thus making possible a greater clarification and 
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clearer delineation of strategic choices that otherwise would have been missed by the mail 
survey. 
In the next chapter, these shipowners' views will be compared with strategic decisions 
made by shipowners under simulated conditions to determine the extent to which these 
sets of findings are congruent. 
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Chapter Nine 
RESEARCH FINDINGS: SIMULATION 
In this chapter, focus now shifts to data obtained through another research method, the 
simulation. Like the survey and interviews, the simulation relied upon information 
provided by shipowners; unlike the first two, however, which relied primarily on self-
reports, the simulation required shipowners to make strategic decisions under conditions 
that simulated a typical competitive shipping environment. The computer-based 
simulation program Stratship was used for this purpose (see Appendix 4 for details on 
Stratship). To attract shipowner interest, the simulation was run as a shipping 
competition among commercial shipowners. A total of 570 senior managers participated, 
representing 86 Asia-Pacific shipowners all of whom were part of the shipowner 
population (n=340) used for the survey. Participants worked in teams o f three or four 
each, with members from the same company typically working together. Each team was 
required to complete a decision sheet for each of the 20 quarters that the simulation was 
programmed to run. Of the 190 sets of decision sheets submitted, 174 were useable and 
served as the basis for the data analysis. A copy of a decision sheet is in Appendix 4. 
9.1 SIMULATION VARIABLES FOR STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING 
The aim of the simulation was to make a shipping company financially profitable, and 
had 20 quarters within which to accomplish this aim. The basic decision-making 
structure was simple: analyse the information provided by the program, and then make 
strategic decisions. Two types of quarterly information could be accessed: the 
company's financial status and market conditions. Information on the company's 
financial (or internal environmental) conditions changed according to the strategic 
decisions taken by participants; information on market (or external environmental) 
conditions changed as determined by the program, independent of any decision taken by 
participants. Changes to market conditions varied in magnitude; some were slight (e.g. 
interest rates) while others were major (e.g. trade indices). Such a program setup made it 
relatively easy to delineate the specific conditions under which a certain strategy was 
chosen. 
Table 9.1 summarises the types of company and market information available to 
participants and the strategic decisions they were expected to make on the basis of this 
information. 
Table 9.1 List of quarterly variables 
Company Information Market Information Strategic Decisions* 
Total vessel operating costs Route trends Future outlook for quarter(s) 
For each route: 
Route accounts • leg Strategic objectives 
For each route: * market share 
• cash surplus/deficit • load ^tor Corporate strategy (ies) 
• capitalised route value 
Market trends Fleet structure decisions 
Accounts summary For each route: • order 
• operational cashflow • trade indices • buy 
• financial cashflow • liner rates • sell 
• net cashflow • scrap 
• current liquid assets Vessel price • charter in or out 
• re<harter 
Company value Construction lag 
• total fleet value Operational decisions 
* liquid assets Charter rates * add/delete routes 
• value of routes • (re)allocate vessels to routes 
Interest rates * decide on port setup costs, 
vessel speed Joint ventures. 
Oil prices freight rates, mariceting 
expenditures 
Exogenous shocks 
* Strategic decisions were made by participants, and affected company information but not market 
information; market conditions were programmed to change eveiy quarter, irrespective of strategic 
decisions and changes in company information. 
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As columns 1 and 2 of the table show, information on the company's financial status 
included total vessel operating costs, the financial viability of each trading route (route 
accounts), cashflow and liquidity status (accounts summary), and overall company 
value; information on market conditions covered route trends, market trends, vessel 
prices, construction lags, charter rates, interest rates, oil prices, and exogenous shocks. 
Participating teams analysed this information, jotting their findings on their decision 
sheets for that quarter, eind from this analysis, they made strategic decisions for the next 
quarter, or i f they wished, for several quarters ahead. They predicted what the outlook 
for the next quarter(s) would be, set what strategic objective(s) to pursue within this 
time fi'ame, selected a specific corporate strategy (or a combination o f strategies) to 
enable them to achieve their objective(s), and translated this strategy (or set of 
strategies) into specific fleet structure decisions (i.e. order, buy, sell, scrap, charter in, 
re-charter, or charter out) and operational decisions (i.e. add/delete routes or legs, 
(re)allocate vessels to routes, or decide on port setup costs, vessel speed, joint ventures, 
freight rates, and marketing expenditures). These decisions were also jotted down on the 
quarteriy decision sheet. The effect of these decisions on the company's current fleet 
structure and route status was also recorded. 
9.2 PRIMARY FINDINGS ON CORPORATE STRATEGY SELECTION 
Simulation findings were arrived at using a qualitative approach to data analysis. The 
general approach was to identify the corporate strategies used by the teams over the 
simulation period (i.e. 20 quarters), check these strategies against prevailing 
environmental conditions, and determine the extent to which decisions followed the 
assumptions of the model. Data was summarised onto quarterly-decisions summary 
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sheets and entries coded according to the coding index in Appendix 2. Using the 
summary sheets, key trends and patterns were identified, first at the individual team 
level and then at an aggregate level to arrive at more generalised and broader patterns of 
behaviour. 
Like the survey and interview data, the discussion of simulation findings is organised 
aroimd the six assumptions of the strategic choice model. For each assumption, 
simulation decisions are categorised according to whether they adhered to or deviated 
from the strategic choice model; then the nature of this adherence or deviation is 
explained, with emphasis given to the various modifications made to the model. Decision 
categories are based on the following types o f decision makers, which were identified 
during the initial analysis of simulation data: 
those who followed the strategic choice model without deviations (consistent 
followers), 
• those who often followed the model but changed parameters when it suited them, 
for instance, disregarding environmental conditions to pursue strategic objectives or 
combining/substituting strategies to strengthen their hand (eclectic users), 
• those who followed the model occasionally (occasional samplers), and 
• those who did not follow it at all (non-users). 
Each category had a cut-off point of 75 per cent; to qualify for any one category, a team 
should have taken the action called for at least 75 per cent of the time required to 
complete the simulation (20 quarters). A team would be considered a 'consistent 
follower', for instance, i f it adhered to the model without making any modifications 75 
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per cent of the time. Findings are summarised in Table 9.2 and discussed in succeeding 
pages. 
Table 9.2 Simulation responses to the six assumptions of the strategic choice model (n=570) 
Assumptions of the Model Categories of Responses (%) 
Consistent 
Followr 
Eclectic 
User 
Occasional 
Sampler 
Non-user 
Asia-Pacific shipowners will: 
1 change/modify their corporate 
strategies in response to changing 
environmental conditions 
58 18 15 9 
2 base strategic changes and the time 
frames of these changes on their fiiture 
expectations of environmental 
conditions 
74 - 14 12 
3 pursue a 'grow* strategy when 
internal and external environmental 
factors are both favourable 
55 30 6 9 
4 pursue a 'stabilise' when internal 
environmental factors are favourable 
but external factors are not 
67 14 11 8 
5 pursue a 'develop* or 'turnaround' 
strategy when external factors are 
favourable but internal factors are not 
44 32 19 5 
6 pursue a 'harvest' strategy when 
internal and external environmental 
factors are both unfavourable 
79 7 5 9 
Support for the model 
(SIM-Q1) Will Asla-Pacif Ic shipowners change/modify their corporate 
strategies fn response to changing environmental conditions? 
On this count, the majority of participants (58 per cent) strictly followed the model, 
that is, they changed/modified their corporate strategies in response to changing 
environmental conditions. However, the level of deviation was only slightly lower, with 
42 per cent of respondents deciding on a different course of action. Some (18 per cent) 
followed the model more often than not, deviating only when they wanted to speculate; 
others (15 per cent) followed the model only occasionally, preferring to take a gamble 
the rest of the time; the rest (9 per cent) did not make any changes at all. To a lesser 
degree, the deviation could also be attributed to errors/miscalculations in participants' 
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assessments of environmental conditions (i.e. overstating/ understating the 
environmental conditions). 
Although deviations totalled 42 per cent, when those who faithfully followed the model 
(consistent followers) and those who frequently followed the model but deviated 
occasionally (eclectic users) were bracketed together, their combined support for the 
first assumption of the model rose to a high 76 per cent. 
Another clear trend that emerged from the data was that future predictions had a 
significant efTect on all simulation participants. That is, the firmer their future 
predictions of internal and external environmental conditions were, the more likely were 
they to change their corporate strategy even i f i t was not appropriate to current 
environmental conditions or trends. Conversely, i f they expressed uncertainty in what 
the future held, they were less likely to make changes to their corporate strategy. 
(SIM-Q2) Will Asia-Pacific shipowners base strategic changes and the time 
frames of these changes on their future expectations of environmental 
conditions? 
The simulation program addressed the question of future expectations more narrowly 
than the survey and interviews. Unlike the latter which allowed respondents greater 
latitude in answering this question (e.g. many respondents said for instance that they 
would base their decisions not only on their own expectations but on a range of factors 
as well), the simulation locked participants into a narrower decision path where they 
had to specify their outlook for the next quarter or number of quarters, and based on this 
outlook, determine their strategic objectives and strategies for that time frame, and then 
make their decisions. 
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Overall, simulation data supported the second assumption of the model. The majority of 
decisions (74 per cent) showed that decision makers relied a lot on their future 
expectations of environmental conditions when making strategic changes and selecting 
the time frames for these changes. This finding confirmed the trend initially identified in 
SIM-QI, which showed that future expectations were a major influencing factor on 
shipovmers' decision to change/modify corporate strategies and that the extent of the 
strategic change depended on how strongly decision makers felt about the change (i.e. 
the stronger the views, the greater the likelihood to change). Data also showed that the 
time frames chosen for corporate strategies were typically short term: very few went 
more than 7 quarters ahead, with the average falling within 3-6 quarters. Further, the 
longer the time frame set, the more conservative the change predicted, almost as i f 
forecasts were averaged over the period. For example, the freight rates that decision 
makers would predict within say 5-6 quarters would be half as much as what was 
predicted within say 1-3 quarters. 
Deviations were a minority, with 14 per cent following the model only occasionally and 
12 per cent not doing so at all. On average those belonging to these groups were not in 
strong financial positions when they made their decisions. They disregarded future 
expectations in times of financial crisis, or when both internal (e.g. dropping company 
value) and external (e.g. declining trade routes, dropping market share) environmental 
conditions were bad. Their response was to do either of two things: do nothing and just 
wait and see (maintain the status quo), or say they would pursue a certain strategy but 
would not carry out changes that reflected such a strategy. For example, they might say 
they would pursue a *grow', 'develop', or 'turnaround' strategy to improve their 
financial situation but the changes they subsequently implemented were so minor that 
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any effect was negligible or hardly visible (e.g. lowering freight rates slightly to say 5-8 
per cent or reducing the speed of the fleet on 1 or 2 routes from say 20 knots to 18 
knots). 
(SIM-Q3) Will Asla-Paclfic shipowners pursue a *grow' strategy when Internal 
and external environmental factors are both favourable? 
Only a slight majority (55 per cent) followed the model without deviation (i.e. pursued a 
'grow' strategy when both internal and external environmental factors were favourable), 
with the rest (45 per cent) deviating from the model in varying degrees. A big group (30 
per cent) did follow the model but chose to spread risks by combining 'grow' with other 
strategies (18 per cent) or diverted occasionally in favour of another strategy or in spite 
of unfavourable conditions (12 per cent). The rest either followed the model 
intermittently (6 per cent) or did not do so at all (9 per cent). In spite of these 
deviations, however, when those who faithfully followed the model (54 per cent) and 
those who followed it but at times changed directions for strategic reasons (30 per cent) 
were combined, support for the third assumption of the model rose to a strong 86 per 
cent. 
The most common *grow' strategies used by participants were expansion and 
diversification. Typically, participants expanded and diversified into more trade routes 
and/or added more ships to their most profitable trade routes. Ships were mostly 
secondhand tonnage rather than newbuildings because of the long lead time required to 
build vessels (defined as 'construction lag' in the program) and the cheaper cost of 
purchasing relative to the availability of finance (defined as 'borrowing limit' in the 
program). Another popular 'grow' strategy was diversifying operations, which took 
four major forms: ship operating (i.e. operating trade routes only), ship chartering, 
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playing the sale and purchase market (i.e. buying and selling ships), and joint ventures. 
Of these four approaches, a combination of (a) ship operating with chartering in, 
chartering out and rechartering was the most used, followed equally by (b) chartering 
and sale & purchase, and (c) chartering, sale & purchase, and a limited amount of ship 
operating. Joint ventures were the least preferred form of diversification. 
A trend that clearly emerged from the data was the dominance of external environmental 
factors over intemal factors. While both external and internal factors had to be 
favourable before a 'grow' strategy was pursued, more 'grow' choices were made when 
external factors were stronger than intemal factors. For instance, i f participants thought 
that the market held many opportunities that were simply too good to miss, they would 
choose to grow even i f they might not be as competitively strong or ready as they 
needed to be. 
For those who combined 'grow' v^lh other strategies (18 per cent), the most popular 
choices were 'develop' and 'stabilise': the first ('develop') to help the company expand 
and diversify into new and existing high growth areas (e.g. new trade routes, reallocation 
of vessels to routes, charter-in vessels for high market share/demand routes), and the 
second ('stabilise') to maximise the revenue value of a profitable trade route or charter 
without increasing costs. To a much lesser degree a 'harvest' strategy was also used in 
conjunction with 'grow' to divest of routes which were still profitable but did not show 
as much potential as other routes, or to divest of charters, ships, and occasionally joint 
venture arrangements to maximise opportunities. 
Those who deviated from the model only occasionally (12 per cent) did either of two 
things: they pursued a 'grow' strategy even when conditions were not favourable or 
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they substituted another strategy. A 'stabilise' strategy was the most frequently used: 
the aim was to maximise profits by minimising costs and maximising revenue 
opportunities, and this typically involved making minor adjustments like 
increasing/decreasing ship speeds (average 2 knot change), marketing expenditures 
(average 7 per cent change) and freight rates (average 8 per cent change). 
With the remaining 15 per cent of the population, who represented significant deviations 
from the model, some 6 per cent used a 'grow' strategy only occasionally, giving greater 
preference to a 'stabilise' strategy to minimise operating costs, maximise revenue, and 
thus increase overall profits; the other 9 per cent did not use it at all. With this last 
group, responses were so widely dispersed and varied that no clear trend emerged as to 
why a 'grow' strategy was not pursued under favourable conditions or what alternative 
strategies would have been acceptable under these conditions. 
(SIM-Q4) Will Asla-Paclfic shipowners pursue a 'stabilise* strategy when 
internal environmental factors are favourable but external factors are not? 
A majority of shipowners (67%) did pursue a 'stabilise' strategy under the conditions 
assumed by the model, that is, when internal environmental factors were favourable and 
extemal environmental factors were not. Data showed that most used this strategy to 
maximise profits by maintaining their internal operating structure (e.g. maintain same 
trade routes or charters as in previous time frames) and reducing costs. With a stable, 
albeit slightly declining, revenue base and reduced costs, they were able to increase route 
performance and profits. Typically, costs were decreased by reducing vessel speeds 
(average 4 knot reduction), marketing expenditure (average 16 per cent cut), and route 
size. Route size was normally decreased by removing route legs (average 1 leg removed) 
and indirect routes. 
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The 'stabilise' strategy was mostly used by trading route operators and charterers, with 
those in the sale & purchase markets using it the least Al l three groups used the 
'stabilise' strategy as a short term measure. Most participants used it over an average of 
3 quarters; very few used it continuously beyond 5 quarters. The 'stabilise' strategy 
proved to be most used during times of relatively high freight rates and when 
participants perceived the market demand to be high but the threat of decline imminent, 
or, as one team described it in their decision sheet under future predictions, when 'the 
freight rate is at or near the peak of the business/shipping cycle and likely to decline 
soon—next 1-2 quarters'. 
Of those who deviated from the model, 14 per cent also used the 'stabilise' strategy 
under conditions stipulated by the model, but rather than restrict themselves to this one 
choice, they usually combined it with other strategies. 'Grow' and 'develop' were the 
most commonly used; 'harvest' the least. The most typical approach o f this group was 
to (a) maintain an existing route with a 'stabilise' strategy (either change nothing or make 
minor adjustments to vessel speeds, freight rates, marketing expenditure, and vessel 
allocation to routes), (b) pursue a 'develop' strategy to expand or diversify into new 
trade routes or scope of operation (i.e. instead of just operating vessels, increase scope 
of operation by adding more charters, pursuing the sale and purchase market and/or less 
frequently, setting up joint ventures), and (c) pursue a 'grow' strategy to expand or 
diversify into existing routes (i.e by increasing the number of legs or vessels on a route, 
marketing expenditure, and freight rate adjustments). When the 'harvest' strategy was 
used, the most typical approach was to use (a) the 'stabilise' strategy in the most 
profitable areas, (b) a limited amount of the 'grow' strategy in existing areas that were 
predicted to be profitable, and (c) a 'harvest' strategy in the most threatened areas or 
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when poor trading conditions were predicted. By using a combination approach, this 
group of eclectic users aimed to maximise internal strengths while the market still gave 
acceptable returns. Like the majority group (consistent followers), they used the 
'stabilise' strategy as a short term measure, rarely going beyond 7 quarters but using it 
for about 1-2 quarters longer than the former. 
With the remaining 19 per cent of the population, which represented significant 
deviations from the model, a number followed the model only occasionally (11 per cent) 
while the rest (8 per cent) did not do so at all. Instead of the 'stabilise' strategy, other 
strategies, notably 'harvest', 'grow' and 'develop', were preferred. The 'harvest' 
strategy was most used in the sale & purchase market where participants sold vessels 
while ship prices were still high to strengthen their cashflow and financial and operating 
positions. At the opposite end, others pursued 'grow' and 'develop' strategies to take 
advantage of strong internal environmental factors (i.e. a healthy financial position) 
amidst what they perceived to be a declining market. Under these circumstances, 
chartering in vessels over longer time periods (4-6 quarters ahead was the norm) to take 
advantage of reduced charter rates was the most frequently used approach. 
In spite of these deviations from the model, when those who faithfully followed the 
model (67 per cent) were added to those who followed the model frequently (14 per 
cent), a strong support for the model's fourth assumption emerged (81 per cent). 
(SIM-Q5) Will Asia-Pacific shipowners pursue a 'develop' or 'turnaround' 
strategy when external environmental factors are favourable but Internal 
factors are not? 
On this assumption, strict adherence to the model was lower, with less than half of the 
participants (44 per cent) using a 'develop' or "turnaround' strategy under the assumed 
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conditions, that is, when extemal environmental factors were favourable and intemaJ 
factors were not. Of this group, 'turnaround' was more widely used than 'develop', and 
each strategy tended to be used differently. The 'develop' strategy was used more on a 
rising market (i.e. increasing freight rates and trade demand), where the approach was to 
go into new high profit areas and earn good revenue so that a company's 
competitiveness, particularly its financial position, could be strengthened. The 
'turnaround' strategy on the other hand was used mostly on existing areas of operations, 
and it did not matter whether market conditions had been on the rise or stable for a 
period of time (i.e. 3-4 quarters o f strong market conditions). The turnaround approach 
was to reduce intemal costs and market exposure as much as possible while maximising 
good revenues. This was usually done by reallocating the majority of the fleet to the 
most profitable routes, reducing route size by deleting indirect and some direct (but 
unprofitable) ports of call on a particular route (e.g. reducing 4 ports of call or legs to 2), 
reducing vessel speed and marketing expenditure, and forming joint ventures on routes 
where they perceived would not be high growth in the longer term (7-10 quarters ahead 
normally). 
Another important distinction in the way the two strategies were used was that 
'turnaround' involved a greater degree of change than 'develop'. However, this was to be 
expected: a 'develop' strategy normally required a major infusion of resources to become 
viable, but companies in the circumstances typically limited lacked the financial capacity 
(i.e. insufficient cashflow to purchase/charter vessels and buy into new trade routes) to 
fully realise the strategy's potential. 
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Among those who deviated from the model (56 per cent), four groups emerged: (a) those 
who also followed the model but modified its parameters as they saw fit, either by 
occasionally substituting another strategy (13 per cent) or regularly using other 
strategies in combination with develop/turnaround (19 per cent), and (b) those who 
showed the least support for the model, either by follov^ng it only intermittently (19 
per cent) or not doing so at all (5 per cent). 
The two groups in the (a)-category followed a similar approach. The first group 
substituted a 'grow' strategy on occasion, while the second group frequently combined 
'grow' with 'develop/turnaround'. To a far lesser extent, a 'harvest' strategy was also 
used by the second group to divest of trade routes that still showed earning potential 
and were less of a financial drain on internal operations. The 'grow' strategy was 
popular to both (a)-groups because it helped them expand and diversify into existing 
areas of strength without creating significant increases in costs, which was often the 
limitation of the 'develop' strategy. The typical growth approach was to increase the 
capacity of existing operations by purchasing and/or chartering in more vessels (mostly 
secondhand, as new vessels were more expensive). Wherever possible, positioning costs 
(i.e. the cost of getting a vessel allocated to a particular route) were minimised by 
allocating vessels to their closest route; this was an area where many made good cost 
savings. 
For those in the (b)-group, which deviated from the model the most, their general 
tendency was not to make any strategic changes to take advantage of favourable external 
conditions and halt worsening internal conditions. While the first (b)-group would 
occasionally try a 'grow' or 'harvest' strategy to improve financial health/avoid a 
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financial crisis, more often that not both groups did nothing more than maintain their 
current strategies and wait and see i f intemal operations improved. 
Of all of the strategies used when extemal conditions were favourable but intemal 
conditions were not, 'tumaround' proved to be the most successful, that is, it provided 
the greatest increase in company value in the shortest period of time. It was successful 
because it was better able to pit market opportunities (i.e. high levels o f revenue) against 
intemal weaknesses (lack of capacity and finance). Unlike 'grow' and 'develop' 
strategies, for instance, it did not require a major infusion of funds and other resources. 
This was one of the major problems that financially weakened companies typically met 
when they tried to implement 'grow' or 'develop' strategies. They simply did not have 
the intemal capacity (lack of cashflow, limited access to charters and finance due to poor 
route values) to improve operations (number of trade routes, vessels on routes and 
chartered vessels) and take full advantage o f good market opportunities. 
Although a slight majority did deviate from the model (56 per cent), support for this 
assumption still proved to be strong when the numbers of those who also followed the 
model but occasionally substituted another strategy (13 per cent) or frequently 
combined strategies (19 per cent) were added to those who faithfully followed the model 
(44 per cent). Based on these figures, a healthy majority (76 per cent) emerged in 
support of the model. 
(SiM-Q6) Will Asia-Pacific shipowners pursue a 'harvest' strategy when 
Internal and external environmental factors are both unfavourable? 
A large percentage of decisions (79%) showed strict adherence to the model, pursuing a 
harvest strategy under the assumed conditions, that is, when both intemal and extemal 
environmental conditions were imfavourable. The most common approaches were to 
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abandon poorly perfomiing trade routes and sell o f f vessels to improve internal 
conditions. In contrast with the 'grow' strategy where external factors tended to 
dominate over internal factors, internal factors tended to prevail in 'harvest' decisions. 
Indeed, the weaker the organisation was (poor cashflow and liquidity, declining 
company value), the greater the magnitude o f divestment 
Within this majority group of consistent followers, there were two main groupings: 
diversified operators and sole ship operators. The diversified group, which operated in 
various trade routes and were major charterers as well, divested most of their trading 
operations by abandoning routes and selling o f f vessels; at the same time, they 
maintained their charter operations as their new core base. The ship operating group on 
the other hand divested either most o f their trade routes and vessels (i.e. from 4 trade 
routes down to 1 and from a fleet size of 25 down to 7) or pursued selective trade 
route, ports of call and vessel divestments. A typical approach of this second group 
was to divest of one trade route, make direct port calls only on the remaining routes, 
and sell o f f most of the fleet and maintain the minimum level of vessels on routes 
(normally 2 vessels per route). 
Deviations from the model (21 per cent) fell into three groups: those who frequently 
combined 'harvest' with other strategies (7 per cent), those who followed the model 
only occasionally (5 per cent), and those who did not do so at all (9 per cent). The most 
popular combination pursued by the first group was 'harvest' and 'tumaround': a 
'harvest' strategy for areas or operations perceived to have limited future value or were 
most vulnerable to worsening conditions, and a 'turnaround' strategy for areas that 
could be improved i f costs could be better controlled relative to revenue earning 
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potential. For those who used 'harvest' occasionally or not at all, the most commonly 
used substitute was the 'turnaround' strategy. The typical approach was to reduce 
costs and the scope of operations as much as possible to improve cashflow and 
liquidity, reduce vessel speed to the minimum, significantly cut freight rates and 
marketing expenditure, reduce ports of call, and carefully balance vessel allocation to 
routes which minimised their exposure to high operating costs on routes. For this last 
group, they often had no choice but to pursue a 'turnaround strategy i f they wanted to 
continue with the simulation. Choosing to harvest when they were running out of 
options would have meant not having any vessels, charters, or trade routes with which 
to carry on with the simulation. Under these conditions some tried the 'grow' strategy 
but they were generally unsuccessful because they did not have the financial capacity to 
grow significantly enough to halt their worsening fortunes. Those who chose the 
'tumaround' strategy often produced better results, which allowed them to stay in the 
simulation longer than those who chose the 'grow' strategy. 
Of all the strategies used here, the selective combination of 'harvest' and 'turnaround' 
strategies proved to be the most successful in increasing company value, for example, a 
selective 'harvest' strategy on trade routes and areas of operation showing limited 
future potential (i.e. getting out of joint ventures, charters or trade routes; selling vessels 
at the appropriate time) and a 'turnaround' strategy on those areas perceived to show 
good future potential. Pursuing a 'tumaround' strategy on its own was the next most 
successful strategy. 
Overall, when both the majority group of consistent followers (79 per cent) and those 
who also used 'harvest' but in combination with other strategies (7 per cent) were 
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bracketed together, a very strong level of support (86 per cent) for this final assumption 
of the model emerged. 
Summary of primary simulation findings 
As the preceding discussion has shown, like the survey and interviews, simulation data 
strongly supported all sbc assumptions of the model. The general pattern of response 
was also the same. 
Support came from two main groups: those who followed the model without making 
any changes to it, and those often followed the model but modified its parameters for 
strategic reasons. Again, as in the survey and interviews, modifications typically 
involved disregarding environmental conditions when strategic considerations required it, 
using a sU-ategy under environmental conditions not called for by the model, or 
combining several strategies to spread risk instead of just limiting themselves to the one 
or two choices offered by the model. 
The most frequently used combinations of strategies during the simulation are plotted in 
Figure 9.1. Those in parentheses indicate other choices made by shipowners in addition 
to the strategies assumed by the model. When compared with Figure 8.5 (see Chapter 
Eight), which shows the results from shipowners' self-reports, the high degree of 
congruence becomes easily noticeable. Choices were the same except in quadrants 1 and 
2, where the 'harvest' strategy appeared as another choice. It should be stressed here, 
however, that 'harvest' was only chosen on a few occasions. While on this basis it can 
be argued that it should not appear on the matrix along with the more widely used 
strategies, the decision has been to include it to show the range of choices that the 
majority of respondents pursued during the simulation. 
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High 
(Strengths) 
Organisational Competitive Factors 
Low 
(Weaknesses) 
High 
(Opportunities) 
External 
Environmental 
Factors 
Low 
(Threats) 
Ql 
Grow 
(+Develop) 
(+Stabilise) 
(+Harvest) 
Q2 
Develop 
Tumaround 
(+Grow) 
(+Harvest) 
Q3 
Stabilise 
(+<jrow) 
(+Develop) 
(+Harvest) 
Q4 
Harvest 
(+Tumaround) 
Figure 9.1 Matrix of corporate strategic choices based on simulation data 
9.3 OTHER SIMULATION FINDINGS: SECONDARY TRENDS 
In addition to the main findings on corporate strategy selection, a number of key 
secondary findings were also identified. These involved decision-making styles, patterns 
of information use, environmental focus, competitive performance of participating 
teams, and cultural differences. The first was based on the researcher's observations of 
team behaviour during the simulation sessions, the next three on data provided by 
participants on their decision sheets, and the last on a combination of researcher 
observations and participant data. 
Decision-making styles 
Four major styles of strategic analysis and decision making were displayed by the 
participating teams: autocratic, democratic, delegating, and adaptive. 
In the AUTOCRATIC TEAM, the most senior person in the team took control and became 
the key strategist while other members became the implementors and followers. It was a 
very hierarchical approach, with the most senior people having the greatest input. This 
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was the preferred style of many East Asian senior managers, peirticularly those from a 
Chinese ethnic background (Hong Kong, Singapore, and Indonesia were the main 
countries of domicile). 
In the DEMOCRATIC TEAM, cvcryone got equally involved in the team's strategy analysis, 
strategy development, and decision making. Each team member was expected to be 
equally participative; as a result, there was a lot more discussion and debate than in 
other teams. The main negative aspect of this type of decision making was lack of 
leadership; there were occasions when no one was in charge. This style was observed 
most frequently in teams whose members were of East Asian and European origins 
(with Singapore, Malaysia, and Australia as main countries of domicile). 
In the DELEQATiNQTEAM, team members allocated the various tasks among themselves and 
each became responsible for his or her own area They did not do much collective 
brainstorming or decision making. Instead responsibility was delegated over three areas: 
assessing and providing key information on key environmental trends, making strategic 
policy and setting strategic directions, and policy implementation and operational 
decision making. In terms of ethnic makeup, unlike the previous two teams (autocratic 
and democratic), no clear trend emerged, with the ethnic backgrounds o f team members 
too varied to allow general patterns to be observed. 
In the last group, the ADAPTIVE TEAM, the roles of individual team members changed as the 
simulation progressed. Like the delegating team, members assumed any of three key 
responsibilities: information providers, strategic policy makers, and operational decision 
makers. During the simulation, they rotated their roles to remain motivated and creative. 
Brainstorming and decision making was always done as a group. The team leader was 
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much more participative than those in the other groups; it was also not uncommon for 
the leader to change during the simulation to improve group dynamics. Members of 
adaptive teams were of East Asian and European descent, with a slight dominance of the 
latter (the main countries of domicile were Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia, and New 
Zealand). 
Of the four groups, adaptive teams were observed to be the most empowered and highly 
motivated; on average they also achieved the highest levels of performance (measured in 
terms of the highest company value achieved). However, autocratic teams tended to be 
just as successful due to the high level of individual competence of their team leaders. 
The big difference between the two was in the degree of team spirit: as a rule, members 
of adaptive teams were highly participative; in contrast, there were occasions when 
members of autocratic teams appeared not to be involved and/or interested due to 
dominant team leaders. The other two teams, delegating and democratic, did not perform 
as well as the first two. Members in these teams often lacked the strong commitment 
and enthusiasm displayed by other teams, and team leadership was often lacking to set 
key strategic directions and get the best out of team members. In terms o f the 
simulation's objective, they performed the worst, that is, they achieved the lowest 
company values. 
Use of Information 
A key trend that emerged from the simulation data was the way participating teams 
used the information provided by the simulation program. Three main user types were 
identified: those whose use of external information was limited to the trades in which 
they operated (limited external information users), those who overemphasised internal 
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information (internal information users), and those who made extensive use of both 
external and internal information (extensive information users). 
The first group, the UMrrEO E X T E R N A L I N F O R M A T I O N U S E R S , usually used all available 
internal information (ie route accounts, cashflow, fleet value, liquid assets, value of 
routes and company value), and as much external information as was available to them 
but only on those areas in which they were operating. Seldom did they venture beyond 
their trade routes. For example, i f they were involved in Europe-Japan-USA routes, 
they only looked for information pertaining to these routes and ignored other routes; as 
a result, they oflen missed the opportunities that lay in these areas. I f they did look at 
other routes, they did so haphazardly or intermittently, rather than consistently and 
proactively, with an eye for new opportunities. Among the key external environmental 
factors they usually overlooked were trade indices and freight rates for routes in which 
they were not involved. Surprisingly, there were more risk takers than conservative 
decision makers in this group; there were also more dry bulk operators. 
The second group, the I N T E R N A L I N F O R M A T I O N U S E R S , spent most of their time analysing 
internal information, often at the expense of external information. Typically, this group 
spent more time on internal information than on external information. The group tended 
to view internal trends more by the percentage difference between quarters than by 
changes in external conditions (i.e. changing trade indices). It focused primarily on the 
'bottom-line' approach: How much profit are we making on routes? What is our 
company value relative to previous quarters? Financial information (i.e. route profit, 
cashflow, company value) was also given more emphasis than operational information 
(i.e. number of vessels on routes, vessel speed, ports of call). Interestingly enough, this 
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group also made more internal graphs than any other group to assist decision making. 
While all participants took advantage of the option of viewing key variables in graph 
form, as preset by the simulation program, this group made more graphs than other 
groups to plot their key internal variables. Because of their preoccupation with internal 
variables, like the first group, they missed a lot of key external trends. Unlike the first 
group, however, this second user group was dominated by conservative decision makers. 
It was also made up of a wide range of industry sector operators with no one sector 
dominating. 
The third and last user group, the E X T E N S I V E iNFonwATiON U S E R S , made extensive use of all 
external and internal information provided in the simulation. This group oHen spent 
more time analysing information than the other two groups; as a result, it took them 
longer to progress through the quarters. While this group included both conservative and 
risk-taking decision makers, the latter slightly outnumbered the former. In terms of 
industry sectors, there were also more liner and tanker operators. 
Of the three user groups, the last group, which spent more time analysing information 
and made more extensive use of both internal and external information, achieved the 
highest levels of performance (i.e. achieved higher company values), followed by the 
first group, which limited its use of external information to what was relevant to its 
areas of operation. 
Environmental focus 
Another key trend that emerged from simulation data was the dominance of either an 
external or internal environmental focus among participating teams, E X T E R N A L L Y F O C U S E D 
T E A M S put more emphasis on external rather than internal factors in the choice and 
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selection of corporate strategies. Although they analysed both external and internal 
environmental factors in their decision making, they tended to align their corporate 
strategies more closely with external factors than internal factors; for instance, i f external 
environmental conditions were good, they would pursue a 'grow' strategy even i f they 
lacked the cashflow to adequately fund the growth that such a strategy called for. 
Externally focused teams were found to be more responsive to market conditions; they 
were able to change faster than internally focused teams and/or maintain strategies that 
were flexible enough to adapt to changing market conditions. In most cases, because of 
their external focus, these teams were able to maintain the intent of the selected strategy 
while retaining their ability to respond to changing external conditions. 
In contrast, I M T E R N A L L Y F O C U S E D T E A M S tended to be a lot less flexible and adaptable in the 
face of changing market conditions, and were thus slower to respond to such changes. 
They tended to wait until external trends started affecting internal trends (e.g. declining 
trade route revenues and profits) before acting; often this was 2 quarters later than the 
externally focused teams. They also tended to be more conservative in their decision 
making, preferring minor changes to major ones. In many ways, internally focused teams 
were also the internal information users, the second group of information users identified 
in the preceding sub-section, who put far undue reliance on internal information. 
Competitive performance 
Another key trend that came out of the simulation data related to the teams' competitive 
performance. Among the various participating teams, three definite categories of 
performers emerged: high performers, average performers, and low performers. The 
objective of the simulation was to make an ailing company become financially profitable, 
hence, the higher the company value that a team posted at the end of the simulation, the 
245 
more successful it was deemed to be. At the beginning of the simulation, the company 
value stood at $614.74 million. At the end of the competition, the high performers (19 
per cent) climbed to a company value of greater than $1 billion, the average performers 
(53 per cent) reached between $600 million to $1 billion, and the low performers (28 per 
cent) reached less than $600 million. 
Major differences between the higher and lower performers are highlighted below. 
Comparisons with the average group proved much more difficult because most teams in 
this group straddled both ends, making comparisons less reliable; thus, no trends are 
highlighted for this group. 
High performers 
• The most successful teams, defined as having a company value o f greater than $1 
billion, were those who consistently came up with corporate strategies that 
achieved their objectives, and more importantly, within the limits of what the 
environmental conditions dictated These teams succeeded by matching extemal 
environmental conditions with the best internal or organisational attributes (healthy 
cashflows, high growth trade routes), and came up with corporate strategies that 
captured the organisation's best future opportunities and also defended its most 
vulnerable areas from extemal threats. 
There was, however, no one approach used by this group that was clearly superior 
to others. All—for instance, having a high market share (large number of vessels and 
trade routes), playing the sale and purchase market, being a major charterer, or 
combining all three—led to profitable results depending on environmental 
conditions. While some used some of these methods more than others, the data 
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showed no clear trend as to which method led to higher performance. Each of them 
worked well provided environmental factors were appropriate. 
• High performers also consistently chose more longer-term strategies (4-7 quarters 
ahead) and modified them to suit envirorunental conditions, particularly external 
conditions, as opposed to others who had short-term strategies and changed them a 
lot more frequently. Longer-term strategies were also more strategic in outlook thus 
enabling high performers to better predict broader trends and prepare for change. 
They also spent far greater time analysing information than any other group. 
» Amongst the highest performers were those fix)m the liner sector of the shipping 
industry. In terms of country or ethnic background, results showed that high 
performers represented a good mix of different countries and ethnic backgrounds. 
Low performers 
• The least successfiil performers were those whose company value went below $600 
million, which was lower than what they started with. Their hallmark was chronic 
lack of resources and capabilities. The least successfiil teams went into new trade 
routes or new areas of business (e.g. from ship operating to ship chartering) without 
the requisite capabilities (i.e. good liquidity). They failed to live within their means, 
often trying to expand without the requisite resources (e.g. buying new vessels with 
poor cashflow). They often did not make much profit from such changes and their 
performance was generally mediocre. 
For many within this group, their corporate strategies were too short-term (1-3 
quarters ahead) and operational. They frequently changed their strategies before 
these strategies had a chance to work. For example, they might have been pursuing 
247 
a 'grow' strategy when external trends were good but as soon as the market showed 
any signs of decline, they dropped that strategy for another (e.g. 'stabilise'). 
This group also spent more time in reactive, rather than proactive, mode. They 
often played the simulation fi'om quarter to quarter, always reacting to 
circumstances that happened in the previous quarter. They also lagged behind 
changes in market conditions. Their main rationale for this short-term approach was 
to take advantage of short term gains or opportunities but this was often at the 
expense of long-term performance. However, there was too much concentration on 
short periods of high profits which were either not repeatable in the longer term or 
affected longer term performance. For example, they might have made good profits 
from selling vessels when prices were high but then they didn't have the capacity to 
earn good profits when the route had improved due to the reduced fleet. 
Low performers tended to put too much emphasis on internal information and paid 
inadequate attention to external trends. Indeed they showed a strong tendency to 
underestimate or overestimate market conditions, resulting in poor performance. In 
this group were a lot of conservative decision makers who were slow to act—and 
react—and did so only when external conditions affected internal conditions (loss of 
revenue on trade routes, dropping ship prices, reduced charter rates). Their 
corporate strategies were middle-of-the-road play-safe strategies which rarely 
produced high results. For many, performance throughout the simulation 
progressively declined, with some eventually going bankrupt 
The greatest number of bankruptcies came from three types of decision makers: (a) 
those who pursued rigid and inflexible strategies, and who, in the face of changing 
environmental conditions, were either very slow to respond or did not respond at 
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all, sticking to what they had previously decided to do; (b) those who took on too 
much risk at the wrong time and had inadequate financial resources and capability to 
recover from overexposure; and (c) those who pursued very short-term (quarter by 
quarter) strategies and were highly conservative and reactive in their decision 
making. Most bankruptcies were the results of wrongly timed joint ventures, 
which led to heavy financial losses and severe reduction o f operating flexibility (e.g. 
some had to use valuable fleet capacity on a loss-making route when they could 
have used them on a route which was making high profits). 
In terms of industry sector, country or ethnic background, no discernible trends 
were observed; this group could perhaps be best described as an unfortunate mix of 
all types. 
To summarise, top performers had clearly articulated strategies, which conveyed what 
was to be achieved and how it was to be achieved. These strategies were usually long-
term but they were also flexible. In many instances, they included several types (e.g. 
grow, develop, stabilise) for greater strategic balance. These allowed top performers to 
map out long-term plans for growth while at the same time maintaining the ability to 
adapt to changing conditions. High performers were proactive; they were sensitive to 
environmental information, especially on external conditions; and they were quick to 
adapt to environmental changes. 
Low performers on the other hand often had unclear or conftising strategies, either as a 
result of sloppy presentation or because the changes they implemented did not match 
with the selected strategy. Their strategies were usually short term, but they were also 
inflexible. Once chosen they were kept, even i f environmental conditions called for a 
change. As reflected in this approach, performers were reactive and conservative, slow 
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to react, even slower to change. While they did look at extemal factors, they put more 
emphasis to internal factors. 
Cultural differences 
To a great extent, the four decision-making styles discussed earlier were indicative of a 
range of behavioural differences between East Asian managers (from Malaysia, 
Singapore, Indonesia), and managers of European descent (from Australia, New Zealand, 
and a few European countries e.g. UK, Germany, Norway). For ease in reference, the 
latter group will simply be called 'European'. In general. East Asian shipowners took 
more risks (but suffered the most bankruptcies), made decisions more quickly, were 
slower to change strategies, displayed a more autocratic team management style, were 
more aggressive and competitive, and were less likely to revisit previous decisions when 
deliberating on new decisions. 
• East Asian shipowners took greater risks but they also had the greatest number of 
bankruptcies. In contrast, European shipowners tended to be a lot more 
conservative. Those East Asian shipowners who took the greatest risks came from 
the bulk sector of the industry (both dry bulk and tanker) while the majority of 
European shipowners were from the liner sector. Among East Asian shipowners, 
the level of risk taken didn't seem to correlate with market conditions; with 
European shipowners, the level of risk taken increased as their performance 
declined (i.e. as company value dropped). 
East Asian shipowners made their decisions much faster than European 
shipowners. Based on time differences noted in posting quarterly results, on 
average, they were close to a quarter of an hour faster (13 minutes) at making 
quarter by quarter decisions. In contrast, European shipowners spent more time 
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analysing information before making a decision, which accounted for the time 
difference. Those fit)m the liner sector tended to spend more time analysing 
information than from the bulk sector. 
The simulation structured more periods o f environmental changes than stable 
conditions. While this led European shipowners to change strategies more 
frequenUy, the same could not be said of East Asian shipowners. On average East 
Asian shipowners tended to keep the same strategic objectives for a longer period 
of time than their European counterparts. However, this did not mean that East 
Asian shipowners had longer-term objectives and European shipowners had 
shorter-term ones. More correctly, the latter made change depending on what the 
environmental conditions were: when conditions were stable, they kept their 
strategic objectives for a longer period o f time; when conditions were unstable or 
rapidly changed, the more frequently were these objectives changed. Shipowners 
from the bulk sector (both dry bulk and tanker) were quicker to change their 
objectives than those from liner sector, especially those from container trades who 
were usually the last to change. 
As was found during the interviews, when leading teams, both East Asian and 
European shipowners stressed the need for team work; but while the Europeans 
tended to maintain team harmony and cohesiveness through greater individual 
participation, East Asian shipowners in contrast leaned toward a more autocratic 
and hierarchical approach. Either approach was observed to work well when the 
members of a team, regardless of cultural origin, had the same mindset (i.e. 
supporting either a democratic or an autocratic style); however, conflict arose when 
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members had differing mindsets, especially in the area of decision making and 
leadership. 
East Asian shipowners displayed a more aggressive and competitive behaviour ('we 
must win and get a higher company value than the other teams') than European 
shipowners who, while also promoting competitiveness, gave equal emphasis to 
team harmony ('let's work together and produce the best result under the 
circumstances'). Along the same vein. East Asian shipowrners consistently pursued 
more aggressive strategies than their European counterparts; in contrast, the latter 
pursued conservative strategies when they were doing well (e.g. stabilise instead of 
the East Asian approach of high growth) but changed to equally aggressive 
strategies when they were not doing so well. In general, the tarJcer and liner sectors 
pursued more aggressive strategies than the dry bulk sector. East Asian shipowners 
in both tanker and liner sectors were found to be equally aggressive, while European 
tanker operators were a lot more aggressive than European liner operators. 
European shipowners fi-equently revisited previous decisions to evaluate whether 
these decisions had indeed been good and whether, as a result of this information, a 
change in their current approach was warranted. The information from this constant 
evaluation also influenced future decisions: it worked as a form of experience record 
which shipowners referred to when making new decisions ('we did this in the past 
and it produced this kind of result'). In contrast. East Asian shipowners rarely did 
this systematic 'looking back'; once a decision was made, their approach was to live 
with the outcome, good or bad, and 'get on with i t ' . Even when faced with a similar 
decision in the future, the previous decision was often not cross-referenced; unlike 
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their European counterparts, they put litUe weight on previous decisions to guide 
future action. 
Despite these differences, data and observations from the simulation provided no clear 
evidence that one particular approach or style led to a higher level of performance. While 
it was probable that different approaches/styles could lead to different levels of 
performance, the simulation was unable to categorically determine the influence of these 
factors on performance. 
9.4 POST-SIMULATION EVALUATION FINDINGS 
The post-simulation feedback provided by 90 participants focused on two areas: the 
realism of the simulation, and the overall conduct of the competition (including 
administrative arrangements). In boUi areas, problems were identified and specific 
suggestions for improvement were offered. 
How realistic was the simulation? 
In general, most participants agreed that the simulation was realistic (80 per cent said 
'yes' and 16 per cent said 'no' to 'not really'). The majority view was that the 
simulation provided a competitive maritime commercial environment where they could 
apply different strategies to maximise company performance. However, many 
commented that the format of the Stratship program and the information it provided 
were diflerent from what was normally found in their work environment. As one 
shipping CEO commented, 'This is not the way we present information in our company 
or even in the previous companies I have worked for. But once I adapted to it, it was no 
problem.' 
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Evaluation respondents cited six major limitations of the program, discussed below, 
which they said might have had an influence on the quality of the decisions and 
approaches they took during the simulation. 
• Too much (or too little) information was provided. One group of participants felt 
overwhelmed by the information provided by the program, saying that they 
normally did not have access to—much less use—that much information in real life. 
In contrast, smother group complained that the information provided was 
inadequate, saying that they were used to much more detailed analyses upon which 
to base their strategic decisions. 
• The simulation was too structured. Participants found the simulation too structured. 
Because decision screens were sequentially displayed (route decisions -> fleet 
structure decisions fleet allocation decisions), many participants tended to 
follow this program sequence, rather than selecting which aspect (or decision 
screen) to focus on first. 
The range of strategic choices available was too narrow, A number of participants, 
mostly the more experienced ones, felt restricted by the narrow range of choices 
available to them. In real life, they would have opted for strategies not provided by 
the program. Unfortunately, the program did not allow for differences in individual 
competence, assuming equality in this area and leaving those who were more 
experienced and competent with very little room to manoeuvre. 
• There was too much time pressure. In real life, some participants commented, they 
would normally have more time to make decisions than was available to them during 
the simulation. There were times when they had to rush through their decision 
making so as not to lag behind. 
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The temptation to experiment was never far away, A few participants saw the 
simulation as a good opportunity to experiment and gave in to temptation. They 
s£ud they experimented more and took more chances than they would normally have 
done in real life, justifying their action by telling themselves that the simulation was 
just a game. 
• The market statistics provided were not current, A number o f participants had 
expected all information in the Stratship program to accurately reflect current 
market conditions (e.g. current freight rates, ship prices, charter rates), and felt 
disappointed when they had to use outdated figures. Although they did say that the 
available figures were realistic, nonetheless they would have preferred to work with 
current figures. 
Counterbalancing these limitations were also several strengths of the simulation, which 
participants agreed made up for the program's weaknesses. 
• Competing with peers was a big incentive. Participants found the opportunity to 
compete with other shipowners who had similar commercial shipping experience 
and expertise, and who were often their competitors in real life, a great incentive to 
participate in the simulation. It encouraged them to be very competitive because, as 
one participant put it, 'everyone wanted the distinction of coming out on top and 
beating the pants of f their competitor'. Many said that i f this opportunity to 
compete had not been provided, that is, i f the simulation had been played 
individually and results were not compared, then they would not have put in the 
same effort or encouraged others to compete. 
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• Because of time pressure, their behaviour during the simulation approximated their 
normal behaviour. The limited amount of time set for the simulation was seen both 
as a limitation and a strength. While some felt rushed in their decision making, 
others found that time pressure kept them closer to the bounds o f normal working 
behaviour. ' I f we had more time,' confessed one participant, 'we would have done a 
lot more experimenting, which would not have reflected our normal behaviour. As it 
was, being under time pressure forced us to stick to what we normally did under 
similar circumstances.' 
• Working in teams made decision making more realistic. Participants particularly 
liked the simulation's team approach because this was the way they normally 
worked in real life; very rarely did they make such strategic decisions on their own. 
Team politics under simulated conditions also proved to be very similar to 
workplace politics, with the more senior ones assuming authority over the more 
junior team members, and some individuals tending to dominate others. 
A secondary benefit of the simulation was that it gave participants a good opportunity 
to see how strategic analysis and strategy selection worked. Many said that they did 
not do as much strategic analysis in the workplace as they did in the simulation. To 
these participants, therefore, it was a big challenge to undertake intensive 'what i f 
analysis and to follow a disciplined approach of defining their ftiture expectations, 
setting strategic objectives and coming up with realistic corporate strategies that would 
enable them to increase their company value. Participants also stated that they used 
more focused information in the simulation than they did in their organisations. 
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Problems encountered during the simulation 
On the whole, participants had no problems using either the computers or the 
simulation program. They said that they encountered no administrative problems and 
found the competition environment satisfactory; that is, the room size, seating 
arrangement and location of computer screens were all appropriate. Some, however, did 
mention instances when their computers malfunctioned and had to be reset or replaced, 
but although this meant loss of valuable time they did not consider it a major problem. 
Participants also said that they were given adequate time and instruction on the use of 
the Stratship program before they began the competition. 
There were, however, three areas where participants experienced some difficulty during 
the simulation, and all three involved the use of certain information on the decision 
sheets. 
Setting strategic objectives. Many found it difficult to set strategic objectives. The 
data also supports this, showing that in a lot of cases objectives were either too 
broad, not measurable enough to be used as targets to achieve and often, not 
consistently used or followed. In fact, many teams simply modified them to suit 
circumstances rather than as targets to achieve. 
• Difficulty in articulating the corporate strategy. Many found it difficult to put into 
words the type of corporate strategy that they would pursue. In some cases, this 
meant that valuable data was not used because of this. 
• Using time frames. Once they experienced the level of uncertainty built into the 
simulation program, many had difficulty having to always put a time frame on their 
future predictions, strategic objectives, and corporate strategies. 
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The major reasons given for the first two problems were language difficulties and lack of 
strategic management training. The simulation was conducted in English (both verbal and 
written), and for most participants, English was their second or even third language. 
Some thus found it difficult to express themselves, especially when they had to explain 
their corporate strategy. The lack of strategic management training, which limited their 
familiarity with formal strategic management concepts, also added to the difficulty. 
9.5 SUMMARY 
Primary findings from the simulation showed strong support for all six assumptions of 
the strategic choice model, indicating the model's applicability to Asia-Pacific shipping. 
However, slight modifications to the model were needed to reflect a general tendency 
among shipowners to use other strategies in combination with those offered by the 
model. Secondary findings highlighted differences in team decision-making styles, use of 
information, environmental focus, and competiUve performance. Cultural differences 
between East Asians and Europeans were also identified. Post-simulation evaluation 
feedback showed that despite the limitations and difficulties encountered during the 
simulation, the overall majority view was that the simulation was a realistic assessment 
of shipowners' strategic behaviour. In particular, participants found that the simulation 
represented a fair assessment of their performance, the simulation environment was just 
as competitive, tough and/or hard to foresee as reality was, and the strategies they 
pursued, and the conditions upon which these strategies were based, reflected what they 
would have actually done in real life. Overall, participants found the simulation a usefiil 
and stimulating learning tool for honing strategic decision-making skills. For many of 
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them, unfortunately, such simulation programs or similar tools to assist strategy 
selection were not available in their organisations. 
In the next chapter, the discussion on research findings moves on to the final stages, 
where primary findings from the survey, interviews, and simulation are synthesised to 
produce a shipping-based strategic choice model. 
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Chapter Ten 
RESEARCH FINDINGS: SYNTHESIS 
This final chapter brings to a close the discussion on research findings. It commences 
with a synthesis of shipowner-generated information and the revision of the strategic 
choice model into a shipping-based model. Then feedback fi-om shipping experts who 
reviewed this shipping model is presented. Finally, a revised version of the model for 
use in Asia-Pacific commercial shipping is offered. 
10.1 FIRST ITERATION OF THE MODEL: SHIPOWNER FEEDBACK 
As discussed in Chapter Six (The Conceptual Framework), the strategic choice model 
assumes that under certain environmental conditions, certain generic corporate strategies 
are more appropriate to pursue than others. The model provides a system by which 
environmental conditions are assessed on the basis of market (or external) and 
organisational competitive (or internal) factors that are relevant to the organisation at the 
particular time when strategic choices are made. As noted earlier, internal or 
organisational competitive factors refer to an organisation's strengths and weaknesses 
vis-a-vis competitors; external or market factors refer to the opportunities and threats in 
the environment in which the organisation competes. On the strategic choice model, the 
overall strategic position of a business or organisation is ranked on a sliding scale, with a 
'high' or a 'low' rating marking either end of the continuum. The more strengths and 
opportunities a business/organisation has, the higher is its strategic position; the more 
weaknesses and threats, the lower the position. Judgments on such strategic positions 
are typically qualitative, based on the decision maker's knowledge, experience and 
intuition, bolstered by access to good external information. 
The original model is reproduced in Figure 10.1. As the model shows, when an 
organisation rates highly on both organisational and market factors, which means it is 
competitively strong and the market offers many opportunities, its best course of action 
is to *grow' (quadrant 1). If it is competitively strong but there are many threats in the 
market, a better alternative is to 'stabilise', that is, to keep the status quo (quadrant 3). 
If an organisation is competitively weak but the market offers many opportunities, it 
should take advantage of these opportunities by pursuing a 'develop' strategy in new 
areas or a 'turnaround' strategy in existing areas (quadrant 2). However, if the 
organisation is weak and there are more threats than opportunities in the market, a 
'harvest' strategy is more appropriate (quadrant 4). 
High 
(Strengths) 
Organisational Competitive Factors 
Low 
(Weaknesses) 
High 
(Opportunities) Quadrant 1 
Grow 
Quadrant 2 
Develop/Turnaround 
Marliet 
Factors 
Quadrants Quadrant 4 
(Threats) 
Low 
Stabilise Harvest 
Figure 10.1 The original version of the strategic choice model 
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Assumptions of the strategic choice model 
Because the assumptions underlying the strategic choice model had been drawn largely 
fix)m non-shipping areas, the extent to wliich they applied to Asia-Pacific shipowners 
required testing. As presented earlier, if the model was correct, then Asia-Pacific 
shipowners would: 
1 change/modify their strategies in response to changing environmental conditions. 
2 base strategic changes and the time Grame for these changes on their future 
expectations of environmental conditions. 
3 pursue a 'grow' strategy when both internal (i.e. organisational competitive) and 
external (i.e. market) factors were high (competitively strong, many market 
opportunities). 
4 pursue a 'stabilise' strategy when internal environmental factors were high and 
external factors were low (competitively strong, many market threats). 
5 pursue a 'turnaround' or 'develop' strategy when internal environmental factors 
were low and external factors were high (competitively weak, many market 
opportunities). 
6 pursue a 'harvest' strategy when internal and external environmental factors were 
both low (competitively weak, many market threats). 
Shipowners' response to the six assumptions 
To what extent did shipowner data support the model's assumptions? Table 10.1 
summarises the majority views obtained from the survey, interviews, and simulation. 
The 'yes' columns represent those who strictly adhered to the model, that is, without 
any deviations; the 'qualified yes' columns, those who also followed the model but 
modified it occasionally or regularly for strategic reasons. 
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Table 10.1 A summary of shipowners* feedback on the strategic choice model 
The model assumes that Asia-
Pacific shipowners will: 
1 change/modify their 
corporate strategies in 
response to changing 
environmental conditions 
2 base strategic changes and 
the time frames of these 
changes on their future 
expectations of 
environmental conditions 
3 pursue a *grow' strategy 
when internal and external 
environmental factors are 
both favourable 
4 pursue a 'stabilise* when 
internal environmental 
factors are favourable but 
external factors are not 
5 pursue a * develop' or 
'turnaround' strategy when 
external factors are 
favourable but internal 
fectois are not 
6 pursue a 'harvest' strategy 
when internal and external 
environmental factors are 
both unfavourable 
Survey 
Yes Qualified 
Yes 
85 7 
80 -
76 8 
72 9 
68 -
52 17 
Interviews 
Yes (Qualified 
Yes 
75 12 
44 16 
63 22 
61 19 
52 25 
65 -
Simulation 
Yes Qualified 
Yes 
58 18 
74 -
55 30 
67 14 
44 32 
79 7 
From the table, several key trends can be observed: 
• Data obtained through the three research methods (survey, interviews, simulation) 
revealed a similar pattern of response. Shipping respondents supported all six 
assumptions of the strategic choice model, with survey respondents giving an 
overall support rating of 79 per cent; interviewees, 75 per cent; and simulation 
participants, 79 per cent. The aggregate majority vote averaged around 78 per 
cent. 
• As the 'qualified yes' columns indicate, strategic choices were not always limited 
to those assumed by the model. In both self-reports (survey and interviews) and 
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simulation data, the tendency to modify the model's parameters for strategic 
purposes was evident. Shipowners either changed direction occasionally to pursue 
a strategic objective (e.g. disregarding future expectation of market conditions or 
pursuing a particular strategy under conditions not called for in the model) or 
regularly combined the strategy specified in the model with other strategies (e.g. 
'grow' with 'develop' and/or 'stabilise'). 
The 'mix and match' practice by shipowners initially emerged fi'om the survey data, but 
the extent to which it was done, and how it was done, did not become clearer until 
during the interviews and simulation. To a great extent, this process of gradual 
clarification was to be expected given the relative merits of the research methods used. 
The mail survey provided initial baseline information about the shipping respondents, 
but it relied solely on the ability and willingness of individual respondents to provide 
the necessary information. In contrast, interviews allowed further probes into 
interviewees' thoughts and practices so that the nature and fi-equency of modifications 
made to the model, as well as the reasons behind them, were more clearly explained. The 
simulation also made a high degree of clarification possible because participants were 
required to make specific strategic decisions imder changing environmental conditions, 
thereby allowing specific linkages to be established between strategies and 
environmental conditions. That all three methods led to a similar pattern of responses 
confirmed their convergence as called for by the triangulation approach. 
An Asla-Paclfic shipping strategic choice model: Initial version 
Based on the analysis of shipowners' data, the following conclusions could thus be 
drawn regarding strategy selection among the Asia-Pacific shipowners who participated 
in the study: 
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• The generic strategic choice model was applicable to Asia-Pacific commercial 
shipping, but certain modifications were required. 
• As a rule, Asia-Pacific shipowners changed/modified ^eir corporate strategies in 
response to changing environmental conditions, but where strategic objectives or 
other organisational considerations (notably, preferences of major stakeholders and 
internal politics) ran counter with market conditions, the former took precedence 
and changes were not always implemented even if called for by the model. 
• Asia-Pacific shipowners based strategic changes and the time fi^mes of these 
changes on their future expectations of environmental conditions; however, there 
were occasions when such expectations, particularly of market conditions, were 
subordinated to other, more significant, strategic considerations. 
• When organisational competitive (or internal) and market (or external) factors or 
conditions were both favourable (competitively strong, many market 
opportunities), a *grow' strategy was the preferred choice, pursued alone or in 
combination with 'develop' and 'stabilise' strategies. 
• When organisational competitive factors were favourable but market factors were 
not (competitively strong, many market threats), a 'stabilise' strategy was the 
preferred choice, pursued alone or in combination with 'grow' and 'develop' 
strategies, and to a much lesser extent, with a 'harvest' strategy. 
• When market factors were favourable but organisational competitive factors were 
not (competitively weak, many market opportunities), 'develop' and 'turnaround' 
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strategies were the preferred choices, pursued jointly or independently of each 
other, or in combination with a 'grow' strategy. 
When organisational competitive factors and market factors were both unfavourable 
(competitively weak, many market threats), a 'harvest' strategy was the preferred 
choice, either pursued alone or in combination with a 'turnaround' strategy. 
These preferred strategy choices are plotted in matrix form in Figure 10.2. This figure 
now represents the revised version of the original strategic choice model and is the first 
iteration of a shipping-specific strategic choice model. Strategies preceded with a plus 
(+) sign are the additions made by shipowners. It should be noted that in the simulation 
data, the 'harvest' strategy appeared as another choice; however, because it was not as 
widely and as frequentiy used as the other strategies, it has been excluded fi-om the 
model. 
Market 
Factors 
High 
(Strengths) 
Organisational CompetiUve Factors 
High 
(Opportunities) 
(Threats) 
Low 
Low 
(Weaknesses) 
Quadrant 1 Quadrant 2 
Grow Develop 
(+DeveIop) Turnaround 
(+Stabilise) (+Grow) 
Quadrant 3 Quadrant 4 
Stabilise Harvest 
(•Kjrow) (+Tumaround) 
(+Deve!op) 
(+Harvest) 
Figure 10.2 The Asia-Paciric shipping strategic choice model: First iteration 
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10.2 EXPERT REVIEW OF THE SHIPPING MODEL 
A final aspect of the research approach used in the study was to subject the shipping-
based model to an expert review. The objective was to compare results obtained fix)m 
shipowners with another data source, in this case, a combination of academics and 
practitioners who knew Asia-Pacific commercial shipping and were experienced in 
corporate strategy selection. The expert panel used for this purpose comprised of 
maritime management (6) and strategy (2) consultants, maritime academics (2), 
shipovmer associations' representatives (3), and shipping research institutes' 
representatives (2). AH were based in the Asia-Pacific region. 
A briefing paper describing the strategic choice model for Asia-Pacific commercial 
shipping was sent to each expert for review. They were asked to conmient on the 
model's realism (i.e. whether it represented what Asia-Pacific shipowners actually did) 
and its utility as an analytical/evaluation tool to help shipowners in their strategic 
analysis and strategy choices, and to recommend specific ways by which the model's 
applicability to Asia-Pacific shipowners could be enhanced. Comments received were 
compared against shipov^oier data so that a final version of the strategic choice model for 
Asia-Pacific shipping could be drawn up. These comments were mostly in written form, 
although some were given over the phone or in person. 
While all 15 experts reviewed the model, the quality of the feedback provided was 
uneven. Some reviews were sketchy, providing a brief and/or general critique of the 
entire model ( 40 per cent or 6 experts); others were more specific and useftil, singling 
out certain aspects of the model and expanding upon them (60 per cent or 9 experts). 
The experts' feedback to each question they were asked is summarised in Table 10.2. 
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As the table shows, support for the model's realism was strong (87 per percent), and 
majority (67 per cent) agreed it was a usefiil tool for strategic decision making. However, 
in both areas, a number of issues were raised which could diminish the model's realism 
and utility unless adequately addressed; these are discussed below under their respective 
headings. Several specific suggestions to improve the model were also offered. 
Table 10.2 Expert feedback on the strategic choice model for Asia-Pacinc shipping (%) 
Very 
realistic 
Realistic Unsure Somewhat 
realistic 
Not at all 
How realistic is the model, that is, to 
what extent does it reflect what you 
know about Asia-Pacific shipowners? 
20 67 13 0 0 
How useful would Asia-Pacific 
shipowners find the model as a tool 
for analysing and selecting corporate 
strategies? 
In what specific ways can the model 
be improved to enhance its realism 
and utility? 
Veiy 
useflil 
Useful Unsure Somewhat 
useful 
Not at all 
20 47 20 13 0 
Suggestion 
Improve the rating scale 
• Add a rating scale to the model 
• Use % for rating scale 
Improve terminology: 
• Add the word 'shipping' to 'market factors' 
• Delete the word 'competitive' from 
'organisational foctors* 
• Add 'key success factors* to each variable name 
Provide training in the proper use of the model 
Times cited 
Realism of the model 
A big majority agreed that the model was realistic (87 per cent); that is, that its six 
assumptions represented what Asia-Pacific shipowners generally did in real life. 
However, two experts (13 per cent) expressed some uncertainty. While they may 
represent a minority view, their comments are worth noting because they reflect 
concerns also aired in the strategic management literature. Both experts were concerned 
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that the model might be too simplistic because of its reliance on the matrix approach to 
strategy selection and evaluation. They thought the use of a two-dimensional scale was 
too narrow a view and queried what would happen when strategies or factors fell riglit 
on the borderline between quadrants. While they were not able to offer any alternative 
approach, leading one expert to add that 'this model was better than none at all', both 
emphasised the need for 'better guidance or some means of measurement otherwise the 
model would become unrealistic'. 
A few other experts also queried the model's assumption that the user would be able to 
competently define key environmental factors. According to one, the model would be 
realistic only to the extent that users knew how to use it: 'This would be difficult for 
some shipowners who are not skilled in strategic analysis; I wouldn't put much store on 
its realism if put in the hands of an unskilled user'. Suggested another: 'Detailed 
instructions should accompany the model so that even the novice could follow it; either 
that or give them some training.' 
Utility of the model as an evaluation tool 
Opinion on this question was more dispersed, with a smaller majority (67 per cent) 
seeing the model as a usefiil evaluation tool. Some of these experts likened the model to a 
strategic map on which strategic alternatives could be viewed and plotted, providing a 
broad-picture perspective of the strategic terrain. One expert explained: 
[Asia Pacific] shipowners get so caught up in day-to-day operational decisions that it is often 
very difficult to get them to step back and take a look at the broader picture of how they intend 
to achieve their objectives and what corporate strategies they will use to guide the organisation. 
As a result, their decisions arc more likely to be operational and short term rather than 
strategic. They also oflen miss the broader emerging trends. This is where the model can help 
them if they use it It will force them to look beyond their narrow operational focus because of 
the emphasis given to thinking about and identifying key environmental information. 
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Among those who were unsure of the model's usefulness as an analytical/evaluation tool 
(33 per cent), the lack of training and expertise in strategic analysis was cited as a major 
hindrance in the use of the model. A typical comment was that 'because of the lack of 
training in [strategic] management and the usual approach by a lot of shipping people to 
make decisions based upon intuition as opposed to using planning tools like this one, it 
may not be useful simply because they won't know how to use it properly. Only if 
they are trained in its use and can appreciate the benefits of using it will it truly be 
useful to them.' 
Another threat to the model's utility is the tendency of many people to follow it 
blindly, instead of making an intelligent use of it as an analytical model to aid in the 
selection and evaluation of corporate strategies. As one expert described it, 'There is 
always the danger of these sorts of models being used as some sort of 'cookbook'. Some 
people will expect it to provide all the answers to their prayers and tell them exactly 
what to do. They don't have to think because the model will provide all the answers and 
a step-by-step recipe to success. Then when they find out that it doesn't work like that, 
the model is branded as useless.' Another expert added, 'If the model is used properly, 
it will tend to raise a lot more questions that it attempts to answer. However, that is a 
bigifl' 
Suggestions for Improvement 
Given these concerns, what improvements should be made to the model? According to 
the few experts who provided specific suggestions, changes could be made in two areas: 
the use of a rating scale and changes to the terminology. 
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Rating scale. A frequently cited limitation of the model is its lack of a rating scale for 
plotting the strategic position of a business or organisation. While judgmental calls were 
essential, commented one, it would help if there was some standard basis for decision 
making: 'everybody around the table should have the same yardstick.' Such a scale 
should also overcome the problem of 'fence-sitters', that is, those businesses or 
organisations that sit on or close to quadrant borders because it would make it easier to 
plot a business' or organisation's position relative to its strengths and weaknesses and 
to the opportunities and threats it faces. 
It was also suggested that an efTective rating scale would be expressed in percentage 
points, rather than the usual numeric scales (e.g. 1-5, 1-10), even though conceptually 
they were the same thing. According to one expert, 'shipowners are so used to dealing 
with percentage figures that it would be much easier for them to rate their business(es) 
in this manner. The moment you changed this to a 1-10 scale, which is saying the same 
thing, you will have problems because this will require a change in mindset for some.' 
The application of this suggestion could thus produce a 5-point rating scale (that is, 0%, 
25%, 50%, 75% 100%) such as the one illustrated below: 
High 
100% 
High 100% 
75% 
50% 
25% 
LowO% 
75% 50% 25% 
Low 
0% 
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Terminology. Three changes to the terminology were suggested to tighten up the 
meaning of variables: add the word 'shipping' to market factors to emphasise the 
model's shipping orientation, delete the word 'competitive' fix)m 'organisational 
competitive factors' since competitive factors depended on overall organisational health 
('if the organisation isn't fit, it can't compete'), and rename each set of variables to 
'shipping market success factors' and 'organisational success factors'. 
As the preceding discussion shows, shipping experts lent their support to the model, 
both in terms of its realism and utility as an evaluation model. No major conceptual 
criticism was made, with suggestions focusing more on technical areas, e.g. the rating 
scale and terminology. As the next section shows, these suggestions were incorporated 
into the final version of the model. 
10.3 A STRATEGIC CHOICE MODEL FOR ASIA-PACIFIC SHIPPING: 
FINAL VERSION 
Figure 10.3 represents the final version of the strategic choice model for Asia-Pacific 
commercial shipping. It synthesises the study's primary findings on corporate strategy 
selection by Asia-Pacific commercial shipowners. These findings were obtained through 
a triangulation process that allowed the researcher to successively cross-check and 
confirm information obtained through three research methods (survey, interviews, 
simulation) and from two data sources (shipowners, shipping experts). The researcher's 
review of relevant documents and observations of simulation activities also provided 
additional data. Throughout, a qualitative approach to data analysis was used, except 
where the data lent itself to statistical analysis, as was the case with some survey data 
for which a descriptive statistical analysis was conducted. The high degree of congruence 
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among the various sets of findings establishes strong support for the model's 
applicability to Asia-Pacific commercial shipping. 
Key Organisational Success Factors 
High (Strengths) (Weaknesses) Low 
100% 75% 50% 25% 0% 
High (Opportunities) 100% 
Key Shipping 
Market Factors 
75% 
50% 
25% 
Low (Threats) 0% 
1 
1 
Quadrant 1 
1 
) 
Grow 
Develop 
1 
Quadrant 2 
Turnaround 
Develop 
Stabilise 
» 
Grow 
) 
> 
Quadrant 3 
I 
Sta|)ilise 
• •- Grow " • ~ - • 
Develop 
Harvest 
1 
I 
1 
Quai 
T u m i 
" • " "HaiVi 
Irant4 
iround 
Figure 10.3 Final version of the strategic choice model for Asia-Pacinc shipping 
Focus of analysis 
The model can be used to analyse the strategic position of a single business unit, or the 
relative positions of different business units operated by an organisation, or the relative 
position of an organisation vis-a-vis its main competitors. 
Variables for the environmental assessment 
The model bases strategy selection on an assessment of an organisation's internal and 
external environment The mtemal environment is described on the horizontal axis in 
terms of organisational success factors; the external environment on the vertical axis in 
terms of shipping market success factors. Organisational success factors refer to an 
organisation's strengths and weaknesses relative to its major competitors; shipping 
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market factors refer to the opportunities and threats in the particular area(s) in which 
the organisation competes. This type of analysis is popularly known in the literature as 
the SWOT approach, with SWOT being an acronym for strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, and threats. 
Rating scale 
The rating scale is used to plot the relative position of an organisation on the two 
dimensions discussed above, that is, in terms of organisational success factors (strengths 
and weaknesses) and shipping market success factors (opportunities and threats). The 
scale has 5 cut-ofT points, expressed as percentages, with 0% representing the *low' end 
of the continuum and 100% the 'high' end. The more strengths an organisation has and 
the more opportunities there are in the market, the higher is the organisation's strategic 
position; conversely, the more weaknesses an organisation has and the more threats 
there are in the market, the lower is the organisation's strategic position. The 5 cut-off 
points on the scale are interpreted as follows: 
Organisational Success Factors Shipping Market Success Factors 
100% many strengths and no weaknesses 
75% many strengths but a few weaknesses 
50% strengths and weaknesses balance out 
25% many weaknesses with a few strengths 
0% many weaknesses and no strengths 
many opportunities and no threats 
many opportunities but a few threats 
strengths and weaknesses balance out 
many threats but a few opportunities 
many threats and no opportunties 
A qualitative or quantitative approach can be equally used to plot an organisation's 
position on the matrix; however, a combination of both is advisable as this provides a 
more solid basis for decision making. Qualitative assessment involves the use of 
judgment, intuition ('gut sense'), and experience to gauge the relative position of the 
organisation. Quantitative assessment involves a more systematic measurement of 
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success factors by assigning specific weights and ranks to each success factor and 
calculating an overall ranking. The combined use of judgment calls and systematic 
measurement serves as an effective check-and-balance tool during decision making, with 
one method informing and enriching the other. 
Types of corporate strategies 
The five corporate strategies shown in the model have been discussed in detail in 
Chapter Four, hence, only a brief description of each strategy is provided here. An 
organisation may choose to grow or develop i f it wants to compete in high-grovnh areas; 
the two strategies differ in that the first (grow) is used when the organisation has already 
achieved a foothold in the maiket v^ile the second is used when the organisation wants 
to enter a new niche area or market. I f an organisation chooses to stabilise, its aim is to 
maintain the status quo either by keeping to a tried and tested course, changing 
incrementally in response to environmental changes, or both. I f it is in financial trouble, 
it is likely to choose a turnaround strategy to enable it to reduce or eliminate those 
activities that are hurting its performance and restore financial viability; if this does not 
work, it may move on to a harvest strategy where the objective is to divest of a poorly 
performing business or parts of it that are and/or get out of a particular market. 
Strategic choices 
Figure 10.3 shows the different combinations of strategies Asia-Pacific shipowners are 
likely to pursue within each quadrant of the matrix. This 'mix and match' approach is 
preferred to the one or two choices offered by the original strategic choice model because 
it makes it easier for organisations to achieve strategic balance and reduce the risks to the 
organisation. 
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In quadrant 1, where there are many market opportunities and the organisation is 
competitively strong, a *grow' strategy is typically pursued to further strengthen an 
organisation's position in highly profitable areas where it already operates, but it may 
also pursue a 'develop' strategy to enter into new high-profit areas and/or a 'stabilise' 
strategy to maintain its strong position in more mature markets. 
In quadrant 2, where there are many market opportunities but the organisation is 
competitively weak, the more appropriate approach is to pursue a 'develop' and/or 
'turnaround' strategy, and to a lesser extent, a 'grow' strategy. The first and last are 
both aggressive approaches, aimed at building the organisation's competitiveness in, 
respectively, new and existing highly profitable areas of operation; the second is an 
emergency measure, designed to overcome serious financial problems and restore 
financial health and viability. Whether these strategies are pursued singly or in 
combination with one another depends on the shipowner's number of businesses and 
the level of risk it is prepared to take. 
In quadrant 3, where there are many market threats but the organisation is competitively 
strong, the main strategy pursued is 'stabilise', where the objective is to msiintain the 
status quo, with changes kept to a minimal and incremental level. However, 'grow', 
'develop', and to a lesser extent, 'harvest' strategies may also be pursued, either as a 
substitute to or in combination with 'stabilise', to offset market threats and spread the 
risks. 'Grow' and 'develop' are normally pursued when the organisation decides to 
speculate; 'stabilise' is chosen when the organisation decides to sell up and get out of 
the business while it is still highly marketable. 
276 
In quadrant 4, where the organisation is competitively weak and faces many market 
threats, a 'harvest' strategy is usually pursued, with the organisation selling up and 
getting out of the unprofitable area, but it may also be substituted or combined witii a 
'turnaround' strategy in an attempt to turn the organisation's fortunes around and make 
it financially viable again. 
Using the model 
The process of analysing an organisation's environment to determine its strategic 
position and subsequentiy choose the most appropriate strategy or combination of 
strategies involves three main steps. 
Step 1 Identify key organisational and shipping market success factors of particular 
relevance to the organisation at the time the analysis is conducted. 
This step requires a broad outlook, rather than a myopic or parochial one, 
because there are no set factors to draw on. Factors differ according to 
shipowner and market segment, and they change over time. It is important, 
therefore, for the organisation to look botii inside (which is relatively easy) and 
out (which is more difficult as access to rich external information may not 
always be easy to obtain) to spot new and potential opportunities and threats, 
and select those strategies that will optimise the organisation's strengths and 
reduce its weaknesses. With a reasonably wide scan of the external 
environment, balanced by a realistic estimate of the organisation's 
competitiveness, strategic decision makers would be better placed to gauge their 
organisation's relative strength and profitability in the market. 
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Step 2 Using the rating scale, rate and plot the relative position of each business area 
of the organisation on the matrix. 
This can be based on *gut sense' and judgment calls, with decision makers using 
their knowledge of the organisation's various business areas to position them 
along the x-and y- axes of the matrix. An alternative approach is to assign 
weights to specific success factors to standardise the rating process. However, 
as in step 1, there is no standard set of weights available; every organisation 
would have to decide on these themselves, depending on the relative 
importance they attach to the environmental factors they have identified in 
step 1. A third approach is to take a combined qualitative and quantitative 
approach to enhance confidence in the decisions made. 
Step 3 With the relative position of each business area plotted on the matrix, evaluate 
which or whether the strategies recommended by the model are appropriate to 
pursue, given the organisation's strategic objectives and environmental 
assessment. 
Again, there is no magic formula to reach the 'right' answer; when selecting 
strategies, particularly when several choices are available and the organisation 
falls close to or on the borderline, decision makers would need to depend on 
intuitive judgment, to ask critical questions, to think strategically, so they can 
make wise choices. 
Strategy selection as part of a process 
While selecting the 'right' corporate strategy is essential to survival in an increasingly 
competitive and globalised shipping market, it is also wise to reiterate what has been 
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said earlier in this thesis: that strategy selection is but one aspect of the broader strategic 
management process and that corporate strategies are but one level of strategies that an 
organisation should be concerned with. Thus while this study has focused on strategy 
selection, in practice, there is a need for a constant zooming in and out, the first to focus 
on the fme details on any one aspect of the environment, the second to take in the 
broader picture and the various opportunities and threats it holds. 
Table 10.3 shows the three main strategy levels (corporate, business, functional) that an 
organisation should orchestrate and monitor, and the various sU*ategy types that fall 
under each category, while Figure 10.4 shows where strategy selection fits within the 
strategic management process. Both the table and the figure appear elsewhere in the 
thesis (Tables 4.8 and 6.1; Figures 1.2 and 6.3); they are reproduced here for easy 
reference. 
Table 10.3 Typology of strategies 
Strategy Level Generic Strategy Type 
Specific Strategy 
Primary 
Internal External 
Secondary 
Internal External 
Corporate 
(Generic) 
Corporate 
(Multinational) 
Grow 
Develop 
Stabilise 
Turnaround 
Harvest 
Global cost leader 
Global niche 
Protected national market 
National niche 
Intelligent follower 
Business Cost leadership 
Differentiation 
Cost focus 
Differentiation focus 
Functional 
A common pool of specific strategies can be 
used to support corporate or business level 
strategies. This pool is also the source 
of functional strategies. Among the more 
well known specific strategies are: 
Internal: External: 
Concentration Merger 
Diversification Acquisition 
Divestiture Joint venture 
Integration 
Liquidation 
Newgame 
Samegame 
Timing 
Strategies are internal when they require a 
company's own resources; externa! when 
they require external resources. 
If they are first choice, they are primary; 
if they are alternatives, they arc secondary 
(or ancillary or contingency). 
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Figure 10.4 A model of the strategic management process 
Source: Hawkins, 1993 
To put the research findings synthesised in this chapter into perspective, it is essential 
to reiterate what was said earlier in Chapter Six (The Conceptual Framework): 'The 
[strategic management] model is represented as a circular flow to show the iterative and 
dynamic nature of the strategic management process. All the various activities in the 
process are closely interrelated, with any one activity able to lead directly to another 
and with some activities occurring simultaneously. All the components of the model also 
lock together, much like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, to form an integrated system. 
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While the individual parts may each be taken as a discrete element, with its own 
particular function and focus, their respective roles and functions can only be properly 
understood when examined within the context of the whole.' 
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Chapter Eleven 
CONCLUSIONS AND ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study had three objectives: to analyse the strategic choices that Asia-Pacific 
shipowners pursued at the corporate level, compare actual shipowners' behaviour with 
strategic management theory on strategy selection, and develop a strategy selection 
model that was applicable to Asia-Pacific shipowners and consistent with strategy 
management theory. 
To achieve these objectives, the first step was to conduct a review of the literature to 
determine what was currently known about corporate strategy selection within the 
context of Asia-Pacific shipping. The review began with a broad look at the Asia-Pacific 
region and commercial shipping in the region (Chapter 2), and at the development of 
strategic management as a field of inquiry (Chapter 3). Next, the nature of strategy was 
examined in depth, and the various types and levels of strategies identified were 
synthesised into a typology of strategies (Chapter 4). The main strategy selection 
models found in the strategic management literature were also reviewed, and a generic 
strategic choice model based on these models was drawn up (Chapter 5). Finally, a 
conceptual fiamework, which incorporated the generic strategic model and typology of 
strategies, was developed (Chapter 6). The framework had one primary question to 
answer: would the model's six assumptions on corporate strategic choices hold true for 
Asia-Pacific shipowners? 
To find out, the next step in the study was to get some answers fi-om Asia-Pacific 
shipovmers themselves, and these were elicited through a mail survey, interviews, and a 
computer-based shipping simulation (Chapter 7). Results showed that all six 
assumptions of the strategic choice model applied to Asia-Pacific shipowners (as 
represented by those who participated in the study), but some modifications were 
required (Chapters 8 and 9). These modifications, as well as suggestions made by 
shipping experts fiom the Asia-Pacific region, were then incorporated into a shipping-
specific strategic choice model. While the model focused on corporate strategy selection, 
it also reiterated the need to view strategy selection and corporate strategies as an 
integral part of the broader strategic management process, and a constant zooming in and 
out was necessary to retain the big picture even while fme-tuning specific details 
(Chapter 10). 
In all the three chapters on research findings, specific conclusions were drawn about 
corporate strategic choices made by shipowners; this was a necessary process in 
qualitative data analysis, which required that general patterns and themes be 
progressively teased out of the data throughout data collection and analysis. From these 
specific conclusions, broader conclusions, as well as issues for fiuther research, can now 
be drav^ regarding strategy selection in general and strategic choice patterns of Asia-
Pacific shipowners in particular. In the discussion that follows, it should be noted that 
the term 'European' is used in a generic sense; it includes not only those bom in Europe 
but also North America, Australia, and New Zealand. 
11.1 CONCLUSIONS 
Three sets of conclusions are presented in this section. The first deals with the practical 
aspects of corporate strategy selection by Asia-Pacific shipowners; the second, with 
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methodological considerations, and the third, with the theoretical implications of the 
findings to the applicability and utility of the generic strategic model. 
Corporate strategy selection by Asla-Paclfic shipowners 
1 Who is responsible for corporate strategic choices? On this question, the study 
echoed what is widely acknowledged in the strategic management literature, that is, 
that senior management is primarily responsible for making corporate strategic 
choices. Senior management in this case represents three levels: the top executives 
who are responsible for the entire organisation, divisional managers responsible for 
major areas/divisions within the organisation, and managers responsible for 
providing corporate-level advice and assistance on strategic planning and strategic 
management All three groups are expected to contribute to the decision-making 
process, but to a great degree, culture dictates the way their respective roles are 
interpreted. 
From the interview and simulation data, the study found that among managers of 
European descent, the decision-making process was more democratic and 
participative; among East Asians, it was more autocratic and hierarchical. 
Interviews in particular revealed that while the former viewed strategy selection as 
a shared responsibility among senior managers, the latter expected the top 
executive (e.g. CEO, President, or Chairman) to take control of the reins while the 
rest followed and provided support. These differences extended to the breadth of 
organisational involvement. Although European senior managers saw corporate 
strategy selection as primarily their concern, they expected the lower to middle 
management levels to be involved in the process; in contrast. East Asians had no 
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such expectations; to them, corporate strategy selection was the sole domain of 
senior management, requiring little or no involvement by the lower levels. 
2 Perhaps far more significant than the 'who' was how Asia-Pacific senior managers 
made strategic choices. The study showed that senior managers did not necessarily 
behave as assumed by the strategic choice model or the dominant rationalist school 
of strategic management thought. 
Strategies were selected regardless of environmental conditions to pursue strategic 
objectives, or they were maintained even when changes were called for by 
environmental conditions because of management conflict, inertia, fear, or 
inexperience. The study also found that Asia-Pacific shipowners in general did not 
follow a formalised approach to strategic planning and/or strategy selection; 
strategic planning was carried out, but it did not necessarily lead to formal 
documentation. Rather, the preferred process emerged to be informal, intuitive, 
and incremental. Further, while discussions and consultations were held to make 
strategic choices, formalised approaches to analysing the environment and 
evaluating strategic altematives, such as scenario analysis and computer 
simulation, were not widely used. Neither it seemed was there an extensive use of 
external information sources; these, to .many, were too unreliable and costly to 
warrant usage. Much of the decision making was based on personal knowledge, 
experience, and intuition. 
3 To a great extent, managerial frames of reference (Hamel and Pralahad, 1993), or 
what are more colloquially known as 'mindsets', determine an organisation's 
strategic choices. 
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The study found that where senior managers were more willing to take risks and 
speculate, an organisation was more likely to choose aggressive strategies and 
disregard prevailing environmental conditions to pursue strategic objectives; where 
senior managers were more cautious, preferring to stay within safe margins, the 
organisation was more likely to pursue less risky strategies and keep within the 
parameters of the strategic choice model. Where senior managers were more 
conservative, the organisation was also more likely to have in place formalised 
strategic planning systems. In this study, such organisational differences surfaced 
between bulk and liner trades, and between large and small operators. Shipowners 
in the bulk trades pursued more aggressive strategies and took more risks; in 
contrast, their counterparts in the liner trades opted for 'safer' choices that would 
reduce fmancial risks. More shipowners in the liner trades were also found to have 
strategic plans than their counterparts in the bulk trades; this was true as well with 
large operators, who tended to follow more formalised strategic planning processes 
than smzdler operators. Differences also extended to national cultures. Eeist Asian 
shipowners were found to take more risks, pursue more aggressive strategies, and 
follow a more informal process than their European counterparts. As noted earlier, 
they also tended to be more autocratic in the way they made decisions, limiting 
discussions to senior management only and expecting lower-level ones to follow 
and implement; in contrast, European managers tended to consult more broadly 
and include more formalised planning approaches in their decision making. 
4 Within Asia-Pacific shipping, there is a prevailing lack of familiarity with the 
theories and models of strategy selection (and strategic management as a whole) 
and with recent developments in this field of study. 
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Although Asia-Pacific shipowners did pursue corporate strategies, a big majority 
did not show much familiarity with the mainstream literature on strategy selection 
(i.e. types and levels of strategies, strategy selection models, strategy selection 
process, analytical/evaluation tools, relationship between strategy selection and 
overall strategic management). To a great degree, this could be traced to a lack of 
training in general management and/or strategic management, and a subsequent lack 
of exposure to current developments in these fields. Throughout East Asia 
especieilly, the explosive growth of the various economies in the region over the 
last two-three decades has significantly increased demand for managers at middle 
and senior levels who knew how to do business in a highly competitive and 
increasingly globalised market. Unfortunately, as recent surveys show (Granitsas 
and Say well, 1997), this demand has so far been largely unmet 
While similar figures specifically for shipping are not available, and while the 
current financial crisis gripping the region may well have dampened some of this 
demand, it would still be fair to assume that the demand for experienced and well-
trained senior managers is still acutely felt in the Asia-Pacific shipping industry. 
The industry has grown rapidly in recent decades to meet regional and world 
transport needs; it now controls about 38 per cent of the world fleet, second only 
to Europe, which controls 44 per cent. A fleet this large, whose growth has been 
compressed into a remarkably short period of time, would not have had the time 
to groom managers with the training, experience, and expertise in both intra-
regional and global trading. Neither would it have found a ready pool of qualified 
managers from European countries, as there has been a steady decline in their 
numbers in the last two decades (Bennett, 1996). Current efforts by international 
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organisations now focus on the need to provide strategic management training; 
UNCTAD (1995), for instance, conducts various formal and on-the-job training 
programs to upgrade strategic planning and management skills witiiin the maritime 
industry. In recent years, seminars on strategic planning for senior shipping 
management in the Asia-Pacific region have been conducted, and strategic planning 
courses for shipping managers developed under UNCTAD's TRAINMAR 
program. 
The general profile of the Asia-Pacific shipowner that emerges here bears strong 
resemblance to what studies outside the maritime field have found (e.g. Lasserre and 
Schutte, 1995; Napier and Albert, 1990; Hofstede, 1980). In terms of general 
organisational management perspectives and practices, Asia-Pacific shipowners exhibit 
similar behavioural trends observed in other industries in the region: among East Asians, 
a deference to authority and conformance to tiie group; among Europeans/North 
Americans, democratic decision-making approaches and emphasis on individualism 
(Hofstede, 1980). In terms of strategic planning, the pattern of response is also similar: 
East Asians follow a more intuitive, informal, and incremental approach to decision 
making; Europeans/North Americans, a more formalistic process. Lasserre and Schutte 
(1995) and Napier and Albert (1990), as well as other political and business authors (e.g. 
Fitzgerald, 1997; Chu, 1995) attribute these diflFerences in strategic approaches not only 
to cultural norms but also, and especially in relation to the last two-three decades, to the 
environments in which these two cultural groups operate. Because East Asian 
economies have grown rapidly in the last two-three decades, the market environment has 
generally been unstable and turbulent, marked by rapid change and uncertainty. Under 
these conditions, it is not surprising why a fluid and flexible planning and decision-
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making process, unfettered by formalistic rules of planning and analysis, is viewed as 
critical to competitive survival, and why there is strong concern for secrecy and a general 
reluctance to share or seek for information widely. Napier and Albert (1990) also 
suggest that the devaluing of planning among East Asian managers might be an offshoot 
of deliberate government intervention, arguing that when an industry is targeted for 
growth in the interest of the national economy, grow it will regardless of whether senior 
managers within the industry engage in strategic thinking and decision making. The 
presence of government support is substantiated by the Worid Bank (1993) which has 
reported on the extent to which most governments in East Asia have assisted local 
businesses to grow through a range of supportive and protective measures. However, 
there is no evidence that this has led to less reliance on planning; indeed, it is just as 
likely that strategic planning did occur but not in the way assumed by western models 
and researchers (i.e. formalised and accompanied by documentation) and hence was less 
tr£uisparent. This alternative explanation certainly emerged fi'om data obtained by this 
study from Asia-Pacific shipowners. 
Lasserre and Schutte (1995) also offer the view, based on their studies of Hong Kong 
Chinese, that an incremental approach to business lessens the need for strategic decision 
making. Business owners seize opportunities only as they come and pursue these 
opportunities with a fatalist's expectation of both success and failure; to reduce risks, 
therefore, one need not plan, one need only to diversify into multiple ventures with the 
expectation that some of these will succeed and some will not. This view, however, runs 
counter to what this study has found about East Asian shipowners: firm-level strategic 
planning did occur, albeit informally and often without recourse to formalised 
procedures and documentation; at the same time, incremental steps ('taking a few steps 
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at a time') were favoured to give the organisation greater flexibility. This was why 
combining strategies was highly popular among the shipowners; it helped them maintain 
a better strategic balance and reduce their exposure to market risks. To some extent, this 
approach is reminiscent of Hamel and Pralahad's (1993) idea of strategy as stretch and 
leverage where the organisation manoeuvres to get the best out of its assets and 
resources through a creative combination of strategies. 
These broad similarities between Asia-Pacific shipowners and other 
businesses/industries in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere have significant 
implications to the maritime industry because they help chisel away at a prevailing 
industry viewof'differentness', typified by the oft-quoted statement *it may apply to 
them, but we're different'. Often this view of being different becomes an active deterrent 
against experimentation and adaptation in the field. Thus, while important differences do 
distinguish the maritime industry from others, it is essential that similarities are also 
identified and acknowledged to advance both shipping strategy theory and practice. 
Methodological considerations 
5 To what extent has triangulation been effective as a research approach? As 
described in Chapter Seven (Methodology), triangulation is the systematic use of 
several research methods, perspectives, and/or data sources to evaluate or validate 
the same idea. For the study, four research methods (survey, interviews, 
simulation, expert review) and two data sources (shipowners, shipping experts) 
were used as the primary means to examine corporate strategy selection among 
Asia-Pacific shipovmers. Secondary methods used were a review of relevant 
statistical yearbooks and company papers and researcher observations of 
simulation activities. In their typology of research methods in strategic 
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management. Snow and Thomas (1994) classify surveys and interviews at one end 
of the continuum (highly realistic, uncontrolled) and computer simulations at the 
other (highly artificial, controlled). 
The study has shown that the use of several methods and sources has been very 
eflfective in overcoming weaknesses in individual methods. Had the study relied 
solely on the mail survey, the low response rate (32 per cent), the lack of certainty 
that the appropriate people had completed the questionnaires, and the inability to 
clarify responses would have greatly reduced confidence in the results. I f 
interviews had been the sole means of collecting data, the dispersed geographic 
distribution of respondents and the prohibitive costs of intemational travel and 
communication would have led to a small number of shipowners being reached. 
While data would potentially be rich, it would also be narrow, and the problem of 
generalisability would be difficult to overcome. Compounding the problems of the 
survey and interviews was the additional problem of response errors: people 
giving factually incorrect answers or giving answers that would put them in a good 
light or that they considered more socially acceptable. As for the simulation, if 
used alone it too would have raised many methodological questions, foremost of 
which was whether results obtained under simulated conditions could be relied 
upon as a reflection of actual shipowner behaviour. 
Together, however, these three methods were able to compensate for the others' 
weaknesses. Interviews, which included both survey respondents and non-
respondents, confirmed initial survey findings, thus allaying concems over lack of 
representativeness, and fme tuned information on strategy selection practices of 
shipowners; simulation sessions showed that decisions taken under simulated 
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conditions were not that far away from shipowners' self-reports. Results obtained 
through these three methods were highly congruent, which significantly built 
confidence in the data to a degree that would not have been possible had only one 
method been used. Using shipping experts as another data source further 
enhanced confidence because they confirmed the information provided by 
shipowners in the shipping-specific strategic choice model. 
Multi-method approaches have not been used extensively in management research, much 
less in shipping management research, but they have been found to be effective; indeed, 
although difficulties in applying such an approach are acknowledged, Snow and Thomas 
(1994) speak of growing calls for their use. 
Applicability and utility of the strategic choice model 
Of the strategic choice model, two main conclusions can be drawn about it: 
6 The generic strategic choice model has been modified to reflect more accurately 
what Asia-Pacific shipowners do, but even in its original form, the model has wide 
applicability across industries and businesses, provided it is used as a 'thinking' 
tool and not as a step-by-step recipe to success. 
The strategic choice model does not lend itself well to formula management 
(Ketelholn, 1997); it is not a set of specific instructions that can be manipulated to 
arrive at some specific decision. Rather, as Lewds et al. (1993) put it, it is a tool 
for asking questions, and when used for this purpose, it can be an effective aid to 
strategy analysis and selection, irrespective of business or industry. The best use 
of the model is as a template that provides the general structure and parameters for 
analysis, but leaves the rest to the decision maker: what to look for in the 
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environment, which success factors to use, which strategies to pursue. This 
latitude in decision making is critical because of significant inter-industry 
differences that have already been documented both in the maritime industry 
(Brooks, 1995) and elsewhere (e.g. Campbell and Verbeke. 1994; Barlett and 
Goshall, 1989; see also Armistead, 1994). 
The model also puts discipline into an otherwise informal and intuitive strategy 
selection process by requiring the decision maker to (a) maintain a close watch 
over the organisation's internal and external environment, (b) identify key success 
factors in this environment that are of particular relevance to the organisation at 
the time the analysis is made, (c) decide on the relative importance of each factor, 
(d) gauge the strategic position of the organisation based on these success factors 
(by plotting it on the model, which comes in matrix form), and (e) evaluate 
whether the strategies offered by the model will support this strategic position, 
and i f they do not, what alternative strategies should be pursued. The mere act of 
following this process adds greater transparency to strategy selection, and makes 
decision makers more aware of what they need to do to enhance confidence and 
reliability in strategic choices made. 
When used in this manner, the model facilitates wider applicability of strategy 
selection concepts and principles because it allows individual users to tailor their 
analysis to their specific organisations, businesses, market sectors, or industries as 
well as to the specific time periods during which the analysis is conducted. 
However, the model does require a reasonable amount of knowledge, experience, 
and expertise on the part of the user, particularly in the identification of relevant 
success factors in an organisation's internal and external environment and in the 
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evaluation of the relative merits and appropriateness of various strategic 
alternatives. In this respect therefore the model's utility relies a lot on the user's 
ability to make an intelligent assessment of the environment and use this 
assessment to make wise strategic choices. 
7 While the generic strategic choice model can be applied widely in its original form, 
its applicability to specific businesses or industries still has to be proven to 
broaden its usage and enhance confidence in its applicability. 
Industry validation is necessary for two reasons. As the study has found, there is 
very little evidence to suggest that strategy selection theories and models are 
widely used in Asia-Pacific commercial shipping. Shipping practitioners in the 
region therefore still have to be convinced that the strategic choice model does 
apply to their specific circumstance. Giving them a model that has been tested in 
other industries is not good enough; while they may say they need 
evaluation/analytical tools to help them with strategic decision making, as was the 
case with the shipowners who participated in the study, they are likely to be more 
suspicious of models 'tried elsewhere' and more accepting of models that have 
been applied to their own industry and subsequently 'validated' by prevailing 
industry practice. The second reason is academic. Theorists and researchers need 
to work with a substantial store of empirical evidence so that they can continue 
extending the boundaries of existing theories and models, and in so doing enhance 
the descriptive, prescriptive, or predictive power of these theories and models. 
The more evidence there is that the generic strategic choice model works in a 
variety of industrial and business contexts, the more robust and useful it becomes, 
because such evidence leads to a better understanding of differences and 
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similarities between and within industries and adds more precision and detail to 
theoretical discussions of corporate strategy selection. 
By examining the strategy selection practices of commercial shipowners in the 
Asia-Pacific region, an area about which very little has been written about, this 
study has added further evidence of the robustness of the strategic choice model. 
As the study has shown, Asia-Pacific shipowners support the model, but they 
prefer to combine strategies rather than be restricted to the one or two choices 
assumed by the model. Further, of the five corporate strategies, the 'grow' 
strategy is by far the most popular choice, often or regularly combined with the 
other corporate sU t^egies to spread risks and improve strategic balance. There is 
evidence to show that this pattern of strategic choices made by Asia-Pacific 
shipowners is similar to that observed throughout the region (leading Lasserre and 
Schutte (1995) to call the region the most growth-obsessed region in the world) 
and elsewhere in the worid (Harvey, 1988). Synthesising the results of earlier 
studies, Harvey (1988) has drawn up a table showing the relative frequency with 
which corporate strategies have been used. Harvey's figures are reproduced in 
Table 11.1; to highlight similarities in the pattern of responses, the results 
obtained from Asia-Pacific shipowners are also provided. 
Tabie 11.1 Frequency of use of corporate strategies (%) 
Corporate Strategies 
Grow/Develop 
Stabilise 
Turnaround/Harvest 
Combination 
Frequency of Use 
Other Industries 
(Harvey, 1988) 
54.4 
9.2 
7.5 
28.7 
Asia-Pacific Shipowners 
(Hawlcins, 1997) 
61 
12 
9 
18 
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Confirmation from various industries and geographical regions is essential for the 
continuous improvement of the field. It enhances confidence in the strategic choice 
model because it shows that the model works both within the shipping industry and 
elsewhere; at the same time, it advances theory building and testing because it allows 
researchers to fine tune the concepts, principles, and assumptions of the model. 
Obviously further research is needed to gain a better understanding of strategy selection 
in conmiercizil shipping, particularly in relation to the Asia-Pacific, and these research 
issues will be discussed later in the chapter. First, however, a discussion of the study's 
limitations is in order to put the research findings and conclusions in their proper 
context. 
11.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
In the course of data collection and analysis, several limitations of the study were 
identified. These limitations and their implications to the study's findings and 
conclusions are discussed below. 
Language difficulties 
A lack of facility in explaining and describing strategy selection practices proved to be a 
common problem in the use of all three methods (survey, interviews, and simulation). 
Because the medium of communication was English, which was a second or even a third 
language to many respondents, a number had difficulty articulating their thoughts on 
strategy selection. Compounding this lack of fluency was a prevailing lack of familiarity 
with strategy selection (and strategic management) as a field of study. 
In the mail survey, those with greater fluency in English tended to provide more 
information than those who did not. The same would have held true during the 
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interviews had not the researcher taken greater effort to probe further and explain more 
fully; however, interview sessions with this latter group tended to be more laborious and 
time-consuming. Simulation data, as shown on completed decision sheets and backed up 
by post-simulation evaluation feedback, reflected the same pattern. Due to the combined 
effect of lack of fluency in English and unfamiliarity with the strategy field, many 
initially found it difficult to clearly describe their strategic objectives and corporate 
strategies. Though the majority picked up the pace shortly thereafter, a small minority 
did struggle throughout the simulation. 
Limitations of a 'snapshot* approach to data collection 
Another limitation of the study was its 'snapshot' approach to data collection. All 
participants responded within a particular time frame (1994-1997) and were only given 
a single opportunity to respond (either in the survey, interviews, or simulation). While 
data would likely be valid for the particular period during which the survey, interview or 
simulation was conducted, it cannot be reliably established whether such data would 
hold true over time. Only a longitudinal study which tracked down the activities of a 
number of decision makers over a period of time would achieve this objective. 
Limitations of Individual research methods 
While triangulation has helped overcome the weaknesses of individual research methods, 
it would still be useful to discuss these weaknesses in greater detail to aid future 
research. 
Low response rate from the mail survey. Although the mail survey is very popular as a 
means of collecting data, its potential for generating a low response rate is remarkably 
high. Research methods authorities (e.g. Dilhnan, 1978; Erdos, 1970) accept that a 
response rate of 80 per cent and upwards is a rarity, but argue that 75 per cent is 
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attainable provided proper measures are taken to increase the response rate. According 
to these authors, when used alone, a survey should achieve at least a 50 per cent 
response rate to be considered reliable, and it should be able to verify that survey 
respondents and non-respondents are comparable. While the desired 75 per cent rate has 
been achieved by a number of studies (Snow and Thomas, 1995), in general, the 
response rate falls far below this standard. The average response rate has been reported 
to hover around the 30 per cent mark for small companies and even lower for large 
companies (Cullinane, 1991). Where the target group are senior managers (CEO, etc), 
response rates go even lower, ranging anywhere from 10 to 20 per cent (Gopinath and 
Hoffman, 1995; Pekar and Abraham, 1995), although Snow and Thomas (1995) did find 
an average of 52 per cent response rate among a number of strategic surveys published 
in three major strategy research publications. 
In his survey of shipowners' attitudes toward market risk, Cullinane (1991) suggests 
that a contributory factor to the low response rates of mail surveys in the maritime field 
is the secretive nature of the industry; strong competition within various shipping 
markets generally predisposes shipowners against sharing commercially sensitive 
information with outside parties. Napier and Albert (1990) offer a similar explanation in 
their study of strategic thinking by East Asian senior managers. Rather than administer a 
survey, they interviewed these senior managers; interviews were considered more 
acceptable than surveys presumably because they allowed managers to personally g^ ugp 
the integrity of the interviewer. 
What are the implications of these previous findings to the study? The study achieved a 
32 per cent response rate, which could be considered satisfactory in light of previous 
surveys involving senior managers. However, the reliability of the data would still be 
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suspect unless the comparability of survey respondents and non-respondents was 
established, and generalisability would remain compromised because of the relatively 
small percentage of responses. For tlie study, what served as an effective way of 
increasing confidence in the survey data was to use other methods such as interviews 
with survey respondents and non-respondents, simulation, and expert review to collect 
the same type of information (i.e. corporate strategic choices). Results obtained through 
these various methods were then compared and the extent of congruence determined. As 
noted earlier, while individually all these methods were imperfect measures, their 
combined use made up for their respective weaknesses and provided enough confidence 
in the veracity of the data. 
Because the mail survey is relatively easy to administer, it will most likely continue to 
be a popular means of collecting data. However, because the likelihood of non-response 
is high, the use of other research methods as well as other measures to improve the mail 
survey (Zikmund, 1994; Dillman, 1978) should be built into the research design. 
Limitations of the simulation. There were also aspects of the simulation that posed a 
number of limitations to the study. One involved the geographical distribution of 
participants; the other, the use of the Stratship program as the simulation model. 
Because participation in the simulation was voluntary, sessions were held only in those 
countries where there was a sizeable number of interested participsmts. Of the 570 
simulation participants, over half (55 per cent) came fi-om Southeast Asia (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore), and the rest ft-om Hong Kong (29 per cent) and Australasia (16 
per cent). The other countries included in the study were not represented. This 
geographical distribution could very well skew the findings in favour of Southeast Asian 
shipowners at the expense of other shipowners in the region, particularly those in 
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Northeast Asia, whose decisions might not necessarily be the same as those made by 
their Southeast Asian counterparts. Obviously, the only way to establish 
representativeness firmly is by conducting simulations for Northeast Asia shipowners, 
which can be explored for further research. 
The other limitation of the simulation involved the use of the Stratship program as the 
simulation model. The program could be criticised on four grounds: one, it had a narrow 
focus, which limited participants to the number of strategic options they could pursue; 
two, it was not flexible enough to allow for varying levels of competence among users, 
thus leaving the more experienced ones with little latitude to explore other strategic 
avenues; three, decision making, although conducted in a realistic environment, was still 
not *real life' and decisions made under such simulated conditions might not necessarily 
represent actual workplace decisions; and four, the program was used for both liner and 
bulk trades, but because it was designed primarily for liner trades, its assumptions and 
parameters might not work as well for the bulk trades. 
These limitations could very well throw doubt on the veracity of simulation data; 
however, the following points could also be argued. One, it should be remembered that 
the primary objective of the simulation was to determine which of the five generic 
corporate strategies (grow, develop, stabilise, turnaround, harvest) would be pursued 
under certain company and market conditions. This should thus be the thrust of the 
simulation so that defmitive answers to the six assumptions of the strategic choice 
model could be generated. While critics might see this as restricting participants' choices, 
it could be further argued that such parameters are necessary to control simulation 
variables more effectively and focus the research process. 
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Two, confidence in the simulation data would certainly be weaker if it was the only 
method used to generate information about strategic choices; the very process of making 
decisions under 'safe' simulated conditions, away from the real-life pressures of the 
workplace, and where the novelty of the situation and the opportunity to experiment 
could drastically affect participants' behaviour, would be grounds enough to doubt the 
representativeness of the data. However, because similar data was collected through a 
mail survey and interviews, and this data confirmed what was obtained through the 
simulation, greater confidence in the representativeness of the simulation data could thus 
be established. 
Finally, while the Stratship program was originally designed for liner trades, it had wider 
applicability, as evidenced by its successful use as a training tool in a variety of business 
settings, not all of which were in the shipping industry (Esmee Fairbaim Research 
Centre, 1993). Further, it could also be argued that the main concern of the simulation 
was not so much on the specific details affecting the company but on the general 
principles of strategic decision making and strategy selection, a point that was stressed 
throughout the simulation. 
11.3 ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Out of this study a number of key issues for further research can be drawn out. These 
include: 
A need for an Integrative review of shipping strategy research 
As this study has found, a lot more research into shipping strategy (strategic 
management, strategic planning, strategy selection) both in relation to the industry in 
general and the Asia-Pacific shipping in particular, is badly needed. 
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Strategy research in shipping is a fairly nascent field, with very little written about it. 
As discussed in Chapter 2 (Asia-Pacific Shipping), much of what is available in the 
literature is unsubstantiated by empirical evidence (Frankel, 1989). A quick perusal of 
leading shipping management journals published in recent years would show that 
contributions to the subject comprise mainly of essays, arguments, or commentaries that 
draw on personal views and anecdotal evidence rather than on scientific inquiry. 
Management texts also devote minimal attention to the subject or base their discussion 
mainly on general strategic management literature. There has also been a general lack of 
training in strategic management This is true in the Asia-Pacific, as this study has 
found, and there is some evidence that this may also be true elsewhere in the shipping 
industry (Chapman, 1989). 
Given the importance of sU t^egy and strategic planning to competitive success, 
particularly in turbulent environments (where shipping is typically found), more and 
better information about strategy and its application to the shipping industry is 
obviously needed (Miller and Cardinal, 1994). Studies that analyse, evaluate, and 
synthesise what has been done so far in shipping strategy research and that then draw 
up an agenda for fiiture research (integrative literature reviews) are sorely needed to give 
both researchers and practitioners a general picture of the field's development: how it 
began, where it has been, what it has accomplished, what major schools of thought have 
emerged, where it is headed. Through such integrative reviews, collective knowledge 
about the field can be significantly enhanced. This is something that more established 
fields of inquiry (e.g. the general strategic management literature) regularly do, and which 
shipping strategy research would benefit a lot fi-om. 
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Applicability of Western strategy models to Asia-Pacific shipping 
An evaluation of different approaches to strategy development and strategic planning is 
needed to determine their appropriateness to Asia-Pacific shipping. 
In 1983, Lasserre (1983) argued that a formal approach to strategy formulation, as 
propounded and practised in the West (North Europe, North America), is 
inappropriate for the Asia-Pacific region, particularly in relation to East Asian coimtries. 
In a more recent publication, Lasserre and Schutte (1995) again stressed the same 
argument, pointing to major differences between Asians and Westerners in the way they 
think, live their lives, and conduct their businesses. 
One frequently cited evidence of this cultural divide is the way these two groups 
approach strategic planning: Asians are said to prefer an informal, inductive, and 
incremental approach to planning, while Westerners use a more formalised and 
systematic approach. Writers of popular books (e.g. Chu, 1995; Naisbitt, 1995) 
essentially say the same thing. In shipping, there is some evidence that shows that the 
intuitive and informal approach to decision making is prevalent within the industry 
(Datz, 1971; Aries, 1989); i f this is the case, then the argument that Asia-Pacific 
shipowners follow an informal approach would be stronger, because it has both cultural 
and industry backing. 
Because most of the widely used analytical tools and models reflect a rational-analytical 
perspective, which contrast with an informal and incremental approach, their 
applicability to Asia-Pacific decision makers thus becomes suspect. I f they are to be of 
use to shipowners, their appropriateness has to be determined. To what extent are they 
applicable? To what extent would they have to be changed or modified to make them 
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relevant to Asia-Pacific (especially East Asian) users? Research must be able to provide 
answers to these questions. 
Another area of investigation should focus on the actual strategic process taken by Asia-
Pacific shipowners. While this study gives support to an Asian preference for informal 
planning and strategy selection, it does not necessarily accept the argimient that, ergo, 
littie or no planning is needed or done. What is probably more correct is something in 
between; as noted earlier, an equally likely explanation is that East Asian shipowners do 
plan, but they are more likely to keep these plans, and the planning process, informal 
and hence less transparent to outsiders. To determine whether this is indeed the case, 
longitudinal and observational studies of workplace behaviour would be needed. 
A typology of shipping strategies 
The development of a research-based typology of shipping strategies, particularly at the 
corporate and business levels, is needed to better understand similarities and diversities 
in shipowners' strategic choices. 
A typology of strategies, covering the corporate, business, and functional levels, has 
been developed as part of this study (see Table 10.3). Of these, however, only the five 
generic corporate strategies were tested on a sample of Asia-Pacific shipowners. The 
next task is to extend this test to other shipowners. Would other shipowners in the 
region behave similarly? Would the model be equally applicable to another geographical 
region, say, Europe, which holds the largest percentage of the world fleet (44 per cent 
in 1997)? Only further research will answer this question. 
Research is also needed on business strategies in shipping. Porter (1980, 1985) is the 
dominant authority in business strategy, and his work is widely cited in die shipping 
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literature and is taught to executives studying shipping business management However, 
a number of studies have questioned his business strategy models, particularly their 
applicability to other industries (Miller and Dess, 1993; Grimm et al., 1988; Wright, 
1987; Mathur, 1986) and to the Asia-Pacific region (Fitzgerald, 1994), and are calling 
for more research into the area. In light of Porter's popularity in shipping, it would be 
useful to test whether this popularity is well-deserved. To what extent do Porter's 
models apply to shipowners' strategic choices? One effective way of finding out is 
through simulation as this will require shipowners to select specific business strategies 
under given environmental conditions; data from such simulation can also be backed by 
self-reports (obtained through surveys and/or interviews) from shipowners for greater 
confidence in the data. 
With more research into corporate and business shipping strategies, the link between the 
two, and with supporting specific strategies, can be established more reliably, which 
should significantly improve current shipping strategy theory and practice. The need for 
an integrating framework is becoming particularly acute because of the growing number 
of studies looking at specific strategies in individual shipping trades or markets (e.g. 
Glen, 1997; Knudsen, 1997; Ballis et al., 1997; Cho and Perakis, 1996; Lee, 1996; 
Bendall and Stent, 1996; Ariel, 1989). Thus far, no serious attempt has been made to 
link these specific strategies to the broader categories of business or corporate strategies, 
which can greatly hamper the development of our understanding of shipping strategy. 
As one writer on creative thinking (de Bono, 1993) puts it, a general strategy is needed 
to direct the choice of specific strategies: the first sets the strategic direction of the 
organisation; the second provides more precise measures of achieving the first. He 
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likens this process to painting, where 'an artist sets out the general composition, or 
placing, of [the] figures on the canvas. Then the detailed painting can start' (p. 148). 
Strategic decision making 
There are two areas in strategic decision making that provide a rich ground for research: 
the role and influence of individual strategic decision makers, and intra-industry 
differences. 
Strategic decision making, as this study has found and as confirmed elsewhere in the 
strategic management literature, is the primary responsibility of senior managers. 
However, what is not so clear is what these senior managers actually do during the 
decision-making process and how much influence or power they wield to affect the 
outcome. Who actually does the 'strategising'? Would they all have the same influence 
or power or would one area or level have greater power than the others? While research 
on these and related issues has been done elsewhere (e.g. Whittington, 1996; Schilit, 
1990; Hegarty and Hoffman, 1987), the same cannot be said with the shipping industry. 
In an industry that is known to be secretive and conservative, would strategic decision-
making powers be broad-based or would they be, as in the case of East Asian 
shipowners, vested in the chief executive and a few trusted subordinates? Would 
distinctions in decision-making styles be made on the basis o f culture, or would other 
industry-specific variables have greater influence? In today's highly globalised and 
competitive markets, these are timely questions to address, particularly for those who 
intend to compete in the Asia-Pacific region, where decision-making styles, processes, 
and structures are said to differ drastically from those used in the West. There is a 
definite attractiveness in the idea that i f one knew how the chief strategists of a 
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competitor thought and worked, one would be in a better position to gauge the steps 
that the competitor would take. 
DifTerences in decision-making patterns and processes can also be extended to various 
sectors o f the shipping industry. This study has highlighted some differences in 
approach between the liner, dry bulk, and tanker sectors of the industry; in general, the 
liner trades were found to be more conservative and risk-averse than the bulk trades, 
opting for strategies that exposed them to less risk. Areas of research on this and related 
issues already exist, notably those investigating the risk preferences of shipowners 
(Cullinane, 1991; Harvey, 1987; Hope and Boe, 1981; Lorange and Norman, 1972), but 
these bodies of knowledge do not yet cohere together to provide a comprehensive 
picture of intra-industry differences in strategic decision making. Clearly, more work is 
needed to integrate and extend what is currently known about differential approaches to 
strategic decision making within the shipping industry. 
Extending the applicability of the strategic choice model 
The exploratory nature of this study has led to the use of a qualitative approach to data 
collection and analysis. The analysis has shown that the model is applicable to Asia-
Pacific shipowners, with some modifications. The next task now is to extend the 
applicability of the model even further. This can be done by testing it on another group 
of shipowners, using quantitative methods of analysis, and/or conducting longitudinal 
case studies of individual shipowners. Another way of extending the model is by 
incorporating game theory principles (see, for instance, Dixit and NalebufF, 1991 and 
Camerer, 1991). Thus far, most strategy research has focused on internal positioning, 
that is, on the relative positioning of various business units within an organisation, with 
little attention given to external positioning, that is, on the relative position of an 
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organisation vis-a-vis its competitors. In the Asia-Pacific region especially, Lasserre 
(1995) argues for an 'overall corporate ambition for the region' (p. 29), which can be 
realised only through a good understanding of who and where one's competitors (and 
friends) are and what opportunities and threats the regional markets hold, and through 
an effective system of strategic stretch and leverage (Hamel and Pralahad, 1993). 
11.4 COMPETING FOR THE FUTURE 
Strategy, according to a recent survey of management executives, consultants and 
academics, is considered the single most important management issue today and will 
remain so for the next five years (Bryne, 1996). As markets become globally 
interconnected and as business environments become more turbulent and competitive, 
organisations are increasingly urged to be more proactive and creative in their use of 
strategy to effectively compete for the future (Hamel and Pralahad, 1994). Synthesising 
recent management trends, Taylor (1997) says that greater stress is being placed on 
more ongoing strategic discussions not only among senior people but also between 
senior managers and all relevant parts of the organisation; on networks, alliances, and 
joint ventures to gain access to new markets or technologies; and perhaps most 
importantly, on changing managerial mindsets so that those responsible for leading 
organisations into the future will be better equipped to meet the challenges of the new 
century. 
With the continuing turmoil in the Asia-Pacific and growing signs that many shipowners 
in the region are becoming uncompetitive, these calls, particularly the need for a 
proactive and creative approach to strategy and the need for a radical change in 
managerial mindsets, carry immense implications. 
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Appendix 1 
THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION: BACKGROUND NOTES 
Note: This paper summarises the economic record of the Asia-Pacific region up to the end of 1996; thus 
no reference is made to the currency crisis that hit the region in mid-1997 and whose worsening effects 
continue to be felt, creating widespread economic and political turmoil in many countries in the region. 
Short-term predictions are uniformly dark, and because of continuing market uncertainty, long-term 
predictions, which came fast and thick pre-crisis, are significantly absent 
This background paper covers 12 countries in the Asia-Pacific region: Australia, China, 
Hong Kong, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, 
South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
Of these 12 countries, six (Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and more recently, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) are considered high-income economies, 
while the others (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) are middle income. 
The exception is China, which remains within the low-income group, although this 
should not be for long i f it sustains its more than 8% annual growth rate (World Bank, 
1996). 
A World Bank study on East Asia (1993) also classifies eight of the 12 countries as high 
performing Asian economies, or HPAEs, because they have sustained very rapid 
economic growth over a long period of time. These include, in the first group, Japan, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan whose remarkable growth has spanned 
over 30 years; and in the second group, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, who have 
joined the HPAEs within the last two decades. Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and 
Taiwan are usually referred to as the 'Four Tigers', while the rest are called 'newly 
industrialising economies', or NIEs. China and the Philippines have since been added to 
the group of Asian NIEs. 
All 12 countries are also members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
forum. The other six APEC members are: fix)m Asia, Brunei, and Papua New Guinea; 
from North America, Canada and the United States; and from Latin America, Chile and 
Mexico. These 18 countries make up almost half of the world economy (Bergsten, 
1997). 
1 GROWTH IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 
The growth of the Asia-Pacific region as an economic powerhouse is usually attributed 
to 10 East Asian economies: Japan, China, the Four Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, 
South Korea, Taiwan), and four NIEs (Indpnesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand). 
Of these, the Philippines is the latest to come on board; only since 1993 has it started 
posting annual growth rates of 5-6%, which although healthy are still much lower than 
those that have been achieved by the other NIEs. China's growth is much stronger, 
resembling that of the Four Tigers. What has made this growth remarkable is not only its 
strengtii and duration, but also because it has been accompanied by a significant decline 
in poverty. In no other economy has this type of growth been achieved. 
Very rapid growth In East Asia 
The last three decades (1960 to 1990) have been a remarkable period of growth for East 
Asia. In large part this was made possible by stable world economic conditions that 
spurred worldwide production and trade in the years following the end of the second 
world war. In this hospitable environment, the East Asian economies, notably Japan 
and the Four Tigers, were able to 'set sail towards industrial catching-up when the gust 
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of wind was strongest'. As a result, they were able to compress the industrialisation 
process into 25 to 30 years, compared to the 100 to 150 years that it took most OECD 
countries (Tan and Wee, 1995, p. 41). By the end of the 1980s, the region has become 
the third largest economic region, after the United States and Europe, and it has also 
become the fastest growing (Drewry, 1993). According to World Bank (1993), and as 
illustrated in Figure 1, 
Since 1960, the HPAEs have grown more than twice as fast as the rest orEast Asia, roughly 
three times as fast as Latin America and South Asia, and twenty-five times faster than Sub-
Saharan Africa. They also significantly outperfonmed the industrial economies and the oil-rich 
Middle East-North Africa region. Between 1960 and 1985, real income per capita increased 
more than four times in Japan and the Four Tigers and more than doubled in the Southeast 
Asian NIEs. If growth were randomly distributed, there is roughly one chance in ten thousand 
that success would have been so regionally concentrated (p.2). 
East Asia* 
HPAEs 
East Asia without HPAEs 
South Asia 
Middle East and Mediterranean 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
OECD economies 
Latin America and Caribbean 
T i n 
• 
1 2 3 4 5 
GNP per capita growth rate (percent) 
Figure 1 Average growth of GNP per capita, 1965-90 
*Ea5t Asia includes all low and middle income economies of East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific, 
east of and including China and Thailand. The HPAEs covered by the 1993 Worid Bank study included 
Japan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
Source: World Bank, 1993 
Even with the 1997 currency devaluation crisis which hit Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand, as well as the overall slowdown in regional growth, the 
prognosis for the region still remains good. Although the crisis has created greater 
311 
fmancial uncertainty within the region and is likely to slow down growth in the short 
term, over time the region wil l still be able to outpace all other regions in tiie worid (see 
Figure 2). 
• 
• 
1987-96 
1997-2006 
World 1997-2006 
High 
income 
countries 
East Asia 
and Pacific 
South Asia Latin 
America & 
Caribbean 
Europe & 
Central Asia 
Middle East 
& North 
Arrica 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Figure 2 Real and predicted growth rates, 1987-2006 
Source: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1997 
In one of its recent updates, the World Bank (1997a) has written: 
The recent financial crises in the region have called into question the sustainability of the "East 
Asian Miracle." The collapse of the Thai baht in July 1997 led to speculative attacks in other 
financial markets. Since then, the Philippine and Indonesian governments have floated their 
currencies, and the Malaysian ringgit has depreciated as well. These events have put pressure 
on banks and financial entities. China and Vietnam, with their closed capital accounts, have to 
date remained relatively insulated from the direct financial pressures of these currency 
depreciations. 
[However, the] region's countries confront this financial turbulence with comparatively high 
savings ratios, low debt burdens, historically strong fiscal positions, and a history of maricet-
friendly policies that have produced economic success. These strong fundamentals mean that if 
ongoing economic reforms, especially in the financial and public sectors, are implemented 
swiftly, the countries are well positioned to regain the growth momentum that has been their 
hallmark in recent years (p. 2). 
As this 1997 World Bank assessment indicates, the East Asian countries are 
economically strong and resilient enou^ to recover from the recent financial turbulence 
and regain lost ground. Other extrapolations of Asia-Pacific growth, while predating the 
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1997 currency crisis, carry the same message. Based on his analysis of 20 years of Asian 
growth (1974 to 1994), Leger (1994) is optimistic that although there has been a 
regionwide slowdown in growth, the region's 'economic boom wil l continue ... [as all] 
over Asia, governments are privatising industry, cutting taxes, welcoming foreign 
investment and developing their financial markets' (p. 49). Another study (Lasserre and 
Schutte, 1995), which compares the Asia-Pacific region with Europe (European Union 
and European Free Trade Area) and NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement 
between the United States, Canada and Mexico), shows that assuming an average growth 
rate of 4% for the Asia-Pacific (without Australia and New Zealand) and 2% each for 
Europe and NAFTA over a 20-year period (1993-2023), the Asia-Pacific region is 
predicted to outrank the other two in terms of world output from 2010 onwards (see 
Figure 3). 
US$ (bn) 
20,000 
Asia-Pacific 
18.000 i 
16,000 
Europe 
14,000 
NAFTA 12,000 
10.000 
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6.000 
4,000 
1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 2023 
Figure 3 Growth in GNP: Asia-Pacinc, Europe and NAFTA, 1993-2023 
Source: Lasserre and Schutte, 1995 
In a more recent assessment, which was presented during the World Bank/IMF annual 
meeting in Hong Kong in September 1997, Gamaut (1997) echoes similar predictions, 
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rejecting the argument that the 1997 currency crisis will mean the end of the region's 
economic dynamism. He also disputes the argument now gaining currency Uiat China's 
growth will seriously threaten the newly industrialising economies of Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. According to him, China's strong growth has 
contributed significantiy to the economies of Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea, 
whose prosperity in turn has been critical to trade and investment expzmsion in 
Southeast Asia. These intra-regional economic linkages are a major reason why East Asia 
will continue to grow. As Gamaut points out, it was China's growth upsurge in the 
early 1990s that enabled the East Asian developing economies to keep growing strongly 
in spite of an OECD recession. While it may be true that the East Asian counUies 
initially depended on the United States and Europe for their export markets and 
subsequent economic gains, increasingly and rapidly, the region as a whole is becoming 
what Tan and Wee (1995) call an 'independent engine of growth', drawing much of its 
strength fi-om within itself. 
Growth with equity 
What has made East Asia's growth even more remaricable is that it has been 
accompanied by an improvement in income distribution and declining inequality. It is 
growth with equity. Unlike all other economies, the gains fi^om rapid growth have been 
shared with the rest of the population. The best performers, Japan and the Four Tigers, 
are the most equal in income distribution (World Bank, 1993). 
This rapid shared growth has also led to a significant improvement in human welfare. 
Most importantly, life expectancy has risen and poverty has declined. Birth rates have 
also fallen. Spending on public education has also increased. While similar gains have 
been made by other developing countries, none have reached the same levels and at 
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similar speed as those experienced by East Asia (World Bank, 1993). In terms of raw 
numbers, this has meant that 'between 1970 and 1990, the number of people classified 
as very poor in East Asia fell from 400 million to 180 million, even though the 
population in the region grew by 400 million during the same period. Now, fewer than 
one in 10 East Asians lives in extreme poverty, compared with half the people in Africa 
and a quarter of the people in Latin America' (Leger, 1995). This achievement continues 
to be sustained as a 1997 World Bank update shows: 
East Asia has been the world^s fastest growing region and has made dramatic progress in 
reducing poverty. In the past few decades, rapid growth and major expansions in social services 
have brought some of the most remaricable declines in poverty in history, along with large 
improvements in the educational and health status of the poor. In 1975-85, East Asian 
countries reduced poverty by 27 percent; between 1985-95, the reduction was an astonishing 35 
percent. This is the fastest pace of poverty reduction in any part of the developing worid. 
During this period, East Asia was the only major region to experience declining numbers of 
people living in poverty. In particular, Indonesia's poverty fell by 82 percent, Thailand's fell 
by 90 percent, and Malaysia's fell by 95 percent... (Worid Bank, 1997a, p.I). 
Sharp Increase In savings 
Another result of this rapid shared growth, and which has also been instrumental in 
vastly improving the quality of life, has been a sharp increase in savings rates over the 
last two decades. This has been critical in financing domestic spending on education, 
infrastructure, communication, etc. Except for the Philippines (where savings have 
actually fallen over the same period), savings rates in all East Asian countries have 
increased far more rapidly than in other developing economies (see Figure 4). Today, the 
savings rates in East Asian countries are some of the highest in the world. 
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Figure 4 Gross domestic savings in East Asia and other developing regions, 1965 and 1990 
* Japan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand only (China 
and the Philippines excluded) 
Source: WoHd Bank, 1993 
The rise of the consumer class 
What the World Bank study (1993) calls the twin virtues o f East Asian growth, rapid 
growth and declining inequality, have also been instrumental in the expansion of the 
middle class, particularly in the newly industrialising economies of Southeast Asia, and 
their growing consumer demands are triggering further growth in the region. This trend is 
likely to continue as economic growth is sustained, incomes rise, and people become 
better educated. It will further accelerate as other countries in East and South Asia 
(Vietnam and India being the most notable) join in the 'catch-up' effort. Based on their 
analysis of recent trends and developments in East Asia, Tan and Wee (1995) contend: 
With sustained economic growth, rising income and educational level, the rapid emergence of 
the middle class in East Asia will have significant economic, social and political impact on the 
region and beyond. The region is no longer merely a low cost production base. It is becoming 
a considerable consumer market Japan and the NIEs has reached per capita income ranging 
from US$6,000 to US$27,000. In addition, the ASEAN countries of 320 million people with 
income levels of US$600 to US$2,500 have passed the subsistence level and will generate a 
vast demand for manufactured goods and many high ticket consumer durables like cars, home 
applicances and electronics. More significantly, due to the demographic and income 
distribution structure for East Asian countries, a modest 25% rise in average income over 5 
years could lead to a tripling size of the middle income group and hence create more potential 
consumers. Based on existing trends of growth in output and consumption expenditure, by the 
year 2000 the East Asian market is projected to be comparable in size to that of Westem 
Europe ... (p. 46). 
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This projection may not be too far-fetched. The 10 East Asian economies covered by 
the study account for about 30% of the world's population (see Table 1), more than 
60% of whom are between 25 to 65 years old and with some consumer spending power. 
Asia as a whole, with its more than 3 billion people, makes up about 60% of the total 
world population. I f the pattems of economic growth in the region are sustained, this 
would mean that other Asian countries are likely to join the 'catch-up' wagon and enjoy 
the benefits of this growth; already, Vietnam and India are forging ahead, their annual 
growth rates averaging about 5% in the last several years. By the turn of the century, 
some predict about a billion consumers whose needs and demands have to be met 
(Lasserre and Schutte, 1995). Rohwer (1996) sees in this an Asia rising, whose middle 
class, poised to be history's biggest, wi l l significantly change world dynamics. 
Table 1 Population distribution in the Asia-Pacinc region (millions), 1995 and 2010 
Country 1995 2010 Growth Rate (%) 
Australia 18.1 21.0 I .I 
China 1 200.2 1 371.4 1.2 
Hong Kong 6.2 8.1 1.8 
Indonesia 193.3 236.9 1.6 
Japan 125.2 130.3 0.3 
Malaysia 20.1 26.0 2.3 
Philippines 68.6 94.5 2.5 
Singapore 3.0 4.0 2.0 
South Korea 44.9 49.7 0.9 
Taiwan 21.4 24.4 0.9 
Thailand 58.2 67.7 1.2 
Total (12 Asia-Pacific) 1 762.8 
Total Asia 3.5 bn 
Total World 5.7 bn 
Source: World Bank, 1997 
The task ahead 
While the gains achieved by East Asia's 10 'tigers', both young and old, are impressive 
by all accounts, so much more still has to be done i f these benefits are to spread to the 
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rest of the region, and to Asia as a whole. Speaking of the entire East Asian region, the 
World Bank (1997a) writes: 
East Asia's gains have been remarkable, but the task ahead is daunting. East Asia still has a 
per capita Gross National Product (GNP) of only $890. The region includes close to 40 percent 
of the developing world's population, and about 80 percent of its population live in countries 
with average incomes of less than about $600 per capita. Almost 350 million people are 
estimated to be living on less than $1 a day ... In addition to widespread poverty in the new 
economies in transition—Cambodia, Lao FDR, Mongolia, and Vietnam—there is a growing 
concentration of poverty among specific groups in the regioin's middle-income countries. 
Sustaining income growth and expanding social services will be critical to the continued 
reduction of poverty (p. 2). 
Growth with equity is clearly pivotal to the region; only through this can such dreams 
as an 'Asia rising* be realised. 
2 TRADE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 
It is often remarked that East Asian economies are like flying geese, with Japan at the 
lead, followed by the Four Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan), and 
then the newly industrialising economies (Indonesia, Malaysiei, the Philippines, 
Thailand, and more recently, China). 
This analogy was first made by the Japanese economist Akamatsu (1943, 1961, cited in 
Yamasawa et al., 1991) who used it to describe the pattern of industry development in a 
newly industrialising Japan. This pattern of development involved initial import 
substitution followed by a strong export push; according to Akamatsu, the shape of the 
growth curves resulting from this pattern of development resembled that of geese as 
they flew in formation. 
As Japan industrialised and prospered as an exporter nation, and as its income levels and 
production costs rose, it transferred its high capital and labour intensive industries to 
less developed countries, where labour and production costs were much lower, and 
shifted its focus on higher value-added goods and more advanced technologies. These 
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countries in turn closely followed Japan's lead, and within a short period of time 
achieved unprecedented economic gains. They became the Four Tigers: Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. The benefits of this ' f lying geese' pattern of 
development continues to spread. The latest beneficiaries are China, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, all of which are in various stages of 
industrialisation. Vietnam is also gearing up; so is India (although located in South Asia, 
India's population size makes its potential contribution to East Asia and Asia as a 
whole highly significant). 
Within a matter of two to three decades, the Four Tigers have succeeded in lifting 
themselves out of the poor-nations category into the group of high-income economies. 
They are now investing heavily in their less developed neighbours, which in turn are 
prospering fi-om this close association. Investments Irom the Four Tigers (and to a lesser 
extent, Japan) have enabled the newly industrialising economies of China, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand to grow significantly within the last two 
decades; only the Philippines has lagged behind, posting annual average growth rates of 
5% since 1993 only. Following the flying geese pattern of development, the next group 
of beneficiaries are predicted to be Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. 
This pattern of economic development in East Asia defmes much of the trade in the 
region. It is distinguished by shifting comparative advantage as countries advance in 
tandem and by a mixture of competition and complementarity, making the interplay 
between and among countries in the region far more dynamic (Shibusawa et al., 1992). 
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World market share 
Recent estimates of the Asia-Pacific region's share of total world market peg it at around 
a quarter of total world trade, second only to the European Union (see Table 2), and this 
share is expected to increase as the countries in the region continue to industrialise and 
grow in tandem. China in particular is expected to significantly boost the region's share 
of world trade, i f current growth and trade trends are sustained. 
Table 2 Distribution of world trade (%), 1996 
Econotnlc/Tradlng Zones Share of total world 
trade (%) 
EAST ASIA (Japan; Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan; China, 24.6 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand; Brunei) 
ASIA PACIFIC (East Asia. Australia, New Zealand) 25.9 
APEC (Asia-Pacific + Canada, Chile, Mexico, United States) 45.0 
NAFTA (Canada, Mexico, United States) 18.7 
E U (14 countries) 37.4 
MECROSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay) 1.5 
Source: Bergsten, 1997 
Intra-reglonal trade 
Of its current share of world trade, an increasingly significant proportion remains within 
the region. Drawing on the international economic databank of the Australian National 
University and the IMF, Kunkel (1995) shows in Figure 5 the shift in the region's 
trading pattems since the mid-1980s. While intra-regional trade has increased from about 
38% to 46% between 1985 and 1993, the region's trade with the United States, its major 
trading partner, has decreased from around 30% to 23% during the same period. 
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Figure 5 Intra-regional trade v. trade with the U.S. market (%), 1985 and 1993 
Source: Kunkel, 1995 
Intra-regional trade is bound to increase in the coming years as countries within the 
region continue to take advantage of the benefits they can gain from one another. 
Majority of Asia-Pacific exports already go to the Four Tigers, as Table 3 shows. 
Table 3 Percentage of Asia-Pacific exports purchased by the Four Tigers, 1993 
ASEAN* Japan U.S. 
Purchaser Purchaser Purchaser 
Tigers* 33.6 U.S. 43.3 Tigers* 33.6 
U.S. 28.1 Tigers 32.8 Japan 26.4 
Japan 26.4 ASEAN 13.3 ASEAN 6.1 
ASEAN 6.1 China 7.0 China 3.2 
China 3.2 Australia & NZ 3.6 Australia & N Z 2.5 
Australia & NZ 2.5 
Source: Japan Review of International Affairs, as cited in Leger, 1995 
Indeed, economic complementarity is on the rise, as countries in the region establish a 
highly integrated division of labour depending on the comparative advantages provided 
by each country's location, infrastructure and resources. In car manufacturing, for 
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instance, a typical production network involves several countries, each doing a specific 
aspect in the production chain. This is illustrated in Figure 6, which summarises the 
production chain for Toyota (Menon, 1996). It is a pattern than is prevalent throughout 
East Asia, with manufacturers taking advantage of the benefits of economic 
complementarity and comparative advantage. 
THAILAND 
Diesel engines 
Pressed parts 
Electrical parts 
Electrical 
parts 
Pressed components, electrical parts 
Steering gears 
SINGAPORE 
MALAYSIA 
Steering gears 
Electrical parts 
Coordination 
and management t 
Transmissions, 
steering gears 
Prised parts 
Electrical 
parts 
INDONESIA 
Gasoline engines 
Pressed parts 
Gasoline engines, pressed parts 
Transmissions 
PHILIPPINES 
Transmissions 
Figure 6 Economic complementarity: Building a regional automobile for Toyota 
Source: Petri, 1993, cited in Menon, 1996 
The continuing increase in intra-regional trade is also largely due to the emergence of 
growth triangles, which has further enhanced an integrated division of labour within the 
region based not so much on competition as on complementarity. The two most 
prominent ones are the Singapore-Johor-Riau (SIJORI) triangle, comprising Singapore, 
the state of Johor in Malaysia, and the Riau province in Indonesia; and the Great South 
China Economic Zone, comprising Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and the southern 
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coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian in China (Yue and Yuan, 1994; Yamasawa, 
1994). Both these sub-regional zones began operating in the mid-1980s. Each has 
enjoyed a long history of border trade, which has been accelerated in recent years by 
direct foreign investments into these areas. Singapore and Hong Kong are considered as 
the 'growth poles' in these triangles, providing the much needed capital to allow their 
partners in the triangle to develop. Johor in Malaysia and RJau in Indonesia provide 
cheap land, labour and physical infrastructure, while Singapore provides advanced 
technological and management services. Hong Kong is the major investor in China; in 
exchange, the neighbouring provinces of Guangdong and Fujian provide it with cheap 
land and labour, as well with fresh food and water. Several other triangles, including a 
more formalised free trade zone (the ASEAN Free Trade Area), are in various stages of 
development. 
Apart from the multi-national enterprises and growth triangles, another factor spurring 
the growth of intra-regional trade are growing consumer demands from within the region 
itself As noted earlier in this background paper, economic growth has led to a 
substantial rise in income and educational levels. The benefits of this growth have also 
been shared with a broad base of the population, which has sharply reduced the number 
of poor people in the region, particularly in Southeast Asia. The net effect has thus been 
the emergence of a consumer class with growing purchasing power. The increased 
demand for manufactured goods vrithin the region can be attributed to a large degree to 
the growing consumption needs and demands of East Asia's millions. In part, this 
explains why a growing proportion of the region's exports now remains within Asia. As 
countries in the region continue to industrialise, these patterns can be expected to 
continue. 
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Investments 
A part and parcel of this burgeoning intra-regional trade is the massive inflow of 
investments from the region's leading economies to the newly industrialising ones. 
Majority of foreign investments into the NIEs now come from the Four Tigers and 
Japan, with the Tigers increasingly taking the lead Table 4 shows some comparative 
figures for 1990 for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, as compiled by 
Merrill Lynch and Co. 
Table 4 Percentage of investment distribution in four Asian NIEs, 1990 
To Thailand Philippines Malaysia Indonesia 
From 
Asia 75.6 75.9 85.1 56.8 
Japan 26.7 37.5 28.5 25.7 
Tigers* 44.7 40.0 47.8 29.3 
Hong Kong 29.0 21.6 2.2 11.4 
Singapore 4.6 1.5 5.2 2.5 
South Korea 3.1 2.2 2.6 8.3 
Taiwan 10.4 14.7 37.8 7.1 
Europe 7.4 4.7 8.3 13.5 
United States 6.5 3.2 3.0 1.8 
World total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
•Tigers: Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea. Taiwan 
Source: Tan and Wee (1995) 
More recent figures published by the Far Eastern Economic Review (Leger, 1995) reflect 
the same trend. As of 1994, Taiwan was the biggest investor in Malaysia, Hong Kong in 
China and Indonesia, and Japan in Hong Kong; as a group, the Tigers are the biggest 
investors in the Asian NIEs. Of the NIEs, China now has the biggest share of direct 
foreign investment. 
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Appendix 2 
QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS: CODING SYSTEM 
The analysis of qualitative data is acknowledged as problematic: words can be ambiguous, carry 
multiple meanings, and easily become voluminous and unwieldy. Because of this, the tendency to 
reduce words to numbers is strong. Unlike words, numbers are more clearcut, they are more 
economical to use, and replicability is relatively easier to achieve. A major problem with 
qualitative data is 'word overload': words accumulate very rapidly, and unless measures to 
organise data have been taken prior to data collection, data analysis can deteriorate into a 
nightmarish task, becoming extremely 'difficult to retrieve the words that are most meaningful, to 
assemble chunks of words that go together, and to reduce the bulk into readily analysable units' 
(Miles and Huberman, 1984, p. 56). 
To avoid this problem, a typical solution is to set up a CODING SYSTEM prior to data collection and 
fine tune it during data collection and analysis. A coding system is a means of organising and 
retrieving data (collected through the survey, interviews, discussions, and simulations), researcher 
notes (summaries, retrospective notes, observations, etc), and various materials collected during 
the study. It is made up of codes that refer to specific research themes or topics (e.g. 'SP' for 
'strategic planning', 'CS' for 'corporate strategy'). Such codes help the researcher tag data that 
'belong' together, group them into meaningful chunks, and link them directly to research themes 
or topics. For the study, the following coding system was developed to facilitate qualitative data 
analysis. Prior to data collection, an initial index derived from the research objectives and 
questions was prepared. During data collection and analysis, other categories were added as new 
themes and patterns emerged. 
CODING INDEX: CORPORATE STRATEGY SELECTION 
BACKGROUND CONTEXT B C 
BC-Demographics B C - D E M 
Respondents BCRESP-DEM 
Shipping organisations B C O R G - D E M 
BC-Current status of the AP region B C - R H J 
BC-Current status of AP shipping BC-SHIP 
STRATEGIC PLANNING SP 
SP-Characteristics of the strategic plan SP-CHAR 
SP-Importance to organisation SP-IMPT 
SP-Process SP-PROC 
Formalised system SPFORM-PROC 
Informal approach SPINF-PROC 
SP-Change patterns SP-CH 
Frequency of change S H W H E N - C H 
Reasons for change S P W H Y - C H 
SP-Track record S P - G O O D ? 
Estimated success rate SPHOW-GCXDD 
Success factors S P W H Y - G C K I D 
CORPORATE STRATEGY SELECTION SB 
SS-Presence of corporate strategies SS-OORP 
Corporate strategies pursued SSYES-CORP 
No corporate, other strategic pursued S S N O C O R P 
SS-Change patterns S S < H 
Frequency of change S S W H E N - C H 
Reasons for change S S W H Y - C H 
People involved S S W H O - C H 
SS-Process SS-PROC 
Formalised process SSFORM-PROC 
Informal approach SSINF-PROC 
SS-Types SS-T 
Grow SSG-T 
Develop SSD-T 
Stabilise SSS-T 
Turnaround SST-T 
Harvest SSH-T 
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS E F 
EF-Intemal factors EF-I 
Favourable (Strengths) EFF-I 
Unfavourable (Weaknesses) E F U - I 
EF-Extemal factors EF-E 
Favourable (Opportunities) EFF-E 
Unfavourable (Threats) E F U - E 
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STRATEGIC DECISIONS S D 
SD-Response to changes in environmental conditions S D - C H G 
Change corporate strategy S D Y - C H G 
No change to corporate strategy S D N - C H G 
SD-Basis for change SD-BASIS 
Future expectations SDFUT-BASIS 
Future expectations and others (mix) S D M I X - B A S I S 
SD-Conditions when OK to pursue S D - Y 
Grow S D G - Y 
Stabilise SDS-Y 
Develop S D D - Y 
Turnaround S D T - Y 
Harvest S D H - Y 
SD-Conditions when NOT OK to pursue S D - N 
Grow S D G - N 
Stabilise SDS-N 
Develop S D D - N 
Turnaround S D T - N 
Harvest S D H - N 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES M E T H 
Ml-Shipowners (respondents) perceptions 
Pros & cons of survey & interviews 
Pros & cons of simulations 
M E T H - S H I P 
M E T H S & I - S H I P 
M E T H S I M - S H I P 
MI-Researcher observations 
Pros & cons of survey & interviews 
Pros & cons of simulations 
M E T H - R E S 
M E T H S & I - R E S 
M E T H S I M - R E S 
EMERGENT PATTERNS EP 
EP-Strategic choice model E P - M 
Convergence with model (support assumptions) E P S A M E - M 
Deviation from model (qualifications, deviations) EPDIFF-M 
EP- Decision makers/model E P - D E C M 
Consistent follower EPCF-DECM 
Eclectic user E P E U - D E C M 
Occasional sampler EPOS-DECM 
Non-user E P N U - D E C M 
EP-Strategy selection process EP-P 
Official version EPOFF-P 
As practised EPPRAC-P 
EP-Shipowner's familiarity with strategic management EP-SD 
Knowledge of literature/field EPKNOW-so 
Use of strategy selection models EPUSE-SO 
EP-Variations in strategic approaches E P - V A R 
Market sector EPSECT-VAR 
Company size EPSIZE-VAR 
Nationality E P N A T - V A R 
Training & experience E P T & E - V A R 
Team decision making E P D E C - V A R 
Information use E P I N F - V A R 
Environmental focus E P E N V - V A R 
Competitive performance E P C O M P - V A R 
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Appendix 3 
HowMns ReseCTCh and Consultancy Gfoup 
PO Box 40. Launceston, Tosmanlo, AustroBo 7250 
Phone 61 363272453 Fax 6136327 1807 
Survey Questionnaire 
STRATEGY SELECTION BY ASIA-PACIRC SHIPOWNERS 
Dear Sir/Madam: 
The Asia-Pacific region is predicted to dominate intemational trade in the next century, and already 
many forward-looking companies in the maritime industry are strategically positioning themselves 
to take full advantage of this dynamic growth in the region. 
That strategic decision making is critical to market success is widely accepted, but we don't really 
know much about what actually works in the maritime industry, particularly in a growing economic 
power like the Asia-Pacific. Much of what we know about strategy is drawn from manufacturing 
industries; very little comes from the service industries, and even less from the maritime industry. 
If we are to optimise our use of strategic decision making, then it is critical that we know more about 
how strategic decision makers in the maritime industry make strategic choices. This is what this 
survey aims to find out. 
I would deeply appreciate it i f you could find the lime to participate in this survey. As you will 
find in the attached questionnaire, information is needed on four areas: 
• the general strategic planning process followed by your company 
* the process that your company normally follows to select and evaluate corporate strategies 
* what strategic decisions you will make under certain market and organisational conditions 
• some background information about your company and yourself 
The results of the survey will form part of my doctoral thesis on strategy selection, for submission 
to the University of Plymouth (England). Please rest assured that all individual responses will be 
held in strictest confidence, and that all data collected will be aggregated into overall industry trends. 
No specific details about companies and respondents wil l be reported. A summary of survey results 
will be sent to you as soon as it is available. 
It would be preferrable i f you faxed your completed questionnaire to +61 3 6327 1807. This fax 
number guarantees the confidentiality of all survey responses. I f you wish, however, you could also 
mail it to the address listed above. 
Thank you for your kind assistance. I look forward to hearing from you soon. 
Yours sincerely, 
(7 Enclosed is an extra questionnaire that I hope 
A*' you would pass on to a colleague who may also 
vJ be able to participate in the survey. Your 
Captain Jeffrey Hawkins assistance would be deeply appreciated. 
Managing Director, HRC Group 
Part A: STRATEGIC PLANNING 
Survey Questionnaire 
Strategy Selection by Asta-Pocfflc Shipowners 
Office Code 1 
1 Is the strategic direction on your company conUiolled through head office? 
i p Yes 
2 |_J No, done elsewhere (please specify location) 
2 Does your company have a strategic plan? 
^ Q Yes ' • No (please go directly to question 11) 
If you answered Yes to question 2: 
3 Is the strategic plan written as a formal document? 
" - •Yes 
No, it is 
4 What time frame does the plan cover? 
10 years 
5 years 
3 years 
Other (please specify) 
5 What process does your company take to develop a strategic plan? Please outline the key steps 
or stages. 
6 On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 as the highest score and 1 the lowest, how would you rate the 
level of importance given to strategic planning by your company? Please explain your score. 
Importance score 
Comment 
HBCaratomSuivoy 02 
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7 What percentage of your company's annual budget goes to strategic activities? 
My estimate is % of the annual budget 
Don't know 
Other 
8 How often is your strategic plan changed? 
Every six months Other (please specify) 
Every quarter 
I r n Every two years 
2 L I Yearly 
9 What are the key reasons for changing the strategic plan? 
10 Out of a total score of 100, what would you say is the success rate of your current strategic 
plan? Please explain why you have given it this score. 
rd give it a success rate of 
Comment: 
%. 
11 If you answered No to question I: In the absence of a strategic plan, what process (steps, 
approach, etc) does your company follow when making strategic decisions? 
HSCSJnjtoovSuvov P3 
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Part B: CORPORATE STRATEGY SELECTION 
In this section, our concern is with corporate strategies. For the purpose of this survey, we shall 
define corporate strategies as those strategies that focus on a company's portfolio of businesses 
and determine which businesses the company should be in and how these businesses should be 
developed. They are different from business strategies in that business strategies focus on a 
specific business and how to improve that business's competitive advantage. 
Please answer questions 12-21 on the basis of these definitions. 
12 Does your company have any specific corporate strategy(ies) to pursue? 
' Q Yes (please go directly to question 14) ^ | | No 
13 If you answered No to question 12: If you have no corporate strategies, what type of strategies 
does your company pursue? 
If you answered Yes to question 12: 
(Afier completing question 13. please 
go directly to question 21) 
14 How often is/are yoiu* strategy(ies) reviewed? 
Yearly * • Every quarter 
Every six months ^ I I Every month 
n Other (please specify) 
15 What key factors influence your company to change or modify your corporate strategy(ies)7 
16 Who are the key people who select your company^s coprorate strategy(ies)? Please identify 
diem by the position they hold in the company. 
HRCSMtogvSuMOv P4 
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i 7 Wliat process does your company follow to select your corporate strategy(ies)? 
18 Once you select the strategy(ies), do you evaluate it/them before actual implementation to 
ensure you have made the right choice? 
Yes 
No, once a strategy is selected, we go ahead and implement it (please go directly to 
question 20) 
19 If your answer to question 18 is Yes, what process does your company take to evaluate the 
strategy(ies)? 
20 How much time does it normally take your company to select and/or evaluate the 
strategy(ies)7 Please indicate in terms of number of hours, days, weeks or months. 
Strategy selection Strategy evaluation 
21 I f a model for selecting and evaluating corporate strategies were made available to you, which 
type would you find more useful, given your company's strategic needs and requirements: one 
that is specific to shipping, or one that is applicable to the service industry in general? 
A shipping-specific model will be more useful 
A model applicable to the service industry in general will be more useful 
Both types will be equally useful 
I won't find either type useful 
HRCSifOteoyamov pS 
332 
Part C: SCENARIOS FOR STRATEGY SELECTION 
In this section, you are asked to make strategic choices depending on your analysis of market and 
organisational conditions. If you were reviewing your company's portfolio of businesses, what 
would you do in each of the following situations? 
In answering questions 22-25. please consider conditions in both your company AND the market(s) 
you operate in. 
22 Under what conditions would you expand an existing business or start a new one? 
23 Under what conditions would you wind up an existing business? 
24 Under what conditions would you maintain a business (ie keep it pretty much as is)? 
25 Under what conditions would you seek to save an ailing business? 
HRCStraTOQYSUVOY 
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In questions 26-33. you are presented with a range of market and organisational conditions which 
have to be taken into consideration when making strategic choices. You are also offeredfive strate-
gic choices. 
For each set of conditions described below, please choose ONE STRATEGY that you think would be 
the most advantageous for your company to pursue. Please put a tick 0 in the appropriate box. 
26 Your organisation is very profitable, with a strong competitive edge over other major 
shipowners operating in your area. However, there are many threats in the shipping markets in 
which you operate. What strategy would you pursue under these circumstances? 
start a new business or expand an existing one 
maintain an existing business 
seek to save an ailing business 
wind up an ailing business 
pursue another strategy (please specify) 
27 Your organisation is not as profitable or as competitive as many of the other shipowners 
operating in your area. However, excellent opportunities abound in the shipping markets in 
which you operate. What strategy would you pursue under these circumstances? 
start a new business or expand an existing one 
maintain an existing business 
seek to save an ailing business 
wind up an ailing business 
pursue another strategy (please specify) 
28 Your organisation is not as competitive as other shipowners. There are few potential 
opportunities and many threats in the shipping markets in which you operate. What strategy 
would you pursue under these circumstances? 
start a new business or expand an existing one 
maintain an existing business 
seek to save an ailing business 
wind up an ailing business 
pursue another strategy (please specify) 
29 Your organisation is the leading competitor in your areas of operation and there are a lot of 
opportunities available in the various shipping markets. What strategy would you pursue under 
these circumstances? 
start a new business or expand an existing one 
maintain an existing business 
seek to save an ailing business 
wind up an ailing business 
pursue another strategy (please specify) 
HnCStioTogvSwvoy P7 
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30 Your organisation is not as strong a competitor as many other shipowners. However, there 
are really good opportunities available in the various shipping markets. What strategy would 
you pursue under these circumstances? 
start a new business or expand an existing one 
maintain the existing business 
seek to save an ailing business 
wind up an ailing business 
pursue another strategy (please specify) 
31 Your organisation has considerably greater organisational strengths (ie higher profits, low 
cost structure, more competent and motivated stafi) than other shipowners operating in your 
area. There are also a lot of good opportunities available in the shipping markets. What 
strategy would you pursue under these circumstances? 
start a new business or expand an existing one 
maintain the existing business 
seek to save an ailing business 
wind up an ailing business 
pursue another strategy (please specify) 
32 Your organisation is an industry leader in the shipping markets you are operating in. 
However, the shipping markets are not very profitable (low freight rates) and do not show 
much promise of improvement What strategy would you pursue under these circumstances? 
start a new business or expand an existing one 
maintain the existing business 
seek to save an ailing business 
wind up an ailing business 
pursue another strategy (please specify) 
33 Your organisation has a much higher cost structure than other shipowners and as a result, 
your freight rates are much higher. This situation is exacerbated by very poor market 
conditions (very low freight rates) which you believe will continue for quite some time 
before they improve. What type of strategy would you choose under these circumstances? 
start a new business or expand an existing one 
maintain the existing business 
seek to save an ailing business 
wind up an ailing business 
pursue another strategy (please specify) 
HRCSftOteflySufvov pe 
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Part D: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Could you please provide us with some background information about your company and yourself 
This information will enable us to better interpret the results of this survey. 
Questions 34-37 pertain to your company; questions 38-44 are about yourself. 
34 Sector(s) in which your company operates and the size of your operations in each sector 
Sector Percentage of total operations 
Dry bulk 
Liner 
Tanker/Products 
Other (please specify) 
35 Your company*s major trade routes in the Asia-Pacific region 
36 Where is your head ofice located? 
37 Size of your company 
Number of ships owned/operated 
Gross turnover/revenue 
Number of different businesses/divisions in your company 
38 Your current position in the company 
Title 
Department 
Number of years in this position 
39 Your experience in strategic planning 
None 
1-2 years 
3-5 years 
6-10 years 
over 10 years 
40 Your previous training in strategic planning 
None 
University degree(s) 
Short course(s) 
On-the-job training 
Other (please specify) 
HBCSiWOOySurwv 0 9 
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41 Age 
1 r n under 30 
2 ~ 30-39 
3 _ 40-49 
- _ 50-59 
5 I I 60 and over 
42 Sex 
Male 
Female 
43 Nationality (eg Singaporean, Australian) 
44 Ethnic background (eg Indian, Chinese, Malay etc) 
Survey Questiormaire 
Strategy Selection by Asia-Pacific Shipowners 
Thank you very much for helping us in this survey. 
As we noted in the cover letter, please fax your completed questionnaire to 
+61 3 6327 1807. This fax number guarantees the confidentiality of all 
survey responses. 
Alternatively, you can mail it to Capt Jeffrey Hawkins, PO Box 40, 
Launceston, Tasmania, Australia 7250. 
May we also take this opportunity to reiterate that all responses will be held 
in strict confidence and that no details about individual companies or 
respondents will be reported. We shall send you a copy of the survey results 
as soon as they are available. 
HRCSBOtDOvSuvOV PIO 
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Appendix 4 
STRATSHIP 
'Stratship' is a computer-based simulation program designed to simulate strategic 
decision making in a shipping company. The rationale for its use in the research study is 
explained in this appendix. An overview of the decision-making model underlying the 
Stratship program is also presented, as well as a description of how the one-day 
shipping competition was conducted. 
1 RATIONALE FOR THE USE OF STRATSHIP 
The two most popular strategic planning simulations currently used in shipping are 
'Stratship', produced by the Esmee Fairbaim Research Centre at Heriot-Watt 
University, and 'The Shipping Game', produced by the Centre of Maritime Studies at 
the University of Turku. Both programs are designed to simulate strategic decision 
making in a liner shipping company. 
To test which program was more appropriate for Asia-Pacific commercial shipowners, 
both programs were pilot tested with three different commercial shipowners. Two 
separate test sessions were organised, and in each session, two representatives from 
each company tried out both programs. Twelve (12) people completed the pilot tests. 
All were commercial shipowners holding senior management positions and were from 
companies included in the study population. None of these participants subsequently 
took part in the actual simulations. At the end of each session, participants were asked 
to evaluate the two programs and select the one they thought was more appropriate to 
Asia-Pacific shipping. 
Most of the participants found that Stratship was more appropriate (84.2 per cent), 
citing the following as key reasons: 
Stratship provided a more realistic portrayal of the commercial shipping 
environment: output figures were more realistic to market conditions, the type and 
volume of information provided was similar to the type of information 
shipowners normally had access to, the range of available strategies was more 
appropriate for commercial shipowners, information was more clearly presented. 
• The standard of performance in Stratship was controlled by the program; in The 
Shipping Game, it was dependent on the participants. In Stratship the effect of an 
individual's decisions affected only that person's performance; in The Shipping 
Game, the decisions of one person affected and were affected by the decisions of 
the others. 
It should be noted that for the minority who chose The Shipping Game, it was 
this dynamic nature of the game that they particularly liked. Because the decisions 
of one team affected the decisions of the other teams, this created more 
uncertainty and thus made the simulation more interesting. 
The Shipping Game had too much complexity built into it, making it difficult to 
see the cause and effect of decisions. At times, there was no way of knowing 
whether decisions were effective or not. In contrast, Stratship appeared to 
produce more reliable results for the type of decisions made. 
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The consensus was that Stratship would generate more interest in the Asia-Pacific 
region because it was widely known as a program that could realistically mimic a 
tough commercial shipping environment; The Shipping Game, in contrast, was not 
well known. 
These results of the pilot test are consistent with what is widely known about the two 
programs. Stratship is regarded as a more robust program because it has been tested in 
different contexts over a longer period of time, leading to revisions that have enhanced 
the program's ability to mimic shipping conditions (Esmee Fairbaim Research Centre, 
1993). It has also been used by the researcher over the last six years as an instructional 
tool in two contexts: in commercial training courses conducted through the HRC Group, 
and in maritime management courses conducted at the Australian Maritime College. 
Feedback from these courses has provided further validation of the model's robustness. 
For the purposes of the study, another major consideration in the choice of simulation 
program was the ability to control variables. Stratship is a static simulation; that is, it 
gives exactly the same conditions and information to all participants. The Shipping 
Game, on the other hand, is a dynamic simulation; that is, conditions and information 
change depending on the responses of participants. On this basis, therefore, Stratship is 
a more effective research tool: it provides greater internal validity and better control over 
the interpretation of results (Zikmund, 1994). It is, therefore, a more reliable and valid 
simulation instrument. 
As a result of these findings and research considerations, the Stratship program has been 
selected for use in this study. 
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2 THE STRATSHIP MODEL 
How does Stratship actually work? Figure 1 illustrates the major stages involved in the 
simulation and how they are interrelated. 
strategic 
issues 
Internal 
ironmei 
assessment • 
env ntal , 
Strategic 
issues 
Strategic objectives 
Corporate strategy 
Strategic decisions 
Company performance 
Strategic 
issues 
External 
environmental 
assessment 
Strategic 
issues 
Figure I Stages in the Stratship simulation 
As the figure shows, there are four key stages in the simulation process: 
Setting strategic objectives 
Selecting a corporate strategy (or strategies, based on the strategic objectives and 
environmental assessment) 
Making strategic decisions 
Evaluating company performance 
Of these, the first three are done by the user; the last by the program. The process is 
iterative: every quarter, strategic objectives for that quarter must be set (or 
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restated/adjusted af^ er the initial quarter), the company's internal and external 
environment must be analysed, corporate strategies must be selected, and based on the 
above, strategic decisions must be made. Decisions are processed by the program, which 
generates a performance record for that quarter. 
Setting strategic objectives. Because Stratship is designed to aid strategic decision 
making in shipping, it fumly adheres to the precept that there must be strategic 
objectives to guide strategic decision making. At this first stage, therefore, the user sets 
the strategic direction for the company. That is, the user makes predictions about the 
company's future outlook over a given period of time, explores and analyses 
information provided by the program (company's previous history, infomiation of 
relevance to the current quarter, general market trends), and then uses this information, 
plus management experience and intuition, to set strategic objectives. Predictions and 
strategic objectives are jotted down in the quarterly decision sheet. 
Selecting the corporate strategy. Once strategic objectives are set, the next stage is to 
determine the corporate strategy or strategies that the company should pursue. Here the 
user can access two types of computer-generated information: quarterly information on 
the company's internal and external environment, and general market trends. The 
program allows the user to manipulate this information to explore various alternatives 
prior to making decisions. The user also has the option to study the information on 
screen or in print, and to translate data into graph form, either using computer-generated 
graphs or designing one's own. As with strategic objectives, the environmental 
assessment (total vessel operating costs, route accounts, accounts summary, company 
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value, route and market trends, exogenous shocks) and corporate strategy (or strategies) 
are jotted down on the quarterly decision sheet. 
Making strategic decisions. Having decided on a corporate strategy (or strategies), 
the user must now make specific strategic decisions regarding fleet structure (i.e. order, 
buy, sell, scrap, charter in, re-charter, charter out) and operations (i.e. add/delete routes, 
add/delete legs, port setup costs, vessel speed, joint ventures, liner rates, marketing, 
reallocate vessels to routes). It is at this stage that the user actually feeds data into the 
computer program; and once the command to execute the decision is made, the decision 
becomes irrevocable. In this sense, the program resembles real life; once a decision is 
implemented, the manager must be prepared to live with the consequences of this 
decision. Because of the irrevocable nature of this decision-making stage, the program 
allows the user to manipulate information and conduct sensitivity analysis to study the 
likely cause and effect of contemplated changes. However, this is possible only with 
internally-generated information (e.g. vessel speed, repositioning costs); the function is 
not extended to externally-generated information (competitor freight rates, market share, 
trade demand or ship prices). As in previous stages, strategic decisions are entered in the 
quarterly decision sheet. 
Evaluating company performance. Once the user makes a final decision, the program 
'implements' the decision, that is, it processes the data provided by the user and 
generates information about the company's performance for use in the next quarter. 
This process—setting strategic objectives, selecting corporate strategies (based on the 
objectives and an environmental assessment), making strategic decisions, and evaluating 
company performance—is repeated over 20 quarters (begins in quarter 10 and ends in 
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quarter 30), at the end of which the user must evaluate the aggregate effect of the 
strategic decisions on the company's overall market value. 
3 MATERIALS USED IN THE SIMULATION (SHIPPING COMPETITION) 
Four sets of materials were used during each simulation session: a set of overhead 
transparencies used for the introductory presentation, a guidebook outlining the 
requirements and procedures of the shipping competition, a booklet of quarterly 
decision sheets covering 20 quarters for participants to complete, and a copy of the 
Stratship manual, the first three sets of materials were designed and developed 
specifically for use in the simulation, whereas the Stratship manual was the standard 
documentation provided with the software. All three sets of materials have been used by 
the researcher as instructional tools and have undergone extensive testing and revision. 
The guidebook was for participants to keep, but the manual and the decision sheets 
booklet had to be returned to the competition presenter at the end of the competition. 
O V E R H E A D T R A N S P A R E N C I E S were uscd by the researcher for an introductory 
presentation on the shipping competition and the Stratship program. Participants 
used this period to ask for clarification or further explanation on the nature and 
rules of the competition and the running of Stratship. 
A more detailed explanation of the shipping competition and Stratship was 
provided in a coMPErmoN G U I D E B O O K , copies of which were given out to 
participants at the commencement of the competition. The guidebook explained 
the nature, requirements and procedures of the competition, and provided specific 
instructions on how to make the best use of the Stratship program. 
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A copy of the STRATSHIP MANUAL (Esmee Fairbaim Research Centre, 1993), which 
detmled die various aspects of the program (company history, vessel and route 
characteristics, vessel allocation, quarterly operations and results, messages and 
exogenous shocks, graphics), was £dso provided to participants. The manual was 
distributed the day prior to the competition to allow participants to study it and 
be prepared to ask questions about the program during the introductory 
presentation. 
A B O O K L E T O F Q U A R T E R L Y OEasiON S H E E T S was also provided to participants for them 
to complete each quarter. Each two-page decision sheet required information about 
the company's current situation (total operating costs, route accounts, accounts 
summary, company value, route and market trends, exogenous shocks) and various 
aspects of strategic decision making (future outlook, strategic objectives, corporate 
strategies, fleet structure decisions, operational decisions, company status as a 
result of the decisions). 
4 ADMINISTRATION PROCEDURES 
The procedures for conducting the simulation are detailed below: 
Preparatory stage. Participation in the simulation was voluntary, hence, steps had to 
be taken to attract shipowner interest and motivate them to participate in the 
simulation. To do this, the simulation was conducted as an intensive one-day shipping 
competition. A one-page flier, which invited shipowners to test their strategic decision 
making skills and pit skills with other commercial shipowners, was circulated to Asia-
Pacific shipovmers through national shipowner organisations, which organised the 
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competitions in their respective countries. There was no contact between the researcher 
and the participants during this preparatory stage, and neither the shipping 
organisations nor the participants had prior knowledge that the competition was being 
held as part of a research study. 
A total of 30 sessions were held in five countries (Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, New 
2Lealand, Singapore). Between three-four months was allocated to set up each simulation 
session, fi*om initial contact with a national shipowner organisation to the actual 
competition day; however, in some instances, the actual competition date had to be 
rescheduled to accommodate other national commitments. 
On the day prior to the competition, participants were given copies of the Stratship 
manual to study in preparation for the competition. The researcher also used this day to 
set up the computers, provided by the host countries, load and test the Stratship 
program, and ensure it was ready to run on each computer. 
Competition day. On the day of the competition, the researcher spent the first hour on 
introductions. After an initial ice-breaking, he introduced himself as the competition 
presenter and then spent the rest of the hour explaining the requirements and procedures 
of the competition and showing participants how to run the Stratship program. The 
competition guidebook and the decision sheets booklet were also given out during this 
period. Participants used this period to clarify unclear points or seek further 
explanation. 
Soon after, the competition was declared open. Participants worked in teams of 
normally three people each, v«th representatives from the same company grouped 
together. Each team was given a maximum of eight (8) hours to complete the simulation. 
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No minimum time limit was set. Morning, lunch and afternoon breaks were scheduled 
during this period, but it was left to participants to decide when (or whether) to take 
these breaks. Teams were required to complete a decision sheet for each quarter they 
worked on. 
At the close of the competition, an evaluation session was held to discuss team 
performance and declare the competition winner. During this session, participants were 
also debriefed about the simulation's use for research purposes and their permission to 
use the simulation data was sought. 
Evaluation stage. The day after the competition, three (3) participants, randomly 
selected, were asked by the researcher during separate face-to-face interviews to evaluate 
the simulation in terms of (a) whether it was realistic in mimicking commercial shipping 
in the Asia-Pacific region, and (b) whether their strategic behaviour under simulated 
conditions was consistent with their behaviour under normal working conditions. A total 
of 90 participants (three from each of the 30 sessions) provided individual assessments. 
5 ATTACHMENTS 
Four further details about the simulation, the following materials can be found at the end 
of Appendix 4: 
1 introductory information given to participants as part of the Competition 
Guidebook 
2 a copy of a quarterly decision sheet 
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Attachment I to Appendix 4 
An Introduction to the shipping competition 
The shipping competition v ^ l be run using a shipping-based computer simulation 
program called Stratship. The program simulates strategic decision making in a shipping 
company and challenges you to chart a course that v^ll allow the company to gain a 
competitive adveuitage in the market place. 
The scenario 
You and the other participants will be organised into several management teams, and 
each team must aim to make as much proHt as it can. Each team begins with the same 
scenario: the Board of Directors of a shipping company sacks the previous 
management team for poor performance and hires your team to help the company 
make some healthy profits. As you might have guessed, your team inherits the 
financial problems caused by the poor performance of the previous management 
team! Your job then is to get the company out of its financial doldrums so that it can 
gain a competitive advantage and make healthy profits. 
IHow realistic is the simulation? 
Stratship is designed to help shipping managers apply their strategic decision-making 
skills to realistic problems and test the outcomes of their decisions. To achieve this 
objective, the program simulates the same type of commercial shipping environment 
as you would expect to find in real life. 
Each team is given the same type of information that can normally be found within a 
commercial shipping company—detailed company costs and revenues, freight rates 
for various trades, trade demand figures, charter rates, new and secondhand prices, 
scrap prices and many more. The trick is not to get caught up in deciding whether 
you have enough information or not; rather, focus on what information your team 
should have to meet your objective. 
During the simulation, your team can expect to make the same types of decisions that 
most commercial shipowners constantly make. These may include deciding on the 
best trades to be in (and to get out of!), allocating the right mix of vessels to those 
trades, deciding on the appropriate level of freight rates and other vital areas like 
marketing expenditure, or whether or not to form a joint venture operation. There are 
also a host of other decisions like which vessels to sell, order, charter in or out, scrap 
or buy on the spot market. 
Your team can pursue a range of different strategies like playing the sale and purchase 
market, chartering in or out tonnage, or operating either niche markets or going for 
market share. To implement these strategies, your team will have the authority to 
spend millions of company dollars. However, as in real life, this authority carries 
with it a commensurate responsibility to use resources wisely. I f you become 
insolvent, you may have to sell your assets, or the bank may force you to do so. At 
the worst case, you may have to declare bankruptcy. 
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The way to success 
As in real life, your team's success in the competition depends on two things: your 
team's overall strategy throughout the competition, and how effectively and 
efficiently your team makes use of its scarce resources. Each team's performance 
stands and falls on the strength of its own decisions. 
The performance of any one team is not affected by the decisions of the other 
teams—so do not try to 'strategise* against other teams. Your 'opponent' is the 
Stratship program itself, and the challenges it plants all along the way. 
Rules of the competition 
The following basic rules will govern the competition: 
1 Every one will be assigned to a competing team. 
2 The simulation begins at quarter 10 and finishes at quarter 30. 
3 Each team will be given a limited amount of time to practise using the Stratship 
program before the competition begins. 
4 The measure of your team's performance in the Stratship program is the amount 
of money your company is worth on the open market at the end of the 
competition. Your team's objective therefore is to maximise COMPANY VALUE. 
5 The team with the highest company value for quarter 30 is the winner of the 
competition. 
6 The quarterly decision sheets in your Quarterly Decision Sheets Booklet must be 
completed for each quarter. Failure to complete all decision sheets will invalidate 
a team's results. 
7 At the end of quarter 10, your team must have your decision sheet for that 
quarter verified by the competition presenter before proceeding to the next 
quarter. 
8 At the end of the competition, your team must submit your completed Quarterly 
Decision Sheets Booklet A N D a computer printout of your quarter 30 results. 
The printout will serve as a verification of your team's final results. 
9 All Stratship Manuals must also be returned to the competition presenter at the 
end of the competition. 
10 Each team must complete the competition within the allocated time. 
11 Teams are not allowed to collaborate with one another and to share information 
or decision making. 
What you can expect to get out of the competition 
Competing within a computer-simulated environment is a perfect opportunity to test 
your creativity and innovativeness without inflicting any harm to yourself or your 
company. Not only will you be able to make multi-million-dollar decisions, you will 
also be able to act on them, without having to face the real-life risk of sending your 
company bankrupt and you to the unemployment lines! 
The simulation is entertaining, and provides a stimulating forum for the exchange of 
ideas and strategic approaches. There will be group discussions at the end of the day 
to pull together observations, experiences and conclusions. Strategies and decisions 
will be analysed to improve future performance. 
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Attachment 2 to Appendix 4 
STRATSHIP SIMULATION v3 
CURRENT SITUATION 
Beginning of Quarter 
1 TOTAL VESSEL OPERATING COSTS 
ROUTE ACCOUNTS 
Route 1 Route 2 Route 3 Route 4 
Cash surplus/defldt 
Capitalised route value 
ACCOUNTS SUMMARY 
Operational cashflow Financial cashflow Net cashflow Current liquid assets 
COMPANY VALUE 
Total fleet value Uquld assets Value of routes Company value 
TRENDS 
Route Trends* Market Trends 
Leg Marttet share Load factor Trade Indices Uner rates 
Route 1 
Route 2 
Route 3 
Route 4 
* Direct routes only 
Vessel price" Constnjctlon lag Charter rates"' Interest rates oil prices 
" newlSOOTEU 1 yr 1500 TEU for 5 periods 
EXOGENOUS SHOCKS 
eiSgS HRC Group Australia 
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DECISIONS Quarter 
PREDICTION/FUTURE OUTLOOK 
Number of quarters ahead 
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 
Number of quarters ahead 
CORPORATE STRATEGY 
Number of quarters ahead 
10 FLEET STRUCTURE DECISIONS 
RBmmder Notes: 
Onter 
Buy 
SeB 
SCTBP 
(^IBTtBt In 
Ro-charter 
Charter out 
OPERATIONAL DECISIONS 
Reminder Notes: 
Add/delete routes 
AdtVdeletelegs 
Port setup costs 
Vessel speed 
JOC 
Unof rates 
Mmketlng 
(Re)aDocale vessels 
toroutee 
STATUS AFTER DECISION Currant Fleet Structure Status 
Number of vessels owned 
Number of vessels chartered In 
Number of vessels chartered out 
Number of vessels under construction 
Total TEU capacity 
Average age of fleet 
F4 
F4 
F4 
F4 
F4 
F4 
Current Route Status 
Numt)er of vessels 
Minimum number of vessels required 
Total TEU capacity 
Numtjer of legs 
Vessel speed 
Any JV setup? (YES/NO) 
Length of JV (N/A If no JV) 
Marlceting expenditure 
Uner rates at competing levels? (YES/NO) 
If NO. percentage above/below competitors 
Route 1 Route 2 Routes Route 4 
F4 
F4 
F4 
F2 
F2 
F2 
F2 
F2 
F2 
F2 
eieos HRC Group Australia 
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Appendix 5 
LIST OF ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
This appendix includes major categories of internal (organisational) and external (market) 
environmental factors or conditions identified by shipping respondents during the 
survey, interviews, and simulation sessions. They are best approached from the 
perspective of a continuum, with one end representing 'most favourable' and the other 
Meast favourable'. The more competitive an organisation is and the more opportunities 
the market holds, the more favourable are the conditions, that is, the stronger is an 
organisation's strategic position and the higher is its probability of success. Conversely, 
the weaker an organisation and the fewer the opportunities, the less favourable are the 
conditions and the lower are the chances of success. 
Specific survey, interview and simulation responses were initially coded using the 
coding index in Appendix 2, and the entries aggregated and arranged according to 
frequency of citation. From this initial analysis, several major clusters of conditions 
emerged (3 for internal, 4 for extemal). The factors in cluster 1 for both internal and 
external conditions were the most frequently cited. To put the use of environmental 
factors in the right perspective, a caveat is in order. It should be stressed that 
environmental conditions are highly time-related. Many respondents qualified their 
responses by saying that environmental factors should not be viewed as static, that they 
could 'change tomorrow depending on what the wind blows in'. This concern is 
validated by previous research which has shovm that not only do environmental factors 
have differential effects depending on the trade, their importance also changes over time 
(Brooks, 1995). 
Most favourable ^ ^ Least favourable 
INTERNAL CONDITIONS 
Cluster I 
Profitability/return on investment 
Economic and technological efficiency of ships/equipment 
Experience and quality of managerial and technical staff 
Organisational culture 
Customer satisfaction 
duster 2 
Operating efficiency (service frequency) 
Company image and reputation 
Utilisation of shipping capacity 
Employee satisfaction and loyalty 
Cashflow and asset management 
Safety culture 
Cluster 3 
Operating flexibility 
Level of training 
Quality of information and communication 
Internal systems to monitor and control quality of service 
EXTERNAL CONDITIONS 
Cluster I 
Freight rates and market expectations 
Technological innovations 
Competitive rivalry (new and existing competitors) 
Seaborne trading patterns (include seasonal fluctuations) 
Supply and demand in shipping markets 
Changing customer demands 
Cluster 2 
$US and oil price 
Worid economic outlook 
Business cycles 
Substitute services 
Financial credit availability 
Quality of maritime infrastructure to support shipping 
Cluster 3 
Political and commercial influences of government, regulatory 
and international bodies 
Information technology 
Government support mechanisms for shipping (tax incentives, subsidies) 
Safety and environmental trends and regulations 
Cluster 4 
Union influences 
Shipyard capacity 
Changing patterns of labour supply 
Transport costs 
World shipping fleet productivity 
Most favourable ^ ^ Least favourable 
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